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I 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This research set out to establish whether the supranational management by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) of the monetary policy and exchange rate policy of the 12 European 
Union (EU) member states adopting the euro single currency, could be considered as a 
precursor to the development of a one-size-fits-all model of EU capitalism. In doing so, eight 
typologies of EU national capitalisms were constructed from the broad range of literature of 
types or varieties of capitalism, and were employed to test the performance of their 
economies between 1986 and 2006. Using a broad range of macroeconomic variable 
indicators over a period that began with Single European Act (SEA) and coursed through 
seven years past the launch of the euro in 1999, levels of influence of the ECB and euro as 
institutions on the performance of the selected capitalism groups were measured in order to 
establish the extent to which the ECB as a genuine supranational body would be able to both 
complete the planned transmission to full EU economic and monetary union as a basis for 
future EU political union. 
The findings suggest that although there is evidence of significant overall influence over most 
of the macroeconomic variable indicators of the selected typologies, it remains unclear 
whether such supranational influence will be enough to overcome the difficulties surrounding 
the more politically sensitive areas of taxation and unemployment. And, until the effective 
supranational management of these variables, which would ultimately encompass levels of 
supranational influence over fiscal policy and tax harmonisation, the current level of ECB 
supranational power will remain as it is for the foreseeable future. 
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Introduction 
Origins and background 
The notion and concept of a European ‘supracapitalism’ originate in two aspects of 
international political economy: the asymmetric distributive patterns of wealth1, and the 
national politico-economic systems that manage the generation, aggregation, and deployment 
of wealth. In particular, the original focus rested on how differing politico-economic systems 
reconcile the generation of wealth with attempting to achieve optimal levels of welfare for 
their populations; effectively, the nexus between the creation and distribution of wealth and 
the politico-economic systems nation-states choose to adopt within any given timeframe. 
And, while these constructs can be largely typified by levels of direct government 
involvement in the economy and the property rights of individuals, they are also increasingly 
influenced by, and in some part related to, international and transnational institutions and 
structures such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). And, 
with emergence of the European Union (EU) as an experiment in regional political and 
economic integration, where a number of individual politico-economic systems, or national 
capitalisms, are both interconnected and interdependent at various levels, offered itself as 
both a relevant and timely opportunity to explore the capitalist system in a clearly defined 
and delimited international political economy laboratory. In particular, the question is, given 
the long history of capitalism’s recurring and sometimes extraordinary failures of different  
manifestations of its form, together with the episodic mass privations and widespread 
financial chaos it brings, is it possible that the bringing together of the 12 national capitalisms 
that constitute the Eurosphere under the supranational management of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), may be a way to harness capitalism’s productive benefits without many being 
subject to its injurious side effects, and thereby remedy the escalating  gap between the EU’s 
rich and poor? 
With this in mind, the following introductory passages consider the above-mentioned aspects 
of international political economy, and bring them together by introducing the concept of a 
                                                 
1The World Bank reported in 2008 that, in 2005,  almost half the world’s population - over three billion people - 
live on less than $2.50 a day’, and ‘80% of humanity lives on less than $10 a day’. (World Bank Development 
Indicators, 2008)  
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supranationally-directed form of EU politico-economic system, or supracapitalism, as one of 
the potential trajectories for the ‘European Experiment’. 
Capitalism and asymmetric distributive patterns of wealth 
Although the terms wealth, capital, and capitalism are often used synonymously they do 
describe different characteristics of modern politico-economic activity. The accumulation of 
wealth is not in and of itself capitalism, the materially rich have always been with us, but 
before capitalism they were wealthy precisely because they were religiously, militarily, or 
politically powerful. Before capitalism, wealth was inextricably tied to the prevailing social 
structure. Neither is the use of capital capitalism; money, machinery, and other productive 
assets have been around a very long time, as have trade, markets, and financial transactions. 
Capitalism refers to the particular organisation of society whereby capital becomes the 
driving force of society, especially in the types of laws and institutions that frame that 
society. However, it is these legal and institutional frameworks that determine the distribution 
of the wealth that nation-states produce, and ultimately therefore, their citizens’ welfare. In 
this way the accumulation of wealth is both the rationale for, and the desired output, of 
capitalism as a form of socio-economic organisation. The problem is that this output is 
invariably unevenly distributed. 
A necessary prerequisite for any consideration of the uneven distributive patterns of wealth is 
to initially examine wealth’s nature and characteristics, which are essentially determined by 
considering how wealth is measured, but where the publication, distribution, and analysis of 
financial and monetary assets are usually conflated with a country’s aggregated productive 
assets, or real wealth.  This means that the nature of real wealth is often obfuscated by its 
representational features, largely because wealth is usually framed in monetary or financial 
asset terms. However, money and financial assets2 are effectively the metrics by which 
wealth’s scale and volumes are expressed and represented for comparative purposes; with the 
possession of financial assets arising from the desire to postpone consumption in order that 
money may be saved for future investment or speculation, or for precautionary reasons. 
The nature of real wealth lies in the goods, services, and products people wish to consume 
(The Economist, 2009), the material capital formations of factories, machinery, and 
infrastructures; or the intangible constructs such as an educated workforce or well-
                                                 
2 The nature, and alternative forms of the functions of money are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6  
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functioning legal system, that offer the ability and amenities to enable individuals and 
organisations to produce more such goods, services, and products in the future. Expressed in 
the broadest sense these can be seen as a country’s productive assets; whereas financial assets 
and their prices, as represented by money, are but a claim on real wealth, but not wealth in 
and of itself (See Figure 22 on page 204). If these claims multiply, or rise (or fall), it does not 
mean that aggregate wealth has increased. Should we slice a cake into eight pieces instead of 
four, it does not mean we have more cake to eat. Moreover, if everyone wanting a slice of the 
cake is given tradable shares in it, and those share prices rise from £1.50 to £2.00 on the stock 
market, the cake will still not increase in size. And similarly, should the same index fall to 
£0.75, half its original value, we would not have any less cake to eat. In this sense, what we 
are expressing here is a kind of representational or virtual wealth. 
However, the monetary values of virtual wealth as expressed in financial assets, and 
measured by their market prices, do rise and fall over time. For example, these assets may 
rise over time because they are linked to the goods, services, and products produced by 
companies and other organisations, and as the economy in which they operate grows, so do 
their revenues. And, if margins remain constant during any given timeframe, profits, as 
expressed in monetary terms will also rise, and cash flows to shareholders will increase, and 
vice-versa. Furthermore, these fluctuations are often obscured and distorted by the different 
phases of national, regional, and global business cycles, and also by the subjective 
vicissitudes of investors’ moods, which can jointly and severally further cause the estimated 
monetary values of financial assets to be re-rated as a result of a rise in prices, or de-rated as 
their monetary values fall (The Economist, 2009). Nevertheless, individuals and governments 
in the developed world, and also increasingly some of the faster-developing, emerging 
economies such as those of Brazil and China, appear to remain strongly influenced by the 
movements in the values of the virtual wealth of companies and financial institutions as 
reported by national stock markets. The dynamics of these markets are considered as one of 
the key barometers of a nation’s well-being, and often are seen as evidence upon which to 
form the basis of major policy decisions by governments and central bankers, even though 
this can lead to policy mistakes such as premature fiscal adjustments, or overly optimistic and 
lax monetary stances.  
In this view, wealth has two main guises: that of the real, which is an aggregation of a 
nation’s productive assets; and that of the virtual, which represents financial claims on the 
productive assets of both the home country, and any other national economy invested in. And 
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both, although in some ways closely related, are measured in very different ways, with virtual 
wealth represented by the various monetary and financial claims on real wealth, as reported 
by stock markets and other financial institutions; and real wealth being reflected by 
generally-accepted macroeconomic mensuration. However, the effective calibration of the 
real national wealth upon which virtual wealth is reflected appears to remain elusive, with 
economists and governments preferring to employ published Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
Gross National Product (GNP), Net National Product (NNP), and Net National Income (NNI) 
figures, which are only measures of income, and not wealth itself. These national 
measurements, while offering both static and longitudinal comparative analytical utility, only 
represent the ‘profit and loss’ or ‘income and expenditure’ part of the national accounts, and 
therefore record only the values of flows of goods and services in and out of the country. 
Subsequently, even though these methods were designed only to be used as an indicator of 
economic production, and to aid policy-making by identifying those sectors of the economy 
that were expanding or slowing, they have come to be accepted as general indicators of the 
overall progress and performance of nation-states; and therefore the collective well-being of 
its citizens. For example, in 2006 the real GDP of the United States (US) was measured at 
11.3 trillion dollars, whereas the amount of total wealth from which this income emanated 
was tenfold this figure at an estimated 112.3 trillion dollars3; with a per capita allocation 
figure that would amount to over 380 million dollars for each American citizen.  
The problem here is that although economic growth, as measured by national income 
streams, is a major macroeconomic policy objective of governments the world over,  it does 
not necessarily translate into improvements in the well-being of their citizens. Indeed, 
employment and income of individuals may well increase as a consequence of economic 
growth, but these are just possible outcomes and not automatic or forecastable consequences. 
A more comprehensive definition and measure of wealth which directly relates to the welfare 
and well-being of a country’s population is required. Therefore, by additionally introducing 
natural capital to the primary structure for assessing real wealth, the total value of the 
admixture of a country’s manufactured, human, and natural capital becomes the overall social 
worth of an economy’s assets, and can measured by attributing monetary values to productive 
capital; human capital; knowledge; population; natural capital; health; time; and institutions; 
(Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000). This broader and more inclusive approach to national capital 
                                                 
3Using constant United States (US) dollars, as at 2000, GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, US 
Department of Commerce (2007); and the total wealth figure from UNU-IHDP (2012). 
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and well-being through social worth distils into four measurable groupings of national assets: 
recognisable capital accounting assets, human capital assets, national institutional assets, and 
time assets. Recognisable capital accounting assets include manufactured capital, plant, and 
intangible assets such as patents and brand values – that relate to what national income 
accountants and international organisations speak of when referring to investment and 
accumulation of reproducible capital.  
The measurement of the wealth of national economies thus becomes much more complex and 
complicated than simple macroeconomic indicators suggest. Complex because of the number 
of interacting, or correlating, components and types of capital assets; and complicated as the 
relationships within and between these levels are sometimes difficult to identify or 
understand. However, as alluded to above, there is an opportunity for the development of an 
analytical framework that aids the both the understanding and measurement of a country’s 
real wealth by linking wealth, as the aggregated social worth of a national economy, to the 
on-going well-being of its citizens. Therefore, the relationship between a national economy’s 
worth and its well-being will largely depend on maintaining its capital over time and the 
composition of its productive assets. In this view, the management of a national economy 
becomes a matter of optimising the ratio between manufactured, human, and natural capital. 
See Table1 below as an example. 
Table1 
________________________________________________________________________   
A typology of the wealth distributions of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK), 
1996-2006 
 
 1996 2006 
 Manufactured Human Natural Manufactured Human Natural 
France 23% 75% 2% 25% 74% 1% 
Germany 26% 66% 8% 24% 69% 7% 
UK 8% 90% 2% 10% 89% 1% 
 
   _____________________________________________________________________ 
    Source: adapted from Inclusive Wealth Report 2006 
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And, it is the broader notion of a more comprehensive real wealth measure of citizens’ well-
being that affords the opportunity to link this with the concept of Hicksian well-offness and a 
nation’s capital maintenance by bringing together economic theories of income and well-
offness and the accounting theory of capital maintenance. Therefore, the measurement of the 
material capital formations of factories, machinery, infrastructures, and the intangible 
constructs such as educated workforces and legal systems described above – a nation’s 
productive assets that constitute its real wealth - would normally be located in a balance sheet 
of some kind. 
Nevertheless, for nation-states although there is as yet no widely-recognised accounting 
measure of national stocks of natural, human, and physical assets, it is possible to assign 
monetary values to a number of key national assets such as physical capital relating to 
machinery, buildings, and infrastructure; human capital as in the population’s education and 
skills; and natural capital in the form of land, forests, fossil fuels, and minerals. In the case of 
the 2006 US wealth figure above, physical or productive capital makes up 19 percent, human 
or social capital constitutes 75 percent, with natural resources capital accounting for the 
remaining 6 percent. The three EU examples of France, Germany, and the UK in Table 1 
depict a similar story.  
Both real (productive) and virtual (financial) representations of wealth imply levels of 
Hicksian well-offness4, and they jointly and severally appear to play significant roles in 
steering government policy in relation to growth, the generally-accepted national metric of 
collective well-offness, as well as influencing those institutional agencies upon which 
governments look towards for guidance in their policy-making; such as the IMF, the OECD, 
and the World Bank. Given then that the measurement of wealth is central to such decision-
making processes, and that actual and potential improvements in the well-being of nation-
states, as expressed through growth in these existing benefits and potential future benefits, 
just how is wealth, or well-offness, shared or distributed within, and between, individual 
populations of nation-states?  
The concept of national well-offness in relation to wealth aggregation provides an important 
linkage between the nature and characteristics of wealth described above, and the various 
allocative mechanisms that ultimately determine its generation and distribution. This 
                                                 
4The term well-offness was originally used by John Hicks (Hicks 1946), refined by Alexander (1962) for 
application by firms, and developed as the capital maintenance concept by Hendrickson (1977). 
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relationship can be seen by examining the interdependent notions of income, consumption, 
and capital maintenance, where, adapting Hicks (1946), shows us that real income5 is the 
maximum value that can be consumed during a given period in order to be as well off at the 
end of the period as at the beginning; where well-offness relates to the maintenance of capital 
in relation to positive and negative adjustments to income and consumption. In this way, a 
nation’s wealth, or well-offness can be seen to fit with the generally-accepted 
macroeconomic formula for national income Y = C + G + I + (X-M); where ‘Y’ denotes 
national income, ‘C’ is consumption, ‘G’ illustrates government spending, ‘I’ shows the 
overall level of investment, and ‘X-M’ signifies the difference between exports (X) and 
imports (M). 
The overall management of national economies can therefore be seen to involve the 
generation and distribution of wealth over and above capital maintenance levels in order to 
both maximise a country’s well-offness, whilst also making adequate provision for the on-
going welfare of its citizens. However, these considerations pose two further interrelated 
questions: how and why do different politico-economic systems vary in the way that they 
allocate resources to generate and share such wealth, and how did these systems evolve? And 
the answers to these questions appear to lay in the institutional structures, strategies, and 
operations of the prevailing systems of socio-economic organisation and management in 
place for a particular society at any given time, and where capitalism is now the dominant 
prevailing system.  
National capitalisms and the distributive patterns of wealth  
Capitalism can be seen as a decentralised system whereby governments can be seen to enjoy 
an ‘arm’s length’ relationship with economic actors, and attempts to match resource inputs 
with material outputs, and largely bestows the co-ordination of the generation of inputs and 
the allocation of outputs to markets and individual actors; usually directly intervening only 
when markets are seen to be failing, or to have failed.6 Under capitalism, wealth can be 
viewed as a consequence of nation-states and individuals attempting to match finite input 
variables, or resources, with output variables, or material wealth, the demand for which is 
unlimited. And, because demand is unlimited, and at any given time human populations are 
                                                 
5The original passage from Hicks (1946:172) is ‘...we ought to define a man’s income as the maximum  value 
which he can consume in a week, and expect to be as well off at the end of the week as he was at the beginning.’ 
6The extents to which governments distance themselves from these allocations, and the triggers and mechanisms 
for market interventions, is one of the key differentiating determinants of the types of capitalist systems nation-
states favour. 
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relatively stable, unless every individual receives an equal share of generated material output 
or wealth, some will have more than others. Since every citizen must have access to some 
wealth in order to survive, whether it be by direct government welfare payments, subsistence 
farming, or the production and resale of goods, services, or intellectual property, it is here in 
the relationship between these finite and infinite variables that wealth can be seen to be 
created, distributed, and ultimately accumulated. 
The idea of an EU supracapitalism arrives at a temporal juncture where capitalism has 
prevailed for over 400 years, and remains the world’s dominant politico-economic system in 
the 21st century. However, capitalism is not one system, but rather a generic term which 
encapsulates several variants of economic organisation, reflecting the types of government 
influence as well as levels of direct government involvement, as the seven national ‘value 
systems’ of Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993); Story’s ‘four models of 
capitalism’(1999); Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990); and the 
‘Liberal Market Economies’ and ‘Co-ordinated Market Economies’ of Hall and Soskice 
(2001) all demonstrate. What does appear to synthesise these, and other perspectives of the 
capitalist form, are its ever-present internal contradictions. Throughout the entire length of its 
evolution, the capitalist system of politico-economic organisation is typified by recurring 
episodic and systemic failures followed by metamorphoses into new ‘life-forms’ that, whilst 
retaining the core features of the preceding system, emerge in different configurations to 
again be the default choice of the majority of national governments, often only to 
subsequently fail again. 
This continuing paradox of capitalism’s regenerational transitions appears to suggest three 
things. One, with the exception of a diminishing number of centrally-planned economies, 
governments of most countries remain faithful to various guises of the capitalist system, 
regardless of its repeated failures; two, that the regenerated forms of capitalism must offer, or 
appear to offer, new solutions and remedies in the light of previous failures; and three, the 
mass publics that constitute the electorates of capitalist countries, seem to accept capitalism 
as the only available system that is capable of satisfying their wants and needs. 
It appears then, at least for the foreseeable future, a future that Victor Lippit projects to last 
for another 500 years (Lippitt, 2005), that capitalism will remain the dominant politico-
economic system, despite its internal contradictions and inconsistencies. 
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 (See Table 2 below for a suggested outline of capitalism’s evolution to date). Indeed, if there 
was a need to look for further support for this, the Bretton-Woods agreement of 1944, and the 
resultant post-1945 developments of capitalism, provides ample evidence. The key outcomes 
of the New Hampshire accord were intended to create a framework under which the potential 
for the ravages of unfettered capitalism, as witnessed by the seemingly collective inability by 
the governments of the day in the inter-war years (1919-1939) to effectively harness the 
positive outputs of capitalism whilst controlling for its very seriously damaging side-effects. 
The Bretton-Woods legacy set about to more formerly and rigorously engage governments in 
the running of both their individual economies, and also to engage more meaningfully in 
sharing responsibilities for the collective oversight and governance of international payments, 
and these developments ultimately gave rise to national capitalisms as units of politico-
economic analysis. 
The mainstream response to the Bretton-Woods agreement of 1944 set in train a new form of 
politico-economic organisation, whereby a new level of interconnectedness between the 
national capitalisms of the world economy was created by the elevation of the US dollar as 
the world’s base currency, with the consequence that international exchange rates were also 
strongly linked to the dollar. Not only were national capitalisms now more responsible for the 
shared control and management of the international economic system as a whole, and more 
interconnected both with the US and with each other, but that also two generic models, or 
versions, of capitalism began to emerge: one based on the maximisation of shareholder 
wealth sometimes referred to as the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-US model; and the other based on 
the maximisation of corporate wealth which would eventually be adopted by the Japanese 
and German-influenced economies. And, in the early 1950s the forerunner to the EU, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was born. The advent and early development 
of the EU from 1956 to the early 1980s is well documented, and is largely taken here as a 
given until the two most important events in its history unfolded: the creation of a single 
market, and the agreement on economic and monetary union.  
Summary of the research setting 
This thesis advances the concept of a supranationally-directed form of shared capitalism, or 
supracapitalism, as one of a number of trajectories the political economy of the EU may 
follow.  
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Table 2 
__________________________________________________________________ 
An evolutionary schematic of capitalism’s development 
 
Type of capitalism Period Main characteristics 
Pre-capitalism - Feudalism Pre-17th 
century 
The Feudal system 
Agricultural capitalism – early, 
manual 
17th 
century 
In England, the emergence of 
genuine single market. 
Agricultural capitalism – late, 
mechanised 
18th 
century 
Enclosure. Technological 
advances in agrarian machinery. 
Large numbers of disposed manual 
workers. 
Bourgeois capitalism 18th  
century 
Family owned firms. The Guilds. 
Protected industries. 
Industrial capitalism Mid-18th 
century 
Industrial Revolution Significant 
technological developments. The 
agrarian ‘disposed’ form the 
workforce. New mass 
consumerism. 
Mass production capitalism 1920s-1960s Industrialisation as in the notion of 
Fordism. 
Corporate capitalism 1945-present Owners separate from the running 
of the firm. Professional managers 
employed. Larger and more 
diffused shareholder structure 
National capitalisms as units of 
politico-economic analysis 
1945-present 
day 
Welfare state regimes. National 
output measurement and 
accounting: formalised and 
publicised. Anglo-US, French 
Statist, German Corporatist, 
Scandinavian Social Democratic, 
and Japanese typologies 
EU capitalism 1999-2006 EU monetary and fiscal policy 
integration. 
 
    ________________________________________________________________________  
   Source: primary 
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The arguments are set in the timeframe 1986 to 2006, which captures not only the ground-
breaking accords of the Single European Act in 1986 (SEA) and the Treaty on EU in 1992 
(TEU), as two of the main drivers of the ‘European Experiment’; but also in 1999, the 
momentous realisation of the first stages of economic and monetary union (EMU) with the 
final establishment of the ECB as a legitimate supranational institution, together with the 
launch of the then emblematic EU single currency, the euro. That capitalism as an economic 
system has evolved into a publicly-visible transnational mechanism characterised by a 
network of individual, interconnected, and interdependent national capitalisms, is no more 
apparent than in the EU at this time. And, these developments can be seen as not only further 
reification of the EU’s founding fathers’ dream, but also may come to represent the next 
phase in capitalism’s overall and continuing evolution. 
Few commentators would dispute that the EU is unique. Fewer still perhaps, would contest 
that it is its political ambition and advanced economic integration that sets the EU apart from 
the other major regional collaborations of the world, such as the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). However, until 
recently, the politicisation of the EU integration process has largely remained distant from its 
mass publics, where the planning process has entailed establishing a strong and broad 
economic platform from which to eventually deepen the political union alluded to at the 
signing of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) in Rome in 1957. Full 
economic and political union was clearly the EU’s original telos, as illustrated in the 
preamble to the treaty where the founders made specific reference to a determination to bring 
‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Church and Phinnemore, 2002:209) 
(emphasis added). That full economic and political union appears to remain the vision of 
some, if not all, of the EU decision-making élite has also recently been demonstrated by the 
drive to rush through agreement on an EU constitution. However, following referendums in 
France and the Netherlands on the constitution, the question of whether or not full political 
union is now an achievable or even realistic end, nearly 50 years on from Rome, will no 
doubt continue to receive considerable academic attention well into the future. What is clear 
is that the Treaty on European Union (TEU), agreed at Maastricht in 1993, was effectively to 
project the political elements alongside the economic features of the EU planning process 
fully into the public domain for the first time. 
The Maastricht treaty has proved both immensely significant and highly controversial, not 
least because it portends intergovernmental, supranational and freestanding institutional 
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innovations (Church and Phinnemore, 2002). One of the major outcomes of these innovations 
was the establishment of provisions for EMU. Central to EMU was the creation of a 
monetary system comprising the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the ECB as 
EMU’s overseeing institution, and the euro as its single currency.  Although the advent of the 
ECB in 1999 was to be the first major new supranational institution of the EU for forty years 
(Heisenberg and Richmond 2002), its birth, more significantly represented the creation of a 
new level, and type, of supranationality compared to that of the existing institutions. 
Here, the level of supranationality is taken to reflect the degree to which different EU 
institutions control or influence decision-making on behalf of the member-states. This may be 
considered as a continuum whereby the complete supersession of national autonomy appears 
at one end of the scale; and full, existing national autonomy at the other. The notion of 
calibrating EU institutional supranationality develops from Philippe Schmitter’s analysis of 
issue ‘arenas’ and levels of authority in Europe between 1950 and 2001. Five levels of 
institutional supranationality are considered: all policy decisions at national level; only some 
policy decisions at the then EC level; policy decisions at both national and EC level; most 
policy decisions at EC level; and all policy decisions at EC level (Schmitter 1997:403). The 
analysis charts the incremental rise of EU supranationality across 28 policy areas in four 
clusters or ‘arenas’ identified as economic, socio-cultural, politico-constitutional, and 
international relations and external security. The ECB represents a ‘level five’ economic 
supranationality, with all monetary and exchange rate policy decisions for the 12 euro 
countries being taken at the EU level. Moreover, EMU’s fusing of economics and politics in 
this way reflected the EU’s planned deepening of the integration process; and the consequent 
issuance of the euro currency promoted the notion of EU supranationality in a practical and 
physical sense, for the first time. 
The concept of an ECB Eurosphere supracapitalism 
The origins of the EU, those relating to the immediate post-Second World War European 
Economic Community (EEC) years, can be seen as political; or more accurately, geopolitical, 
in the sense that it spawned from the politics of geography, fear, and hope. This, in the light 
of the majority of subsequent commentary, debate, and literature,, regarding the EU’s 
evolution, where the discourse has been largely shaped by the idea of maximum possible 
economic integration as a precursor for the eventual assimilation of members into full 
political union, may seem incongruous. And, although ideas of economic co-operation have 
13 
 
long been viewed as the most effective (possibly only) way to obviate war between nation-
states, ironically the main catalyst for the beginnings of the EC was Adolf Hitler, although as 
Leonard points out ‘none of the EC’s leaders would readily admit to him being a founding 
father’. However, Hitler, ‘like Charlemagne and Napoleon before him, brought together, by 
the sword, virtually the entire land area of the original EEC, destroying in the process the 
self-confidence of the nation-states from which it sprang’ (Leonard, 2002:3). These states 
were soon recreated in 1945, but no longer viewed themselves definitive autonomous actors 
on the world stage. Fear of the Soviet Union, fear of a Germany ever being able to overrun 
Europe again, and hope brought about by US aid for Western Europe via the Marshall Plan, 
that effectively pulled, firstly the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg to form the 
Benelux Union, and then subsequently joined by France, Italy, and ultimately West Germany. 
In essence then, a ready-made geopolitical region had been created from within which 
increasing economic integration would be an organic process. From this, it may be posited 
that the first foundations had been laid from which to build the necessary institutional 
architecture for a future type of shared capitalism. This idea can also be seen to be a potential 
solution to prevent a repeat of the havoc wreaked upon countries around the world as result of 
their individual and collective inability to control the type of capitalism prevalent in the inter-
war years, and which ultimately led to Germany (and Japan) mobilising for war in the first 
place. Therefore, with the notion of a pre-existing platform for future economic integration, 
and as the EU evolved through the establishment of the EEC and the European Community 
(EC), and moved inexorably towards EMU, it is possible to imagine the potential for the 
above-mentioned type of EU shared capitalism, or supracapitalism.  
The term supracapitalism is used here as a hypothetical future form of EU capitalism. As one 
of a number of possible trajectories for EU capitalism, it is employed on the basis that if 
political union is to remain the telos for the EU movement, and if full economic integration is 
still considered by policy-makers as a precursor for such union, this will force changes on the 
structure and functions of EU capitalism in general, and EU national capitalisms in particular. 
This idea is grounded in the assumption that, in order to function, capitalism must essentially 
be a politico-economic system, and that national capitalisms are autonomous, nation-state 
operationalisations of capitalism, although often internationally interconnected and 
interrelated, are then effectively self-contained political economies, and therefore intensifying 
levels of politico-economic integration will increasingly erode aspects of national autonomy 
whist standardising and normalising national operationalisations of EU capitalism.  
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In this projection, full economic integration therefore is taken to mean that economic policy-
setting, and the consequent macroeconomic management of all the member-states’ national 
economies are centrally controlled at the supranational level, in the same way that the ECB 
has taken responsibility for monetary and exchange rate policy of the 12 members of the 
existing Eurosphere.  
The concept of an EU supracapitalism is essentially based on a mutual operationalisation of 
capitalism by the 12 EU member-states that have adopted the euro, and as such are therefore 
at once inextricably conjoined with each other and are subject to supranational strategic 
planning, policy-making, and operational management of their financial, monetary, and 
exchange rate systems.  
The main claims of the thesis 
The continuing development of the supranational nature of EU institutions such as the ECB, 
and the external management of a group of national capitalisms such as within the EU, 
suggests that the EU policy-makers may have already set in train the movement towards 
supracapitalism. This logic flows from the options open to managers of national economies, 
where price stability via inflation control, low unemployment, sustainable economic growth, 
and movement towards balanced budgets are, and in this order of priority, their main 
economic objectives. In order to achieve these objectives, there are three policy instruments 
at their disposal7: monetary policy, fiscal policy, and exchange rate policy. The ECB now 
controls monetary and exchange rate policy for 12 national capitalisms, although with fiscal 
policy remaining a national concern, this represents one of, if not, the most difficult obstacles 
to achieving full EMU. This is due to both its highly sensitive political nature, and the 
projected timescale estimated to lay just the basic foundations of tax harmonisation across the 
Eurosphere spectrum. 
The advent of the ECB, the creation of the Eurosphere, and the attendant Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) agreed at Amsterdam in 1997, offer a ready-made set of intra-EU 
comparisons to aid the advancement of the above claims. This experimental space offers a 
number of comparative opportunities.  First, there is the Eurosphere collective of 12 member-
states that have relinquished sovereign control of monetary and exchange rate policy to the 
                                                 
7 This selection excludes a fourth policy option, that of prices and incomes control, which although still open to 
national governments, is associated with Keynesian-interventionist macroeconomic management, rather than the 
neoliberal, market mechanism-favoured  by contemporary EU approaches. 
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supra level,  three members of the EU that have remained outside the single currency system, 
and the ten new members that acceded in 2004. Second, as all twelve Eurosphere economies 
have retained control and management of fiscal policy, opportunities exist to consider how 
tax-raising policies and government spending decision-making differ between, and within, 
these collectives. This question is already very much in the political arena, with some 
member-states having struggled to remain within the SGP’s constraints on government debt; 
and others, notably France, and Germany, from whose Bundesbank the model was originally 
derived, having chosen to disregard its limits altogether; the pact effectively remains in 
operational limbo. Third, there is also now the prospect for temporal comparisons, with the 
Eurosphere now nine years in the making, and the euro currency seven years old. 
Consideration of the temporal dimension allows analyses of when key decisions were made 
(time), the sequences of decisions (timing), and the speed (tempo) of developments. 
It is against this backdrop of the political economy of the EU and the de facto and potential 
further developing supranational characteristics of the evolving EU polity, that the ECB 
emerges as genuine EU supranational monetary and economic institution, and that from the 
launch of the euro in 1999, is positioned to not only govern the monetary policy for and on 
behalf of the 12 individual national capitalisms that comprise the Eurosphere, but also to 
assume the overall supra-monetary and supra-macroeconomic management of these member-
states, thereby creating a basis  for the permanent foundations necessary to move towards the 
full economic and monetary bases set out as requisite for progress towards political union. 
The internal logic of the claims link together the ECB as a genuine existing EU supranational 
institution, the endogenous and non-neutral role of money in national capitalisms, and the 
heterodox theory of the monetary production system. If money can be held to be endogenous 
and non-neutral in national capitalisms, then the monetary production system, which is based 
on this centrality of money, together with the counter-neoclassical stance that demand creates 
supply, rather than the neoclassical Say’s Law-based view that asserts the opposite; then the 
ECB’s supra-management of the monetary aspects of 12 Eurosphere members states suggests 
that it may be possible to bring these 12 capitalisms into sharing a new and specific form of 
capitalism. Therefore, the supporting arguments which relate to the notion of an EU 
supracapitalism emanate from three assumptions. 
The first of these is that the ECB is also a different type of supranational institution. It is a 
legitimate, authentic, and to date, the most clearly-defined supranational institution currently 
operational within the EU. The advent of the euro and the creation of the Eurosphere of 
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member-states adopting the currency, not only irrevocably established the ECB’s central 
supranational power, but by doing so also immediately created two politico-economic 
combinations of national capitalisms within the EU: discrete monetary and economic spheres, 
with one comprising those of euro member-states; and the other, a collective sub-group of the 
non-euro EU member-states. Moreover, the ECB and the euro currency indirectly influences 
these key areas of non-euro members’ politico-economic trajectories, as a result of the 
planned and developing politico-economic interdependencies within, and between, member-
states, especially in intra-EU trade activity and the simplified structures of transaction costs 
and exchange rate stability. That the ECB and the Eurosphere can both be seen as genuine 
supranational EU institutions, the assumption then is that the ECB and the euro have de facto 
already begun the process of the transition towards an EU supracapitalism. 
The eight analytical typological groupings of EU capitalisms advanced in this thesis (See 
Chapter 3) can be seen to transcend, and move beyond, the simple comparison between euro 
and ex-euro EU capitalisms, and  the hitherto generally-accepted co-ordinated market 
economies and liberal market economies ‘varieties’ of national capitalisms. This thesis 
proposes an increased analytical scale and scope, whilst also controlling for contrasting 
national strategic objectives and trajectories of all the EU national capitalisms.  
In sum, the main claims for the thesis, and the argument for the potential of an EU 
supracapitalism, are fivefold. One is that the EU’s founding fathers’ original idea behind 
achieving as higher level of economic integration as a foundation for eventual political union, 
has, via EMU, effectively created the opportunity for an EU supracapitalism with the 
establishment of the 12-member Eurosphere, supranationally-managed by the ECB. Two that 
one of the original objectives behind the drive for full economic and political integration of 
the EU was ultimately for the continuing improvement of its member-states citizens’ well-
being through a lessening asymmetric distribution of wealth, and that this may be achieved 
through a shared form of national capitalism co-ordinated by the ECB within the Eurosphere. 
Three, that in order for the ECB and Eurosphere to achieve this objective, an alternative 
approach to the understanding of how national capitalisms function by way of heterodox 
macroeconomic and monetary analyses is required to inform future policy-making. Four, is 
that the perception of progress towards EU integration to date, and the potential for an EU 
supracapitalism in the future, can best be understood from within a constructivist-
institutionalism analytical framework. And, finally, by organising the existing national 
capitalisms of the EU into a typology constituting eight, contextually contingent groups, a 20-
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year, pre and post-euro, quantitative-empirical measurement of the influence of the ECB, the 
euro, and the Eurosphere on all the EU national capitalisms, whether sharing the single 
currency or not, should be possible.  The statistical tests conducted, and the longitudinal 
illustrations of macroeconomic trends and patterns shown, are intended to identify the degree 
of shift, if any, towards the levels of macroeconomic convergence that, in turn, might offer 
evidence of the ECB’s direct and indirect influences moving the Eurosphere towards some 
form EU supracapitalism. Whilst making this particular claim, it is also important to do so 
with the caveat that the construct of any such selected typology, and the choice of statistical 
tests and time-series observations, can only ever be justified alongside a clear and critical 
statement of the limitations of those methods.  
Summary of preliminary findings 
The overview of the theoretical political economy findings in Chapter 5, appear to offer a 
fairly sound basis from which to proceed with the empirical testing suggested above. The 
politico-economic landscape of the EU, and the dynamics of the formations and constructs 
emerging within the political economy of the EU viewed through a constructivist-
neoinstitutionalism lens, both point to opportunities for the development of a one-size-fits-all 
EU capitalism. There is initial support for this from Figure 16 where the dynamics of the 
majority (11) of the 15 capitalisms under scrutiny are positioned in both the top quadrants 
variously representing a propensity for regulated capitalism together with movement towards 
supranationality on both sides of the political spectrum, with Ireland significantly moving up 
towards the supranational spaces, away from its very clear historical nationalist position vis-
à-vis the UK, probably to arrive at somewhere left of centre of the political spectrum. This 
effectively leaves the 12-3 split described above, where the two social democratic economies 
of Denmark and Sweden on the left, and the UK on the right are left to occupy the two lower 
quadrants. However, this dynamic changes radically with ten acceding capitalisms, all of 
who, unlike the previous enlargement groups, are pre-contracted to adopt the euro at some 
point in the short-to medium-term, and will do so with an array of politico-economic 
trajectories destined to populate all corners of the upper quadrants then diagram.  
Whatever the eventual mapping of these dynamics reveals, two things are reasonable 
predictable: the regulated capitalism-neoliberal cleavage in illustrated in Figure 16, will be 
forced downwards to accommodate the more nationalist-oriented of the new members, as 
with, perhaps, Slovakia and Hungary; and the fluidity of positions will increase as national 
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governments change, and of course, as the new economies become stronger and thereby more 
influential in future EU decision-making processes. 
With this in mind, the empirical results appear to generally support the argument regarding 
the post-euro influence of the ECB over some of the major macroeconomic variable 
indicators employed in this research. The strongest influence appears to centre on both 
measures of economic growth, price stability, direct government taxation, and social benefits. 
However, the overall influence on individual groups of capitalisms is noticeably more 
pronounced on the Southern European, the Former Eastern Bloc, and the Baltic Country 
economies than it is on the more mature national capitalisms grouped within the Co-ordinated 
Market Economies and the Liberal Market Economies typologies. 
However, what is clear from the empirical evidence is that taxation patterns tend to be largely 
insulated from the effects of the euro, and that EU unemployment largely remains outside of 
the single currency’s direct influence. And, it is the very politically sensitive nature of these 
two indicators that suggests that any future movements towards a more complete Eurosphere 
supracapitalism, one that is to feature elements of supranational fiscal management, may be 
some way off. And, in this, it may also be one of the constraints to, and limitations of, this 
work, in that a greater range of the scale and scope of the interrelationships between the 
macroeconomic variables alongside the limited within-and- between analyses of typologies of 
national capitalisms offered here, is required. 
Structure of the following chapters 
The next chapter (Chapter 1) critically explores the literature relating to EU integration and 
Europeanisation, and Chapter 2 follows the treatment of these literatures with a rationale and 
justification for adopting a constructivist-institutionalism approach to concept of an EU 
supracapitalism. Then, Chapter 3 is given over to the methodological justification of 
employing a bespoke typology of EU capitalisms as a framework for the unfolding empirical 
evidence presented in Chapter 4.  Following this, the next section (Chapter5) then considers 
the ‘ECB story’ to date, its position as a key economic actor and major political influence, its 
current trajectory, its political and economic performativity, and how its management of the 
national capitalisms will need to change in line with the monetary production model if there 
is to be an EU supracapitalism. Chapter 6 builds on the above political science-international 
relations approach, and moves on to examine alternative understandings of the way in which 
national capitalisms function, the central role of money, and how these heterodox insights 
19 
 
suggest that EU policy issues are not necessarily technical, and in this sense directly relate to 
the constructivist-institutionalism approach outlined in Chapter 2. The summary then 
prescribes some changes to how the Eurosphere should be understood and managed in the 
future. The final chapter offers some a full summary of findings, individual conclusions from 
each of the findings, and some closing remarks.  
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Chapter 2 Varieties of Capitalism and European Integration literatures 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is primarily concerned with discussions and explanations surrounding EU 
national capitalisms, their progress towards full economic integration, the idea of 
‘Europeanisation’, and the advancement of the concept of a Eurosphere supracapitalism with 
the ECB at its centre. Moreover, it is concerned with the development of a constructivist-
institutional approach in order to both further the understanding of these developments, and 
also to allow a heterodox view of how national capitalisms in general, and EU capitalisms in 
particular, are organised and function.  In turn, this alternative view of EU national 
capitalisms affords the opportunity to posit a normative perspective that can both challenge 
the ECB’s current management of the Eurosphere and also signpost towards how an EU 
supracapitalism may evolve. However, before moving directly on to these aspects, there is a 
need to outline the main evolutionary features and salient characteristics of the capitalist 
system as they pertain to the above areas of discourse. And, in so doing there are 
opportunities to identify elements of the historical, sociological, and social influences that 
constitute the constructivist-institutionalism approach adopted in this work. Consequently the 
first following passages here begin with a definitional outline of capitalism and the capitalist 
system, and then trace what is essentially a set of social and historical accounts of the 
development of capitalism as a socio-economic system, and the subsequent advent of national 
capitalisms as politico-economic systems. For this, the work of Max Weber, Robert Cox, 
Ellen Meiksins-Wood, Victor Lippit, and Robert Collins offer important insights in these 
regards.     
Any cursory, generic description or definition of capitalism, the kind that can be found in 
many of the mainstream dictionaries, would allude to it being an economic system where the 
production and distribution of goods and services depend on invested private resources and 
profit-making. Some accounts may go further and also introduce the concept of unfettered 
interaction between buyers and sellers as economic agents within market constructs. In 
essence then, capitalism refers to the particular organisation of society whereby capital 
becomes the driving force of society, especially in the types of laws and institutions that 
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frame that society. It may also be useful to add in to the mixture notions of ownership of 
resources, property relations, a free labour market the competitive imperative, and the 
exploitation of technological advances. However, all of these relatively simple illustrations 
belie the complexities, complications, and multiple interpretations of how capitalism as a 
politico-economic system may be, and has been, understood and operationalised at national 
levels.  
We are also presented with an array of differing accounts that variously chart the advent and 
evolution of capitalism both in terms of space and time. And, although this thesis is primarily 
concerned with EU national capitalisms as the central units of analysis within a clearly-
defined timeframe, overlooking capitalism’s development and its various political adaptions 
would disallow any meaningful platform from which to build a theoretical framework against 
which the empirical evidence and other datasets can be tested. This is because EU national 
capitalisms have not only emerged from clearly very different historical departure points; for 
example, the UK and Greece, or Poland and The Netherlands, have progressed through 
widely contrasting socio-cultural interactions and influences, and have also been subject to 
sometimes diametrically-opposed politico-economic institutional architecture, of which the 
comparisons between Italy and Poland, or Finland and Ireland would be contrasting 
examples. Moreover, there is always the danger with any attempt to collectivise, or group, 
any number of national capitalisms, and especially EU national capitalisms, that boundaries 
that are  broadly set may disallow any realistic meaningful comparative analysis, or  move 
towards the point where  ‘n=1’ and that parameters that are too finely calibrated will have the 
opposite effect and restrict potential analyses to the point where each capitalism will always 
appear very different to the point where n may equal 25. However, there are points along this 
imaginary continuum between n=1 and n=25, which do allow meaningful sub-groups of 
analyses of national capitalisms. For example, Esping-Anderson (1990) in Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism based on how national economies resource the well-being of their 
citizens; Hampden-Turner and Trompenars (1994) The Seven Cultures of Capitalism that 
positions developing socio-cultural attitudes and values at the centre of analysis; and Story 
(2000) who expands on Johnson (1982), Henderson and Applebaum (1992), and Dicken 
(1992) to establish a matrix of alternative national politico-economic systems from which 
national capitalisms may be compared and contrasted. 
However, the meaningful identification of different national capitalisms is not 
straightforward because it is contingent on what is actually meant by the term capitalism. 
22 
 
Robert Cox offers some early assistance here, where he expands the term to discuss 
‘capitalist development’ as a ‘process’, and in doing so, advances a longitudinal continuum 
that begins in western Europe in the 14th century, and ends as ‘coherent expansive force on a 
world scale’ around the middle of the 19th century, which is described as then being in its 
‘competitive phase’, and from which it entered into, ‘from the late nineteenth century’, a 
‘new, monopolistic phase’ (Cox, 1987:51).  And it is here that Cox also introduces the 
concept of the different phases of capitalism as being determined by separate evolving modes 
of social relations of production, a term which aligns with Lippit’s Social Structures of 
Accumulation (SSAs) (Lippit, 2005), and Weber’s ultimate, background, and intermediate 
social preconditions (see Figure I below); and where we can begin to link the development of 
capitalism to constructivism and institutionalism.  
The problem with having a timeline of nearly 500 years, and with only three effective 
epochal turns, is that it offers little contextual insight into capitalism’s development and the 
formation of national capitalisms as units of analysis. As Cox argues ‘debates continue about 
when, during that long period from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries, capitalism 
actually became the dominant organizing force of economic life (Cox, 1987:51). These 
debates effectively centre on the essence of capitalism, and what is actually meant by the 
term. Those who consider capitalism in terms of exchange relations and the accumulation of 
economic capital through trade, tend to locate the origin of capitalism toward the beginning 
of the period; whereas as those who focus on capitalism as the organisation of production 
designed to generate the exponential expansion of capital, position its origin at the latter end 
of the era. And, of particular importance for this study, is that Cox also introduces the 
concept of capitalism in relation to the state with the suggestion of the ‘emergence of a new 
form of state – the liberal state’ which is to the fore as a ‘critical factor in the breakthrough of 
capitalist development’ (1987:52) in the later stages. And, in terms of the development of 
individual national capitalisms, Fernand Braudel in Cox (1996) goes further to emphasise that 
capitalism is not just a way of organising an economy.  
Capitalism, in each of its different historical forms, has also been a distinct system 
of values, pattern of consumption, social structure, and form of state. Each form 
has also projected a conception of world order. The new capitalism with its global 
vocation encompasses all of these things. So do alternative capitalisms, anchored 
in European and Japanese traditions.  (1996:527) 
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In this way, both Cox and Braudel suggest that capitalism’s historical development not only 
contains clear definitional epochs, or phases, but also importantly places the state in its 
various guises as interpreting capitalism in its own image; and thereby offering an early 
explanatory pre-cursor to the variations or ‘varieties’ of European national capitalisms 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Cox’s evolution narrative offers a longitudinal understanding of capitalism’s development, 
and Meiksins-Wood (2002) who brings together a group of Marxist commentators, notably 
Maurice Dobb (1946), Robert Brenner (1977,1985), and Perry Anderson (1974,1980,1985), 
together with Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) in order to offer a framework that firmly 
positions capitalism in a spatial context,. This not only allows a definitional construct for 
capitalism in general, but also insights as to how capitalism has been subsequently adopted, 
and adapted, by various European nation-states in particular. If it is assumed that capitalism’s 
origin can be placed in Europe, and for the moment to put aside any particular country where 
it may have spawned, it is possible to proffer a set of suitable parameters and developmental 
influences that may suggest direct and indirect linkages to modern-day EU capitalisms – both 
inside and outside the Eurosphere. Therefore, somewhere between the 1400s and the 1900s, 
or a juncture connecting the early characteristics of bureaucracy, exchange relations and trade 
to the European-driven worldwide expansion of capitalism, there must be point where all the 
components of capitalism as a complete politico-economic system came together, and from 
where it is also possible to consider the early influences on the formations and trajectories of 
individual of national capitalisms. And Meiksins-Wood is by far the most unequivocal, by 
setting this juncture in England, and in final third of the 17th century. At this time she argues 
came the culmination of ‘a distinctive system of social property relations’ that made both 
producers and appropriators ‘irreducibly dependent on competitive production’ Meiksins-
Wood, 2002:94). More specifically, the components or ‘laws of motion’ of capitalism were 
established: the relentless compulsion to compete; to produce cost-effectively; to maximise 
profit; to reinvest surpluses; and systematically to increase labour productivity by improving 
the productive forces. And, she adds, with these compulsions came all the contradictions of 
capitalism. These contradictions were to become the recurrent internal inconsistencies which 
now are the traits of modern capitalism, which lead to the episodic and widespread damage 
and privations referred to earlier, and to which supracapitalism may be a remedy. 
The components or the laws of motion capitalism, or, as Collins (1980:927) prefers, ‘the 
components of a rationalised capitalism’ can be seen to start from Weber’s (1961:207) 
24 
 
definition ‘Capitalism, is the provision of needs by the method of enterprise, which is to say, 
by private businesses seeking profit, rather than forced contributions or traditionally fixed 
gifts or trade’. According to Collins, for Weber, capitalism is an ‘analytical concept’, and one 
that can be found as part of the historical development of many economies; some going ‘back 
as far as ancient Babylon’. And, capitalism became the indispensable form for the provision 
of everyday wants only in western Europe around the middle of the 19th century. In this way 
Weber viewed capitalism as being underpinned by rationality; the rational permanent 
enterprise characterised by rational capital accounting. Already, it can be seen that these ideas 
represent the early formations of national capitalisms as ‘rational’ units of analysis. In doing 
so, Weber (1961:207) links the ‘rational capitalistic establishment’ to calculations within 
‘modern book-keeping’, and therefore calculability, which differentiates modern rational 
capitalism from its earlier partial forms, and makes it ‘methodical and predictable’(Collins, 
1980), and in this way production and distribution within the capitalist system become both 
routinized and bureaucratised. From these ideas Weber builds a causal chain which can best 
be understood firstly by reference to an illustration that is constructed in a type of 
longitudinal flowchart form as in Figure 1 below. 
By looking at this model from left to right, and starting with the core components of modern 
mid-19th century capitalism, Weber’s logic flows by first citing that there must be private 
appropriation of all the means of production, and their concentration under the control of 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, land, buildings, machinery, and materials must all be assembled 
under a common management in order that decision-making about acquisition, allocation, 
and deployment may be offer optimal efficiency. Moreover, all these factors of production 
should be on sale on the open market, be subject to property rights, and therefore represented 
by commercial instruments such as share ownership certificates on stock markets. It is seen 
that mechanisation is most significant for the organisation of large-scale capitalism (Collins, 
1980:928). Second, labour must be free to move about in relation or response to conditions of 
demand, and that this should be a formal and legal freedom in line with workers deciding to 
sell their labour on the open market. And here, Weber notes that capitalism would be 
‘impossible without a property-less stratum selling its services’ (Weber, 1961:209). This is 
because only this element completes a mass market for the factors of production by making it 
possible to calculate the cos of products in advance. Third, trading in markets must not be 
limited by irrational restrictions, for example non-economic constraints on the movement of 
goods and factors of production. And finally, there must be calculable law in legal  
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Figure 1 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
A politico-religious-economic linear-causal trajectory of capitalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: adapted from Weber in Collins (1980) ‘Weber’s Last Theory of Capitalism: A 
Systemization’ American Sociological Review, 45 (December) pp925-942 
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adjudication and public administration. Laws should be clearly understood and available to 
all, and in such a way as to ensure the enforcement of economic contracts and other rights are 
highly predictable. A legal system designed in this way forms part of the rational capitalism 
that Weber reinforces throughout. These include, the promotion and privileging of property 
rights over the factors of production; the smooth and accessible transferability of these rights 
through financial instruments and banking operations; the legal protection and, to a certain 
extent, regulation of markets; and the formal, legalised freedoms of workers.  
What Collins and Weber do offer here is the opportunity to look backwards from the left-
hand column in Figure 1, and to explore the religio-socio-historical causal chain leading up to 
the neo-classical view of capitalism offered in order to gain some insight as to how the many 
variations of EU national capitalisms may have come about, and perhaps more importantly 
for this work, to identify common threads that may bring them together in a structure of 
convergence towards a potential supracapitalism. Moreover, as a constructivist-
institutionalism approach underpins this research, it is advantageous to have the opportunity 
to also view here the evolution of capitalism and EU national capitalisms through a social 
preconditions lens, which not only also affords the prospect of aligning this to the subsequent 
discussions on constructivist aspects of the ECB and EU supracapitalism in chapters below, 
but additionally to consider such social preconditions in conjunction with Lippit’s SSAs also 
discussed below. Moreover, Weber’s overall historic and social trajectory, also informs the 
historical and sociological neoinstitutional analytical variants advocated in this work  
In sum then, Weber is really offering an early alternative constructivist take on the 
development of the institutional structures that feature in mainstream neoclassical thinking 
about capitalism, which is, of course, the very model of the laissez-faire capitalist economy 
that is challenged here by heterodox views as to how modern national capitalist economies 
actually function.  
In the foregoing passages, Robert Collins’s interpretation of Weber’s social pre-conditions 
model offers the dual simultaneous benefits of a causal explanation of modern capitalism’s 
evolution, together with a clear exposition of the way in which constructivism, in this case a 
version of social constructivism, may be applied to the development of capitalism in general, 
and national capitalisms in particular. Moreover, Weber’s location of modern capitalism in 
the 19th century also aligns with Cox’s third ‘monopolistic stage’ of capitalism. Cox, for his 
part, in addition to charting the three epochal phases of capitalism’s journey, also advances 
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insights regarding the creation of the ‘liberal state’, and  with it the early realisation of 
national capitalisms as separable units of analysis. Meiksins-Wood locates the origin of 
capitalism and 17th century England a template for a national capitalism. In doing so, she 
identifies the essential components of a national capitalism. However, while all these 
accounts build an overall picture as to the evolution of capitalism, what is missing is a link 
that explains how and why national capitalisms change over time. Victor Lippit’s 2005 book, 
Capitalism, introduces the concept of SSAs. In identifying accumulation as the major 
underpinning force of national capitalisms, Lippit rationalises the differing forms of 
capitalism a nation-state may adopt as social conditions reshape at different identifiable 
temporal stages, and while doing so, provides two levels of institutional analysis: the narrow 
sense of institution such as a university or the IMF; and the broader sense which incorporates 
‘the habits, customs and expectations that prevail in a particular society’ (Lippit, 2005:27). 
Although much of Lippit’s narrative, and many of his illustrative examples, is centred on 
Japan and the US, the SSA analytical framework is readily transferrable to the EU. The 
narrower sense of SSA institutionalism can be clearly demonstrated with regard to difficulties 
pre-Eurosphere German capitalism faced, as a result of the institutional structuration of 
German banks. At the time, the German financial system comprised the country’s major 
commercial banks alongside both state-owned and municipally-owned banks. The public 
banks were committed to lending to promote local business rather than to maximise profits, 
and because they had direct credit-backing from local governments (which enabled them to 
raise funds on favourable terms), they were able to lend at much lower rates than the major 
private banks. As a result, the combined market share of the four major banks (Deutche Bank 
AG; HVB Group; Dresdner Bank AG; and Commerzbank AG) was only 14 percent of all 
loans advanced to the individuals, companies, and governments of the day. 
An example of the broader sense of the institutional features of SSAs can be seen in France, 
where agriculture continues plays a very important role in the habits, customs, and 
expectations of French people even though in quantitative terms it accounts for less than 2 
percent of GDP, and continues to fall each year8. And, France’s central role in, and 
commitment to, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is further evidence of  this, and 
is a result of the socio-cultural embeddedness of agriculture in the French psyche, which 
traces back originally to the transition from French feudalism to state absolutism before 
France eventually adopted capitalism. The prominence of agriculture was firmly entrenched 
                                                 
8 From 3.% in 1986 to 1.7% in 2006 World Bank Data (2006) 
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in the 18th century when the political economy of France was shaped through the ideas and 
influence of the Physiocrats, or Les Économistes, a body of highly influential economists, 
notably Quesnay (1694-1774), Turgot (1727-1781), and du Pont (1739-1817). Central to their 
beliefs was the ‘le droit naturale’; the concept of natural law. John Kenneth Galbraith 
describes their purpose 
…to preserve by reform an ancient society of landed precedence and privilege to 
which all were committed and to stand off the pretensions and intrusions of 
merchant capitalism and the unruly, crude and vulgar industrial forces (as they 
were regarded) that had spawned (1991:50) 
Given that this paradigm has been at the heart of French socio-cultural development for 300 
years, it is, perhaps somewhat easier to understand the reluctance of successive governments 
to directly challenge their farmers during periods of industrial dispute. This also may explain 
the dogged French path-dependent position in this regard, when often in isolation in terms of 
its bargaining position in EU policy negotiations on agricultural matters, especially those 
related to CAP.  
An SSA then is a set of institutions that supports the accumulation process over an extended 
period of time, usually a matter of decades. The existence of SSAs accounts for a period of 
relative well-offness (as in the post-war recovery and unequalled growth 1945 to 1970) 
alternating with extended periods of stagnation (for example, the world recession with 
stagflation from 1971 to the early 1980s). Lippit illustrates our understanding of SSAs as a 
series of questions: what accounts for an SSA’s structural integrity; why do they take a long 
time to form and why do they persist; why do they always eventually collapse, and how are 
new ones formed? Central to the answers to the first of these questions are the 
interconnectedness between the institutions that constitute the SSAs and the related concept 
of their mutual overdetermination.  For example, in labour relations, expectations concerning 
the nature of employment opportunities likely to be available affect the educational system, 
the jobs themselves affect family life, and employee feelings about health care and retirement 
benefits are likely to affect voting behaviour and thereby political institutions. In other words, 
the various institutions of a society are mutually-determinative; with each one 
overdetermining the others. Lippit continues. 
Moreover, since institutions are also subject to the effects of the full array of social 
processes and of exogenous events or conditions, there are numerous forces 
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contributing to the overdetermination of any particular institution, and any 
particular institution contributes to shaping the rest of society and whilst also 
influencing exogenous events and conditions. Of course this means that in the last 
analysis such events or conditions cannot be fully exogenous and their treatment of 
such is largely for reasons of analytical convenience (2005:29) 
In this way, when we think of an extended period of economic expansion, it is the entire 
structure of institutions that is involved, and this, in turn, is sustained by the interrelationships 
among its component parts, and any isolated event or institutional change will not necessarily 
bring about the collapse of an SSA, but that such change may well reverberate throughout the 
SSA overtime, and then begin to erode the glue of the interconnectedness that originally 
brought the institutions together.   
Why then do SSAs take a long time to form and why do they persist? This is because if we 
think of institutions as being formed by habits, customs, and expectations, then it is normal 
for them to change only slowly. And while there can be no predetermined length of time an 
SSA will take to form, or to collapse, the intensity of the internal contradictions, the strength 
of the impact of exogenous events, and the interactions of the component parts of the SSA 
will all influence its duration. The very clear shift in capital-labour relations institutions in the 
UK between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, when trades union activity was diminished and 
the balance of power between capital and labour significantly shifted to capital with the onset 
of neoliberal interpretations of the function of national capitalisms is one such example.   
This leads to the question of why SSAs collapse and how new ones are forged. As indicated 
above, institutions are mutually-determinative, and as well as mutually sustaining each other, 
they can also concurrently dissipate each other’s positions. In the example above, the 
Keynesian politico-economic management of the UK in the 1970s was found wanting in the 
face of both increasing internal industrial strife and the largely exogenous factors of world 
stagflation, the Middle-East war and oil crises, and the escalating war in Vietnam forcing the 
US to abandon its fixed dollar price for gold. The connectedness of the institutions of labour 
relations, foreign exchange regimes, central banks’ management of interest rates, and a host 
of others led to the demise of this particular Anglo-US SSA. 
What we are presented with here is the notion of SSAs underpinned by the core capitalist 
accumulation imperative and being defined by a network of contingent institutional 
structures, which themselves are determined by, and emerge from, their historical 
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antecedents, external conditions, the other institutions with which they interact and which 
serve to define their environment, and by the on-going struggles that define each society. 
Lippit (2005) continues. 
If a society is able to prosper under conditions of rapid accumulation and 
economic growth, then many beneficiaries will be created, and their support will 
add to the stasis that tends in any event to characterise institutions. Social 
structures of accumulation therefore, tend to persist for lengthy periods once 
established. Ultimately, however, they are subject to erosion as external conditions 
change and internal contradictions emerge. (2005: 42) 
Lippit refers to the durations as ‘long waves that characterise capitalist economies’ and 
explain more than just alternating periods of growth and stagnation, each one the result of the 
other. For these reasons, each new SSA represents a new phase in the development of 
capitalism in each country. As Lippit observes, ‘the SSA formed at the beginning of the 21st 
century is quite different from its post-World War SSA, and that consequently contemporary 
American capitalism is quite different from the capitalism that existed in the 1950s’. In 
essence American capitalism, like every other national capitalism, overcomes its recurrent 
crises by reinventing itself each time.   
It is with this in mind that we can think of the Eurosphere as a set of interconnected 
institutional structures bound together by the ECB as a new SSA, and therefore embodying a 
new phase of capitalism in all of the 12 countries sharing the euro, thereby creating an EU 
supracapitalism. Of course, the ultimate question posed by SSA analysis must be how long 
can it last?  
Varieties of EU capitalism 
As the empirical evidence and analytical structure relating to the selected typologies of EU 
national capitalisms in chapter 5 are derived from some elements of the varieties of 
capitalism literature in general, and loosely from the two varieties promulgated by Hall and 
Soskice (2001), it follows that this section should follow on from this body of work. 
However, before doing so, it is first useful to outline out a broad foundation for the 
consideration of how individual EU national capitalisms may align with any given type of 
politico-economic system. Initially, Sloman (2000; 2003), Johnson (1982), Henderson and 
Applebaum (1992) and Henderson (1993) in Dicken 1998), and Story (2000), help set the 
scene. 
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First, Sloman schematically illustrates in Figure 2 below how most, if not all, national 
capitalisms over recent times, have been gradually moving towards free-market management 
of their economies; a shift many political science and international relations commentators 
would suggest is evidence of a universal movement towards neoliberalism. This is 
particularly stark in the case of non-democratic, centrally-planned economies like North 
Korea and Cuba, who, unlike China, have not officially declared policy shifts towards 
economic liberalisation. In relation to the EU capitalisms in the illustration, both France and 
the UK can be seen as moving significantly to the right, and although this is largely 
unsurprising in the case of the UK as a ‘Market-Ideological State’ (see Table 3), the French 
version of a ‘Plan-rational/development’ political-economy depicted in the same matrix, and, 
as is interpreted in Table 3 the ‘French Statist’ model of capitalism, also demonstrates a 
similar progression towards the free-market economy end of the continuum. The case of 
Poland, as a former Eastern Bloc (FEB) economy, is somewhat different, Firstly, it would be 
expected that as a former planned economy, and then immediately after, as an applicant to 
join the EU and eventually the euro, that the pre-set convergence criteria for the membership 
of the EU that was achieved in 2004 would automatically pull the country towards a more 
free-market political economy, but Poland appears to have gone much further than what 
would have been expected. Nevertheless, what is telling from both the dynamic of the EU 
countries, and all the other examples in the illustration, is that there is a clear and on-going 
global shift towards free-market economics. However, such a simplistic observation requires 
qualification. First, Sloman’s model of the sample ‘mixed economies’ reflects an 
approximate percentage of government intervention, or admixture of  decisions made by the 
government and those made by the markets. The percentage indicators on the centre bar of 
Figure 2 are set at about 12.5 percent, and reflect increasing proportions of market influence 
or decision-making moving from left to right.  So, for example, the USA government in the 
early 1980s would have enjoyed just less than 25 percent of direct involvement in its 
economy, compared with China’s approximate 73 percent contribution, and Cuba at well 
under ten percent. And, 20 years on China’s government can be seen to be moving closer to a 
50-50 share with market influence and private enterprise, with even North Korea embracing 
increased market activity. Additionally, these illustrations are useful to the extent that they 
provide a basic picture of the mixture of government and the market that exists in various 
national economies; as well as showing change, and an approximate rate of change over time. 
 
32 
 
Figure 2 
__________________________________________________________________   
Classifying politico-economic systems and the global shift towards the free-market 
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Source: adapted from Sloman (2000:2003) 
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general consideration of how national economies may be categorised into useful typologies, 
and especially so for the present analysis of the EU national capitalisms. From this, it is 
possible to construct a matrix typology which not only captures all the example countries in 
Sloman’s analysis, and thereby the full spectrum of prevailing global politico-economic 
systems. The illustration in Table 3 below summarises the characteristics of four such 
typologies. 
Aligning the countries in Sloman’s continuum with the above typologies, North Korea, Cuba, 
China, and Poland in the early 1980s would fall into the ‘Plan-ideological state’ (as would 
have other EU former Eastern Bloc economies, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), with China moving into a position straddling the Market-
‘Rational/ regulatory state’ and the ‘Plan-rational/development state’, but moving gradually 
into the latter, where Poland now can be located. It is interesting here to note that within the 
EU context this positions Poland clearly alongside France, and, to a lesser extent, Italy, 
within this category. This discussion will be taken up again in Chapter 3 where the EU 
typology of national capitalisms employed here is outlined. France, clearly positioned as 
statist-influenced, ‘Plan-rational development state’ in the early 1980s remains as such in the 
2000s, but with a significantly greater market influence in its economy, and more so that the 
Thatcher-influenced, neoliberal UK of the early 1980s. And, the UK itself, as a ‘Market-
ideological state’, has followed the USA into a much more advanced market-led position in 
the 2000s, and to an even greater extent than the latter. Hong Kong remains very much at the 
end of the spectrum, and as is clear from the dynamic, and has probably reached as far as it 
can go, with a complete lack of government intervention difficult to imagine, especially in the 
2000s and more directly under the control of China. 
From this general overview and introduction to how national economies may categorised into 
typologies, the work of Jonathan Story offers the opportunity to begin to ‘Europeanise’ these 
groupings into meaningful clusters of EU national capitalisms. Story does so by describing 
four such types within a post-Second World War ‘world financial order’ framework, and 
considers this in terms of different systems within a ‘Global Capitalism’ (2000:129). Table 3 
below introduces these ideas. 
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Table 3 
______________________________________________________________ 
Typology of national politico-economic systems 
 
 
Market-ideological state 
Driven by the 'new right’ economic and 
social policies of the 1980s. Based on a 
reversion to the state-civil relations of the 
epoch of competitive capitalism. Policy 
choices based on ideological dogma 
 
 
Plan-ideological state 
The state owns and controls most or all 
economic units. Resource 
allocation/investment decisions are a state 
function. State controls redistribution of 
wealth/income. Policy choices based on 
ideological dogma 
 
Market-rational/regulatory state 
The state regulates the parameters within 
which private companies operate. The 
state regulates the economy in general but 
investment, production, and distributive 
decisions are the preserve of private 
companies, whose actions are disciplined 
by the market. The state does not concern 
itself with what specific industries should 
exist and does not have an explicit 
industry policy. 
 
Plan-rational/development state 
The state regulation of economic activity 
is supplemented by state direction of the 
economy. The economy itself is largely 
in private ownership and firms are in 
competition, but the state intervenes in 
the context of an explicit set of national 
economic and social goals. High priority 
is placed on industry policy and on 
promoting a structure that enhances the 
nation's economic competitiveness. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Adapted from Johnson (1982); Henderson and Applebaum (1992, Figure 1) and 
Henderson (1993) in Dicken (1998:8) 
 
 
35 
 
Story (2000:129) introduces the illustrations by suggesting there are two competing views. 
‘Economic optimists’ hold the view that financial markets have ‘leapt free’ from government 
control, and these utopians share a vision of ‘a radiant future’ of convergence, where the 
world economy is now heading for integration. The Economist (1994) agrees ‘within a 
generation’ several advanced industrial economies are ‘likely to be dwarfed by newly 
emerging economic giants’. Unsurprisingly, regulatory pessimists, on the other hand, see 
things somewhat differently. They maintain that imperfections in world markets derive from 
the distribution of corporate, state, and market power. They conclude that world capitalism is 
in charge, and that the populations of even the most advanced industrial states and regions are 
at the mercy of ‘autonomised and globally uncontrollable global forces’ (The Economist 
1994). However, Story goes on to argue that both accounts exaggerate. Effectively, global 
financial markets are the result of competing corporate, and above all, divergent state policies 
and institutional structures, which offer significantly different sets of incentives for all market 
participants. The globalisation arguments of the 1990s maintain that the ‘dominant vision’ is 
one that is stamped ‘made in the USA’, that is also a ‘One-World’ vision where there will be 
shared prosperity, democracy, and better living conditions for all. 
Of course, there are a number of problems with this view, not least of which is the ongoing 
empirical evidence that there is asymmetric distributions of wealth to be found almost 
everywhere, and that is also very much the case in the US itself. Moreover, the optimists’ 
view fails to recognise the evolution of capitalist diversity, ‘complex interactions’ and for ‘la 
longue durée’, between the late 1940s and the early 1970s. 
States are embedded in markets, as are corporations, with both actors being members of the 
world system of nation-states. This might be thought of as a triumvirate form of state-to-state, 
state-to-firm, and firm-to-firm configuration (Stopford and Strange, 1991). And, as over time, 
political systems emit very divergent structures and performances into an increasingly 
interdependent commercial world; ongoing world turbulence is the result. Therefore, it is the 
contrasting financial systems sitting at the epicentre of individual variable forms of corporate 
governance that underpin different forms of national capitalism. This means that states are 
participants in, and are in no way separate from, the financial markets they have jointly 
conspired to create. 
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Table 4 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Market competition, corporate strategy, and national structures 
 
 
High 
 
Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon System 
• Large, listed firms 
• Oligopolistic competition 
• Diversification 
• Trade, foreign investment 
• Larger, limited government 
• Extensive regulation 
 
German-Japanese Corporate System 
• Large conglomerates 
• Corporate cross-shareholding 
• Diversification 
• Trade, foreign investment 
• Distinct government structures 
• ‘Self’- regulation pervasive 
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Bretton Woods Ideal System 
• Small, family firms 
• Price competition 
• Specialisation 
• International trade 
• Minimal government 
 
French State Capitalism System 
• State allocates capital 
• Lobbying skills 
• State/family enterprises 
• ‘Cohesion’ policies 
• Pervasive government 
Low  
Low                                       Concentration of Ownership                                    High                                                                                         
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Adapted from Story (2000:133) 
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This, in essence, can be seen to characterise the unfolding global financial dynamic from the 
Bretton Woods agreement in the mid-1940s. And, it this epoch in the history of post-war 
capitalism where Story’s typology of national capitalist structure illustrated in Table 4 above 
begins. The matrix essentially describes four models: the ‘Bretton Woods Ideal’ model, 
together with three other distinct types of national capitalism structure comprising the Anglo-
American or ‘Anglo-Saxon System’; ‘German-Japanese System’; and the ‘French State 
Capitalism System’.  
The Bretton Woods model outlines what in 1944 was perceived to be the ideal national 
capitalism, where minimum government intervention oversees an open economy where small 
family firms and businesses compete sharply on price, and where survival depends on 
specialisation and on stable economic conditions. In turn, these conditions are secured by 
effective government policing of local markets to prevent abuses, as well as negotiating 
binding agreements on international free trade. A firm within the Bretton Woods model then 
is content with exporting until foreign governments threaten to impose duties, tariffs, or 
quotas, and when the exporter will seek to invest abroad to develop alternative markets. The 
government, for its part, attends to the business of making the country an attractive place for 
overseas corporate investments by setting policies for favourable taxation and support for 
education.  
Up until the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon (US/UK) 
system was typified by large, publicly-quoted, and diversified corporations that were 
managed by executives that dominated shareholder interests until significant changes to the 
hitherto tightly-linked financial institutions of New York, Chicago, and London. The 
resultant revival of shareholder capitalism in the early 1980s in both countries meant that 
private entities are set up by investors for their own benefit, and who then employ managers 
to look after their business interests at arm’s length. Managers control costs such as labour, 
raw materials, and capital, and in doing so, seek to deploy up-to-date technologies to 
increasingly enhance efficiency in order to produce goods and services that are attractive to 
consumers in terms of both value and quality. The financing of these firms is largely provided 
by relatively short-term borrowing from commercial banks, although the major source of 
funds is the capital markets. Shares in the corporations are therefore owned directly by 
individuals or by institutions investing on individuals' behalf, as in pension fund activity. 
Shares in corporations are actively traded on these markets, and priority is given to paying 
shareholders dividends, even when profits are falling 
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 When shareholders become dissatisfied with dividends and/or profits, and sell their shares in 
enough quantity, firms become vulnerable to takeover. This market for corporate assets in 
turn facilitates mergers, acquisitions, and restructurings. It is here that proponents of the 
system argue that it is legitimised as providing the most efficient set of incentives for 
participants in the market by maximising wealth. Moreover, such a shareholder-driven 
economy is seen to be underpinned by a shareholder democracy where the voting public 
participates in the performance and rewards of corporations. Through this mechanism the US 
and UK administrations have engineered a shareholder-driven corporate economy. Indeed, 
the supporters of this type of system also suggest that such free markets are also politically 
democratic in the minimisation of government involvement. 
Free financial markets also allocate savings to the most efficient apolitically-determined 
investments. However, labour market legislation must be sympathetic and supportive, in 
order for labour forces to be grown, reduced, or transferred with the minimum of friction. For 
its part the government is set the main tasks of providing regulatory and legal institutional 
structures within which capital markets may function, but also to emplace a safety net for the 
unemployed, the infirm, and the old. Within this framework, shareholder and consumer 
interests are paramount, domestic markets are deliberately kept open to overseas competitors 
and inbound investors. As a result, government policy is less concerned with giving political 
advantage to national producers than to satisfying the wants and needs of shareholders and 
consumers alike. Performance is seen to be better assured by diversifying locations of firms 
and thereby diluting the effect of any particular downturn in any single national market. 
Linking the Anglo-American system to typologies in Table 4, it can arguably be positioned as 
market-rational/regulatory, but since the early 1980s, being increasingly shaped by market-
ideological influences.       
As regards the German-Japanese Corporate System, both countries were late industrialisers 
and promoted banks taking deposits and investing in the shares of businesses in an attempt to 
accelerate industrial growth. Both encouraged the development of large corporate 
conglomerates in private hands and at the same times sought to reduce trade and financial 
dependency on foreign sources (Story, 2000:135). Managers, bureaucratic mechanisms, and 
political parties were placed in the driving seats of corporate Germany and Japan in 
collaborative frameworks. This arrangement effectively calls upon the respective loyalties of 
the actors whereby their powers are legitimised by a national corporate ideal. Labour, 
industrial policy and capital markets were designed around a national cohesive polity in order 
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to overcome the 'wounds of war' rather than as a means of creating an efficient economy 
(Story, 2000:135). In both systems the financial markets are highly regulated to ensure 
monetary stability and to protect depositors from bank failure.9 Compared to the UK and US, 
the amount and volume of shares freely floating on stock markets makes them volatile, as 
investors, domestic and foreign, move in and out of the market. This effectively means that 
the majority of activity and therefore, market discipline, is generated by the insider elites 
(Story, 2000:135) of managers of the corporations and financial institutions. Corporate 
control is effected by a largely internal allocation of resources within corporations. This is a 
fundamental departure from the Anglo-American model as it maintains a closer relationship 
between the external sources of capital, the banks, and capital markets, with the corporations' 
decision-making processes and, arguably, their governance.  In this bank-industrial cross-
shareholding way the diverse conglomerates in Germany and Japan are protected from 
exposure to foreign market access and, therefore, take-over. This in turn allows the domestic 
market to be launch pad for forays into foreign markets which suggests a more mercantilist 
approach to world trade. However, as Story observes, this is national mercantilism's ‘Achilles 
Heel’ (200:135). The financial system as a whole must be prepared to deal with the 
consequences of large trade surpluses which flow from the joint corporate interest in markets 
shares described above, as there is the potential for domestic inflationary pressure. This is 
overcome by the rapid recycling of funds earned from exports into the building of portfolios 
of investments in other markets around the world, revaluations of currency, and foreign direct 
investments to avoid the high cost of domestic production. In this way corporations may 
become detached from banks as their external source of funds from world markets grow 
while the banks and other financial institutions increasingly compete in other countries for 
new clients. This separation in turn diminishes the self-regulatory mechanism. This system 
can be seen to represent elements of both the market-rational/regulatory state and the plan-
rational/development state in Table 3 
A third variation deriving from the national economic-political systems described in Table 3, 
is the ‘State-led Financial Market System’ which can be seen to lie within the plan-
rational/developmental framework quadrant in in the way France has developed its political 
economy. This model, as it was, can in some ways be considered as a 'half-way house' 
between US/UK capitalism and the former Soviet planned economic system. Story 
(2000:136) suggests this model appeals, or did appeal, to those countries whose agriculture 
                                                 
9  Recent history suggests the German interpretation of this protection is more robust. 
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was backward, where small businesses dominated and larger corporations were few and 
foreign-owned. The French Ministry of Finance siphoned off surplus deposit funds taken by 
the financial and deposit-taking institutions and redirected them to public sector institutions 
who, in turn, lent them to specific industries such as agriculture, nuclear energy, and regional 
investment projects. 
However, the result of this particular corporate-public funding relationship led to public 
officials being closely attended by senior managers of large private corporations in those 
favoured sectors in search of priority distribution of recycled funds. The result of this was a 
series of contests between competing producer coalitions for a 'silver key' to public finances. 
In 1981 the new Mitterand administration extended the public sector just as external debt was 
rapidly increasing and domestic savings were significantly reducing. France then needed to 
reduce the cost of servicing its public debt and market reforms were introduced between 
1984-1988 to promote Paris as a major financial centre, in order to lower the cost of public 
capital. 
This conflation of private and public capital requirements with government redistribution of 
funds and a more open national stock market effectively led to a political market for 
corporate control as the top management positions were sought by the elite of state officials. 
Story (2000:137) argues that this state-led capitalism is unsustainable, as by definition it 
seeks to allocate national resources for national purposes. With a more receptive stock market 
foreign investors seek entry and bring with them access (to domestic investors and producers) 
to new technology, alternative management skills, and above all, access to foreign markets. 
Inward investors then are competing with domestic producers in their home markets, which 
prompts national investors to retaliate and enter foreign markets through trade and 
investment. The state now finds itself torn between its old and its new exposure to freer trade. 
As the state's corporations increasingly nationalise their domestic purposes and methods must 
undergo fundamental revision. In the longer term, national corporations conjoin their foreign 
corporate cousins in the global markets. 
In this way, we are now able to establish three theoretical frameworks for early consideration 
of variations between EU national capitalisms: those states aligned to institutional structures 
that demonstrate a combination of market-ideological and market-rational-regulatory 
influences; members adapting a mix of market-rational-regulatory and plan-rational-
developmental inspirations; and the third alternative of plan-rational-developmental only. In 
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EU terms these translate respectively as UK market-influenced, German corporate-
influenced, and French state-influenced versions of national capitalism. Schmidt (2002) 
describes the three as models of capitalism, and translates these as market capitalism, 
managed capitalism, and state capitalism. Market capitalism is where the liberal state allows 
economic actors to operate autonomously, and to decide for themselves on the directions of 
their economic activity. Managed capitalism describes the enabling state that encourages 
economic actors to operate co-operatively and to co-ordinate the direction of their activities 
with one another and the state. And, state capitalism portrays the state as an interventionist 
organiser of co-operation among autonomous economic actors and directs their economic 
activities (2002:107). 
Effectively, this offers a departure point, although only that, for a closer examination of the 
potential for a greater variety of capitalisms that now constitute the EU, and it is important at 
this point to differentiate between the literature that broadly encompasses a comparative 
political economy perspective, and which attempts to variously embrace all, or most, of the 
differing types of national economies; and the narrower, which some would argue, is not 
really a varieties of capitalism narrative but more a dichotomous, or n=2 view, that of the 
Varieties of Capitalism text by Peter Hall and David Soskice. Colin Hay begins by positing a 
challenge to the text based narrowly on what he describes as micro-foundations-based 
rationalist variant of neoinstitutionalism, and one which he views as overlooking the  
sociological and  historical elements of the new institutionalism (Hay2002:2). The first 
question here, and one that Hay suggests is essentially an ontological issue, is whether 
capitalism does in fact come in varieties.  
Hay argues… 
It is important, then, that we ask ourselves whether capitalism does indeed come in 
varieties and, if so, whether the varieties of capitalism perspective operationalises 
adequately that insight. Though these are independent issues, they are by no means 
unrelated…  
… In other words, one can defend the notion that capitalism comes in varieties 
without having to defend the varieties of capitalism perspective of Peter Hall, 
Daniel Gingerich, David Soskice and their various co-authors (2002:3) 
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This is important, and especially so for this thesis, because although the nominal terms ‘Co-
Ordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) are used later 
to nominally categorise two of the proposed five types of EU national capitalism against 
which empirical evidence from selected macroeconomic datasets is compared, these 
expressions are employed to represent a much broader neoinstitutional alignment, which 
attempts to take into account the full spectrum of the neoinstitutionalist variants illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
Whilst acknowledging that national capitalisms do vary, that there are also both institutional 
variations and commonalities over time, and that these characteristics may lead to ‘clustered 
variation’ that is useful to map empirically and to conceptualise theoretically, Hay describes a 
number of dangers in attempting any attempt at developing a varieties of capitalism approach. 
Four such potential pitfalls can be identified. First, with the ‘growing salience’ of 
transnational institutions, particularly at regional level and especially so with the EU, uni-
scalar or dual-scale, approaches to capitalist variation may be cruelly exposed.  Second, the 
tendency towards comparative statics such as the ‘British political tradition’ and the ‘French 
political tradition’, as though they are ‘invariant over time’ completely overlooks the 
dynamics of national institutions over time, with the result that there may be an overly 
incremental and path dependent conception of institutional change, deviations from which 
can only be explained by reference to exogenous shocks. Third, there is the dual tendency of 
linking political fatalism with institutional and culture lock-in effects which obviously 
disallows any real opportunity to embrace political dynamism.  
As Hay puts it.  
… if political actors in Britain are, in the end, confined to replicate and reinvent 
the British political system and the institutions which serve (and service) it  ad 
nauseam, then there is little or no place for political dynamism. In a world of path 
dependent lock-in effects… institutionalists wedded to the notion of capitalist 
variation principally at the national level are likely to anticipate the replication of 
national distinctiveness over time, relegating political variables to a rather 
secondary role (2002:5-6)  
And finally, the ‘occupational hazard’ to over-emphasise the unit level, invariably in this 
case, the national level rather than the sector level or the system level. Although the 
prominence of the firm in Hall and Soskice’s account does go part-way to consider the 
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system level in their analyses, the same cannot be said for the system level, where Hay argues 
‘it is difficult to tell that the objects of analysis are varieties of capitalism as distinct from 
varieties of exchange economy or, indeed, varieties of liberal democracy’ (2002:6). As 
Howell (2003) notes, ‘Capitalism is an empty vessel in much of the analysis’. 
So here there are a number of questions raised about the notion of a generic varieties of 
capitalism analytical framework as based on the ontological view that capitalism does indeed 
come in various forms, and that these are essentially groups of national capitalisms; the 
assumptions about, and dependence on, a micro-foundations-based rationalist variant of 
neoinstitutionalism; and also the dualistic categorisation of Hall and Soskice’s LMEs and 
CMEs. On this last point, Hay points out that the depiction of LMEs as institution-light and 
CMEs as institution-dense may suggest that CMEs are potentially more fragile that their 
LME counterparts, although Hall and Soskice confuse us here by saying that LMEs are not 
un-co-ordinated, but rather co-ordinated in different ways - and by markets (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001:Introduction chapter). However, this only works if it is either assumed or 
believed that markets are self-regulating, or as Hay puts it ‘self-equilibrating’, which they are 
patently not. Markets exist partly as a consequence of the centrality to LMEs of 
commodification and marketization, that are, are often products themselves of the 
‘institutionalisation of market incentives’ and associated rationalities. 
An analytical framework that is ostensibly based on a ‘clear’ dualistic distinction, will always 
face difficulties when presented with the kind of developmental tendencies that have been a 
demonstrable feature throughout the history of the EU in general, and of its national 
capitalisms in particular. So how does such a dualistic cluster stand up to perhaps the 
emergence of a new variety of capitalism, and so be faced with moving from two to three or 
more varieties? What of the potential for a subsumption of one variety by the other, thereby 
moving from two varieties into one? How would the approach deal with one national 
capitalism moving into the other variety? There is also the twin question regarding 
convergence and divergence: what of potential convergence and divergence of capitalisms 
within; or convergence and divergence between either variety? And, what of the possibility of 
greater or lesser variation amongst all the national capitalisms contained in both sets? 
To sum up, Hay’s observations leave us with a clear view that while there is utility in both 
the generic varieties of capitalism comparative framework and Hall and Soskice’s dualistic 
varieties of capitalism perspective, care must be exercised especially in terms of paying due 
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attention to the need to consider the full neoinstitutionalist spectrum with its seven variants 
spanning the rational-choice economic quantitative through to the normative political 
qualitative of the former; and also the dualistic and static  limitations of the latter. In essence 
we are pointed towards thinking more about variations of institutionalism, rather than 
variations of capitalism. And, this is obviously a major consideration of this thesis as the 
notion of an EU supracapitalism demands the need to illustrate just how the 25 members of 
the EU and the 12 members of the Eurosphere, each with their own particular 
neoinstitutionalist profiles may react to, or interact with, the supra-institutional complexities 
of the EU in general, and the ECB in particular.  
EU Integration and the conception of Europeanisaton 
While the foregoing passages have so far focused on the evolution of capitalism in relation to 
the EU, and an examination of the broader scope of the varieties of capitalism genre, the 
potential for an EU supracapitalism also requires an exploration of the literature covering EU 
integration. This can be seen as having two dimensions in the context of this thesis: the 
broader aspect of European integration based on economic integration as a precursor to 
political union; and the narrower issues surrounding Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
and the ECB as the central institutional actor of an EU supracapitalism.  
Hooghe and Marks (1999) perhaps offer a suitable starting point by considering EU 
integration as a ‘struggle’ in the making of a polity. For them, European integration has been 
a twin process of polity-creating and market-deepening. The Single European Act (1986) and 
the Maastricht Treaty (1993) effectively ensure market integration where a wide variety of 
nontariff barriers have been reduced or eliminated; while institutional reforms have created a 
single, although diverse polity. This polity is seen to be a system of multi-level governance 
that ‘encompasses a variety of authoritative institutions at supranational, national, and sub-
national levels of decision-making’ (1999:70). What is of particular relevance to this thesis is 
their view that the failure of Keynesianism in the face of the neoliberal interpretation of 
national capitalisms, was not simply the failure of a particular set of macroeconomic policies, 
but the ‘failure of a mode of policy-making that was distinctly national’. In essence, then we 
have the view here that the former national interpretations of how capitalist economies should 
be run were no longer valid, and that collective institutional management may be a viable 
alternative. They stress that European integration is an ‘irreducibly political, as well as an 
economic process’ (1999:71). The result of these ideas of a struggle for an EU polity with 
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supranational, national, and sub-national dimensions, together with the part failure of national 
economies to harness capitalism and the onset of the neoliberal agenda yields a ‘spaces of 
contestation as illustrated in Figure 5.       
For Schmidt (2002), there is the need to consider the concepts of both ‘Europeanisation’ and 
European integration. Europeanisation is thus seen as either a sub-text to the many and varied 
characterisations and interpretations of globalisation, where it can be either a reaction to, or 
feature of, globalisation; or a reactive challenge to the very existence of the phenomenon of 
globalisation (see Hirst and Thompson, 1992:1996). In general, Europeanisation can be 
viewed as a post-Second World War movement which set out to end war (in Europe) and 
fight communism by embracing Germany, while containing the Soviet Union and its Eastern 
Bloc allies economically, as well as militarily. For the countries that were to eventually form 
the EU, regional integration represented not only a way of ensuring peace, it also appeared to 
answer the problems of international and inter-European competition, thereby running 
counter to most globalisation theories, and also supporting Hirst and Thompson’s 
proclaiming of regionalisation as an alternative view. As its mandate grew from a narrow 
focus on co-ordinating structural adjustment in the sectors most linked to the problems that 
fuelled the Second World War, to promoting and organising trade liberalisation and 
economic development across sectors of industry. Subsequently, pressures related to 
Europeanisation have significantly increased on EU member-states not only in terms of 
market liberalisation and capital mobility, but also in terms of the drive towards a clear 
political programme for European integration (Schmidt 2002:41). In this way, 
Europeanisation has effectively moved on from the early modest effects of a post-war 
programme for ‘little more than a customs union’ to the dramatic changes related to a 
programme for common defence, economic, and monetary policy along with enlargement to 
the east; the latter being seen with the 2004 accessions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia together with the three Baltic countries. This view of the 
process can best be seen as EU decision-making exerting economic, institutional, and 
ideational pressures on member-states, who in turn, through their individual policies, 
practices, and politics establish economic, institutional, and ideational positions that converge 
and transmute into European integration. The establishment of EMU, the creation of the 
ECB, and the consequent launch of the euro are illustrations of this process. 
However, Howe (1995) views the concept of European integration somewhat differently. 
Considering the ‘requisite underpinnings for a community of Europeans’, Howe begins by 
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unpacking earlier explanatory frameworks regarding European integration that centre on 
levels of government. The creation, expansion, and consolidation of the EU owe much to the 
determination of statesmen to forge into a ‘common community the historically-divided 
countries of western Europe’. The continuing integration within the EU since 1957 has 
largely been the product of forceful initiatives on the part of governments. However, for the 
fuller, and perhaps more meaningful ongoing EU integration, Howe looks to two theories of 
community, by starting with the notion that in modern liberal communities there is an 
‘abundance of norms’ that require some measure of altruism on the part of citizens. For 
example, the payment of taxes often amounts to nearly half of people’s income, in order to 
support the welfare state and the provision of numerous other public goods and services. 
‘Individual citizens’, argues Howe, ‘in complying voluntarily with such norms, demonstrate a 
willingness to sacrifice their own interests to the interests of others, many of whom are 
complete strangers’ This is considered in the historical scheme of things as unusual. Perhaps, 
citizens of modern liberal communities recognise some intrinsic value in their fellow citizens 
(1995:29). Assuming for now that we consider the EU as a modern liberal community, Howe 
draws on the theories of Anthony Smith and Karl Deutsch to explain how, at different 
historical stages, people, by attaching importance to different shared elements, can come to 
have new notions of the boundaries community. 
Smith (1986;1988;1992) begins by rebutting the oft-repeated argument that national 
communities are fabrications, with little substantiation in ethnicity, and as being largely 
concocted by 19th and 20th century political leaders and the print media to promote the 
acceptance of capitalism as the only meaningful and effective  politico-economic system for 
the promotion of citizens’ well-being. Smith argues that while the ethnicity, and ethnicities, 
of today of differ from the ethnicities of the past, and that while ethnicity has now been 
joined by important civic elements that can have transferable sub-national, national, regional, 
and supranational influences, its importance has often been overlooked by those blinkered by 
an unquestioning conviction of the modern state as the sole unit of analysis. Smith points to 
the use by national leaders of historical memories and myths about a nation’s ethnic origins 
to buttress national unity, and also the high rates of failure when there is no visible, ‘pre-
modern’ ethnic community available to ‘lend credence to these myths’. Moreover, while 
nationalist histories may be modified over time, there is often in many instances an unbroken 
thread of evolution from pre-modern ethnic community into modern nationhood.  
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However, these ideas are not easily transferrable to the EU, where Smith sees the ‘prospects 
for a community of Europeans as bleak’ (Smith, 1992). Europe will have difficulty in 
competing with the existing array of multiplicities of language groups, ethnic heritages and 
sentiments, myths, memories, and symbols. In matters of ethnicity, culture, and history, there 
is little, if anything uniquely European; and certainly nothing as compelling as that which 
sustains existing national sentiment (Smith 1992:65). For EU integration then Smith is 
suggesting that the past is problematic; but Howe suggests that this can be addressed by 
looking in the other direction: to the future. Starting with the first reason for the creation of 
the EU, that of the shared European-wide lesson as to the savagery and futility of war, and 
the need to do everything possible to prevent another European war, the European project can 
start being oriented towards the future and to collect and reinterpret national history over 
time. In this way, it does not need, in order to succeed, the sort of ancient ethnic and cultural 
history Smith imagines is necessary for any community. Many European leaders are looking 
out on a brave new future, are ‘enjoining their people to be more expansive in their 
communal sentiments, to see in each other something that transcends ethnic and differences, 
a common purpose and destiny’ (Smith, 1992). 
Karl Deutsch sees social communication as the key to building and sustaining communities. 
For Deutsch, political institutions encourage community because they foster, as they have to, 
communication. Deutsch does not reject alternative theories of community that embrace 
national sentiments such as ‘language, territorial residence, traditions, habits, historical 
memories, and the like’ (Deutsch, 1966:17). As Howe notes, there is, Deutsch freely admits, 
a certain correlation between each type of characteristic and nationhood. However, some of 
the most frequently cited objective characteristics of a people, such as language, do not seem 
to be essential to its unity; for example, Switzerland (Deutsch,1966). According to Deutsch, 
the essence of community is ‘the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider 
range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders’ (Deutsch, 1966:97). 
However, this simple, although very reasonable, theory requires some qualification, and 
certainly so before it could in any way be useful as an insight into the notion of an EU 
community. First, although Deutsch is very clear that cohesive communities are marked by 
distinctly superior communication networks. However, Howe argues that it is ‘sometimes 
unclear, in his various works’, where the superiority is to be found. For example, is it the 
quantity of communication, such as mail flows or travel links, moving between the residents 
of a particular territory that make them a discernible community? Or, is it the quality of their 
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communication, or the ‘fidelity’ or clarity with which ideas are transmitted from one 
individual to the next? Unfortunately straightforward answers do not really help much. 
Intuitively, most would argue that quality is the most important, but does that mean that those 
groups who communicate little but understand each other very well are more of a community 
than those who communicate very often, but sometimes misunderstand each other. Put like 
this one would probably opt for the former, largely because it is likelier to engender a more 
cohesive community. Finally, and perhaps most importantly in terms of the EU as a 
community, Deutsch stresses a ‘historical process of social learning in which individuals, 
usually over several generations, learn to become a people’ (Deutsch, 1966:174), and in 
doing so sees integration in this way as a long-term process. So, for the EU, increased mail 
links, shared and standardised information communication technology (ICT), travel, trade, 
and a general increasing and improving interconnectedness would seem to be the order of the 
day. However, and linking with Smith’s ideas, this will only lead to an effective community 
of Europeans, if, over time, Europeans also successfully generate a shared combination of 
learned memories, symbols, habits, operating preferences that together underwrite the 
crystalline communications essential to the modern community Deutsch, (1966:96).  
To summarise, Howe concludes by reminding us that there is probably no single factor alone 
that determines the readiness of a population to receive and digest new beliefs about the 
boundaries of community. What matters is the cumulative impact of a whole series of 
conditions and influences; and the achievement of this threshold may be necessarily rare 
(Howe, 1995:45). Clearly, then there are only certain populations in which a new belief in 
community has much chance of taking hold. And, at this point in time for Howe, the EU 
would appear to be such a group. At the time of Howe’s narrative EMU was moving towards 
its later developmental stages, the population of the EU was over 30 million more than that of 
the US, the free movement of people, goods, labour, capital was moving apace, 12 countries 
were to adopt a single currency and share a supranational central bank, and the EU parliament 
had been operational for 14 years, and English has largely been adopted as the EU’s ‘business 
language’. It would appear then that there is, by default, a de facto European community in 
existence, and perhaps has been so for a while; the extent to which this can be seen as a 
‘community of Europeans’ remains a moot point. However, for purposes of this thesis, these 
operational community aspects of integration can be taken sufficient, if not yet optimal.  
 Remaining with the broader issues concerning European integration described above, and 
with the nexus of integration and notions of community in mind, leads us directly now to 
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consider a range of international relations theories regarding European integration. In 
‘mapping the mainstream in international relations’, Hay (2002:13), sets out a contemporary 
comparative framework of theories that comprises neoliberalism, neorealism, constructivism, 
and postmodernism. As one would expect, the first two ‘neo’ categories each have 
antecedents and derivatives, and in schematic form, Hay illustrates these for us. Classical 
realism being identified as being the forerunner to structural or neorealism; and with idealism 
its counterpart for neoliberalism. In turn, neoliberalism is also shown as encompassing the 
guises of pluralism, liberalism, liberal institutionalism, interdependence theory, and liberal 
intergovernmentalism. With these two positions seen as the ‘core’, Hay also introduces to the 
mainstream, although perhaps somewhat contentiously, constructivism and postmodernism. 
However, for now it is to neoliberalism, or more specifically, its liberal intergovernmentalism 
form, that is employed to further consider EU integration. Indeed, it is an approach that is 
difficult to ignore, especially as it can be seen as one of a group of leading theories that seek 
to explain, in their own way, the evolution of the EU as the most successful example of 
institutionalised international policy co-ordination in the modern world. Andrew Moravcsik 
(1991;1993;1995;1997;1999) introduces the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism to not 
only describe one such theory of EU integration, but also to clearly lay down a challenge to 
another mainstream rival, by setting out perceived limitations of neofunctionalism. 
Neofunctionalism, developed and refined between 1955 and 1975, Moravcsik (1993) argues, 
‘remains the most comprehensive and sophisticated attempts to provide a general theory of 
European integration’. Since 1975, despite many insights into case studies relating to specific 
issue areas, overviews of EU history, and ongoing criticisms of neofunctionalism, no 
comparable theoretical synthesis has appeared (1993:474). Nevertheless, Moravcsik argues 
that, contrary to claims that European integration can only be explained terms couched in, 
and influenced by, general theories of international relations, the EU can (and should) be 
analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime which is designed to manage economic 
interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination. Therefore, refinements and 
extensions of existing theories of foreign economic policy, intergovernmental negotiation, 
and international regimes provide a credible and generalizable explanation of its evolution. 
These theories rest on the assumption that state behaviour reflects the rational actions of 
governments constrained at home by domestic social pressures, and abroad by the strategic 
environment(s) they may find themselves in. Moravcsik continues by also suggesting that an 
understanding of the preferences and power of EU’s member-states is a logical starting point 
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for analysis (1993:474). Moreover, that the EU is undoubtedly a unique institution in its own 
right does not necessarily require it to be seen as one of its own kind, or put another way, 
does not require a sui generis theory.     
Firstly, as regards the limitations of neofunctionalism, Moravcsik points to the 
neofunctionalists’ central prediction that the European economic integration which was (is) 
seen as the precursor for eventual political integration would be self-sustaining. Central to 
this idea was the notion of ‘spillover’, where initial integrational steps trigger endogenous 
economic and political dynamics leading to further co-operation. Neofunctionalists identify 
two types of spillover: functional and political. Each is considered to both deepen and widen 
integration by working through interest group pressure, public opinion, elite socialisation, or 
other domestic actors and processes. Functional spillover, which is economic in nature, 
occurs when incomplete or slowing integration undermines the effectiveness of existing 
policies and therefore creates pressures for further deepening and widening policy co-
ordination. Political spillover happens when the existence or formation of supranational 
organisations sets in motion a self-reinforcing process of institution-building. The effective 
regulation of a modern, integrated international economy requires technocratic oversight by 
supranational authorities. 
 However, Moravcsik notes that despite its ‘richness of insights’, neofunctionalism is now 
widely regarded as having offered an ‘unsatisfactory account of European integration’ 
(Moravcsik, 1993:475). There are three main reasons for this. First, in the mid-1970s 
neofunctionalists had largely convinced themselves that what they then called ‘regional 
integration theory’ having explained the progress of the EU (then the EC) should be 
supplemented or supplanted by a general theory of national policy responses to international 
interdependence. Rather than focusing on the future aspirations that make the EU unique, 
they preferred to believe that the existing aspects of the current activities of the EU were 
already generalizable. Second, because the neofunctionalists were concerned with inexorably 
moving towards a terminal position called ‘political community’ as a unique and potentially 
federal structure in Europe that would prevent war and guarantee peaceful change, and whilst 
remaining under the assumption that the two types of spillovers would endure and continue to 
be automatic mechanisms for progress towards integration, oversight was lost in terms of 
important policy areas such as external tariffs, agricultural prices, and regulatory 
harmonisation. And third, again during the 1970s, an increasing realisation among 
neofunctionalists regarding the need to meaningfully incorporate theories of national 
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preference formation and intergovernmental negotiation, both grounded in in assumptions 
about actor preference, choices, and constraints. Effectively, neofunctionalism had been 
mostly describing the progress and evolution of the EU when there was a growing need to 
explain it.  
So then what does liberal intergovernmentalism offer in terms of explaining EU integration?  
Moravcsik offers a two-stage approach. In the first stage, national preferences are primarily 
determined by the constraints and opportunities imposed by economic interdependence. In 
the second, the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations are determined by the relative 
bargaining power of national governments, and the incentives that for the creation of 
institutions created by increasing transaction costs and the desire to control individual 
domestic agendas. Moravcsik reinforces this by suggesting that this approach is grounded in 
the fundamental concepts international political economy, negotiation analysis, and regime 
theory Moravcsik (1993:517).  
Therefore, the economic interests of producers and popular preferences for public goods and 
services offer a solid foundation for explaining industrial trade liberalisation and   agricultural 
policy formation, as well as socio-economic public goods provision within the EU. These 
preferences indicate the goals of individual states, their alternatives, and the extent to which 
governments may then wish to compromise. Furthermore, the outcomes of intergovernmental 
negotiations are shaped by unilateral and coalitional alternatives to agreement, in addition to 
opportunities for compromise and association-forming.  
EU institutions usually delegate and pool sovereignty by taking key decisions about linkage 
out of the hands of national governments. This delegation and pooling of authority of 
supranational authority in the EU can be explained by extending existing functional regime 
theory which holds that international institutions affect the behaviour of other states or 
international actors. It assumes that co-operation is possible in the anarchic system of states, 
as regimes are, by definition instances of international co-operation. Governments weigh the 
potential gains from co-operation against the domestic political risk. However, governments 
also delegate authority and provide for qualified majority voting in order to increase the 
efficiency of bargaining at the expense of slightly increased political risk for domestic 
groups. 
Therefore, by bringing together theories of preferences, and bargaining and regimes, liberal 
intergovernmentalism provides credible accounts for many aspects of the major decisions in 
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EU history. It sharply contrasts with neofunctionalism in the following ways. Firstly, 
neofunctionalism emphasises domestic technocratic consensus; where liberal 
intergovernmentalism looks towards domestic coalitional struggles. Secondly, where 
neofunctionalism emphasises opportunities to ‘upgrade the common interest’; liberal 
intergovernmentalism stresses the role of relative power between national governments. 
Thirdly, where neofunctionalism propounds the active role of supranational officials in 
shaping bargaining outcomes; liberal intergovernmentalism highlights instead passive 
institutions and the autonomy of national leaders. Moravcsik adds here ‘Ironically, the EC’s 
(EU’s) ‘democratic deficit’ may be a fundamental source of its success’ (1993:518). 
Liberal intergovernmentalism, while not readily aligned to the main supranational thrust of 
this thesis, does appear to offer a cogent alternative to the once embedded ideas of 
neofunctionalism as an explanatory mechanism for EU integration. However, it does have its 
critics; and they generally point to three areas. First, there is a question regarding the basic 
theoretical framework, in that state behaviour is not necessarily pre-determined and 
instrumental; national preference formation does not always precede the formulation of 
strategies; or that national preference and intergovernmental bargaining are mostly 
subjugated to, and manipulated by, supranational actors. Second, critics may challenge the 
liberal understanding of state preferences, which calls on contemporary theories of economic 
interdependence in order to explain national preferences. This is largely because alternative 
understandings of economic interest are both possible and readily available. And third, they 
may also question the intergovernmental explanation of bargaining, with its stress on 
negotiating power rooted in unilateral alternatives, competing coalitions, the possibilities for 
associations, and the controlled delegation of power up to supranational institutions. 
However, it is, as Moravcsik strongly emphasises, difficult to deny the importance and 
relevance of preferences and power altogether (1993:519). Indeed, within the context of this 
thesis in general, and the later arguments regarding a suitable typology of EU national 
capitalisms in particular, national preference and power formations, both individual and 
collective, play a central role in employing national capitalisms as units of analysis in any 
meaningful comparative political economy exercise. And, while Moravcsik and his liberal 
intergovernmentalism clearly afford supranational institutions less weight and prominence 
than neofunctionalism did, he does encourage ongoing debate between general theories of 
domestic and international politics rather than a ‘clash between ‘intergovernmentalist’ and 
‘supranationalist ideal-types’  (1993:519). 
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As a footnote, and contrast, to Moravcsik’s argument in some of the foregoing discussions 
regarding liberal intergovernmentalism and its role in European integration, Thomas 
Christiansen’s contribution offers an insightful study into the role of supranational actors in 
EU treaty reform negotiations at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). The salient points 
from Christiansen (2002) are summarised below. 
The study of supranational agency confirms the need to analyse treaty reform as a process, to 
consider its structural elements and the way in which structures interact with action. The 
main points are first, IGCs have a structure consisting of rules of governing the interaction 
among players. Supranational institutions may not necessarily be the strongest players with 
respect to the negotiation of outcomes, but they have considerable influence in the setting of 
the rules, and therefore in the structuring of the IGCs. These formal and informal rules rely 
on established practices governing EU policy-making, and have been imported  as a side-
effect of relying on the exiting institutional structure of the EU. This includes the use of fora 
like the European Council and the General Affairs Council for the debate of IGC matters; the 
familiarity of participants, whether representing member-states or EU institutions, with 
existing procedures, but also the very involvement of supranational actors in the negotiations 
who have both an interest in, and a habit regarding, extending those working methods to the 
IGC. Therefore, Commission President Delors had a major role in the setting up of the first, 
major IGC of recent times, not only in terms of substantive issues, but also in terms of the 
format and the structure of the talks. Without such a strong Commission influence at the time, 
probably an entirely different format of negotiating treaty reform would have evolved. Less 
obvious, but nevertheless much more consistently, the involvement of Council Secretariat 
together with its legal service have ensured that IGC negotiations have remained wedded to 
the standard operating procedures of the EU, regardless of their different constitutional status.  
Second, a particular aspect of this institutionalisation is the provision of a process for agenda-
setting that is fairly open, and which is also tied to the existing EU policy process. It includes 
consultation of other institutions and participation of their representatives in arenas of 
‘structured reflection’ and also permits them to commission special reports from independent 
advisors, or ‘wise men’ (Christiansen, 2002:50). This participation in the agenda-setting 
phase of the IGC, in turn, provides a privileged platform from which to generate a wider 
public discourse about the need for, and the aims of, EU treaty reform. Even if, as Moravcsik 
appears to imply, such ploys do not have a direct effect on the IGC negotiations at hand, they 
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do tend to create an air of expectation which means that issues will be addressed at future 
IGCs. 
Third, supranational institutions have a special role in the legitimation of treaty reform, 
owing to their particular standing among the IGC actors. They stand apart because they do 
not possess formal veto rights over outcomes of negotiations, but at the same time they can 
claim to represent the common European interest, and to protect this against certain 
challenges by national governments. Because of this they occupy a certain moral ground, 
although not necessarily a higher moral ground, which ‘may induce specific dynamics both 
inside and outside the conference room’ (Christiansen, 2002:50).  
Fourth, representatives of supranational institutions at IGCs are participants in a social 
process. The IGC negotiations are conducted by a select group of individuals, and not by 
either member-states or supranational institutions. Personal relationships among conference 
participants, therefore, do develop over time, and at the same time the duration and intensity 
generates an espirit de corps. In terms of their specialist knowledge of the substance and 
working methods of the IGCs, and the value which they come to add to proceedings, the 
group can be considered as an epistemic community. This development is one particular 
aspect of the social process of European integration which occurs at the domestic, as well as 
the transnational European level. Interestingly, this process is recognised by rationalists and 
social constructivists alike (Moravcsik, 1999: 267-306). 
This transnational community of negotiators conducts the everyday IGC proceedings, often in 
the face of opposing political positions imposed by national governments. However, they are 
also operating in an environment in which the continuous and long-term interaction among 
group members becomes a unifying element, and where ideas and knowledge, independent of 
their origins, can have an impact on negotiations, notwithstanding the potential for 
subsequent disagreements or vetoes on political levels. (Christiansen, 2202:51)  
Synthesis 
Although there are further intrinsic treatments of the literature is subsequent passages, 
especially those relating to constructivism and institutionalism in the next chapter, heterodox 
challenges to mainstream neoclassical understanding of national capitalism and the role of 
money, and an extension to the commentary on varieties of capitalism, the main purposes of 
the literatures in the above passages have been threefold. First to link evolutionary aspects of 
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capitalism to the contemporary national capitalisms of the EU; then to identify salient 
explanations of EU integration and Europeanisation in relation to the notion of an EU 
supracapitalism; and finally to identify and locate a theoretical framework which can support 
such a notion. The evolutionary literature seems to point towards the potential for a new form 
of capitalism emerging given the required social preconditions, and that a given set of 
appropriate institutional structures such as the ECB and the Eurosphere, may constitute these 
requirements. Furthermore, the existing extensive bodies of work on EU economic 
integration and varieties of capitalism offer substantial analytical utility, and are of 
considerable value in understanding certain aspects of EU national capitalisms in general, and 
Eurosphere economies in particular. The central aspects of methods of similarity and methods 
of difference are utilised alongside elements of both eras of integration commentary in 
Chapters 3 and 4. And, the ECB is discussed in relation to the supranational management of 
the 12 Eurosphere capitalisms, and in Chapter 3 where an analytical typology of EU 
capitalisms is advanced.  
However, it is important to emphasise that, with the exception of the SSA explanations which 
do, to some extent, facilitate both opportunities to consider alternative interpretations of 
national capitalisms, and also to more closely examine differing institutional architectural 
dynamics of individual capitalisms over time, the ultimate limitations of these literatures is 
that they do not explicitly address three of the key issues of this thesis. The first of these 
pertains to the episodic failures of collective national capitalisms as politico-economic 
systems, and the recurring regenerations of capitalism, which, in turn, become future episodic 
failures. Secondly, and in line with the first point, is that they overlook the redistributive 
problems highlighted in the introduction chapter, largely because in the majority of the  
material covering EU capitalism and national capitalisms, the overall nature and 
characteristics of capitalism are treated as accepted ‘givens’, and as such are not 
meaningfully addressed. The varieties of capitalism literatures look toward national or 
collective national interpretations of virtually the same mutually-accepted nature and 
character of capitalism.  And finally, there does not appear to be anywhere in the bodies of 
work discussed above, whether economic or political integration or varieties of capitalism, a 
serious challenge to the neoclassical view of the core functionalities of national economies, 
and especially so regarding the actual role(s) of money in the overall financial management 
of these economies. These concerns are referred to in a number of the following passages, but 
specifically so in Chapter 6. 
56 
 
 
Chapter 2 The ECB and the Eurosphere as social constructs: 
a constructivist-institutionalism approach 
 
Introduction 
The value of bringing an institutional political science approach alongside a constructivist 
international relations perspective is seen by Dyson (2000) to address the meaning of power 
in, and of, the Eurosphere, and together see its matters of interests as Wendt (1999) notes, 
largely a function of ideas. The neoinstitutionalist approach is employed here in two ways. 
Firstly, it assists us in understanding the movements and forces behind these Eurosphere 
dynamics; and secondly, it helps to highlight the potential for collective identity and 
accepted norms within the Eurosphere. As Dyson argues, these aspects of European 
integration tend to elude the realist approaches (2000:8), which view governments as rational 
and self-interested actors characterised by interests in power, security, and wealth, and which 
are exogenous givens and root states in the mind-set of considering other states as rivals or 
enemies, rather than as partners. Here, the use of sociological institutionalism helps us to see 
institutions within the Eurosphere as working towards less of a constraining type of 
behaviour as portrayed in the rationalist approaches, and more like mechanisms that shape 
how identities are perceived, interests are defined, and power is deployed. The ‘thin’ 
constructivist, and ‘thick’ constructivist perspectives are ways of viewing the Eurosphere as 
morally defensible, whereby the value, and values, of seeing Eurosphere members as 
partners or friends as opposed to rivals or enemies, is underpinned by inter-state relations 
based on mutual aid rather than self-interest. Two early, pre-Eurosphere examples of this can 
be seen with the formations of the post-war ECSC and Benelux alliances. Moreover, the 
constructivist perspective can accommodate the complexity, complication, uncertainty, and 
collective insecurity related to what the future may hold. And, in doing so recognises the 
difficult process of cultural transformation, identity formation, and interest definition. 
Possible future changes within the Eurosphere, and between its members (and within and 
between ex-Eurosphere EU members), together with its collective ability to obviate 
endogenous and exogenous shocks, will be shaped by the constructivist values of collective 
identity and shared ideas. As Ben Rosamond (2005) notes, ‘constructivism inevitably sheds 
new light on EU governance simply as it can incorporate more ontologies into its 
understanding, and a larger arsenal allows it to analyse both endogenously and exogenously’.  
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 Table 5 below summarises the conjunction of neoinstitutionalism and constructivism in an 
ECB context. 
Table 5 
______________________________________________________________________ 
A constructivist-institutionalism theoretical alignment to the ECB and the Eurosphere 
 
 Neoinstitutionalism 
and constructivism 
The ECB and the Eurosphere 
Role of theory To inform and 
sensitise analysis to 
the complexity of the 
process of change 
The need to build a theoretical 
framework from which to measure 
and understand the processes of the 
developing EU centred on the ECB 
and its Eurosphere 
Theoretical 
assumptions 
Complex Unique and complex  
Analytical approach Sensitising and 
informative (guides 
analysis) 
The need to analyse differing 
political and economic trajectories 
Method Theoretically 
informed; 
comparative and 
historical. 
Development of theory using 
comparative, sociological, 
historical and empirical approaches. 
The EU, ECB, and the Eurosphere 
as a set of ideas 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: adapted from Table 1.9 in Hay (2002:29 
 
With this in mind, the chapter follows a structure that begins with overviews of rationalist, 
constructivist, and postmodern or reflectivist perspectives, before moving on to consider how 
a constructivist-neoinstitutionalist amalgam may be applied to the ECB and its Eurosphere by 
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looking at the Eurosphere through an ECB-centric lens and via selected variants of 
constructivist-neoinstitutionalism analyses. 
The rationalist approaches  
During the late 1990s, approximately half way through the prescribed analytical timeframe of 
this thesis, not only did EMU culminate in the establishment of the ECB, the single currency, 
and the Eurosphere, but the investigative focus employed by most commentators to 
understand the development of the EU collectively shifted from the integration process itself 
towards matters concerning governance. In what is sometimes referred to as the ‘governance 
turn’, the integration-focused debate between neo-functionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism gave way to an ideological contest between rationalism and 
constructivism (Christiansen et al, 1999, Moravcsik 1998). This analytical realignment can 
also be seen as a defining moment of the EU’s journey along the path from 
intergovernmentalism to transgovernmentalism, where the movement towards the building of 
an EU supranational institutional architecture was viewed as a variant of neofunctionalism; 
and intergovernmental institutionalism was employed to focus on the state, and convergent 
and divergent national interests and interstate bargaining (Moravcsik, 1991). Furthermore, the 
intergovernmental view was, in turn, given by Keohane (1984) to affirm elements of realist 
foundations in what he describes as the modified structural realist explanation for regional 
co-operation. And, although Moravcsik (1991:27) argues that ‘states are not black boxes’ in 
order to describe that states’ interests and the power distributions between them change over 
time, and therefore that these movements are often decisive in integration processes, both 
point to rudiments of realist analyses transcending or threading between the above two eras of 
EU commentary. 
At first glance then, it may appear natural that any early explanatory account or longitudinal 
analysis of the development of the ECB and its Eurosphere up until its realisation in 1999 
(and, for that matter, perhaps the EU’s ex-Eurosphere as well), should be undertaken from 
within either of the above two dominant streams of integrationist thought; and that any post-
single currency examination of the ECB may be influenced by rationalist or constructivist 
interpretations, with therefore, some form of rationalism in its broadest sense transcending 
both phases of analysis. This, in the late 1990s rationalist sense, means either from a 
neorealist or neoliberalist international relations perspective. In the case of the former, 
analysis based on the concepts of balance of power, relative gains, and hegemonic stability 
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theory (HST); and the latter on the central ideas of interdependence, co-operation, 
international regimes, and absolute gains. Both of these approaches are built on foundations 
of a number of key themes and assumptions, and a brief outline of these will provide a 
comparative backdrop to what may be seen, by some perhaps, as the heterodox notion of the 
ECB and Eurosphere ultimately as social constructs.  
Neorealism begins with the view that states can be analysed as if they were unitary rational 
actors, wholly motivated by national self-interest, by striving to maximise expected utility, 
and under conditions of the international anarchy they perceive constitute the pre-existing 
context within which they find themselves. From this, the behaviour of states can be 
explained solely in terms of the structure of the international system itself, as they are rational 
and as such seek only one optimal course of action open to them (Hay, 2002). The state is a 
sovereign, natural unit of analysis, although neorealism does not overlook the role of 
international institutions in the governance of politics and economics in international 
relations. And, as unitary actors operating under these conjectures, states seek to achieve 
relative, rather than absolute gains from other states. In terms of the perceived anarchical 
structure of the international system, it is this that forces states to act as they do, and although 
states are, as a consequence, inherently competitive and conflictual, actual conflict can be 
avoided through the mechanisms that are the result of balances of power. The neorealism 
approach to world politics, whilst accepting anarchy in the international system, also believes 
this may be ameliorated if a dominant state emerges from within the system to assume a 
level(s) of leadership whereby international institutions can provide a reliable basis for co-
operation between states. An example of this the post-war Bretton Woods accord, where the 
US assumed the leadership or hegemonic power of the international economic system. 
However, as Colin Hay notes, state-centric neorealism does rely on a series of implausible 
assumptions about the unity and rationality of the state (Hay, 2002:21), and lacks any real 
lucidity regarding necessary conditions for co-operation or conflict in the international 
system. 
Neoliberalism, having materialised out of post-First World War utopian idealism, aimed to 
counter this form state centrism, and via the economic dynamics of international relations, to 
investigate the possibilities for co-operation within the international system. Whilst aligning 
with neorealism as to the rationality of individuals and states, neoliberalism believes these 
actors have the capacity to solve problems through collective action, and that such 
international co-operation is both achievable and desirable. However, other actors like 
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transnational corporations (TNCs), religious organisations, and nationalist movements also 
play a central role in international outcomes. Also, unlike their neorealist counterparts, 
neoliberalists assert that states cannot be considered as unified actors but are multi-centric 
and subject to a variety of competing domestic and international pressures. For them, power 
in the international system is dispersed and changeable, and because military force is not the 
only, or most effective, instrument of foreign policy, liberal democratic states do not wage 
war on each other. And, also contrary to its ‘neo’ counterpart, sees states seeking absolute 
gains, rather than relative ones. The complex world economic system renders states evermore 
sensitive, and therefore vulnerable, to outcomes in other countries, thus resulting in a 
significant loss of state autonomy. As regards international institutions and organisations, 
although themselves a product of state action, they often assume an independent identity and 
agency. Nevertheless, and similar to neorealism, neoliberalism lacks clarity regarding the 
conditions under which co-operation or conflict should be expected. It also is considered to 
adopt a utopian and perhaps naïve understanding of the human condition, and of the 
prospects for international co-operation. While the role of international institutions is 
exaggerated, the capacity of the state is understated, and this means that the status quo is 
often either accepted or directly promoted. Critics of the approach also point to the evidence 
relating to the notion that liberal democratic states do not wage war against each other, and 
argue that such democratic states can be, and are, often belligerent towards each other. 
So, how may either of these ‘neo’ approaches inform any longitudinal analysis of the ECB 
and the Eurosphere? Firstly, they both either accept or recognise the importance of 
international institutions. Secondly, both covet the notion of co-operation, and the mutually-
advantageous gains (either relative or absolute) that are to be enjoyed from international 
collaborative policy frameworks. Thirdly, the state is jointly considered as a rational actor, 
and therefore offering up an identifiable unit of analysis, although it is conceded that 
neorealists deem rationality contingent on the anarchic condition of international affairs, 
while neoliberalists view such rationality in relation to collective and co-operative problem-
solving. Fourthly, they both posit a given international anarchy as an explanation for state 
behaviour. Finally, neorealism stresses the need for hegemonic stability, which the ECB’s 
Eurosphere can be seen to offer, although more in a European regional sense than globally. 
And, neoliberals emphasise the need for international institutions and organisations, even if, 
like the ECB, these come to assume an independent identity and display agency in their own 
right.   
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Both perspectives then would seem to have some explanatory power, and also potential 
foundations for an analytical framework. The problem is, however, that both also share an 
inherent instrumental rationality that takes the objectivity of the social and political world as 
another given, and that rejects or underemphasises what Hay describes as the ‘impact of 
national norms on international politics and international norms on national politics’ 
(2002:25). Moreover, both these rationalisms fall short in their analytical capability because 
they both stress the existence of either given, or fixed, national preferences; an emphasis that 
is reinforced by the shared notion of material interests being objective, uncontested, and 
transparent.  Understanding the decision-making processes of the actors involved in the EU, 
as expanded upon by Christiansen (2002) above, is crucial to uncovering the motivators that 
influence policy-making, strategy, and governance. Constructivism, on the other hand, seeks 
to explore the implications of replacing instrumental rationality’s internal logic with a more 
sociological concept of agency. And, is at this point that the alternative, constructivist 
approach to international relations may be introduced; first by way of its assumptions and 
themes, and second as to its potential usefulness as an explanatory mechanism and analytical 
framework in the context of this thesis 
An overview of constructivism 
Taking neorealism and neoliberalism together as being rationalist approaches, and placing 
them at one end of an imaginary international relations analytical continuum with 
postmodernism or reflectivism at the other, constructivism could be positioned somewhere in 
the centre ground, or as Adler (1997) suggests, ‘a middle way’. From this position, 
constructivism seeks to recognise and understand the consequences and effects of accepting 
that political realities are socially constructed, and that (new) ideas relating to the analysis of 
international relations should be allowed a wholly independent role. Moreover, 
constructivism pursues the implications of treating preferences and interests as social 
constructions rather than as objectively given in the way Moravcsik and other liberal 
rationalists portray them. Constructivists forward the notion that beliefs and visions for the 
future play a crucial role in the construction of human reality, and therefore the political and 
social world is not a given, but as Hay puts it an inherently intersubjective domain - a product 
of social construction (2002:24). This means there cannot be an objective social and political 
reality outside of human understanding, and it then follows that there is no social realm 
independent of human activity. A consequence of this is that ideational factors are seen to 
play both a major and material role international relations. 
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Further to the above, Wendt, (1999) suggests constructivism stresses that ‘anarchy is what 
states make of it’. This means that, contrary to the rationalists’ view, the structure of the 
international system does not dictate state behaviour; rather it is the interaction and 
intersubjective understandings of states which gives rise to the condition of anarchy (Hay, 
2002). The constructivist perspective allows an assessment of the transformative impact of 
‘novel social constructions, such as the European Union’, on the state system Hay (2002:25). 
Following Hay further, constructivism also stresses the importance of expansive construction, 
and, in particular, in the identification and response to international relations such as security 
threats – where threats are perceptions, and it is these readings of situations that are 
effectively the bases of responses. 
A summary of constructivism might then be a structural theory (or range of theories) of the 
international system that makes, according to Wendt (1994), the following core claims. First, 
states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory. Second, the key 
structures in the state system are intersubjective rather than material. And third, state 
identities and interests are importantly part-constructed by social structures, rather than given 
exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. However, as is suggested 
above by the references to thin constructivism, thick constructivism, and social 
constructivism, these are variations of constructivism that may be seen to form a series of 
calibrational points along a continuum of ‘constructivisms’, with this interpretation by 
Wendt, as described by Hay (2002), as thin constructivism, say at the left-hand end of the 
imaginary scale, with the wholly philosophical constructive perspective at the other (See 
Figure 3 below). The positions on the scale reflect Hay’s (2002:200) understanding of 
Wendt’s ‘eclectic’ variation of constructivism through the above summary. Whilst accepting 
that the second and third core claims are, by way of their reference to intersubjective and 
ideational factors, obviously (more) constructivist, Hay clearly locates Wendt’s type of 
constructivism at the thin end of the scale by virtue of it containing an ‘unapologetic 
endorsement of the most fundamental of neo-realist assumptions’ in relation to states being 
principal units of analysis. In this way, Wendt’s constructivism accepts (or perhaps 
embraces), the elements of neorealism indicated in the diagram. If we accept that the polar 
opposite of this position is the type of philosophical constructivism that is distinctly anti-
realist, and some way towards the post-structuralist or postmodern standpoints, then, as Hay 
points out, there is a ‘range of ostensibly constructivist positions in the existing literature’ 
that may be situated between the thin and thick boundary limits.  
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Figure 3 
____________________________________________________________________ 
A constructivist continuum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
 
Whilst an extended discussion of all these individual calibrations falls outside the scope of 
this thesis, it is useful to indicate perhaps the four most readily identifiable for the purposes 
here. It should also be noted, that for some observers and commentators, for example Reus-
Smit (2009), that social constructivism is not a theory, but rather a viewpoint or analytical 
framework that has entered the debate in relatively recent times, the key concept of which is 
the claim that human beings live in a social environment that is constructed by their own 
behaviour and actions. Moreover, this environment is, furthermore, constantly reproduced by 
current behaviour and actions. Indeed others, notably Christiansen et al (1999:529-531), 
argue that (social) constructivism as such does not make any substantive claims about 
European integration, but rather enters the debate on European integration from a different 
standpoint. Taken this way, it can be seen more as a complementary perspective to other 
integration theories, where it assumes a different ontological position, say for example, 
compared to rationalism.  
Elements of 
neorealism 
Wendt’s ‘Eclectic’ 
Constructivism 
Hacking’s 
‘Social’ 
Constructivism 
Anti-realist 
Thick 
constructivism 
‘Philosophical’ 
constructivism 
Thin 
constructivism 
Rosamond’s social 
construction of the 
‘European Economy as 
a Space’ 
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However, as an explanatory and analytical framework, the range of available 
‘constructivisms’ is not without shortcomings. For example, by positioning itself as Adler’s 
middle way between rationalism and postmodernism, constructivism in general may be seen 
to be too far away from both of these polar perspectives to realistically offer a compromise 
approach between the two. The actual outcome of this is that many constructivists drift 
towards one boundary or the other. Moreover, rationalists stress that much of what 
constructivists claim theoretically is, by nature, untestable, or simply remains untested. For 
other observers, constructivists are more united by what they oppose than what they agree on.  
And, in terms of constructivism as it may be applied to EU integration in general, and the 
ECB and its Eurosphere in particular, it effectively entered the discourse in 1999, and 
therefore may been seen to not yet have realised it full explanatory and analytical potential. 
With the above reference to postmodernism, and given that we are positioning constructivism 
between it and the two rationalist perspectives, it is perhaps important here to also outline the 
main themes and assumptions of postmodernism, and, where possible, to identify any 
contextual linkages with the ECB and the Eurosphere, and before moving on to expand on the 
justification for a constructivist explanation of the development of the ECB and the 
Eurosphere.  
Postmodernism in context 
One of the problems of discussing postmodernism, especially within the setting of the ECB 
and the Eurosphere, is that all too often the term is used in a pejorative sense by non-
postmodernists, anti-reflectivists, or other mainstream commentators to dismiss it just as a 
contradictory response to almost anything. That is, a sort of a systematic deconstruction of 
issues but without consideration of doing so with a view to offering a subsequent 
reconstruction. Indeed, if this were to be the case, then postmodernism is reduced, as a 
number of its hard line critics assert, to little more than fatalism or even nihilism. A summary 
of its basic tenets would probably begin with the view that the political and social world has 
no facts, only interpretations offered from convenient vantage points, and is characterised by 
difference, diversity, and otherness. The notion of history as a form of progress is challenged 
or rejected altogether, and that any opportunity to make the world a fairer place is seen as an 
opportunity to replace one structure of domination with another; there is no escape from 
tyranny. And, that all other international relations theories, and, for that matter, political 
science explanations, can be collectivised as just metanarratives. 
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In terms of its limitations, postmodernism, in its underpinning drive to always seek 
difference, or otherness, leads nowhere because once the difference is identified nothing 
further is offered, whereby, rather, the difference is protected; it merely stays as a narrative in 
its own right. As Hay (2002) asks is not postmodernism itself the metanarrative to end all 
metanarratives and hence a contradiction in terms?  As such, postmodernism cannot advance 
any sort of meaningful analytical framework, and its explanatory capacity does not extend 
beyond the descriptive. 
However, some elements of postmodernism may be related indirectly, if not directly, to some 
aspects of the evolution of the ECB and Eurosphere. For example, the notion of an EU 
supracapitalism itself is predicated on it being a potential new form of capitalism as the result 
of the nature of its evolutionary regenerative transitions, where we see it continually re-
inventing itself in other guises albeit with the same basic underlying imperative, subsequent 
to it having self-destructed as a result of its own persistent internal contradictions. The 
postmodernist view here would be that capitalism in general, and a potential EU 
supracapitalism in particular, would be illustrations of one set of relations of dominance 
replacing another set of relations of dominance. Also, one the central concepts of 
postmodernism, that of otherness or difference, can be useful in justifying selected typologies 
of national capitalisms where, if the notion of contextual contingency, or the formation of 
groups for certain explanatory and analytical exercises, is accepted, (n=1, n=11, n=12, n=15, 
n=25, …), and the postmodern view that all the EU national capitalisms, are, and will always 
be different (where n=25); or as Blyth ( 2003) observes ‘same as it never was’ where n is 
some sort of variable constant, or perhaps even a constant variable.  
The ECB, the Eurosphere, and neoinstitutionalism 
While the array of available analytical approaches to understanding the development of the 
EU and ECB in international relations terms presents various opportunities for explanation, 
they do not necessarily offer the chance to construct a fully sufficient analytical framework. 
There are three main reasons for this. First, the EU, and therefore its institutions, are unique 
and, unlike other subjects of international relations analysis such as affairs between states, 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations, and transnational 
corporations (TNCs), is a regional grouping predicated on the political and economic union 
of its members states and their individual and collective relationships with custom-built 
supranational institutions; and therefore demanding certain levels of institutional analysis. 
66 
 
And, if it is accepted that there is such a need for institutional analysis, it has then to be 
recognised that the building of the EU’s supranational institutional architecture presents a 
number of challenges to traditional institutionalism, but where neoinstitutionalism may offer 
viable alternatives (See Table 6 below). 
Second, the inclusion of institutional perspectives also takes into account and advantage of 
the parallel trajectories of the EU’s development and the emergence of neoinstitutionalism 
out of traditional institutionalism from the early 1950s. In this way, it can be viewed that in 
terms of the development of neoinstitutionalism and the EU, three significant relational 
aspects can be found. The first of these is that the journey for new institutionalism out of, and 
from, traditional institutionalism coincided with the evolutionary lifespan of the EU from the 
early 1950s until the present day. This can therefore assist in the analysis of the transition of 
the EU from a collection of six like-minded states each with its own discrete, embedded 
institutions to a group of 6, 9, 15, and then 25, perhaps not so like-minded but evermore 
interdependent capitalisms, where the sinews of the interconnectedness are the processes of 
the EU institutions themselves. Second, that the new institutions of the EU, such as the ECB 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), highlight the need for considering the institution not 
only as a set of prescribed rules, procedures and organisation, but also as informal fora for 
human interaction and exchange, and where firms, individuals and government agencies 
operate in a flexible, trans-organisational way in order to reconcile national and supranational 
imperatives. 
Finally, new institutionalism offers the prospect of the development of theory in the search 
for an understanding of these relationships. Whereas traditional institutionalists do not see the 
need for such theory, neoinstitutionalists are interested in testing theoretical-deductive 
models of how institutions affect behaviour (Lowndes 2002:102), rather than relying on the 
descriptive-inductive methods of the traditional school. 
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Table 6 
________________________________________________________________ 
Comparisons of traditional institutionalism and neoinstitutionalism 
 
 
Concept 
 
Traditional institutionalism 
 
Neoinstitutionalism 
Focus of approach On organisations On rules 
Formality Formal Informal 
Dynamics Static Continual change by process 
Values Submerged, not visible. Overtly critical stance 
Perspective Holistic Disaggregated 
Position Independence Interdependent , featuring 
embeddedness 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Source: derived and constructed from description in Lowndes (2002:97) 
 
 
And third, with the above in mind, a more useful analytical framework could be assembled if 
constructivism and neoinstitutionalism could somehow be usefully blended together, thereby 
not only extending the framework to encompass elements of both international relations and 
political science theories, but also to take advantage of such a merger in the sense that they 
perform, as Hay (2002:28) notes, very similar roles anyway, and to therefore more effectively 
calibrate different aspects of the analysis.  
The notion of the ECB as being a unique institution is rarely seriously challenged, and 
that it is also contained within an EU, itself also recognized as a sui generis institution, 
means that any state-focused or governance models are analytically insufficient by 
their very nature, and because the Eurosphere operates at both macro and micro levels, 
and bearing in mind the discussion above regarding traditional institutionalism and 
new institutionalism, it seems appropriate that a neoinstitutional level framework 
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would be appropriate. Figure 4 below illustrates the array of neoinstitutional 
variations, showing these positions moving left from the economic-quantitative 
boundary towards the political-qualitative limit on the right. Whilst it must be noted 
that each of these approaches do perform very differently in what they prioritise, are 
methodologically separate, and also acknowledging that they all have their strengths 
and limitations, they can all offer a different perspective on the operation of the 
Eurosphere, in the objects that they seek to explain, and in the causal mechanisms 
that they specify. Moreover, they can help to shed light on how membership of the 
Eurosphere affects member-states, the nature of intra-Eurosphere, and how member-
states interact with the ECB and shape political and policy outcomes.  
However, because the institutional approach in political science is complex and multi-
dimensional (Hall and Taylor 1996), there is no one strand within the neoinstitutionalist 
range in Figure 4 that in isolation offers a wholly sufficient analytical framework. Each 
of the seven approaches in the array can be seen to perform differently in what they see 
as important, and are all characterised by their own strengths and limitations. In their 
separate ways they all potentially offer a different perspective on the operation of the 
Eurosphere, in the objects that they seek to explain, and in the causal mechanisms that 
they specify. In this way, the institutional approach helps to outline more closely the 
factors shaping how governments interact with the ECB in the Eurosphere and in what 
ways the Eurosphere shapes political and policy outcomes. For Dyson (2000) two of the 
neoinstitutional variants identified below appear particularly salient in relation to the 
ECB and the Eurosphere: sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism.  
Sociological institutionalism sees institutions as locations through which shared meanings 
are constructed, identities formed, interests shaped, problems defined, and actions 
framed. The Eurosphere is important in providing cultural effects by establishing cer-
tain standards of appropriate behaviour into which policy-makers are socialised, with 
consequent effects on discourse and action at the domestic level. Historical 
institutionalism differs in focusing on how institutional structures and processes lock 
in certain kinds of policy development over time. The Eurosphere is important in 
producing outcomes in the form of path dependent policy development. Its 
development is conditioned both by the historical circumstances of origin of its 
institutional structures and processes, which carry the experiences of past problems of 
economic stabilisation; and by critical junctures in its historical development, which 
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provide an opportunity for discontinuity in policy change. Therefore, both historical and 
sociological institutionalism place emphasis on the constitutive effects of structure. 
Institutional approaches can be divided for analytical purpose into those working top-
down from a macro-political, systemic level of explanation, and those focused on a 
micro-political level. Macro-political explanation concentrates on how historical, cultural 
and sociological variables condition the operation of the Eurosphere and how its 
institutional arrangements affect states through internalization of certain norms. 
Micro-political explanation in realist terms highlights the egoistic and calculative 
nature of actors and their strategic interaction in the pursuit of advantage as variables 
shaping how, and to what extent, co-operative behaviour takes place. Dyson (2000) 
argues for the primary importance of historical and sociological institutionalism in 
capturing the cultural effects of the Eurosphere in constituting how actors define their 
interests and give meaning to their use of power. This position does not deny the value of 
rational choice and game theory. It simply sheds its identification with a realist 
ontology that sees interests and power in individualist and material terms. 
Moreover, it could be argued that Dyson’s selection offers a clearly balanced flavour to 
neoinstitutionalist analysis, where, as Figure 4 illustrates, the historical variant can be 
seen to be positioned further towards the economic-quantitative pole of the spectrum, 
and the sociological approximately equally situated nearer to the political-qualitative 
end. However, while this makes sense in the context of this thesis, it is not wholly 
sufficient, and a third neoinstitutionalist variation is necessary. In conjunction with 
sociological and historical institutionalism, and consideration of the empirical nature of 
the main findings in Chapter 4, there is a clear need in this research to supplement 
Dyson’s selection approaches with a third strand from the spectrum in Figure 4 
Here, the empirical variation of neoinstitutional analysis is justified on the grounds that 
while recognising that Dyson’s pairing does offer insights into both the political-
qualitative and economic-quantitative aspects of the ECB and Eurosphere, the nature of 
the longitudinal and statistical datasets employed in this research also demand 
commensurate empirical attention, but whilst at the same time not giving way to the 
pure rational choice approach critically dismissed above. This analysis can be justified 
on the grounds of the need to be cautious when being heavily influenced through, and to 
a large extent, guided by, an overall constructivist-institutionalist framework that 
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disallows adequate attention the science part of the political science discipline from 
within which neoinstitutionalist approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
______________________________________________________________________ 
A spectrum of neoinstitutionalist variants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: derived from Peters 1999 cited in Marsh and Stoker 2002:96 
 
And, as Hay argues that ‘however tempting it may well be… to dismiss an empirical 
political analysis on the grounds that it aspires to a science of the political that is simply 
impossible… is a temptation we should resist’ ((2002:252). And while the objects of 
natural science investigations always remain independent of the analytical process in a 
way which cannot be the case for social and political spheres, because the latter are 
inhabited by conscious and reflective agents who are capable of reversing their 
behaviour, often in the light of - and even in direct response to - the theories advanced 
by social and political analysts, there is no equivalent in the natural sciences. Matter 
cannot choose to disobey the laws of gravity (Hay, 2002). For the purposes of this 
thesis, at least the empirical attention given to the trajectories of Eurosphere and ex-
Eurosphere member-states with regard to a number of variables, if nothing else offers a 
  Political - 
qualitative 
Economic - 
quantitative 
 
Historic 
  Rational        
choice 
International 
Sociological 
  Network 
Empirical 
Normative 
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descriptive basis for the development of analysis and understanding. Hay encapsulates 
this accordingly… 
For while it is important to retain a cautious, even sceptical, attitude towards 
the empirical indices we use and to be sensitive to the fact that many of our 
most significant explanatory variables do not avail themselves of 
quantification or simple measurement, description is the basis from which 
interpretation and explanation must build. Indeed, it seems fair to suggest 
that while political analysts are always likely to remain divided by the 
interpretations and explanations they offer of particular events or processes, 
they do have a rather greater chance of agreeing on the description of their 
subject matter. That entails the accumulation of empirical evidence. Thus, 
while empirical evidence alone is never enough it is an important and 
necessary starting point. (2002:252) 
As the empirical evidence unfolds in Chapter 4, in both longitudinal and statistical analytic forms, the 
purpose then is to employ the empirical in line with Hays view, and to align it as far as possible with 
both the objectives of this research, and also with the philosophical and theoretical frameworks 
advanced. Therefore, the proposal is empirical within a neoinstitutionalist frame; but not wholly 
empiricist in nature.  
The concept of a constructivist-institutionalism approach 
From the above outlines of approaches, and given that the potential for an EU supracapitalism 
embraces both political science in relation to aspects of member-states as national capitalisms, and 
international relations theory is essential to understanding the creation and evolution of the ECB, and 
member-states’ interconnectedness within the Eurosphere, it is clear that some form of a dual 
analytical approach would be instructive. Following the discussions above regarding selected 
elements of neoinstitutionalism performing the political science aspects of the required analysis, and 
that we can assume constructivist and neoinstitutionalist approaches also perform very similar tasks in 
their respective domains, it seems reasonable to adopt a form of bespoke constructivist-
institutionalism for the purposes of this research. 
As is discussed above, and endorsed by Dyson (2000), both sociological and historical aspects of 
neoinstitutionalism offer significant and balanced analytical utility while representing respectively 
both the political-qualitative and the economic-quantitative aspects of the neoinstitutionalist range of 
variants. Moreover, by adding an empirical frame to the mix, full advantage can be taken of the 
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neoinstitutionalist ‘offer’ of perspectives, not only as an important and necessary starting point, but 
also because the conduct and performance of national capitalisms as post-Bretton Woods units of 
analysis. 
On the other hand, the rationale and associated justification for including any particular type, or types, 
of constructivist element in such an amalgam presents more of a challenge. This is due to both the 
broad spectrum of constructivisms referred to earlier, and also the contextual contingency of the 
subject matter being addressed here. In terms of the range of constructivism, both its scope and 
polarity are immediately problematic largely because of the very nature of constructivism itself. If it is 
accepted, in the most general terms, that constructivism is an approach to understanding international 
relations where reality is created by how actors perceive their experiences which, in turn, shapes the 
environment or context in which they find themselves; then two interrelated observations can be 
made. One is that the context that shapes actors’ understanding must be a dynamic created by the 
actors as a result of ideas and perceptions, and also one that is, therefore, also shaped by actors. And 
two, in turn, these ideas and perceptions directly influence the design and building of the institutional 
architecture within which they will operate. However, this depends on the interpretation of the degree 
of ‘purity’ of constructivism deemed appropriate.  
Returning to the idea of a constructivist continuum in Figure 3, the illustration is effectively based on 
the degree to which elements of neorealism are, or may be, assimilated into the analysis, where the 
left-hand extreme of thin constructivism, where ‘thin’ represents a weaker concentration of 
constructivist elements, with the contrasting ‘thick’ end denoting more constructivist ingredients than 
any other. At this outermost pole, reality is seen as being constituted in and through discourse and the 
exchange of ideas; with the position where reality is viewed as represented by discourse and ideas 
being located further to the left towards the centre ground and described as social constructivism. 
Social constructivism, as seen by Hacking (1999), is where subjects, objects, and processes serve to 
emphasise the contingent, fluid nature of the dynamics of social and political processes. This is 
particularly important where such processes are seen as by some as fixed, and thereby reality is static, 
and where the constructivist position helps us to perceive that things could and can be different. In this 
way, constructivism can be seen to attempt to restore politics and individual actors or agents to 
environments often held as fixed and unbending. In a normative sense, Hacking’s version of 
constructivism can summarised by the present state of affairs of an object, subject or process being 
taken for granted as inevitable, but need not have existed in the first place, and as such, is neither 
determined by the nature of things nor is inevitable. If things are bad as they are, we would be better 
off either doing away with them altogether or at least ‘radically changing them’. Positioned to the 
73 
 
right (perhaps somewhat contentiously) of social constructivism, and of particular salience here, a 
fourth position on the proposed constructivist continuum might be Ben Rosamond’s (2005) social 
construction of the European economy. Not only does this treatment relate to both elements of the 
historical and sociological neoinstitutionalism advanced previously, but also offers up two very clear 
epochs in the discourses of European integration and the development of the European economy as a 
whole. Taking the period 1950 to 1984, Rosamond focuses on the advancement of integration, the 
‘legitimating myth’ of European security, and the technocratic-functionalist governance methodology 
prevalent at this time. Then from 1985 to 2005, the foci switch to matters concerning the European 
economy and its competitiveness, transnational space, and now varying types of governance. While 
Rosamond’s thrust is to ‘problematize and think through the term the economy’ as a social fact’ and 
to consider an alternative to just thinking about the economy as a standard-materialist account of how 
it works; for example, rather than interpreting market behaviour through an economics lens, why not 
instead via sociology or historical lens?  
Therefore, having briefly and generally located four relative constructivist positions on the continuum, 
and whilst also accepting that there are a number of other calibrational points between its polarities, 
we can firstly return to Wendt, and the thin end. The first thing to note here is that where it was argued 
above that the neo-functionalist versus liberal intergovernmental debate shifted to a contest between 
rationalism and constructivism around or just before  the launch of the single currency, and that it 
appeared that elements of realist interpretation had also made the transition. Moreover, if we further 
accept that Wendt’s thin constructivism, for whatever reason, either does similarly accommodate 
rationalist features, or at least does not wholly disallow them, then it is perhaps feasible in the practical 
sense to advance Wendt’s constructivism as the international relations counterpart to the three-
component neoinstitutionalist analytical structure previously forwarded. And, whether we accept that 
Wendt’s view is at best a diluted, wide-ranging version of constructivism, or merely an attempt to 
assuage the mainstream rationalists commentators at worst; that he is a strong proponent of the power 
and importance of ideas in international relations whilst retaining elements of neorealist analytical 
utility offers much to the task of advancing the notion of an EU supracapitalism. The reasons for this 
are three-fold: the institutional uniqueness of the Eurosphere and the proposed EU supracapitalism; 
the pre-existing typology of the national capitalisms of the EU10 individual units of analysis; and the 
ideas-based rationale of the EU’s founding fathers. That the EU, and therefore by extension, its 
institutions, are unique means that there can be no analytical precedent to readily facilitate the setting 
                                                 
10 Pre-existing or pre-given in the context of the timeframe of the thesis, where EU national capitalisms in 1986 
were all to some extent, individually identifiable, although increasingly less so for the euro countries engaged in 
the single currency convergence programme from this time until 1999. 
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of this research. So, where can a form of constructivism be located that both complements the three 
strains of political science neoinstitutionalism already identified, and also offer a suitable analytical 
framework? Initially, we can return to Wendt.     
Constructivist-institutionalism and the development of the Eurosphere  
Beginning with Wendt’s expansion of Mercer, (1995) who had acknowledged that at ‘least 
in the European Union some states had managed to form a collective identity’ (Wendt, 
1999:242), it seems appropriate to look at a constructivist perspective of the EU in general, 
as a precursor to, and before focusing on, constructivism and the ECB and the Eurosphere. 
Identity is both an integral tenet of constructivism, and also a recurring central issue when 
comparing constructivism with rationalist approaches to the management and governance of 
the EU. Christiansen et al (1999) also present constructivism as the middle-ground approach 
to understanding EU management and governance in much the same way as Adler (1997), by 
separating rationalism and reflectivism; although Adler more specifically identifies 
postmodernism as the opposite pole to rationalism, with Christiansen et al preferring the more 
generic term of reflectivism which encompasses feminism, post-structuralism, post-
colonialism, and critical theory.  Moreover, Christiansen et al elevate the constructivist 
position to the top of a perceived triangle, thereby not only separating rationalism and 
reflectivism along a flat continuum, but by being positioned above these two approaches. It 
could be argued that this reflects its position as a more encompassing theory, in which 
rationalism and reflectivism are increasingly playing supporting roles. This is reflected in 
other fields of political science, notably in international relations where constructivism 
became a very popular theory following the end of the Cold War. Drawing further on 
Christiansen’s (1999) research, his situation of constructivism is important as relating to 
everything between rationalism and reflectivism (1999:536). However, there is an alternative 
interpretation to the understanding offered by Christiansen. Instead of perceiving the 
constructivist position as a cantilever bridge, it could be argued that constructivism is 
actually drifting away from rationalism and towards reflectivism, stretching the links to the 
former whilst absorbing the latter. Despite that it would be wrong to claim the two are poles 
apart, a more accurate image would be an expanding constructivist canvass converging on a 
static rationalist pole. 
So where does constructivism offer advantages over rationalism in terms of its analytical 
capabilities? First of all, the rationalist stress on fixed preferences invites constructivist 
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criticism (Schmidt, 2002; Checkel, 1998). Understanding the decision-making processes of 
the actors involved in the EU is crucial to uncovering the motivators that influence 
governance and, here, the rigid structure of rationalist analysis will never shed new light on 
EU governance. The problem is two-fold. Firstly, these fixed preferences vary depending 
on which rational choice advocate is writing. Whether it be Hoffman’s (1966) predilection 
for safeguarding sovereignty, or Moravscik’s (1998) interest in economic security, a 
significant aspect of rational choices ideological cornerstone is ambiguous. Secondly, this 
reliance on fixed preferences suggests fixed outcomes dependent on the variable structure. 
This is to be expected from an explanatory tool that relies exclusively on material ontology 
for its foundations. In conjunction, these characteristics present a skewed version of reality 
and a confused theoretical framework. Schmidt (2002) acknowledges the adoption of some 
flexibility in preferences. However, this is unable to address the larger issue of rationalism, 
failing to not just explain, but to understand institutional change. Constructivists like Checkel 
(1998) suggest a change in formula to enhance understanding of institutional development. 
A constructivist-institutionalism challenge to the neoclassical view of the function of 
national capitalisms 
One of the underpinning themes of this research is the proposition that the ECB is advanced 
as both the key economic agent, and by extension, the man political actor in the concept of an 
EU supracapitalism. However, any meaningful assessment as to the extent to which the ECB 
will be able to successfully manage the Eurosphere as a supracapitalism depends on how its 
managers understand the function of national capitalisms in general and the role of money in 
particular. This is of central importance to the main claims of the thesis, and an issue that calls 
upon the power of ideas and discourse. And here, the thick end of the constructivist range 
offers up an opportunity to consider national capitalisms from a completely different 
perspective to that of mainstream observers and commentators. In the same way that 
Rosamond (2005 ) asks us to think about the European economy as an imagined ‘economic 
space’, Gerard (1989) argues that national capitalisms should be viewed in a completely 
heterodox fashion. In doing so, he contests the commonly held ideas that supply creates 
demand and that money is exogenously neutral. Indeed, for Gerard it is the opposite case for 
both understandings. Gerard builds a comparative framework to contrast the generally- 
accepted market exchange version of a national economy with that of a monetary production 
model. These ideas are more expansively explored in Chapter 6, but the following passages 
offer a summary of the main ideas.  
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The theory of a market exchange economy and the theory of a monetary production economy 
provide two theoretical conceptions of the nature, characteristics and operation of the 
contemporary capitalist economy, or national capitalism. They originate in two alternative 
frames of reference, embodying entirely different sets of assumptions as to the nature of 
national economic order. The theory of a market exchange economy has been developed by 
the followers of neoclassical theory, the dominant approach in economics. Neoclassical 
theory views all economic phenomena as being within the allocative mode of activity11. The 
theory of a monetary production economy, on the other hand, offers an alternative 
perspective, inspired by Keynes’s General Theory, which recognizes the existence of non-
allocative forms of economic behaviour alongside allocative behaviour. The theory of a 
monetary production economy attempts to move beyond the neoclassical allocation-
misallocation duality by recognizing the existence of other dimensions of economic order. In 
particular, prices and quantities are no longer seen to be determined simultaneously in an 
allocative process with the outcome depending on the prevailing structural and informational 
conditions. The monetary production economy approach allows for some prices and 
quantities to be determined quite separately in non-allocative processes. 
These differences in the presupposed notions of economic order lead to very different views 
as to the operation of national capitalisms. In a macro-exchange economy, equilibrium 
outcomes are determined, ultimately, by the supply side, and in particular, towards full-
employment equilibrium; while the allocative mechanisms on the demand side ensure that 
there is sufficient aggregate demand to maintain the full-employment level of aggregate 
supply. However, in a monetary production economy, the macro equilibrium is determined 
by the demand side. The multiplier process determines the flow of aggregate demand, which, 
in turn, determines the rate of the productive flow and, hence, the current level of 
employment. There is no reason why the demand side in a monetary production economy 
should move towards generating a rate of monetary flow consistent with the full-employment 
rate of the productive flow. Therefore, at the macro level, a market exchange economy and a 
monetary production economy explain opposite causal sequences. In the exchange economy, 
the supply side determines the demand side, this causal sequence being summed up by Say’s 
Law, where supply creates its own demand. In a monetary production economy, the causal 
sequence is inverted, with the demand side determining the supply side; that is, demand 
creates its own supply. 
                                                 
11 The ECB’s published benefits of price stability are all based on the allocation of resources, with non-
allocative resources almost completely overlooked (ECB, 2004:42) 
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Another fundamental difference between the two economies lies in the opposing views 
regarding the nature of money. In a market exchange economy the quantity of money is 
exogenously determined. It is a parameter of the system under the control of the central bank. 
As the supply of money changes, this initiates an allocative process within the exchange 
economy with equilibrium being restored through adjustments in the aggregate price level (as 
captured in the quantity theory of money) and the rate of interest (as captured in the theory of 
liquidity preference). It follows, therefore, that in a market exchange economy the quantity of 
money ultimately determines the rate of flow of money income. The quantity of money is the 
crucial exogenous variable determining, in turn, the aggregate price level and the rate of 
monetary flow. 
In a monetary production economy, however, the causal direction is again inverted. The rate 
of the monetary flow depends on the separate socially interactive processes which determine 
the aggregate price level and the rate of the output flow. It is the rate of the monetary flow 
which determines the quantity of money required. Unless the central banks impose money 
supply restrictions, money is always automatically created within a monetary production 
economy through demand by households and firms. Money is the medium for exchange, and 
the quantity of money is entirely demand-determined, not demand-determining. Monetary 
production economies possess the potential to create the necessary monetary means for 
conducting transactions. The actual amount created depends on the rate of monetary flow. It 
is this separation between the potential and the actual which makes the quantity of money 
both a theoretical, and empirically challenging, concept. From a non-neoclassical perspective, 
the idea of some exogenously-determined supply of money is merely an ill-founded 
assumption arising from the neoclassical view that a national capitalism behaves as if it is a 
market exchange economy. 
The difference in the nature of money in the two economies is most apparent over the issue of 
the neutrality of money. In a market exchange economy, the all-important equilibrium 
outcome is full employment, regardless of the prevailing monetary conditions. Money is 
neutral, and therefore has little influence regarding any movement towards such an 
equilibrium level. This neutrality is the logical implication of the neoclassical assumption that 
money is a non-essential aspect of the context of economic behaviour. The theory of a 
monetary production economy starts from the entirely opposite position: that is money is an 
essential aspect of the context of economic behaviour, giving rise to varying patterns 
economic behaviour. Far from being neutral with respect to real economic variables, it is the 
monetary context which shapes the behaviour patterns that, in turn determine output, and 
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therefore adjustment in employment levels. Neoclassical theory assumes the neutrality of 
money in all economic behaviour. As Gerard (1989 argues) … ‘it is then unsurprising that an 
analysis which assumes that money is peripheral, should ultimately arrive at the theoretical 
conclusion that money is indeed peripheral’ Gerard continues. 
 
What is remarkable is the failure on the part of the followers of neoclassical theory 
to admit that the ‘discovery’ of the neutrality property is little more that the 
uncovering of their own, still unacknowledged, assumptions. Logical analysis is, 
after all is said and done, only a set of rules and deducing the implications of what 
has been assumed in the first place. Change the premises and the implications are 
likely to change. The neutrality property of money is entirely the result of a 
particular restrictive assumption adopted by neoclassical theory. (1989:6) 
 
The monetary production economy offers the opportunity to move beyond the limitations and 
constraints of the neoclassical frame of reference in three ways. First, the neoclassical system 
should be considered as a theoretical system founded upon a restricted, perhaps distorted, 
view of human behaviour within national capitalisms. If this methodological flaw is accepted, 
then neoclassical economic theory can no longer be held as generalisable. Second, the 
neoclassical frame of reference is predicated on the perception that all economic phenomena 
are situated entirely within allocative modes of economic activity. This positions markets, 
and therefore market mechanisms, at the centre of all economic operations, and, in doing so 
depends on the choice-theoretic, market-theoretic, and equilibrium-theoretic explanations of 
how a national capitalism operates. Moreover, that these three accounts are very tightly 
interrelated, or more precisely, wholly interdependent, means that they must stand or fall 
together. Any movement beyond any one of the components of this theoretical framework 
automatically necessitates a movement beyond all three. That there is this almost complete 
dependence on the allocative explanation of the workings of national capitalisms, and the 
‘house of cards’ relationship between all three components, suggests that at the very least, 
alternative conceptual approaches should be considered. Moreover, a move beyond 
neoclassical explanations allows economic theory to become liberated from the constraints 
and limitations of the allocative-exclusive framework, and therefore more readily 
generalisable than when locked in to ‘any one set of presupposed notions of order’ (Gerrard, 
1989). 
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Third, and as introduced above, is the question of the role of money. The neoclassical view is 
that money is both exogenous and neutral in the workings of national capitalisms. However 
the capitalist economy is characterised by the interface between the production of goods and 
services and the patterns of behaviour that firms and individuals are directly related to, and 
are therefore expressed in monetary terms. Different economic actors’ actions and reactions 
in relation to money, money flows, and money-income, differ at separate and discrete 
temporal junctures, and also according to a whole range of rational and irrational socially 
interactive characteristics, and therefore in this way have a direct bearing on the quantity of 
money required in the economy at any given time. Effectively, these temporal and socially 
interactive dynamics form the basis for the requirement for differing amounts of money, and 
that in this way money is centrally demanded, and therefore supplied in different responses to 
this demand. The neoclassical view holds that the introduction or withdrawal of money is an 
exogenous (sometimes policy driven), neutral action, and is only employed as an agent to 
manage, or control, the behaviour of economic actors within the national capitalism. In 
essence, for neoclassical theorists, money is not only non-central, but is non-essential, and 
only usually employed to reflect the price-multiplied-by-quantity expression of market 
activity outcomes 
The monetary production view of the capitalist economy follows a broader explanation of 
economic phenomena in general, and the workings of national capitalisms in particular. 
Central to this explanatory framework is the view is that the behaviour patterns of 
households, firms, and individuals differ significantly from those to be found in the 
neoclassical exchange economy. It is in this way that non-allocative modes of economic 
activity may be considered alongside allocative modes of activity, and thereby broadening the 
scale, scope, and utility of economic analysis at national, regional, international, and 
transnational levels. 
Neoclassical theory assumes that all economic activity is bounded within a market theoretic 
context of behaviour. In this way it bounds neoclassical theory within an ‘allocation-
misallocation duality’ (Gerrard, 1989:38). In this view, all observed economic outcomes are 
seen to fall into one of two mutually-exclusive categories: perfect allocative equilibrium or 
imperfect allocative equilibrium; with imperfect allocative equilibrium being a misallocation 
of resources owing to the existence of either informational or structural imperfections, or 
both. The suggestion here seems to be that it is only the market-theoretic view that represents 
‘real’ economic behaviour, with monetary flows only playing a subordinate role in 
determining real variables when the exchange economy falls into disequilibrium. The 
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monetary sector is treated as a discrete entity within which the demand for money equals the 
supply of money, and is therefore a purely automatic and self-balancing allocative 
mechanism. The view that money is non-essential is one of the most important limitations to 
the neoclassical understanding of national capitalisms. In a monetary production economy 
however, economic behaviour is taken to manifest itself within a monetary context. 
My argument here follows one particular path towards a more general heterodox, 
understanding of economic phenomena.  The point of departure is the notion that the 
monetary dynamics of a national capitalism significantly affect the nature of behaviour 
patterns of firms and households.  In this way a national capitalism is characterised by the 
production of commodities in a ‘monetised’ economy.  The conjunction of these 
characteristics creates a monetary production economy in which the behaviour patterns of 
firms and households differ in significant ways from those to be found in a market exchange 
economy. And, it is this fundamental assumption which allows us to consider the equally 
important role of non-allocative modes of activity alongside the allocative aspects of national 
economies.  
Summary 
These passages have endeavoured to lay down a constructivist-institutionalism perspective 
for considering national capitalisms through ideas and discourse, and that together advance a 
heterodox view of how they may be seen to function. In the context of EU national 
capitalisms, the combination of three neoinstitutionalist variants and four constructivist 
positions serve to pave the way for the following chapter that proposes a set of typologies of 
EU national capitalisms, and for an extended evaluation of the ECB’s evolution and 
performance on managing the Eurosphere in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 An analytical typology of EU national capitalisms 
Overview 
In support of the principal arguments of the thesis, the purpose of this chapter is to build an 
analytical framework for measuring and testing selected empirical data relating to the 
macroeconomic trajectories of EU national capitalisms between 1986 and 2006. In doing so, 
there is both a return to further elements of the varieties of capitalism literature and 
accompanying commentaries, and also the development of a related theoretical framework 
from which to achieve a number of empirical objectives. Consequently, the purposes of the 
subsequent analysis are fourfold: to identify pre and post-euro longitudinal macroeconomic 
patterns; to quantitatively assess the impact of the ECB’s supranational management of the 
post-euro national capitalisms; to contrast and compare the euro economies with the non-euro 
EU economies, and to derive from the dataset a time series projection of potential future 
trends.  
Such a proposed analytical construct immediately offers up two ready-made, discrete groups 
of similar scale and scope: the euro and ex-euro; with 12 capitalisms in the former and 1312 in 
the latter. And, with these comparisons alone it could be posited that this type of dualistic 
framework would be sufficient. Indeed, analysis at this level can reveal significant outcomes 
as can be seen in Chapter 4, especially in terms of a primary assessment of the Eurosphere 
capitalisms’ behaviour, and the effectiveness of ECB’s supranational management. 
Nonetheless, although this analytical parsimony has its merits, there would also be many 
missed opportunities, particularly in relation to the comparative dynamics of individual 
national capitalisms over time, and potential contingent clustering under certain conditions. 
Moreover, the ultimate tests of the ECB’s potential to successfully oversee the development 
of EU supracapitalism will be the extent to which it can effectively regulate 12 different 
national capitalisms, each with their own socio-cultural and politico-economic historical 
trajectories. These individual pathways again highlight one of the recurring issues of this 
research: to what extent can n=1? Put another way, under which conditions and in what 
circumstances can all the 12 euro capitalisms function in an externally-managed co-ordinated 
fashion? Here, levels of convergence of certain post-single currency macroeconomic 
indicators are one way of assessing the degree of supranational influence the ECB may 
                                                 
12 It should be noted here that all acceding member countries from the 2004 enlargement, do so on the basis that 
they will automatically join the euro at a pre-determined date set by the EU, and there is no longer an opt-out as 
in previous enlargements 
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exercise over the Eurosphere capitalisms; and, for that matter, to also assess any spillover 
effects upon those EU capitalisms still retaining their domestic currencies. And, by extension, 
this is of particular importance in gauging the wider implication of the potential for an EU 
supracapitalism. This leads to the questions of why and when would it be necessary to 
typologise the EU national capitalisms? 
However, before addressing these questions, it is worthwhile introducing the idea of 
contextual contingency. This originates in the constructivist approach in general, and perhaps 
positioned somewhere between Hacking’s Social Constructivism and Rosamond’s European 
Economic Space, in particular (See Figure 3). That is, any particular typology can be seen as 
socially constructed or as being located in a particular space, and possibly within a particular 
set of discourses. The logic of the concept flows from the type of analysis being undertaken, 
and rather than accept the subjects for analysis as being pre-determined, or ‘givens’, as in in 
the neorealist sense, the subjects can be organised in such a way that analytical utility is 
maximised for a particular purpose or set of ideational objectives. This is of special 
significance here as EU national capitalisms, by way of being both asynchronous as units of 
analysis in the sense that there have been five enlargements of membership from 1958 to 
2004, each with its own specificity; and also that they do not naturally fall into any  
convenient statistical categories. 
So, to return the questions of why and when would it be necessary to typologise EU national 
capitalisms, it is perhaps intuitive and also initially instructive to expand on some of the 
varieties of capitalism literature introduced in Chapter 1. Following this, subsequent passages 
in this section explore a theoretical framework which builds on the above literature by 
introducing some elements of comparative political economy alongside the concepts national 
preference and path dependency, before advancing a justification for the particular typology 
employed to analyse the empirical datasets in the next chapter. 
Potential typologies of EU national capitalisms 
At this point, and continuing with the notion of contextually contingent typological 
constructs, it may be useful reflect on some of the potential combinations and permutations of 
national capitalism typologies relevant to, and pre-existing within, the EU.  For example, 
following on from Hay’s critical examination of the Varieties of Capitalism text, the EU 
could be viewed through another dual lens by separating all the 25 member-states into either 
liberal market economies (LMEs) or co-ordinated market economies (CMEs), but perhaps 
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with the contingent need to recalibrate or re-interpret both. In Capitalism Against Capitalism, 
Michel Albert’s post-Cold War narrative introduces us to ‘Rhine Capitalism’, where, in the 
EU context, Germany and the  Benelux countries are put together to identify a form of social 
capitalism seen in direct contrast to the Anglo-American model of shareholder-maximisation 
(Albert, 1993). The well-being or welfare of mass publics’ perspective would align with 
Esping Andersen’s three-way, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, and with it a 
sociological-cultural neoinstitutionalism. The Seven Cultures of Capitalism by Hampden-
Turner and Trompenars (1994) offers a socio-cultural perspective that would offer 
opportunities to explore historic, international, and sociological variants of 
neoinstitutionalism. Another way of classifying the array of EU national capitalisms may be 
to adopt a geo-strategic framework, where it would seem logical to bring together, for 
example, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as a Baltic system where such a politico-economic 
combination may be viewed from a historic (and perhaps network) neoinstitutionalist 
perspective.  In much the same way, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have long 
been associated together as the Benelux countries, which were, of course, a trading group that 
was effectively a substructure of the original six members of the EU, which itself, in turn, 
could also be considered as a grouping of national capitalisms, in the network-international 
sense of neoinstitutionalism. Rhodes (1997), among others, has also described the potential 
for analysis of a ‘Mediterranean’ form of capitalism that would align Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain in similar fashion. 
Finally here, there is also the special case of the Nordic model of capitalism, a notable and 
influential typology that emerged following on from the early work of Titmuss (1958) 
regarding the welfare state, and from where Sweden, Denmark, and Finland were often 
grouped together as a regime cluster characterised as a group of international welfare states 
with a shared social democratic consensus. These ideas attracted a considerable amount of 
literary and critical attention up until the mid-1990s, and which was largely synthesised by 
the above-cited work of Esping-Andersen in 1990. However, following the deep recession of 
the mid-1990s, a very public criticism of the model was initiated by the work of Anthony 
Giddens, and his New Labour-inspiring ‘Third Way’ insights, where he suggested that the 
Nordic model was an outdated form of ‘traditional’ social democracy which was incapable of 
dealing with the contemporary ‘realities’ of technological change, globalisation, and ‘post-
industrial risk society’(Giddens,1998). Moreover, even though the suggestion by Hall and 
Soskice (2001) at that time that any overall neoliberal convergence had been overstated, it 
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appeared then that the Nordic model had been effectively collapsed into another regime 
cluster, a form of co-ordinated market economies, and one which is based on a type of 
Christian Democratic capitalism. Fortunately for some observers, any degree of convergence 
into any typology as a consequence of post-Fordism, post industrialism, globalisation then 
came under close scrutiny from Hay (2003a, 2003) among others, who championed the 
notion that there is indeed still case to be made for consideration of whether the Nordic social 
model may provide insights about prospective alternatives in contemporary neoliberal times. 
Moreover, with the prima facie empirical evidence of the early part of the 21st century 
suggesting both a re-stabilisation, and even a superior economic performance in the Nordic 
region, there is at least reason enough for the continuing analytical utility of the model.  
Similarly, a temporal analytical structure would bring together those other EU capitalisms 
that joined the original six members at different times, and would therefore have comparable 
time-series trajectories. Denmark, Ireland, and the UK in 1973; Portugal and Spain (as 
perhaps also ‘Iberian Capitalisms’) in 1986; and the joint accession of Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden in 1995 could also be an illustration of this type of approach. In this vein, the 
American economic historians, Larry Neal and Daniel Barbezat, consider the Benelux 
countries alongside Denmark as a grouping; Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain together as 
the ‘First Outsiders’; and Austria, Finland, and Sweden as ‘Part of the Outer Circle That Joins 
In’. Each of these collectives are worthy of brief description. 
Firstly, the Benelux countries have several features in common with Denmark, and which 
Neal and Barbezat (1998) argue justifies treating these four countries as a group. They are all 
small, both in terms of land area and population; they are all approximately constitutional 
monarchies, although Luxembourg is really a duchy; they are high-income economies; and 
all do most of their trade with Germany. And, with respect to EU matters, given their 
common interests, tend to vote as a bloc on strategic issues. It is also within their interests to 
maintain continued access to German markets. However, it also the case that with external 
EU issues they are often divergent in their perspectives as a consequence of strong 
differences in their history and language. Each has also been historically vulnerable to 
international conditions relating to trade, capital movements, exchange rate fluctuations, and 
immigration flows. All four were forcibly occupied by Nazi Germany during World War 
Two, and it appears natural to assume that each would insist on exercising a political 
peacetime influence on the EU, that is perhaps greater than their small size warrants. Neal 
and Barbezat continue this line of reasoning.  
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This also explains the energy with which their political leaders pursue initiatives 
that will deepen the economic and political union of a larger Europe that 
encompasses, and perhaps contains or even controls, their powerful neighbour. 
(1998:275)   
Secondly, another gang of four, the ‘First Outsiders’, Ireland Greece, Portugal and Spain, can 
all be considered to have originally been on the geographic periphery of Europe, and were 
also late joining the then European Economic Community (EEC). All four were relatively 
poor countries linked by both their former agricultural-economic profiles, and the drive to 
industrialise and modernise their economies alongside the more advanced economies of the 
then existing members of the EU. It is their original common poverty that brought them 
together as a voting bloc, and has enabled them to attract an increasing share of the EU 
budget in the form of regional development funds, and more latterly, cohesion funds largely 
finance by contributions from the richest member-states. Membership of the EU has helped 
them re-evaluate their economic strategies, so that a consensus development programme 
evolved amongst them. By radically changing policies, Ireland has seen a significant rise in 
its per capita income; although Greece by not radically changing its policies has significantly 
limited the growth in its own per capita income and remains well below the EU average. 
However, the experiences of both Ireland and Greece generally hold out a large measure of 
encouragement for policymakers in other backward countries that selecting the right policy 
mix cam make a difference. This is particularly salient with former Eastern Bloc economies 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland having the opportunity to learn the lessons 
learned by these earlier arrivals into the EU. 
In addition to the above linkages, the Iberian countries, Portugal and Spain also share a 
southern European location, joined the EU at the same time, and were both subject to fascist 
dictatorships for 30 years after the Second World War (Neal and Barbezat, 1998). And, they 
were also both neutral during that conflict, although Portugal was favoured with Marshall 
Plan aid and Spain was not. Portugal has a largely a very similar economic and political 
history to that of Spain, and has mainly anticipated events in Spain by a few years. 
Finally, Austria, Finland, and Sweden are collectivised by Neal and Berbazat as ‘Part of the 
Outer Circle’ that has joined in. On January 1st 1995, the three countries joined the EU as the 
‘fourth expansion’. These three countries, all members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the European Free Trade Area (EFT), are all small, 
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open economies, the bulk of whose trade had been with the EU countries from the early 
1960s, but now significantly with Germany as their main trading partner. They had all 
decided to be part of the EU decision-making processes, rather than continuing to accept 
whatever terms and conditions the EU decided were appropriate for economic relations with 
them. Neal and Barbezat, (1998) explain. 
In other words, they were not satisfied with the terms of the European Economic 
Area (EEA), which had been dictated by the EU. The decision to join took as long 
as it did because each of the three had carefully a neutral position between the US 
and the Soviet Union. None of them belonged to North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) or the Western EU (WEU), the two military alliances for 
Western Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet military threat, however, all three 
felt that their neutral status would not be jeopardised by joining the EU. 
(1998:321) 
All three were welcomed as valuable members of the EU, both as relatively well-off 
countries, and also enjoying highly developed economic relationships with the West, as it 
was then referred to. Some reluctance was demonstrated by their farmers, who would receive 
lower subsidies under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), although they were all 
allowed to top up the EU’s support payments over a transitional period of several years. And, 
although some resistance was also demonstrated by the poorer, peripheral countries discussed 
above, who were afraid of being outvoted on issues dealing with regional aid to backward 
regions of Europe, this was overcome when the new entrants agreed to add to the cohesion 
funds of the EU as well as paying subsidies to their own farmers.  
All of these combinations, and potentially more, are contingent in that they all based on a 
variety of politico-economic, geopolitical, and geo-strategic relationships, and these 
connections are contextually framed. The argument here is that varieties of national 
capitalisms, in the general sense, are established or identified for a variety of developmental 
and institutional reasons, and as such are usually analytically-comparative in nature. 
Hay (2004), both adds weight to this contingent argument, whilst also adding a tentative 
footnote to the varieties of capitalism debate, when considering the concept of potential dual 
convergences of types of capitalism via the extension of LMEs and CMEs into forms of 
social democratic corporatism and market liberalism.  
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Arguably the identification of dual convergence owes much to the distinctive 
counterpoising of liberal and co-ordinated market economies as varieties of 
capitalism…or, by extension, social democratic corporatism (SDC) and market 
liberalism (ML) as varieties of  partisanship (Garrett, 1998). It is surely tempting 
to suggest that had a greater number of initial clusters been identified a rather more 
complex pattern of convergence, diversity and/or divergence might also have been 
identified. If dual varieties of capitalism (or partisanship) lead to dual 
convergence, then might not triple varieties of capitalism lead to three-fold 
convergence, quadruple varieties of capitalism to four-fold convergence and so 
forth? (2004:238) (original emphasis)  
In ways similar to those discussed above, the national economy of Germany, say, could be 
analytically linked to Austria, the Netherlands, and Poland on geopolitical and socio-cultural 
bases; or to France, in terms of an intra-Eurosphere politico-economic alliance (as in the 
Stability and Growth Pact established in 1998). Therefore, by extending the geopolitical 
structure of the EU, and expanding its many and varied politico-economic, social-cultural, 
and historico-sociological influences and relationships through a neoinstitutionalist lens, a 
whole range of analytical permutations present themselves, and the n=1, n=2, n=12, n=13, or 
n= 25 varieties of capitalism question becomes less of a problem, and more of a set of 
analytical opportunities.   
In earlier passages of this thesis it is suggested that clearly defined temporal and spatial 
starting lines are required to facilitate multi-layered analysis. This is considered appropriate 
as member-states were, for the first time, collectively exposed to a new, omnipotent type and 
level of EU supranationality, and had been subjected to a very clear and rigid temporal 
schedule of politically and economically challenging, predetermined macroeconomic 
indicator targets leading up to the launch of the euro in 1999. In order to take these 
typological ideas towards a justifiable categorisation for the proposed analysis here, support 
can be found in certain elements of comparative political economy, which are offered below. 
Comparative political economy 
In this regard, the works of Esping-Andersen (1990), Arend Lijphart (1971), Ellen Meiksins-
Wood, Jonas Pontusson (1995), and Susan Strange (1997) are drawn upon to apply elements 
of the comparison method in relation to the national capitalisms both within and between 
their prescribed typologies. Lijphart (1971:690) stresses that the comparison method and 
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comparative politics are by no means coterminous, that is, that other methods can clearly be 
employed in comparative politics and the comparison method is also applicable in other 
fields and disciplines. 
However in the study of comparative national capitalisms, especially within such clearly 
defined spatial and temporal boundaries as the EU, the comparison method offers 
opportunities to identify concomitant variations13 as opposed to simply comparing instances 
when a phenomenon does occur with those instances when the same phenomenon does not 
occur (Lijphart,1971:687). Three particular aspects of the comparative political economy 
approach appear to be relevant in order to facilitate the identification of key variables and 
make necessary comparisons of the capitalisms of the EU: the method of difference, the 
method of similarity, and preference theory 
In order to use the method of difference as an effective analytical tool in the examination of 
the national capitalisms of the EU, it is first necessary to identify the key variables of, and 
within, those capitalisms, and then to compare them. These variables distil into three levels of 
analysis: the macroeconomic rationale, the major components of national capitalism, and the 
individual nation-states' path dependencies. 
The method of difference. 
The identification of key variables then can be regarded a pre-requisite to employing the 
elements of the method of difference. In addition, the recognition of the three levels of 
variables illustrates overlaying capabilities where national capitalisms' similarities and 
contrasts can be viewed simultaneously. 
The method of difference itself has two strands that can be used to consider the capitalisms of 
the EU. The first of these, the area approach, contributes to the comparison method by 
considering 'the cluster of characteristics' (Lijphart 1971:688) that geographical areas tend to 
have in common and therefore can be effectively used as controls. The area approach is by no 
means confined to proximate, physical similarities. An inductive study by Russett (1968) 
shows how 54 socio-cultural variables of 82 countries have similar socio-cultural groupings 
of countries which correspond to regions or areas. Also, the statistical work of Au (2000), 
                                                 
13 Concomitant variations as employed here are those variables that are shared by, or accompany groups of EU 
capitalisms compared to others that may be control groups, or whose variation cannot be explained.  
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which examined the intra-cultural variations of 42 countries, 13 of which were EU member-
states, illustrated similar area likenesses. These studies suggest that although comparability is 
not inherent in any given area or region, it is more likely so than in a randomly selected set of 
countries. 
Within the geographical area of the EU there are a number of these groupings that may 
occupy such various politico-economic sub-spheres. The Benelux countries provide an 
example of such a geographical grouping that share similar socio-cultural and politico-
economic characteristics. The Scandinavian countries within the EU; Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden as a collective, offer both the means of a control and various comparisons, i.e. the 
area similarities of geography and culture, whilst differing politico-economic positioning 
places; Finland within the Eurosphere, and Denmark and Sweden outside; but with all three 
adopting the CME variation of capitalism14 Similarly, Greece, Portugal, and Spain are 
considered to be not only 'southern' European countries, as in this thesis, but also share, along 
with Ireland, an economic grouping as the poorer members of the EU. Portugal and Spain 
whilst being members from the above group, also represent a geographical sub-group; that of 
the Iberian Peninsula. Both, as discussed above, emerged from decades of dictatorship in the 
1970s (alongside Greece, to form a "cluster" of southern European Economies), (Fishman, 
1990:422-440), and they are also allies in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO. 
However, they have different languages and cultures which sets them apart, perhaps in a 
similar way to that of England and Scotland or Wales in the UK. France and Germany, which 
are considered to have formed the original political axis on which the EU has been 
constructed and developed, provide a contrasting example of how area comparison may be 
employed at the meta level. It is argued, as in The Economist (Feb.6th 2003), that it is the 
differences between France and Germany that constitute such an axis. Germany is Europe's 
leading industrial power, France is its leading agricultural producer; France is mainly 
Catholic, Germany is mostly Protestant; Germany wants a federal Europe, France believes in 
the nation; Germany straddles eastern and western Europe, France borders both northern and 
southern Europe. By contrast, the UK and Ireland, whilst being respectively outside and 
inside the Eurosphere, and remain arguably distant from each other in socio-cultural terms, 
align closely around a specific politico-economic version of capitalism, the Liberal Market 
Economy (LME) model. 
                                                 
14 Soskice in Kitschelt et al, further differentiates CMEs into industry group types. 
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Lijphart (1971:689) develops this theme by considering intra-nation alongside inter-nation 
considerations. An example of this could be found in the comparison of say, Germany and 
Italy. Smelser in Lijphart (1971) suggests. 
 
…For many purposes, it would be more fruitful to compare northern Italy with 
southern Italy, and the Ruhr with Bavaria, than it would be to compare Germany 
as a whole with Italy as a whole. These two countries differ not only in the level of 
industrialisation, but also in cultural traditions, type of governmental structure and 
so on. Lijphart (1971:689). 
 
The advantage of intra-unit comparison is that inter-unit differences can be held constant. 
Smelser in Lijphart continues. 
 
…Then, having located what appear to be the operative factors in the intra-unit 
comparisons, it is possible to move to the inter-unit comparisons to see if the same 
differences hold in the large. (1971:689). 
 
This intra-inter approach is particularly applicable to the contemporary positions held within 
the EU in relation to both geographical clusters and the politico-economic sub-spheres 
member-states occupy. 
The intra-inter approach can be extended to other levels of area analysis.  Such an extension 
can be found in relation to the EU in Dicken's seminal work Global Shift, where the macro, 
micro and meso scale perspectives of the European region in general, and the EU as a part of 
that region in particular, are considered in terms of the interdependencies between, and the 
collective behaviour of, economic regions.  The 'Golden Triangle' of Europe being such an 
example (Dicken, 1998) 
The second variant of the method of difference is a diachronic analysis of a single country or 
group of countries. Such a comparison of the same unit(s) at different times offers a generally 
preferred solution to the control problem than comparison of two or more different but 
similar units in the same area at the same time. This is of particular use when considering the 
developing EU polity in relation to member-states by fixing a departure point in time as a 
base year, such as the launch of the euro, in 1999, and comparing their trajectories relative to 
both sides of such a base year. This may also be helpful for comparing the EU timetable for 
political and/or economic union and the current spatial domains inhabited by the member-
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states at varying times. In particular, use is made of the diachronic method below when 
examining the asynchronous patterns of economic and political convergence. The diachronic 
method can also be applied to the EU in terms of what may be described as temporal 
groupings. This may be considered an alternative way of searching for comparisons and 
similarities between groupings of EU member-states.  
 This approach to the comparison method not only allows an assessment of the varying 
degrees to which member-states are moving towards, or away, from the Euro 
supranationality, but also a gauge with which to measure the level of transfers of 
independence from their national capitalisms (if any) to relative dependencies on the 
supranational capitalism of the EU. To this end, there is a ready-made economic 'laboratory' 
to conduct tests; that which comprises the 12 capitalisms that have been situated within the 
Eurosphere since 1999. There is also a set of default controls against which to test any such 
transfers; the three non-Euro countries. On the other hand, as yet, there appears to be no 
obvious political laboratory available at present to conduct similar experiments. However, 
certain key political assumptions may be drawn and used in comparative analysis. These may 
include, for example, the extent to which member-states exert their political influence outside 
the constraints of economic and monetary union (EMU), say when forced into using fiscal 
policies which conflict with EMU, like the flouting of the 3 percent of GDP budget deficit 
rule of the Growth and Stability Pact.  
The method of similarity 
Whilst the comparison method has been hitherto employed largely in attempts to highlight 
differences between nation-states, there is also a need to consider similarities. Susan Strange 
employs a horticultural analogy to capitalist diversity. 
 
Given that the seeds of a capitalist mode of production grew to maturity in very 
different gardens, and evolved under the hand, as it were, of very different 
gardeners, within very different cultures and social structures, and under the 
influence of very different state laws, constitutions and policies… (1997:182) 
 
Strange continues to argue that comparative social scientists are misnamed in that they do not 
compare nearly as much as they contrast. Their attention is mainly directed at the differences 
between states, or economies or societies, rather than at their similarities.  
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They are asking how states or societies differ, and why they differ. For example, 
the study of neo-corporatism has centred on why neo-corporatist practices in 
Austria, The Netherlands, or Sweden differ from each other. They seldom appear 
to inquire why is it that all these states have adopted broadly similar system-
sustaining policies and institutions at about the same point in their social, 
economic and political development. (1997:183)  
 
This perspective is applied in the following chapter when the sub-spheres are analysed; as it 
is the social, economic, and political similarities between them that membership of the 
Eurosphere sometimes reveals. A return to the above France-Germany comparison adds some 
support to Strange's argument. Although numerous contrasts are readily identifiable between 
the two, a number of similarities can be found in their political trajectories. An example of 
this can be found in the Economist's article regarding 'A co-ordinated kick-start?' of the 
German and French economies.  
 
… It may be coincidence that Messrs Schröder and Raffarin, leading centre-left 
and centre-right governments respectively, are adopting a similar approach to 
reviving their economy. Or is it a more co-ordinated stand? 
Officially, no. But the two governments have recently been working closely on 
other matters, from Iraq to farm reform. "There's a clear sense that France and 
Germany are moving side by side on economic co-ordination," says a French 
official. If so, no need to worry too much about the penalties for breaching the 
Stability Pact. "Since last week, a clear Franco-German strategy has emerged: to 
pursue structural reforms and cut deficits only after, when growth resumes," says 
Jacques Delpha of Barclays Capital in Paris. “This entails each voting no to fines 
against the other." (2003:39)  
 
The need to seek out common trajectories and variations is developed by Pontusson (1995), 
who argues that this is at the core of comparative politics. 
 
Comparativists often shirk this challenge by focusing on exclusively on the 
variations; and even when they do rise to the challenge, they typically pursue a 
dualist strategy, seeking to explain commonalties and variations in terms of 
different sets of variables. Thus social-structural or economic-structural variables 
are frequently invoked to explain common trajectories, but they are seldom 
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seriously considered in the analysis of cross-national variations. The conventional 
view among students of advanced capitalist countries seems to be that the social 
and economic structures of these countries are essentially the same and therefore 
cannot explain variations in political outcomes across countries. (1995:495)  
 
These considerations are of particular importance in the comparison between the economic 
and political trajectories of the EU member-states, and in relation to the spatial and temporal 
asymmetries between the various, and varying, sub-spheres. It is here that an examination of 
the functions of the institutions within member-states and the EU should be made in order to 
determine the level(s) of supranationality that exist now and may evolve in the future. It is 
argued below that there has been a continuing shift from the intergovernmentalism prevailing 
in the early 1980s to a newly-developing form of transgovernmentalism. What caused this 
movement? Perhaps, the metamorphosis of some elements of traditional institutionalism into 
neoinstitutionalism described earlier may offer some explanation (See Table 6). 
Although three particular variants of neoinstitutionalism have been advanced earlier under 
the constructivist-institutionalism approach adopted here, it is interesting to note that all 
seven variants of neoinstitutionalism in Figure 4 could, arguably, be related to the role of EU 
institutions. For example, of interest for the Rational Choice Institutionalists, who focus on 
systems and rules, might be the relaxation of the economic convergence criteria for most EU 
members, including France and Germany, in order to keep the launch of the euro on 
schedule; or, the struggles of some members, notably Germany (again) and Portugal, to 
conform to the demands of the Stability and Growth Pact. The ‘Empirical Institutionalists, 
who most closely resemble the 'traditional' approach (Lowndes 2002:96), may be involved in 
the identification and classification of types of institutions. The ‘Historical’ variant may 
consider the design of institutions and how this may influence future decision-making of 
individuals. ‘Network’ institutionalists may show how regularised, but often informal 
patterns of interaction between individuals and groups shape political behaviour, (Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992, cited in Lowndes 2002:96). The behaviour of states working within the formal 
and informal structural constraints of international politics would be the domain, perhaps 
somewhat obviously, of the ‘International’ Institutionalists, where the relationship between 
the economic and political trajectories of the EU would be of major importance. 
The Social Chapter, a major institution born out of the Maastricht Treaty, would be a field, 
inter alia, in which the ‘Sociological’ Institutionalists would offer analytical insight. And 
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finally, at the political end of the neoinstitutionalism spectrum, Lowndes describes how the 
‘Normative’ institutionalists would be able to consider how the norms and values embodied 
in political institutions shape the behaviour of individuals' (2002:96), 
One way of directly relating this to the developing supracapitalism of the EU is to examine 
the strategy formulation mechanisms of the ECB. For a broad examination of this, central 
theme of the thesis, it is useful to examine the specificities of the sub-Eurosphere political 
economy of the ECB, and the mechanics and perspectives of ECB policy decision-making, as 
discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
Towards a theory of national preference 
Such a departure point allows a base from which to consider not how, but more importantly, 
why states exhibit national preferences. Orfeo Fioretos contextualises this (See Table 7). 
 
…However, despite the pivotal importance of accounting for the shape (emphasis 
added) of states’ preferences, there is little consensus among scholars on what 
determines national preferences over multilateral institutions. (2001: 215) 
 
The work of Fioretos is drawn upon in the following pages to apply elements of the varieties 
of capitalism approach to these issues. This is of significant assistance as Fioretos proceeds 
by considering the Societal School’s position as a bridge between Realism and 
Institutionalism. The reasoning is that with both these theories states are considered as unitary 
actors, with the exogenous environment considered as the source of preferences. The societal 
school, with its strong ‘microfoundations’ emphasis, can be employed as a ‘sophisticated 
version of the domestic approach to IR to explain why interest groups (usually firms) have 
distinct policy preferences and how governments aggregate these preferences to arrive at a 
specific policy choice’ (Fioretos, 2001.218). However, this effectively would shift the 
analysis towards another direction, and away from the constructivist-institutionalism 
analytical approach that this thesis advances. This is largely, although not exclusively, due to 
the significant differences between traditional institutionalism and neoinstitutionalism 
illustrated in Table 6. It is necessary therefore to employ Fioretos to assist in the core issues 
surrounding national preferences, from a neoinstitutional perspective: and this is where he 
offers most assistance to the approaches advocated here. 
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 With this in mind, three aspects of Fioretos’s insight can be used to position a framework 
from which to understand why states’ domestic institutional preferences may influence the 
form (and substance) of the multilateral, supranational institutions involved in the shaping of 
EU integration. First, EU institutions can be seen as mechanisms which may sustain or ‘lock 
in’ national regulatory regimes at the supranational level. For example, the Single European 
Market and the Single European Act have served to develop, and strengthen, the liberal free 
trade policies of EU member-states. On the other hand, common minimum regulations in 
social and environmental areas prevent processes of competitive deregulation from 
undermining the core features of national frameworks. Second, Fioretos argues that EU 
institutions may create new institutional growth trajectories at the domestic level that a 
country might have difficulties achieving on its own. This is called positive institution-
building, as the individual state’s basic reason for supporting a particular supranational 
institution is in order to ‘supplement’ its own national institution(s) with a common EU-level 
institutional structure in order to achieve goals that it may not be able to on its own. An 
example of this can be found in one of the aspects of Germany’s mid-point negotiating 
position between France and the UK position at Maastricht regarding industrial policy. The 
issues in relation to industrial policy centred on whether the European Commission should 
have the authority to orchestrate an interventionist industrial policy. The British were 
strongly against the idea as it was perceived to ‘offer alternative market incentives that would 
seriously distort economic co-ordination when Britain wanted to enhance competition policy, 
in line with, and because of, its Liberal Market Economy (LME). France was in favour of 
giving increased powers to the Commission, which would direct EU funds towards specific 
industrial projects in particular sectors or firms (Fioretos 2001:238). The rationale of the 
German position was based on regulatory mechanisms that are at the heart of the Co-
ordinated Market Economy (CME) model. This meant that it was in favour of only limited 
EC industrial policy that would have beneficial effects for German producers in areas where 
they had been relatively weak, such as the high-tech sector. Furthermore, this would offer 
opportunities for German producers to ‘make use of the comparative institutional advantages 
of the CME in technology transfer and diffusion’ (Fioretos 2001:239); while improving its 
innovation in the production of high-tech goods. This allowed Germany to facilitate a 
positive institutional growth trajectory, which it could have only achieved with great 
difficulty and costs alone. And third, if there can be positive institutional-building at the 
domestic level through, or as a direct imposition by EU-level institutions, then there can also 
be negative institution building. Here, the objective is to undo and reduce certain (perhaps 
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embedded) national institutional frameworks that are deemed detrimental to achieving 
desired policy outcomes. Again, Germany offers an example. This is where concerted efforts 
are being made by producers in some countries (e.g. large firms in Germany) to undermine 
antitrust and merger laws (market concentration issues) that are more restrictive at the 
domestic level than those of the EU. Fioretos summarises these points. 
 
In brief, the EU should not only be seen as an institutional constraint on member-
states, but also as an organisation that presents opportunities for (domestic) 
institutional reform that may be difficult to achieve on a purely national scale. In 
that sense, joining national with European institutions presents member-states with 
an opportunity to explore and achieve institutional complementarities. (2001: 
224) (qualification in brackets added).    
 
Although these selected elements of Fioretos’s approach above have largely focused on a 
neoinstitutional interpretation of influences on national preferences, a number of broader 
considerations emerge. The first is that by employing the varieties of capitalism approach, 
and by concentrating on the differences between CMEs and LMEs, while allowing for the 
observation that the underlying determinant of a country’s preferences over the structure of 
EU institutions is the composition of its market economy; the approach stops short. This is 
because there are variations or sub-spheres, which Esping-Andersen (1990)  describes as 
'regime clusters', within both models. There is clear difference, for example, between the 
German and Scandinavian versions of CME, and between the Irish and UK interpretations of 
its counterpart, the LME. Moreover, the intensity and impact of EU institutional influence 
over the individual capitalisms within the sub-spheres varies significantly, as the empirical 
overview below demonstrates. The second issue is that, paradoxically, the EU institutions 
which (presumably) are designed to bring about economic and political convergence in the 
long -run, often appear to be the instruments of divergence in the short and medium-terms; 
the discussions above regarding the ECB and the Stability and Growth Pact being such 
examples. This convergence/divergence relationship is further complicated when the view of 
certain EU scholars who assert that institutional convergence is a prerequisite for the 
successful achievement of important economic gains (Heylen and van Poeck, 1995, cited in  
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Table 7 
________________________________________________________________ 
EU member-states' interpretations of the capitalism model 
 
 
Capitalist 
imperative 
Methods employed Examples of national variations 
 
Wealth 
maximisation 
Fiscal adjustment and 
financial deregulation  
Progressive and regressive 
taxation. Types and use of indirect 
taxation. Transfer payment levels 
Single market 
(internalities) 
Free movement of goods, 
services labour, and capital.  
Competitive or network based. 
Competitive 
advantage 
(externalities) 
Regionalisation. Non-tarif 
barriers. EU subsidies. (E.g. 
Common Agricultural 
Policy).  
Role and concentration of 
transnational corporations 
(TNCs). Outward and inward 
FDI. Market structures. 
Maximisation 
of labour 
surpluses. 
(Profit) 
Efficiencies through flexible 
labour forces. Capital 
substitution for labour. 
Industry policy. 
Production methodologies e.g.  
Levels of research and 
development. Selection of 
technologies. Trades union 
membership levels. 
Interpretation of the Social 
Chapter 
Reinvestment Labour surpluses traded on 
the capital markets. 
Stock market profiles. 
Debt/equity ratios. Portfolio or 
long-term investment preferences. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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Fioretos 2001) is considered. The suggestion seems to be that states’ preferences will 
converge over time if they are members of the same organisation. However, if the collective 
profiles of diverse forms of advanced capitalisms, either in a straightforward CME/LME 
dichotomous relationship, or as is called for by this thesis, a more complex set of interacting 
economies, are to coexist, ‘the analytical emphasis in the future should not be on how 
convergence may be promoted but how divergence can be accommodated’ (Fioretos 
2001:243). 
 A final issue concerns the continuity of national institutions, and therefore their interaction 
with the EU institutions, in the face of greater politico-ideological shifts within member-
states economies than has been seen over the last six or seven years. Although the Blair 
government and the Schröder administration are ostensibly ideologically different from their 
predecessors, Thatcher and Kohl respectively, they have largely continued with very similar 
major economic policies. The durability of stable and interactive relations between national 
and EU institutions would be seriously put to the test by more violent disturbances to some 
member-states' political complexion. A recent example was the level of support shown for 
Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Jorg Haider in Austria, which appeared to mirror the 
emergence of a new and more extreme right-wing movement across the EU countries. The 
generally centrist to centrist-right 'feel' to the EU at present could be argued to generate the 
optimum conditions under which it has the legitimacy to maintain existing liberal market 
economic policy direction, whilst cementing institutional relationships between member-
states and the EU. A significant shift to the right would disturb the fine balance, which 
appears to exist at the moment, whereby social democrats, conservatives and liberals are all 
accommodated. The spectre of enlargement would also appear more dark and threatening to 
political convergence under a more polarised or right-wing EU. This is, of course, outside the 
scope of this thesis but is one of the variables that will be of concern, especially to varieties 
of capitalism and neoinstitutionalist scholars. 
The foregoing passages then, have introduced the concepts of differences of national 
capitalisms, together with their preferences and associated path dependencies, which have 
ultimately shaped the differing forms of capitalism particular nation-states have adopted 
overtime, and perhaps suggest that n=25. However, the similarities between some capitalism, 
and the influences on them, also point to possibilities for contingent typologies. Assuming, 
Weber’s Causal Chain holds (Figure1) as a generic trajectory from all modern capitalisms, 
the constituent components and drivers of the capitalist state, as laid out by Meiksins-Wood 
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are accepted; and if the collective variations of national capitalisms as categorised in Tables 3 
and 4 are applied, a framework for a typology emerges. And from this, three common key 
variables can be identified.   
Three key variables 
The first key variable relates to the macroeconomic rationale of all capitalist economies 
involves the primary relationship between the creation of wealth and its resultant 
redistribution. So, in linking any particular typology it involves the state's policy strategy and 
mechanisms in managing the interface between the producers (and productive forces) of 
wealth and the appropriators, or main recipients, of such wealth. In Marxist dialogue, the 
question is how do states decide upon how much should their producers retain of the surplus 
labour they have generated, and to what extent, or in what proportions, are their appropriators 
encouraged (discouraged) to accumulate immediately or reinvest this surplus labour for 
future (exponential) accumulation? Of course, this explanation of macroeconomic rationale is 
overly simplistic because between the producers and the appropriators there is a third group 
within a nation's population that neither produces, in a significant materialistic sense, nor 
appropriates wealth in any meaningful or measurable way. In other words, a complexity of 
the interface described above is that this third group will also consist of non-producing 
benefactors and beneficiaries of state redistribution of wealth. The state's policies then have 
to determine to what extent the producers' surpluses should contribute to this redistribution, 
and/or by how much of the appropriators' wealth, previously accumulated or currently being 
appropriated, should be redirected to these economic actors. In essence, and perhaps 
paradoxically, this tertiary collective defines by default, the complexion of the national 
capitalism in which it exists. This welfare element of capitalism as it has developed, and is 
developing, in the EU countries, is reducible to three alternatives; the Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism as described by Esping-Andersen (1990). Consistent with the 
comparative method, Esping-Andersen identifies and compares the conservative, the liberal 
and the social democratic 'regime types' of state welfare. Moreover, these three regime types 
can be used as an overlay to the rationale level of analysis of national capitalisms within the 
EU described above. The German and Benelux economies can be aligned to the conservative 
label, Ireland and the UK are examples of the liberal system, and the Scandinavian countries 
can be broadly described as social democracies. 
 The second level of key variables that inform the comparison method comprises the main 
components of capitalism as described in its historical sense, and can be applied to the 
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national capitalisms of the EU. Meiksins-Wood (2002), builds her history on the origins of 
capitalism by comparing capitalism with previous forms of social organisation, such as 
feudalism. In doing so, she identifies those features or components, which are uniquely 
capitalist. From the modern EU nation state's perspective these features can be cardinally 
sequenced by imperatives, as follows. Then nation's wealth, and therefore well-offness, but 
not necessarily well-being, is increased by firms' compulsion always to maximise profit. This 
is most efficiently achieved by competition in a single market. In turn, this drives the 
competing firms to continually search for cost-effective production in order to gain 
competitive advantage(s) largely by increasing labour productivity, or replacing it with 
machinery. Finally, the labour surpluses thus gained, may be reinvested in the capital markets 
in order to facilitate further exponential accumulation of such surpluses.  
In relation to the individual capitalisms of the EU, and in their respective sub-spheres, these 
imperatives offer opportunities for analysis at a national operational level. That is, this level 
of analysis can be employed to consider, for example, the efficiency of the German 
workforce with that of French labour output whilst also measuring the two countries' stock 
market performances over the same period; or, alternatively, comparing reinvestment levels 
in the newer industrialised growth economies of the poorer Southern European Economies 
(SEEs) of Portugal, Greece, and Spain. These components can also be employed to compare 
the sub-spheres identified below; for example, to examine the growth pattern differentials 
between the LMEs and the CMEs, or the unemployment trajectories of the 12 Eurosphere 
countries, and the 13 non-Eurosphere countries. Additionally, these features of capitalism, 
although variously co-ordinated and prioritised by the individual members of the EU in a 
domestic sense, are planned to be pulled gradually, but continuously, by the homogenising 
forces of the EU's institutions, towards a 'one fit' Euro-construct that members have 
(variously) contracted to follow. This allows a 'control' model of capitalism against which to 
both measure individual state variations and the extent of the development of an EU 
supracapitalism. 
The third level of analysis identified, aims to determine those cultural and historical 
formations, social structures and forms of state that have set the member-states on their 
respective political trajectories. The extent of the embeddedness of path dependency brought 
about by the above forms and structures will impact on their ability to move towards the 
political union that is the EU's ultimate objective. 
One of the main problems with determining these aspects of the EU countries is that all 15 
countries have, arguably, different political path trajectories which have been largely 
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determined by historical events impacting on, and developing, individual national cultures. 
However, although there is again the recurring problematic of complexity in this regard, there 
is a major analytical advantage to be found when employing the comparison method in 
historico-cultural terms. 
Towards an typology of  EU national capitalisms 
The departure point for the selection of typologies of EU capitalisms here was first to 
establish a ‘needs of analysis’ framework. The structure of typologies would have offer the 
opportunity to compare the EU capitalisms over a longitudinally acceptable timeframe; a 
clear pre-euro and post-euro comparison; the ability to compare the macroeconomic 
performances of both these sub-groups, to allow for differing socio-cultural evolutions, socio-
political dynamics, and geopolitical positions; the scale, scope, and types of economies, and, 
above all, differing national capitalisms’ expectations of, and contribution to, the EU overall. 
This entails selecting typological groups where each could, where possible, have a euro sub-
group and a non-euro sub group. This is particularly important because the planned analysis 
has to be flexible enough to include 12 capitalisms that constituted the membership from the 
beginning of the period of study, the three mid-stage pre-euro additions in 1995 known as the 
fourth enlargement, and the accession in 2004 of ten new members that significantly swelled 
the membership to 25 countries, and which not only more than doubled the scale of the 
collective, but also introduced another marked increase in scope of the EU, together with a 
major shift in its overall dynamic. This is because the balance between Eurosphere and non-
Eurosphere member-states had now tipped in favour of the latter sub-group; a sub-group 
which simultaneously introduced two further sub-divisions of its own: those existing 
members who had chosen to stay with their domestic currencies, and the newly acceding 
countries that would compulsorily  join the Eurosphere after a qualifying period 
It is clear at this point that the existing literature, as broad and varied as it is, does not have 
the individual or collective capacity to accommodate the required pre and post-euro analysis, 
the Eurosphere versus non-Eurosphere level of investigation, or to capture the longitudinal 
timeframe in its completeness and with the pre-designated temporal points for analysis. 
However, within each of the literatures cited above there are one or more elements of 
potential analytical utility that can be borrowed and stitched into the overall fabric of the 
typology selected for the analyses below. And, at this point it is instructive to briefly examine 
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the underpinning rationale for these approaches within a view to establish those components 
that may be included. 
Beginning with the work of Michel Albert, whose seminal work Capitalism against 
Capitalism exploded the Anglo-Saxon or English-speaking model of capitalism, so often 
taken as a given typology, or paradigm, both before his intervention and right up to the 
present day, by arguing that the America version of capitalism was becoming dislocated from 
the British Anglo-Saxon construct. This perspective was derived from his central observation 
that… 
 
Given that the UK, for all Mrs Thatcher’s efforts to import Reaganism is destined 
to draw nearer Europe while distancing itself somewhat from America, the 
inescapable conclusion must be that constitutes an economic model in and of 
itself. (Albert, 1993) 
 
This is at once both useful and contentious. It is quite normal for the emergence of the 
neoliberal movement to be attributed to Thatcher and Reagan, as their joint crusade against 
the failure of Keynesian-influenced macroeconomic management, long-adopted by most 
western governments following the Bretton-Woods accord at the end of Second World War, 
but now seen as impotent in the face of what had become transnational contagions of 
spiralling inflation and stagflation. And, in this partnership, it is assumed that the two 
national capitalisms’ and their ‘Special Relationship’ were not only one and the same, but 
that the Anglo-US version of capitalism also encompassed Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand.  
‘Reaganonics’, as the model became known, was a new version of capitalism, and one really 
only shared by other economies at the margin. For Albert, the Anglo-US version had only 
been perpetuated by the post-war American need for ‘trans-Atlantic solidarity with not only 
the UK, and although more remotely, with Europe, in the perceived confrontation with 
communism. And, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore the end of the 
immediate threat to America’s European interests, it was no doubt insightful of Albert to 
describe this new version as neo-American capitalism However, what can be observed in 
terms of the Anglo-US, or Anglo-Saxon, model is the shared view on the efficiency of market 
mechanisms and the need to keep commercial regulatory constraints to a minimum. In this 
way, the model can be relaxed to a more fluid version of national capitalism into which both 
the UK and the United States can be seen to exist, that of the liberal market economy, later to 
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become one of the versions of capitalism identified by Hall and Soskice in their Varieties of 
Capitalism analysis. Therefore, Albert is both contentious and useful, in that for the purposes 
of this research it is possible to strip out any encumbrances that ties to American capitalism 
may present, while retaining those elements pertinent to both the UK and to Ireland who 
enjoy a ‘joined at the hip’ economic relationship, and one much closer that the UK does with 
the United States. And, in this, we can secure the first typological group of the analysis here; 
that of the Liberal Market Economy (LME), and with it a sub-division as the result of 
Eurosphere membership, to reveal the UK as a liberal market economy, non-euro (LMENE), 
and Ireland as a liberal market economy within the Eurosphere (LMEE).  
This distinction can be seen as much influenced by Hall and Soskice, as by Albert, although 
for different reasons. Whereas Albert effectively deconstructed the Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-US 
model to reveal a separation of the neo-American model from the UK, perhaps although 
loosely staying together with Australia, Canada (to limited extent), and New Zealand, Hall 
and Soskice’s compendious distillation of capitalism, effectively employs the Liberal Market 
Economy (LME) model as a counterweight to the Co-ordinated Market Economies (CME) 
pre-eminent in Europe and Japan. In this, they faithfully mirror the above six Anglo-Saxon 
economies as a collective, while aggregating the economic profiles of 11 economies, 
including Japan and ten European capitalisms, seven of which are EU member-states. It has 
to be noted that while, in effect, this is a dichotomous analysis and therefore hardly a variety 
of capitalism, including really nothing more than a measure of the levels of different 
governments’ direct involvement in their respective economies, and an evaluation of the 
extent to which firms operate at arm’s length to politico-economic institutions, such as banks  
and trades unions, it does offer, in an EU context, the opportunity to cluster those national 
capitalisms that are meaningfully influenced by Germany directly, or indirectly by their own 
similar internal relationships between firms and institutions. And this, in terms of the 
intended analysis here, is important, as one of the major metrics employed is indeed set to 
measure the potential for a functional relationship with politico-economic institutions: in this 
case the ECB. Therefore, by adopting some convenient elements of the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach, and separating what are mature EU economies, into LMEs and their 
CMEs counterparts, the second typology can be identified. And, as with the LME model, 
there are those CMEs in the Eurosphere, and those outside. There are now four analytical 
typologies, two Eurosphere groups (CMEE and LMEE) an two ex-Eurosphere collectives 
(CMENE and LMENE) ; and this where the varieties model, for in as much as it is a variety 
ceases to be of  much further use here. 
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At this point then, there are four typologies: those categorised as CMEE; CMENE; LMEE; 
and LMENE. These CMEEs comprise Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The CMENEs include Denmark and Sweden. Ireland is 
the LMEE, and the UK, the LMNE. However, at this point the models are overly simplistic, 
and more qualification for, and of, each of the individual country’s inclusions are required, 
alongside a recognition consistent with the arguments regarding the need for multi-level 
considerations. Although Hall and Soskice provide a convenient list of both CMEs and 
LMEs, and that these do form the basis for the construction of the four typologies used here, 
there needs to be at least a recognition of intra-group sub-sets that may somehow influence 
the reliability and validity of the outcomes of the quantitative analyses carried out below in 
Chapter 6 below, and which may of course also be used to reinforce identified similarities as 
well as differences. Starting with the Germany, and its direct influence, it is almost 
impossible to disaggregate Germany from Austria, on culture, language, geographical, 
geopolitical, and trade. In the same way the Benelux countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg share a number of similar relational ties, not least of which are the 
geographical, geopolitical, and trade ties, and that all three came together to comprise three of 
the six founder members of the EU, And moreover, as the Benelux collective, are often seen 
as a singular unit of analysis. France and Italy, notwithstanding obvious cultural and 
geopolitical differences are very clear, they closely share the state interventionist, or the 
statist form of capitalism that Story (2000) identifies by using a matrix that cross-tabulates 
concentration of ownership against corporate concentration within economies, and shows 
France and Italy more likely to exhibit state allocation of capital, joint state and family 
enterprises, and industrial sector and government cohesion policies. Also within my 
‘borrowed’ CME collective are Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, and these countries are 
probably the most difficult to justify inclusion within a largely German-influenced or, more 
broadly, Rhinish, typology; especially as Esping-Andersen (1990) considers the Scandinavian 
countries as closely linked via their welfare state regimes, and that this could qualify them as 
a typology of their own – a Scandinavian-type capitalism. However, and perhaps ironically in 
the light of the above perspective, these capitalisms are brought together not only by their 
social care profiles, and as the analysis on social benefit payments in Chapter 4 below 
suggests this commonality must be open to closer scrutiny; but the main qualifying linkage 
for the analysis here is the overall level of state involvement, and inclination towards direct 
institutional influence in their economies that both not only binds them together as a sub-
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group, but more significantly includes them all on the grounds of direct state involvement, 
regardless of their Eurosphere status. 
Moreover, this ‘second level’ analysis of the CME subsets also fits in with three of the four 
types of national capitalism that the Grouch and Streeck (1997) approach identifies, where 
the typologies are grouped into market-oriented; Rhineland or corporatist; statist; and social 
democrat. Here, the USA, Canada, and the UK are cited as examples of market-oriented, 
Germany and Japan as Rhineland (Rhinish) corporatist, France and Italy as Statist, and 
Sweden and Austria as social democrat, when considering the nature and characteristics of 
labour market structures. 
In terms of the LME typologies employed in this research, it is perhaps at first glance 
awkward that each typology has only one unit of analysis when separated by membership of 
the single currency. However, on nearly all counts of distinguishing between CME and LME, 
the economies of Ireland and the UK demonstrate the clear laissez-faire separation of state 
from business and markets, ongoing programmes of privatisation of state-controlled 
organisations, evidence of increasing de-regulation wherever possible, diminishing labour 
power through reduced trades union memberships and the resultant development of flexible 
labour markets, and the marketisation of former public service sectors such as health and 
education. The grouping of the LMEs in this case not only aligns with both the Hall and 
Sokice and  Crouch and Streeck models, but also that of Hooge, (1998) and Hooge and Marks 
(1999), where Hooge (1999:458), in particular, reinforces the LME qualification employed 
here by making the distinction between neoliberal and regulated capitalism, when discussing 
the problems of EU cohesion, and whereby he notes a number of related dichotomous 
tensions between ‘unfettered and institutional capitalism’; the ‘neo-American and versus 
social democracy’; ‘Anglo-Saxon versus the Rhine social market economy’; and ‘unco-
ordinated or co-ordinated regimes’. In doing so, he raises the central question posited in my 
opening chapter here regarding the asymmetric distribution of wealth, and locates the 
question in the EU by asking ‘to what extent- if at all- should the European Union redistribute 
from rich to poor? In short, what form of capitalism do Europeans want? And, where he sees 
his neoliberal and regulated versions of capitalism as ‘the two dominant contending models 
for organizing European society’. In doing so, he charts the ‘death of national Keynesianism’ 
and the ‘liberalization of the common European market in the 1980s leading to the 
reorganisation of European political economy’. 
 It is with this level of qualification that there can be seen the potential for the n=1 position 
discussed above, but that with these first four typologies enough justification can be seen for 
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the typological grouping, even if only the contingent analytical demands of this research. 
However, the remaining four typological constructs suggested here have altogether 
contrasting rationales and internal logics. 
Three of the remaining 13 national capitalisms of the EU, Greece, Spain, and Portugal can be 
seen as a pre-determined typology. As categorised by  Neal and Berbazet (1998)  above,  all 
three are southern European Economies, are making the transitional from agricultural based 
economies to industrialised economies, have relatively recently become democracies, and are 
all designated Eurosphere capitalisms, and in this convenient form are collectively labelled as 
Southern European Economies in the Eurosphere (SEEEs). And, there is as well a clearly 
identifiable subset; one that can pair Portugal and Spain as the Iberian sub-category, although 
based on geographical rather than geopolitical, and recent politico-economic developments as 
opposed to socio-cultural alignments. Moreover, it could be argued that Portugal may also 
form a second sub-category with Greece if based on their very similar size of economy and 
available labour force; and whereas Spain has nearly four times the size of economy and 
workforce. Therefore, the fifth group within the typology offered is the southern European 
economies within the Eurosphere or SEEE. 
The ten countries that all acceded in 2004, as the fifth enlargement, share three immediate 
commonalities: that they all acceded to the EU at the same time; that they are all nascent, 
developing economies; and that they are all non-Eurosphere national capitalisms. However, 
these similarities having been made, there are also significant contrasts, that, as with the other 
typologies also offer grounds for sub-group formations. First, the ten fall into two types of 
transition: those industrialising from former agricultural-based or tourism-based economies, 
and those progressing from backward, centrally-planned industrial economies to modern, 
market-based industrial economies. And, although there may be some minor structural and 
temporal differences, these new member-states can be seen to occupy three typologies. 
Cyprus and Malta, by virtue of the scale and scope of their agri-tourism economies, and their 
relatively diminutive geographical size can be considered as Small Island Economies outside 
the Eurosphere (SIENEs). The very close geographical, and relatively close geopolitical, and 
trade relationships, bind together the Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as the Baltic Country 
Economies, again outside the Eurosphere, and designated as BCENEs. The five countries of 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia come together as former, 
centrally-planned Eastern Bloc countries (FEBNE), and while having very different pre-
communist socio-cultural and politico-economic trajectories, their transitional similarities and 
approximate geopolitical profiles place them in a convenient, if not ideal grouping. And, as 
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with the above categorisations, there are natural and politico-economic subsets that need to be 
recognised in order to qualifying certain analyses, and understanding certain 
interrelationships. For example, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were one and the same 
country under the Soviet regime, and Slovenia was also under the same communist influence, 
but as part of the former Yugoslavia. Poland is very much an individual unit of analysis 
within the group, largely because of the size of population and economy; as is Hungary albeit 
on smaller scales of both. What unifies all five in this group is the joint transition from old 
industrial management to new market-based service and industrial economies. However, this 
comes with an important qualification: there is a noticeable asymmetry in the velocity of 
transition between all these new capitalisms, and the time it may take each of them to qualify 
for the single currency is a distinguishing feature of the group. Adjusting for size Slovenia 
appears to be closest to adopting the euro with Hungary considered by many as a moribund 
economy with many structural adjustments still to be made. Poland may well be alongside 
Slovenia in the pursuit of currency union, with Slovakia somewhere in the middle of the 
pack. Notwithstanding this multi-speed characteristic of these economies, their strategic 
politico-economic positions and their similarities in terms of recent transitional history, bands 
them together, albeit contingently, for the purposes of the following analysis.  
Summary 
As the literature and associated commentaries suggest, it is highly improbable to effectively 
categorise the national capitalisms of the EU into a universal, fit-for-all purposes typology for 
analysis. The wide array of typological methodologies discussed above bear witness to this. 
Yet, once liberated by recognition of the notions of contextual contingency, and the readily 
available permutations and combinations of politico-economic, geopolitical, socio-economic, 
socio-cultural, and other possible groupings, the task can be  distilled into a sort of 
convenience sampling model, where the needs of analysis shapes the typology, rather than 
the typology determining the type of analysis. And in this, all typologies will always be 
subject to scrutiny in terms of both rationale and justification, as is clearly the case with the 
varieties of capitalism genre. 
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Table 8 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
An analytical typology of EU national capitalisms  
 
Abbreviation 
used 
Description of typology group EU national capitalisms in 
group 
BCENE Baltic country economies not in 
Eurosphere 
Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV), 
Lithuania( LT ) 
CMEE Co-ordinated market economies in 
Eurosphere 
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), 
Finland (FL), France (FR), 
Germany, (DE), Italy (IT), 
Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands 
(NL) 
CMENE Co-ordinated market economies not 
in Eurosphere 
Denmark (DK),  
Sweden (SE) 
FEBNE Former Eastern Bloc economies not 
in Eurosphere 
Czech Republic (CZ), 
Hungary (HU),  
Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK) 
Slovenia (SL) 
LMEE Liberal Market Economies in 
Eurosphere 
Ireland (IE) 
LMENE Liberal Market Economies not in 
Eurosphere 
United Kingdom (UK) 
SEEE Southern European economies in 
Eurosphere 
Greece (EL), Portugal (PT), 
Spain (ES) 
SIENE Small Island economies not in 
Eurosphere 
Cyprus (CY), Malta (MT) 
 
________________________________________________________________Source: 
primary 
 
 
However, this should not detract any research on EU capitalism from establishing a more 
meaningful analytical framework for the national capitalisms of the EU. Indeed, some may 
argue that it would constitute a significant oversight and major methodological weakness if 
the undoubted institutional uniqueness of the EU, the momentous creation of the Eurosphere 
(and ex-Eurosphere), and any pre-existing groups and potential clusters of EU capitalisms 
were not in some way taken into account. And, it is with this in mind that Table 8 above 
summarises the selected capitalisms 
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Chapter 4 Analyses of selected EU macroeconomic variables 
 
The selected analyses of the available empirical evidence of both the EU national capitalisms 
and their prescribed typological collectives fall into two broad groupings of four. The first of 
these are the generally-accepted macroeconomic variable indicators that most of the world’s 
governments employ as politico-economic imperatives, and which form the basis on which 
national capitalisms are managed through policy-making, forecasting, and target-setting. 
And, because these indicator variables are closely interdependent and interrelational in the 
sense that they contingently behave in variable sequences of subsequent and consequent nexi, 
they are continually being prioritised and re-prioritised by different governments facing 
varying domestic, international, and transnational conditions. For example, trade-offs 
between unemployment and inflation; growth and inflation, unemployment and growth; and 
the balance of payments and unemployment. Therefore, price stability - the primary policy 
objective of the ECB - as measured by the GDP deflator and the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP); growth, as measured by GDP per capita and GDP percentage 
change; unemployment; and balance of payment (BOP) differentials over time are examined 
both by longitudinal trend-pattern analyses, and also by statistical analysis between and 
within typological groupings, before and after the advent of the single European currency, 
and therefore also after the creation of the additional Eurosphere and an ex-Eurosphere 
spaces of analysis. The second group of macroeconomic indicator variables are chosen 
because of their high level of importance within the EU itself, and therefore also with the 
issues surrounding the potential for an EU supracapitalism based on the single currency and 
the ECB. Here, interrelationships before and subsequent to the advent of the euro, of all the 
identified collectives and sub-groups, focus on intra and extra-EU trade patterns; productivity 
comparatives, taxation differences; and social benefit payment quantities. 
There, are of course, myriad other indicators that could be employed, and this is clearly a 
limitation of this work. However, in the earlier discussions above it is argued that capitalism 
can generally be taken as an economic system that privileges wealth creation over wealth 
distribution, but that the managers of national capitalisms are charged with the responsibility 
of optimising the welfare (or well-offness) of their citizenry via distributive and allocative 
mechanisms, and that these four indicators, in addition to the main macroeconomic 
imperatives above, offer at least a range of analysis in line with the objectives of the research.   
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When considering all eight indicator variables together in the way described, it is also 
important here to recognise the centrality of GDP, and its derivatives GNP, NNP, and NNI, in 
the measurement and evaluation, and therefore the performativity, of EU national capitalisms 
over time. And, while it is clear that GDP has significant flaws and limitations, its 
development and ultimate transnational utility requires further consideration, especially in the 
light of the nature and unfolding chameleonic characteristics of capitalism, and the evolving   
structure and management of national capitalisms throughout the 20th-century. 
The four main macroeconomic variables identified above, by being generally-accepted by 
most of the world’s post-Bretton-Woods governments, became central features in managing 
their national economies. Perhaps more significantly, these indicators became both 
universally recognised, internationally-accepted, and shared national imperatives; and de 
facto the direct responsibility of individual national governments, and the basis of related 
intergovernmental agreements. This is in stark contrast to the widespread laissez-faire 
attitude of the majority of capitalist government regimes during the first third of the 20th-
century where the impacts and influences of capitalism appeared to remain largely 
unchallenged, with policy responses based on the acceptance and treatment of the symptoms, 
rather than causal investigation and preventative courses of future actions. 
Almost in parallel with the immediate post-Bretton-Woods period, the modern development 
of GDP as the key comparative metric and management mensuration of national capitalisms 
emerged at this time15, although its antecedents can be seen to be located in the American 
Depression of the 1930s, where the US government employed crude estimations of stock 
prices, industrial production, and transport data. This first glimpse of GDP measurements in 
the relationship between national governments’ management of their economies and the 
direct and indirect effects of transnational capitalist activity on their economies, importantly 
offered, for the first time, a method of standardising performance indicators within and 
between national capitalisms, and therefore the potential for international co-operation 
beyond simple trade agreements or embargoes. From this, in 1947, the United Nations (UN) 
adopted the System of National Accounts (SNA), and national capitalisms became both 
discrete and comparative units of analysis for the first time. 
                                                 
15GDP was a component of a standard analytical framework for measuring national economies adopted by the 
United Nations in 1947. This was to be the first recognised System for National Accounts (SNA) 
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This is important for two reasons. One is GDP’s position in the significant and distinct 
chronological phases of the history of capitalism in the last century; the other is in the almost 
simultaneous evolution of the post-war regeneration of capitalism itself alongside the 
establishment of an internationally-shared responsibility for the world’s economy, as typified 
by newly-created transnational institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. 
In relation to the chronological phases of the 20th century, the 10-year period can be bisected 
almost exactly in half around the early 1950s, with the two halves each comprising clearly 
defined politico-economic epochs. The first half is characterised, in a politico-economic 
sense, by two world wars either side of a 20-year inter-war period that is, in itself, significant 
not only by linking the two wars together, but also by witnessing perhaps the most damaging 
effects of unfettered capitalism up until that time. Governments of national capitalisms before 
the advent of the Second World War, but in particular during the interwar years (1919 to 
1939), although charged with managing their national economic affairs in terms of policy-
making and agenda-setting, were seen both to be unwilling or incapable of obviating the 
damaging effects of capitalism. Moreover, an effective dearth of analytical capability 
together with a lack of demonstrable political will appears to have rendered capitalism, as a 
transnational economic system as non-obviable, and as such seemingly impossible to either 
control or harness by individual governments.  
The second half of the 20th century can be seen to be where the entire international political 
economy landscape was reshaped by the conduct and outcomes of the Second World War, 
especially in Europe. In western Europe most countries began massive rebuilding 
programmes, aided and influenced to a greater or lesser extent by US investment under the 
Marshall Plan; while most of eastern European countries fell under the control of Soviet 
Union, to become a collectively discrete and alternative economic system known as the 
Eastern Bloc. The influences of the war can be also seen to be directly related to the early 
foundations being laid for the EU; where the threat of westward expansionism by the Soviets, 
the economic dominance of the US, and the shared political will to prevent war in Europe 
ever happening again.  
Therefore, in the early 1950s, we can identify the conditions and influences under which the 
idea of a European supracapitalism may be promulgated. Firstly, the new (western) world 
economic order designed at Bretton-Woods transformed individual national capitalisms into 
measurable, accountable, and comparable units of economic analysis; and with a new shared 
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responsibility for economic order. Secondly, both the real and perceived threats of Soviet 
military intentions and US economic ambitions can be seen to have generated the beginnings 
of a collective politico-economic will to protect western Europe. And thirdly, perhaps less 
obviously, there was now an available blank European canvass upon which to both promote 
new and radical ideas, and also changes to how capitalism and its effects may be controlled 
and harnessed rather than its perceived advantages being privileged over the injurious side 
effects of its internal contradictions and inconsistencies. 
The empirical evidence analysed in the following passages of this chapter is founded upon 
EU national capitalisms as systems of national accounts (SNAs),that are not only measurable 
and internationally comparable, but now more importantly visibly accountable to their mass 
publics. GDP becomes the constant and central metric by which SNAs, and therefore national 
capitalisms, can be compared. Moreover, these are now measurements of not only national 
capitalisms as individual economic systems, as in pre-Bretton-Woods history, but more 
significantly as comparative evaluations of post-Bretton-Woods EU politico-economic 
systems. 
With the foregoing in mind, the selected evaluations and analyses of EU national capitalisms 
as SNAs below are economic growth as measured by both GDP annual change and also GDP 
per head of population or per capita; annual unemployment rates; price stabilities assessed by 
both GDP deflator and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP); and national 
balance of payments figures. In addition to these four generally-accepted macroeconomic 
indicators of individual national capitalisms’ performance, also included are EU intra and 
extra-trade openness comparisons; economic productivity; social benefits payments; and 
government direct taxation levels. These additional four types of evaluations are intended to 
broaden and deepen the assessments of EU national capitalisms by employing them to more 
readily align with the earlier description of national capitalisms as systems for generating, 
accumulating, and distributing wealth or, well-offness, whilst also optimising their citizens’ 
overall welfare. In addition to the above, social benefit payments and direct government 
taxation levels are cross-correlated in order to offer a send level analysis of wealth and  
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Table 9 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Summary of selected EU macroeconomic variables indicators 
 
 Macroeconomic 
economic variable 
Methods of analysis Rationale for inclusion 
1 Economic growth GDP annual percentage change. 
Longitudinal illustration of patterns 
and trends, and statistical analysis 
Main macroeconomic 
indicator of national 
capitalisms’ performance 
2 Economic growth GDP per head of population. 
Longitudinal illustration of patterns 
and trends, and statistical analysis 
Illustration of wealth 
distribution per capita 
3 Economic                        
Productivity 
GDP per person employed. 
Longitudinal illustration of trends and 
patterns, and statistical analysis 
Illustration of wealth 
generation per capita 
4 Price stability Inflation measured as a GDP deflator 
and the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP). 
Longitudinal illustrations of trends 
and patterns, and statistical analysis 
Main macroeconomic 
indicator of national 
capitalisms’ performance 
5 Unemployment Percentage of eligible workforce 
population. Longitudinal illustration 
of patterns and trends, and statistical 
analysis 
Main macroeconomic 
indicator of national 
capitalisms’ performance 
6 National accounts 
of balances of 
payments 
Balance of transactions with the rest 
of the world at current prices as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Longitudinal illustration of patterns 
and trends 
Main macroeconomic 
indicator of national 
capitalisms’ performance 
7 Trade openness Intra and extra EU imports and 
exports as a percentage of GDP. 
Longitudinal illustration of patterns 
and trends, and statistical analysis 
Illustrations of within 
and outside trade activity 
before and after euro 
8 Taxation Direct government taxation on 
earnings as a percentage of GDP. 
Longitudinal illustration of patterns 
and trends, and statistical analysis 
Illustration of 
redistribution of wealth 
9 Social benefits 
payment 
Direct government social benefits 
payments as a percentage of GDP. 
Longitudinal illustration of patterns 
and trends, and statistical analysis 
Illustration of 
redistribution of wealth 
and optimisation of 
citizens’ welfare 
10 Social benefit 
payments and 
taxation cross 
correlations 
Correlation analysis between the 
collection of direct tax and its part- 
redistribution to social benefit. 
Comparisons of national 
capitalisms’  income 
collection and 
distribution 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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Table 10 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Explanation of statistical output components (See Appendices 1-9) 
 
Component Explanation 
N Sample size – the number of years data for each typological group 
Mean The arithmetic mean of the sample 
Pooled standard 
deviation (St Dev) 
The average distance of each datum from the mean within a sample. 
SE Mean 
(Standard Error of the 
Mean) 
The standard deviation of a sample divided by the square root of the 
sample size (N) 
95percent Confidence 
Interval (CI) 
The approximate distance of two standard deviations above and below 
the mean value 
P value (0.05 or 5 
percent) 
The tolerated error chance of error at 95 percent Confidence Level 
(CL). Any value below 0.05 (<0.05) offers evidence at the 95 percent 
CL of a statistically significant difference between tested  samples 
DF (Degrees of 
Freedom) 
The number of possible locations for the mean value in a sample 
T-Value (Student’s 
Distribution Value) 
The difference in the two arithmetic means of the samples tested 
divided by a formula which calculates the distances from the difference 
in the overall mean value of each of the two samples being compared. 
Similar to the F distribution below for multiple comparisons. 
SS (Sum of Squares) In ANOVA tests, the aggregate of each of the observations in a sample 
in terms of their distance from the mean value squared 
MS (Mean of Sum of 
Squares) 
In ANOVA tests, the Sum of Squares (SS) divided by the Degrees of 
Freedom (DF) 
F (Fisher Distribution 
Value) 
In ANOVA tests, the critical value of an F distribution. The Mean of 
the Sum of Squares (MS) of the Factor divided by the Mean of the Sum 
of Squares (MS). F value table have critical values for most Degrees of 
Freedoms in relation to selected confidence levels (CLs), usually 90 
percent, 95 percent, or 99percent 
S (Standard Deviation) In ANOVA tests ,the Pooled  Standard Deviation of a sample 
R-Sq (R squared or R2) In ANOVA tests, the square of the Pearson Regression value  (R) 
R-Sq (adj) In ANOVA tests , the R-Sq value adjusted to allow for the explanatory 
dilution of added independent or predictor variables 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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The measurement and analysis is offered at two levels: longitudinal illustrations in graphical 
form, and statistical analyses using t-test and analysis of variance (ANOVA). See Tables 9 
and 10 above.  
EU economic growth 
The main macroeconomic indicator employed to reflect a country’s increasing wealth is 
GDP, even though GDP is not itself a measure of the total wealth (See introductory chapter). 
What the annual percentage change in GDP does illustrate is the increase (or decrease) in a 
national capitalism’s productive output, monetary income, and monetary expenditure; where 
the aggregated accumulation of income over time translates into stored wealth. Therefore, by 
measuring economic growth, or lack of growth, through changes in output and income over 
time offers a reasonable approximation of the variations in a national capitalism’s wealth, and 
thereby the overall picture of the collective well-offness of its citizens. 
Of course, the major limitation of this analysis is that it tells us little about either the 
distribution of such monetary income and wealth, or, if a national government’s economic 
policies can being seen to be working. Its strength lies almost completely in the readily 
transferable nature of its comparability with other national capitalisms, due to the 
standardisation of its components, and its general acceptance as a key economic indicator by 
the major transnational watchdog institutions like the OECD and the IMF. 
However, for the purposes of this research, there are advantages. First, economic growth can 
be seen to be related to capitalism, in that it approximates accumulation as one of its major 
imperatives. Second, in these analyses, it allows an overall critical comparison between the 
prescribed typologies of EU capitalisms. And third, further to the above, it allows cross- 
comparisons of individual components that comprise the overall GDP measurement 
Figure 5 below illustrates the longitudinal trajectories of GDP variations over the 20-year 
period for all the EU typologies laid out above, with the vertical, perforated line indicating 
the advent of the Eurosphere in 1999. The most striking feature of EU growth during this 
period is, with the overall exception of the Baltic country economies, a very clear post-euro 
convergence of all the groups into a band of between five percent and ten percent of GDP. 
The pattern of the Baltic countries (BCENEs), whilst not converging in the same manner as 
the others, also very clearly exhibits a post-euro dynamic. Although the mean growth figures 
for Latvia and Lithuania between 1991 and 1993 significantly distort the early growth 
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trajectory for the group, where the former averaged 258 percent growth, and the latter was 
390 percent, whilst by contrast Estonia’s growth for the entire pre-euro period was only 28 
percent, there is also a meaningful realignment with the other EU economies by the late 
1990s, and the launch of the euro. 
 
Figure 5 
______________________________________________________________________ 
EU growth by annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1986-2006 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
The post-2002 upward divergence of the Baltic economies coincides with all three states 
pegging their individual currencies to the euro as a precursor to membership of the EU in 
2004. 
Significantly, the clear pattern of convergence appears to be set to continue to arrive in 2007-
2008 at between a band between six and eight percent. Not only is this level of convergence 
very clear, but what is also worthy of note is that this includes both Eurosphere and non-
Eurosphere economies. And, while it would analytically flawed to suggest any direct 
evidence of causality from such a longitudinal illustration, the advent of the euro in 1999 
certainly connotes that something inducing this convergence occurred in 1999, and that it 
affected seven of the national capitalism typologies. 
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The statistical evidence appears to support the longitudinal trajectory evidence above that that 
the advent of the euro in 1999 has clearly affected the behaviour of the majority of the 
typologies in terms of pre and post-euro group comparisons, except those of the ex- 
 
 
Table 11 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
EU Growth – summary of statistical analysis 1986-2006 (See Appendices 1-9) 
 
Group 
(see 
key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level 
(CL) 
Sample 
size 
range 
(n) 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a, b Two-sample t-test 64-104 0.012 Statistically significant difference 
c,d Two-sample t-test 16-26 0.138 No statistically significant difference 
e,f Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.433 No statistically significant difference 
g,h Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.014 Statistically significant difference 
e,g Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.090 No statistically significant difference 
f,h Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.004 Statistically significant difference 
i,j Two-sample t-test 24-39 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
k,l Two-sample t-test 24-34 0.016 Statistically significant difference 
m,n Two-sample t-test 16-26 0.001 Statistically significant difference 
o,p Two-sample t-test 21-24 0.029 Statistically significant difference 
q,s One-way ANOVA 120-156 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
r,t One-way ANOVA 88-96 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
u,v One-way ANOVA 184-276 0.07 Statistically significant difference 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
Source: analysis primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006) 
   Key codes to groupings for Table 11 
a CMEs in Eurosphere    1986-1998 l FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
b CMEs in Eurosphere   1999-2006 m SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
c CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 n SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
d CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 o BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
e LMEs in Eurosphere   1986-1998 p BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
f LMEs in Eurosphere   1999-2006 q ALL in Eurosphere  1986-1998 
g LMEs ex-Eurosphere   1986-1998 r ALL in Eurosphere  1999-2006 
h LMEs ex-Eurosphere   1999-2006 s ALL ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
i SEEs in Eurosphere     1986-1998 t ALL ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
j SEEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 u ALL  1986-1998 
k FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 v ALL  1999-2006 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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Eurosphere CMEs and Ireland, the only LME within the Eurosphere, The statistical analysis 
also reveals some other interesting results. For example, there is no statistical difference 
between both euro and non-euro LMEs before the euro, but a very clear difference post-euro 
outcome. Moreover, the three all-country analyses, Eurosphere pre and post euro; ex-
Eurosphere pre and post-euro, and all economies pre and post-euro all show significant 
statistical differences as a result of the advent of the euro. This is interesting, because it 
appears to suggest that it is not only the Eurosphere economies that have changed, but that 
ECB’s management of the Eurosphere has impacted on its EU partners. This could be of 
course, as a result of trade interdependencies; and the whereby other economic variable 
analyses offered below may provide further evidence of such influence. 
EU economic growth per head of population 
When referring to capitalism as a means of increasing and accumulating the aggregate wealth 
of individual countries, it is also important to consider how such wealth is distributed to 
individuals. However, a major characteristic of modern capitalism is that wealth is not shared 
proportionately or equitably, although it is often argued that economic growth over time 
benefits everybody in some measure. And, while these asymmetric patterns of distribution 
remain a major by-product of the capitalist system, economic growth as measured by head of 
population does offer useful comparative and longitudinal bases for analysis.  
While the analysis of economic growth, as a percentage of GDP, offers very clear evidence 
that the advent of the euro, and associated ECB supranational management of the 12 
Eurosphere economies, has offered trend, pattern, and statistical support to the idea that the 
economic growth, as a major component of a national capitalism’s performance, can be  
considered in the supranational sense, the per-population head (GDP per capita) longitudinal 
trajectories in Figure 6 below are less straightforward. And, while ostensibly appearing to 
offer an additional, albeit crude, distributional dimension to the analysis of a national 
capitalism’s income and wealth, it does little to meaningfully address the real problems 
associated with asymmetries of income-wealth allocation or apportionment. The first feature 
of note from the graphical illustration below is that of a distinct change of pattern between the 
pre-euro years (1986-1998), and the post-euro period (1999-2006). The trajectories of all the 
typologies, with the exception of the co-ordinated market economies outside the Eurosphere 
between1997 and 1999, although at markedly different levels spread between below 20 
percent and just above 140 percent, they were all relatively stable. However, post-euro there 
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are two noticeable changes in pattern and trend. The pattern changes into a top and bottom 
half split, with the all co-ordinated market economies and liberal market economies enjoying 
an overall upward converging dynamic to a shared band range between 110 percent and 150 
percent, and the remaining typologies of economies growing more slowly and in tandem, but 
all noticeably below 80 percent. And this is to be expected; these economies as a collective 
are all the EU developing economies, and although still outside the Eurosphere, now 
beginning to see the advantages of membership of the common market and the EU subsidies 
designed to generate such steady growth towards convergence with the mature economies of 
the EU. From this it could be positively argued that the ECB and the Eurosphere are fulfilling 
exactly the objectives in terms of economic growth as benefitting citizens, although without 
any real grasp of how this economic growth is then distributed across class systems within 
both typologies, and also individual national capitalism 
 
 
Figure 6 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Growth by increase in EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head of population 1986-2006 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
Considering overall economic growth together with per capita growth appears to suggest that 
membership of the euro has benefitted all economies to a degree over the 20-year period, but 
more noticeably the post-euro years show signs of much clearer overall improvement for all 
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members, although much slower and incremental upward movements for the EU’s 
developing economies. Moreover, a two-tier, maybe two-speed, pattern appears to be 
emerging, but without any real visual evidence of meaningful convergence between either the 
two post-euro groups, or between all the typologies as a collective.  
 Statistical analyses of EU economic growth per head of population 1986-2006 
The statistical tests and outcomes are summarised below in Table 12 and illustrates for all the 
individual typologies, plus collectives of Eurosphere non-Eurosphere capitalisms, together 
with all economies, pre and post-euro statistical differences. And, while the visual, 
longitudinal analysis above offers evidence of the overall post-euro improvement of all EU 
economies, the statistical analysis allows a closer examination of how each of the typologies 
were affected by the introduction of the euro, the establishment of the euro, and the direct and 
indirect supranational influence of ECB monetary management.  
Of the ten typologies tested before and after, six demonstrated statistically significant 
differences, with both the euro and non-euro CMEs together with the euro LME, and SIEs 
showing no significant difference, even though all post-euro mean values show overall 
increases. The analysis of the collectives shows that all the euro economies are significantly 
different post-euro, and although the non-euro grouping is not statistically different, this is 
not against the overall trend, as all economies are significantly different following the launch 
of the euro. Again, as always there must be the customary statistical caution regarding 
identifiable causalities within each of the above analyses, the overall evidence suggests both 
economic versions of economic growth have been mostly directly, and positively, affected by 
the advent of the euro, and therefore ECB monetary management.  
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Table 12 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
EU GDP per head of population – summary of statistical analysis 1986-2006  
(See Appendices 1-9) 
 
 
Group 
(see 
key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level 
(CL) 
Sample 
size 
range 
(n) 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a, b Two-sample t-test 64-104 0.699 No statistically significant difference 
c,d Two-sample t-test 16-26 0.074 No statistically significant difference 
b,d Two-sample t-test 16-64 0.114 No statistically significant difference 
e,f Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
g,h Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
f,h Two-sample t-test 8-8 0.003 Statistically significant difference 
i,j Two-sample t-test 22-41 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
k,l Two-sample t-test 24-35 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
m,n Two-sample t-test 6-36 0.237 No statistically significant difference 
o,p Two-sample t-test 20-24 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
q,r Two-sample t-test 129-215 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
s,t Two-sample t-test 72-129 0.172 No statistically significant difference 
u,v One-way ANOVA 156-344 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
 
             _________________________________________________________________________  
             Source: analysis primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006) 
 
 
 
Key codes to groupings for Table 12 
a CMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 l FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
b CMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 m SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
c CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 n SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
d CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 o BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
e LMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 p BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
f LMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 q ALL in Eurosphere  1986-1998 
g LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 r ALL in Eurosphere  1999-2006 
h LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 s ALL ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
i SEEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 t ALL ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
j SEEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 u ALL  1986-1998 
k FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 v ALL  1999-2006 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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EU Productivity 
Please see Figures 7 and 8 below. 
 
Figure 7 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
EU productivity by annual percentage change 1986-2006 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________  
Source: primary 
 
While it can be contested that productivity analyses of this nature are rarely like-for-like 
comparisons and contrasts, largely because of extreme variations in countries’ technology 
profiles and working practices, it is useful to be able to identify overall patterns. The pre-euro 
pattern in Figure 7 above does show, with the exception of just one economy, a semblance of 
a trend that the typologies follow. What is very noticeable, and cannot be ignored, is the 
striking convergence of all the groups of national capitalisms in the last three years of the 
period under review. Again, as with all analyses of this type, causality, and the influences of 
individual characteristics of single capitalisms is problematic, but on the other hand a 20-year 
timeframe does hold some validity, not least in relation to the overall profile of 25 countries 
and nearly 400million people. 
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Figure 8 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
EU productivity by annual percentage change – comparison with USA and Japan 1896-2006 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________  
Source: primary 
 
As the chart in Figure 7 illustrates, economic productivity, although showing some 
approximations of similar trajectories, with the exception of the LME within the Eurosphere 
(Ireland), before the advent of the euro, in the post-euro phase clearly has two distinct phases; 
1999 to 2003 and 2004 to 2006. The first of these features a visible divergence in the pre-euro 
period of 1986 to 1998, whilst the second indicates very clear convergence towards an annual 
percentage change for all typologies of between one and two percent by 2006. The second 
chart in Figure 8 offers a comparison of EU Eurosphere and ex-Eurosphere productivity to 
those of the US and Japan. Here, there appears to be little or no overall similarity of 
productivity performance before the launch of the euro, although the Eurosphere countries do 
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Additionally, the comparison with the US and Japan does offer further evidential support to 
the overall observation that the post-euro productivity measurements are showing clear, albeit 
first level, evidence of convergence. This can be particularly illustrated by looking at the 
three main pre-2004 outlier typologies of the SIEs, CMENEs and the euro LME, and their 
noticeable alignment by 2005. 
The statistical analyses below do offer support to the longitudinal illustration above, in that 
the picture regarding productivity is not as clear as economic growth, but nevertheless clear 
evidence to conclude overall that there is a measurable, positive influence of the economic 
and monetary union over EU productivity. The statistical summaries for EU productivity are 
shown in Table 13 below. Here, as in elements of the graphical illustration above, the picture 
is not as clear as both analyses of economic growth, however there is significant support for 
the view that EMU through the launch of the euro has, overall, collectivised and converged 
all the typologies over time, although not necessarily effectively until the last there or four 
years of the time-frame under scrutiny. 
Starting with the very last entry in the table, the pre and post-euro comparison of all EU 
national capitalism typologies, there is no statistical difference, and this is hardly surprising 
when viewing the overall longitudinal trajectory illustrated above; however, there are 
significant statistical differences evidenced for both the Eurosphere and ex-Eurosphere 
collectives during the same period. And, perhaps while at first this is surprising, over the 20-
year analysis, the fluctuating pattern of the LMEE and SEEE will introduce some distortions 
to the overall mean of the major collective, and this can obviated by separating out the euro 
and non-euro collectives before and after the launch of the euro. 
In terms of each of the typological groups of capitalisms, Table 13 reveals that out of eight-
tests half exhibited individual post-euro statistical difference, and half showed no such 
difference. Interestingly, the CMEEs share this distinction with three groups of emerging EU 
economies, the SEEs; the SIEs, and the BCNEs. However, the extent to which any correlation 
here would offer any analytical utility is open to question. 
Overall, the statistical outcomes presented in this section, whilst being less clear that the 
longitudinal illustration, do offer some indication, and some evidence, to accept that 
productivity has been influenced by the advent of the euro, the ECB, and the EMU regime, 
although the exact nature of this influence remains unclear. 
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Table 13 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
EU productivity – summary of statistical analysis 1986-2006 (See Appendices 1-9) 
 
Group 
(see 
key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level 
(CL) 
Sample 
size 
range 
(n) 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a,b Two-sample t-test 64-104 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
c,d Two-sample t-test 16-26 0.689 No statistically significant difference 
e,f Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.485 No statistically significant difference 
g,h Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.752 No statistically significant difference 
i,j Two-sample t-test 21-42 0.033 Statistically significant difference 
k,l Two-sample t-test 19-24 0.287 No statistically significant difference 
m,n Two-sample t-test 10-16 0.005 Statistically significant difference 
o,p Two-sample t-test 20-24 0.045 Statistically significant difference 
q,r Two-sample t-test 94-158 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
s,t Two-sample t-test 95-104 0.051 No Statistically significant difference  
s,t One-way ANOVA 95-104 0.044 Statistically significant difference 
u,v Two-sample t-test 198-253 0.511 No Statistically significant difference 
u,v One-way ANOVA 198-253 0.532 No Statistically significant difference 
 
           __________________________________________________________________________ 
          Source: primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006 
 
    
 Key codes to groupings in Table 13 
a CMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 l FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
b CMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 m SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
c CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 n SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
d CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 o BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
e LMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 p BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
f LMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 q ALL in Eurosphere  1986-1998 
g LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 r ALL in Eurosphere  1999-2006 
h LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 s ALL ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
i SEEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 t ALL ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
j SEEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 u ALL  1986-1998 
k FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 v ALL  1999-2006 
 
________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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EU price stability as measured by inflation 
Price stability is one of the four main macroeconomic indicators from which most western 
governments now set economic policy targets and political strategy. Additionally, following 
the displacement of Keynesian politico-economic planning, and the effective collapse of the 
Bretton-Woods system, neoliberal policies were adopted by the majority of non-centrally-
planned economies, and price stability through monetary policy, or more broadly 
monetarism, became privileged over growth, unemployment, and balance of payments 
equilibria. 
In terms of the EU in general, and the Eurosphere in particular, the planned economic and 
monetary union was to become the responsibility of the ECB, and the primary objective of 
the ECB was the control of price stability through interest rate adjustment and money supply 
contraction and expansion. Therefore, the advent of the ECB, together with price stability 
through monetary policy, underpins EMU, which in turn, signals a de facto supranational 
management of the Eurosphere member-states. And, also because of the trading and political 
relationships between the Eurosphere and ex-Eurosphere national capitalisms within the EU, 
the ECB can be seen to be a major influence over not only the economic behaviour of 
member-states, but also to hold levels of political influence of national policy-making, 
thereby establishing, from the early stages of its existence, a sort of vicarious role in the 
development of the Eurosphere as a model of EU supranational capitalism. 
In the following analyses, two methods of measuring price stability through inflation are 
considered: the GDP deflator and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). The 
main differences between the two metrics are that the HICP disregards the direct cost of 
housing, and that HICP did not come into common use until around 1997, and therefore data 
under this measurement is only available for half the 20-year period under consideration.  
With this in mind, the two graphs illustrated in Figures 9 and 10 below represent the 
longitudinal patterns of trends of GDP deflator indicators from 1986 to 2006, while the HICP 
figures follow the trajectories from 1997 to 2006. The subsequent statistical analyses for both 
measures of price stability follow these same timeframes; with the GDP deflator statistical 
outcomes first, and where the HICP indicators statistical outcomes offer some alternative 
‘within and between’ typology analysis. 
The illustration in Figure 9 above delineates the GDP deflator measure for the EU national 
capitalism groups for the whole of the 20-year period being considered here, with the Baltic 
127 
 
economies (BCENE), and the former Eastern Bloc economies (FEBNE), being plotted from 
the earliest year their figures became available. The first noticeable feature of these 
trajectories is a clear clustering of trend-lines after 1999, and a further closer convergence by 
2003, and then a final settling of all economic groupings to between about one percent and 
three percent in 2006, with the exception of the Baltic countries. Such convergence of the 
Eurosphere typologies is entirely expected given the very narrow target band for inflation the 
ECB has been charged with maintaining, but the associated tight convergence of the non-
Eurosphere countries offers evidence that there are elements of ultra vires influences 
emanating out of the ECB’s control of interest rates. Even allowing for the knowledge that 
 
Figure 9 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
EU inflation by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator 1986-2006 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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Figure 10 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
EU inflation by Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 1997-2006 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
most western governments had prioritised price stability practically from the early days of the 
rise of neoliberal politico-economic thinking from the very early 1980s, the starkness of this 
convergence is remarkable. However, it is also clear when looking at the overall picture that 
there was a gradual, but almost inevitable pattern of convergence(s) from 1986 onwards, and 
then the concentration to within the narrow band described above. There are three main 
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trade openness, where from 1990 in general, but particularly from about 2002, intra-EU trade 
was situated in a band between 20 percent and 60 percent of GDP, and extra-EU trade had 
narrowed into a band of between ten percent and 40 percent. The obvious effects of the single 
market, the fixed exchange rates of Eurosphere members, and the resultant stable purchasing 
power parity (PPP) between all EU economies, all having their part to play on the back of 
increasing concentration of trade within the EU compared with the EU’s trading partners in 
the rest of the world. 
The HICP illustration in Figure 10 above offers only limited comparative analysis in so far as 
this method of measuring price stability through inflation was only accepted by the EU from 
1997 onwards. As a metric HICP tells a similar story about inflation, but disregards housing 
mortgage interest payments, which are considered by the EU as investment expenditures as 
opposed to consumption. This explains why there is a slightly different trendline profile, but a 
difference that does not distort the overall pattern of convergence. And, interestingly the 
Baltic countries, who were outliers in the post-2005 trendlines under the GDP deflator 
illustration at nearly ten percent, drop down to around five percent under the HICP metric, 
suggesting a significant increase in mortgage-financed home ownership within and between 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from 2004. 
Table 14 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
EU inflation – summary of statistical analysis 1986-2006 GDP deflator measurement  
(See Appendices 1-9) 
 
Group 
(see 
key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level (CL) 
Sample 
size 
range 
(n) 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a, b One-wayANOVA 64-104 0.005 Statistically significant difference 
c,d One-wayANOVA 16-26 0.009 Statistically significant difference 
e,f One-wayANOVA 8-13 0.581 No statistically significant difference 
g,h One-wayANOVA 8-13 0.013 Statistically significant difference 
i,j One-wayANOVA 24-39 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
k,l One-wayANOVA 23-24 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
m,n One-wayANOVA 15-16 0.558 No statistically significant difference 
o,p One-wayANOVA 21-24 0.019 Statistically significant difference 
q,r Two- sample t-test 96-156 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
s,t Two- sample t-test 117-121 0.007 Statistically significant difference 
u,v Two- sample t-test 213-277 0.004 Statistically significant difference 
 
         __________________________________________________________________________ 
          Source: analysis primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006 
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Key codes to groupings in Table 14 
a CMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 l FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
b CMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 m SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
c CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 n SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
d CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 o BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
e LMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 p BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
f LMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 q ALL in Eurosphere  1986-1998 
g LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 r ALL in Eurosphere  1999-2006 
h LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 s ALL ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
i SEEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 t ALL ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
j SEEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 u ALL  1986-1998 
k FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 v ALL  1999-2006 
______________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
Table 15 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
EU Inflation – summary of statistical analysis 1997-2006 Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) (See Appendices 1-9) 
 
 
Group 
(see key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level 
(CL) 
Sample 
size 
range(n) 
 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a, b Two-sample t-test 20-80 0.334 No statistically significant difference 
c,d Two-sample t-test 10-10 0.004 Statistically significant difference 
i One way ANOVA 
with Tukey analysis 
10-80 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
e,f Two-sample t-test 20-30 0.024 Statistically significant difference 
g,h Two-sample t-test 30-30 0.043 Statistically significant difference 
a,b,c One way ANOVA 
with Tukey analysis 
10-80 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
a,b,d One way ANOVA 
with Tukey analysis 
10-80 0.306 No statistically significant difference 
 
         ____________________________________________________________________________ 
        Source: analysis primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006) 
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 Key codes to groupings in Table 15 
a CMEs in Eurosphere   1997-2006 
b CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1997-2006 
c LMEs in Eurosphere   1997-2006 
d LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1997-2006 
e SEEs in Eurosphere    1997-2006 
f SIEs  ex-Eurosphere   1997-2006 
g FEBs ex-Eurosphere   1997-2006 
h BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
i ALL                           1997-2006 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
The statistical analyses of both methods of measuring inflation are intended here to consider 
different intra-EU aspects of inflation. The different timeframes of the two analyses suggests 
separate treatments, especially as any direct comparison would be akin to an apples and pears 
comparison, and therefore relatively meaningless. What it does allow however, is for the 
hitherto standard of statistical analysis carried out in this chapter to be applied to the GDP 
deflator figures, with the HICP profiles being examined using multiple-grouping ANOVA 
within-and-between analysis. 
Overall, the GDP deflator largely supports the analysis based on the longitudinal trendline 
illustration above, with only two typological groups, the LME Eurosphere economy and the 
SIE small island pairing not demonstrating statistically significant pre and post-euro 
differences. Moreover, all three of the collective groupings, ALL Eurosphere; ALL ex-
Eurosphere; and ALL economies before and after the euro, clearly demonstrate statistical 
difference, and it is then possible to consider the LME euro and SIE non-euro groups as 
outliers in this analysis, a proposition supported by the visual evidence in Figure 9 
In terms of the HICP analysis using ANOVA for multiple groups it is possible to identify not 
only statistical differences, of which there are only two tests out of seven that do not show a 
post-euro difference in inflation, but also to examine some intra-group comparisons with the 
additional aid of Tukey analysis, which highlights those within a group creating statistical 
difference. For example, test number 3 (See Appendix 4), which compares all the typologies 
over the whole period (1997-2006), and offers a graphical spread of the groups in relation to 
each other, their respective mean inflation values, and algebraic cluster analysis that identifies 
both sub-groupings and outliers. 
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EU unemployment 1986-2006 
Again, unemployment is considered one of the main policy-setting and economic-targeting 
macroeconomic indicators, and although usually subjugated below price stability through the 
control of inflation, and economic growth, it remains arguably the most important barometer 
of economic measurements, and also often the most politically sensitive for electoral mass 
publics, and therefore also to incumbent administrations. And, as with the other three main 
indicators, it has important correlative interrelationships with them, especially growth and 
inflation. However, the neoliberal agenda has largely managed to persuade electorates that by 
privileging flexible labour force regimes over both rigid employment contracts and trades 
union membership, and in doing so has legitimised not only management short-termism and 
the associated generally-accepted ad hoc redundancy notices, but also reluctance on the part 
of labour forces to pursue issues against, or challenge the decisions regarding pay and 
conditions of work by, employers and their representatives.  
Moreover, as the neoliberal era unfolds and proliferates, the structure of employment patterns 
has been changing conterminously, as the shift from manufacturing to service provision, with 
job-sharing, fractional contracts, short-term and zero-hour contracts of employment, shifts 
from benefit-defined to contribution-defined pension rights, training budget reductions, and 
the increasingly strategic management function of human resource departments, have all 
contributed to an almost complete shift of labour relations power from labour to capital in 
western democracies between the late 1970s and the early 2000s. 
The main challenge for the EU, and its member national capitalisms as a collective, is to be 
seen politically to be addressing trans-EU unemployment as a unitary issue, when the reality 
is one of causes and effects of widely divergent and manifold unemployment types presenting 
multi-dimensional, complicated, and complex economic problems. This can be seen when 
considering employment sub-groups taken from the typologies of national capitalisms used 
throughout this research. At the first level of complexity, there is the dichotomous 
relationship between the developed and developing economies within the EU membership, 
usually as a result of the developing member-states making the transition from agricultural 
economies to industrial economies. And this is hardly straightforward because some of the 
industrial economies are already planning for their own transitions from industrial to 
knowledge-based economies in the face of increasing competition from newly-emerging 
industrial powers outside the EU. And, in the EU context, whereas the SEEs and the SIEs can 
133 
 
be seen as traditional agriculture-to-industry types, the FEBEs and the BCEs are already 
industrially-based, but having been formed within centrally-planned economies, are emerging 
not from agriculture to industry, but from backward industry to advanced industry. At the 
second level of complexity can be seen the different potential problems besetting the co-
ordinated market economies and the liberal market economies, each with very different 
attitudes to labour markets, and the rights of workers. A third level sees the Eurosphere 
economies compared to the non-Eurosphere economies, although this is further compounded 
because there are CMEs and LMEs in both camps. And then there are the twin catalysts of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the EU structural funding programme, operating 
across all EU economies and typologies, at different times, for different reasons, with 
different objectives (not all economic), and at different volumes and intensities. 
It is then against this multi-dimensional EU unemployment landscape that the longitudinal 
illustration (Figure 11) below is considered. At first glance, especially between 1986 and 
2001, the above-mentioned complexities and complications, appear to be graphically 
mirrored. However, a second examination of the pre-euro years, suggests more of a gently 
undulating but relatively stable set of trajectories with most of the typologies settling within a 
band of between four and eleven percent; the only outliers being the Baltics and the LMEE. 
Post-1999 sees a clear downward convergence from the upper boundaries to within ten 
percent by 2005, together with the establishment of a stubbornly persistent baseline of four 
percent; which maybe projecting the future ‘natural’ rate of employment for the EU as whole.  
The statistical outcomes set out below, and summarised in Table 16 seem to reflect the 
complexity and complication suggested in the above narrative, and represent more of a 
typologically-related mix of responses to EMU, the ECB, and the euro. Of the eight 
individual typology tests, only the two liberal market economies and the SIEs demonstrate a 
pre and post-euro difference. In terms of the three collective tests, all Eurosphere pre and 
post-euro; all of non-Eurosphere; and all economies before, and after EMU, it is only the 
Eurosphere groups that show a significant statistical difference. This suggests that the non-
Eurosphere capitalisms, which are greater in number after 2004 by 13 to 12, compared to 3 to 
12 between 1999 and 2003, distort the overall impact of the single currency and fixed 
exchange rate. However, that the Eurosphere collective does indicate a statistically significant 
difference, more readily agrees with overall assessment from the longitudinal illustration that 
the euro has clearly had a positive effect on EU unemployment regardless of the complex and 
complicated structural nature of unemployment within the strata of EU national capitalisms. 
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Figure 11  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
EU unemployment 1986-2006 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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Table 16 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
EU Unemployment – summary of statistical analysis 1986-2006 unemployment as a 
percentage of GDP (See Appendices 1-9) 
 
Group 
(see 
key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level 
(CL) 
Sample size 
range 
(n) 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a, b Two-sample t-test 64-104 0.512 No statistically significant difference 
c,d One-wayANOVA 16-26 0.298 No statistically significant difference 
e,f One-wayANOVA 8-13 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
g,h One-wayANOVA 8-13 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
i,j 2-sample t-test 22-41 0.113 No statistically significant difference 
k,l One-wayANOVA 18-24 0.743 No statistically significant difference 
m,n One-wayANOVA 12-16 0.043 Statistically significant difference 
o,p One-wayANOVA 22-24 0.099 No statistically significant difference 
q,r Two- sample t-test 94-158 0.004 Statistically significant difference 
s,t Two- sample t-test 88-91 0.264 No statistically significant difference 
u,v One-way ANOVA 182-249 0.195 No statistically significant difference 
 
          __________________________________________________________________________ 
         Source: analysis primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006) 
 
 
Key codes to groupings in Table 16 
a CMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 l FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
b CMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 m SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
c CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 n SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
d CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 o BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
e LMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 p BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
f LMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 q ALL in Eurosphere  1986-1998 
g LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 r ALL in Eurosphere  1999-2006 
h LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 s ALL ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
i SEEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 t ALL ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
j SEEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 u ALL  1986-1998 
k FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 v ALL  1999-2006 
 
             __________________________________________________________________________ 
             Source: primary 
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EU social benefits payments 
The monetary production model plays a central role in this thesis as the basis upon which an 
EU supracapitalism may be offered as one of the possible future trajectories for EU 
capitalism. One of the fundamental arguments underpinning this heterodox view of how 
national capitalisms function, and thereby the notion that a supranational central bank may be 
capable of operating and managing such a collective model of capitalism, lies in the view that 
the allocative mode of accumulation and distribution can (and should) be allowed to function 
alongside non-allocative modes of accumulation and distribution. Perhaps, there is no more 
explicit example of non-allocative mechanisms than that of social benefits payments. Of 
course, without the provision of any non-allocative distributions, social benefits would not 
exist: how could a state-funded pay-out mechanism operate if the central authorities 
marketised the distribution of such handouts? This section examines the longitudinal 
trajectories of the EU member-states, grouped together in their prescribed typologies, by the 
graphical illustration in Figure 12 below, and the following supporting statistical analysis.  
 
Figure 12 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
EU social benefit payments as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1986-2006 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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In addition to the discrete analysis of social benefit payments, and following the subsequent 
section on direct government taxation, the two economic variables are brought together and 
cross-correlated to offer a more rounded income-wealth distribution analysis. 
As with most of the longitudinal analyses there does appear to be both increased stability in 
patterns of the trajectories and trend convergence into an overall narrower band in post-euro 
years from 1999 to 2006. With social benefits payments, the first observation here is that 
there is a more stable set of post-euro trajectories, with all typologies gathering within a ten 
percent band, ranging from about 7.5 percent at the lower end to approximately 17.5 percent 
at the upper end. The trendlines before the single currency are both less stable, and also 
occupy a band range of between 5 percent to about 20 percent. It is also unsurprising to see 
the CME non-euro group of Denmark and Sweden showing the highest mean values in this 
category, as they typify the social democratic ‘Welfare-State Regimes’ politico-economic 
structure as identified by Esping-Andersen (1990:26). The major omission to this group, and 
perhaps then a distortion to this analysis, would be Finland who also operates a social model 
of this persuasion, but have been included in the CME Eurosphere typology for a number of 
vying comparative reasons. And, although this can be seen as downwardly skewing this 
particular comparison, Finland’s inclusion in the CME Eurosphere perhaps offers a 
compensating upward adjustment to that typology’s social benefits payments profile. The 
following analysis of direct government taxation reinforces this, where the non-Eurosphere 
CMEs taxation is markedly higher than all the others, and where also interestingly the CME 
Eurosphere capitalisms occupy the middle ground, with Finland being more typical of that 
group with regards to direct taxation. The second feature of this longitudinal illustration is, 
with the exception of the Baltic countries’ economies, a gradual convergence of economies 
towards a projected band of, say 5 percent between ten and 15 percent. The causation of this 
is unclear, although the influence of the euro and the supranational management of EMU by 
the ECB are clearly visible, in crude outcome terms at least. Table 17 below summarises 
these statistical outcomes  
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Table 17 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
EU social benefits payments – summary of statistical analysis 1986-2006 
(See Appendices 1-9) 
 
Group 
(see 
key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level 
(CL) 
Sample 
size 
range 
(n) 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a, b Two-sample t-test 94-143 0.263 No statistically significant difference 
c,d Two-sample t-test 16-19 0.004 Statistically significant difference 
e,f Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
g,h Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.015 Statistically significant difference 
i,j Two-sample t-test 24-28 0.003 Statistically significant difference 
m,n Two-sample t-test 5-16 0.873 No statistically significant difference 
k,l One-way ANOVA 20-24 0.050 Statistically significant difference 
o,p One-way ANOVA 19-24 0.323 No statistically significant difference 
q,r One-way ANOVA 94-147 0.322 No statistically significant difference 
s,t One-way ANOVA 86-104 0.005 Statistically significant difference 
u,v One-way ANOVA 198-233 0.001 Statistically significant difference 
 
           ____________________________________________________________________________  
           Source: analysis primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006) 
 
Key codes to groupings in Table 17 
a CMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 l FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
b CMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 m SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
c CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 n SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
d CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 o BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
e LMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 p BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
f LMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 q ALL in Eurosphere  1986-1998 
g LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 r ALL in Eurosphere  1999-2006 
h LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 s ALL ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
i SEEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 t ALL ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
j SEEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 u ALL  1986-1998 
k FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 v ALL  1999-2006 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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In terms of the statistical analyses of EU social benefits payments summarised in Table 16 
five of the eight typological groups of national capitalisms demonstrate statistically 
significant differences between pre and post-euro phases, with the Eurosphere CMEs and the 
non-Eurosphere Small Island and Baltic country economies showing no such difference. And, 
as with the previous analyses, the statistical outcomes do not offer clues regarding causation, 
they merely identify quantitative difference. Causality then becomes the focus of secondary 
and tertiary analysis, which, in the case of social benefits payments, can be addressed in both 
the political aspects of social benefit attitudes, and by also by linking such benefits to direct 
taxation levels, which are examined below. 
The collective analysis in Table 17 shows us that, overall, all EU economies and also all the 
non-Eurosphere capitalisms demonstrate significant statistical differences pre and post-euro, 
isolating the Eurosphere again. This can be partly explained by those groupings’ outcomes 
being rather dominated by the Eurosphere CMEs who also showed no statistical difference as 
a group, and partly by the numerical superiority of the datasets and sample sizes of all the 
non-Eurosphere economies influencing the overall pre and post-euro outcome.     
Direct EU government taxation on income 
Taxation, or more precisely, fiscal receipts revenue, is included in the analysis for three main 
reasons. First, it is a redistributive mechanism whereby a nation’s income and wealth can be 
employed, even if only in a normative sense in some cases, and as such offers some important 
checks and balances against the inefficiencies and inconsistencies of raw, unregulated 
capitalist activity at the national level. Second, as it represents another non-allocative set of 
transactions that fits in with the monetary production model version of the function of 
national capitalisms. Taxation cannot be subject to unfettered market forces; unless, that is, if 
firms were allowed to compete for the right to collect taxes and transfer receipts to the 
government under contractual arrangements. The ramifications of this are too complex and 
complicated to be considered here; but as fiscal policy and the potential for fiscal harmony 
within the EU remains politically sensitive, not least of which because of the very different 
socio-cultural trajectories that all the EU economies have historically followed in terms of 
direct taxation, and which has largely disallowed it from most EMU planning to date. Value 
Added Tax (VAT) and other indirect taxes are obvious examples, where  although largely 
EU-influenced and redistributed, remain under the control of individual member-states. 
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And third, direct taxation offers insights as to how different national capitalisms approach 
optimising the collective and individual welfare of their citizens. For example, Esping-
Andersen (1990) aggregates regime clusters into three distinct approaches in this regard: the 
‘liberal welfare state’ exemplified by the US, Canada, and Australia; the ‘corporatist-statist’ 
grouping including Austria; France; Germany, and Italy; and the smaller collective of ‘social 
democratic’ Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Sweden. Moreover, in this regard, 
there is the correlative relationship that direct taxation has with various states’ social benefits 
payments. The longitudinal trends are shown in Figure 13 below 
 
Figure 13 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
EU direct government taxation as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1986-2006 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
The picture in Figure 13 again follows most of the observations in the above analyses. There 
is a clearly different range of levels of taxation, and also pattern of trajectories before and 
after the advent of the euro. The pre-euro phase illustrates more variation and volatility 
between the typologies. The most noticeable feature of the overall period 1986 to 2006 is the 
stark difference between the CME non-euro countries, Denmark and Sweden, and all the 
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others, which clearly reflects the social democratic welfare-state-type regime prevalent in 
these states alluded to above. However, even with this group of capitalisms, there has been a 
five percent drop from 1993, and from there remaining relatively stable at about 25 percent of 
GDP throughout the period. It is here, perhaps that we see the clearest example of significant 
distributions of income/wealth of all the EU countries under examination. The profiles of the 
other seven typologies have some interesting features. For example, the CMEs in the 
Eurosphere, and non-euro LME, UK, both share stable patterns of direct taxation with almost 
identical average taxation throughout the period at 13.75 percent and 14.0 percent 
respectively, with both not moving outside a bandwidth of between 12 percent and 16 
percent. Perhaps less surprisingly are the almost identical trendlines of the former Eastern 
Bloc states and the Baltic countries, where from the early 1990s both their direct tax revenues 
have averaged 9.5 percent. The Southern Europeans’ economies show a consistently gradual 
rise from 6 percent to just fewer than ten percent by 2006, and the Eurosphere CMEs remain 
noticeably stable throughout the period. All in all, direct government taxation appears as the 
most stable of all the economic variable indicators considered here, although demonstrating 
less undulating post-euro trajectories which appear to be the least affected by EMU. 
These observations from the longitudinal illustration are corroborated by the statistical tests 
itemised below, and summarised in Table 18 .The evidence shows no statistically significant 
difference before and after the launch of the euro for both types of CMEs, for the ex-
Eurosphere LMEs, and for the all the collective groupings. With these groups, all in 
Eurosphere, all ex-Eurosphere, and all the economies aggregated before and after the euro 
show that as regards direct taxation there is little evidence to suggest any meaningful EU-
wide effects due to the euro, although some newly developing economies, those either 
transforming from agricultural to industrial outputs like Ireland (LMEE), and the SEEs, 
Greece Portugal, and Spain; or the former Eastern Bloc and Baltic collectives who are 
moving from centrally-planned industrial and agricultural outputs to modernised market-
influenced economies are shown in both the longitudinal illustration, and in the statistical test 
to show elements of change.  
If it is accepted that taxation, especially direct government taxation, is as much a political 
variable as it is economic, then the above analysis makes sense. Governments find it 
generally difficult to introduce or institute radically different fiscal arrangements over time 
for fear of electoral failure; and where governments of alternative political persuasion gain 
power at elections, there is usually a reluctance to change mainstream tax regimes because of 
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the level of power of large corporations and the influence of the financial markets on policy-
making. 
However, the nexus between direct taxation and social benefits payments remains a central 
feature of, and determinant for, the type of capitalism a nation-state develops over time. For 
example, consider the contrast between the statist-influenced economies of France and Italy 
and the liberal market economies of Ireland and the UK; or the taxation and social benefit 
payment levels of Denmark and Sweden compared to those the Baltic countries and former 
Eastern bloc regimes 
 
Table 18 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
EU Direct government taxation – summary of statistical analysis 1986-2006 
(See Appendices 1-9) 
 
 
Group 
(see 
key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level 
(CL) 
Sample 
size 
range 
(n) 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a,b Two-sample t-test 64-100 0.278 No statistically significant difference 
c,d Two-sample t-test 16-19 0.306 No statistically significant difference 
e,f Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.001 Statistically significant difference 
g,h Two-sample t-test 8-13 0.101 No statistically significant difference 
i,j Two-sample t-test 24-28 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
k,l Two-sample t-test 40-40 0.000 Statistically significant difference 
m,n Two-sample t-test 5-16 0.002 Statistically significant difference 
o,p Two-sample t-test 21-24 0.004 Statistically significant difference 
q,r Two-sample t-test 96-141 0.183 No statistically significant difference 
s,t Two-sample t-test 82-88 0.079 No statistically significant difference 
u,v One-way ANOVA 178-229 0.372 No statistically significant difference 
 
          ____________________________________________________________________________ 
         Source: analysis primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006) 
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Key codes to groupings in Table 18 
a CMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 l FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
b CMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 m SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
c CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 n SIEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
d CMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 o BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
e LMEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 p BCEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
f LMEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 q ALL in Eurosphere  1986-1998 
g LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 r ALL in Eurosphere  1999-2006 
h LMEs ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 s ALL ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 
i SEEs in Eurosphere  1986-1998 t ALL ex-Eurosphere  1999-2006 
j SEEs in Eurosphere  1999-2006 u ALL  1986-1998 
k FEBs ex-Eurosphere  1986-1998 v ALL  1999-2006 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
As it has been established that one of the major characteristics of capitalism as a generally-
accepted politico-economic system in general, and of national capitalisms as individually 
comparative units of analysis in particular, is wealth creation through accumulated income 
and the patterns of its subsequent distribution; the relationship between direct taxation and 
social benefits payments requires further examination, and it is to this that the next set of 
analyses turns. Table 19 summarises direct taxation and social benefits payments as a 
framework for considering this relationship, and Table 20 highlights the level and type of 
relationship between these two variables 
Table 19 shows all the typologies’ 1986 starting points and 2006 end points, with the 
exception of the BCENEs commencing in 1990; the FEBEs in 1991; and the SIEs in 1995; 
together with the highest and average levels during the period. This matrix effectively 
quantifies the information shown in the longitudinal projections in Figure 13 above. Apart 
from much higher level of the CMENEs’ direct taxation, the most noticeable feature of these 
quantities are the similarities between the tax levels and social payment levels of each of all 
the other typologies in the analysis. Moreover, the CMENE’s social benefit payment level is 
more similar to the other groups than its level of taxation at first appears to suggest. Indeed, 
neither do they have the highest overall average for social payments expenditure; which at 
15.5 percent is just over 3 percentage points above the average for all the national 
capitalisms, and which seems to throw a challenge down to at least part of the Esping-
Andersen argument in his The Three Worlds of Welfare. However, much of this significant 
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disparity may be explained by much higher levels of public expenditure on, say, education, 
health, transport, or local authority spending in Denmark and Sweden. 
Table 19 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
EU direct government taxation and social benefits payments comparisons 1986-2006 
 
 
 Direct government taxation Social benefits payments 
 Percent 
of GDP 
Percent 
of GDP 
Percent 
of GDP 
Percent 
of GDP 
Percent 
of GDP 
Percent 
of GDP 
Percent 
of GDP 
Percent 
of GDP 
 Start High End Average Start High End Average 
CMENE 28 30 25 26.5 15 22 16 15.5 
LMENE 16 17 17 16.5 15 14.5 14 13.75 
CMEE 13.5 14.5 14 13.75 16 17 16 16 
LMEE 14 15 14 14 15 11 9 12 
SIENE 8 12 12 10 8.5 14 13 10.75 
BCENE 11 12 8 9.5 6 12 8 7 
SEEE 6 10 9 7.5 8 12.5 14 11 
FEBENE 11 12 8 9.5 17.5 18 14 15.5 
Average 13.44 15.31 13.38 13.16 10.94 15.13 13.00 12.69 
Standard 
deviation 
6.72 6.33 5.71 6.30 5.73 3.67 2.98 3.10 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
At the other end of the scale, both the SEEs and the small island economies of Cyprus and 
Malta (SIEs) so follow similar levels to each other for both taxation and social benefits. And 
similarities can also be found in the taxation levels for the FEBNEs and BCENEs, although 
exhibiting very different profiles for social benefit payments.  It is also clear that the average 
values for both tax and social benefits spending all the EU national capitalisms follow a very 
stable pattern, with average taxation changing by only about a quarter of 1 percent over the 
entire period, and social benefits payments shifting upwards, but only by 1.75 percent. 
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The overall picture of the relationship between the two variables can be summarised by 
noting the stable pre-euro pattern of direct taxation becoming a very stable set of post-euro 
trajectories, and the gently narrowing band of social benefit payments values, albeit not 
necessarily demonstrating any clear convergence. In terms of any statistical evidence for 
relational, or correlative, trends Table 20 below illustrates a number of combinations between 
the two over the whole period. Here, the very stable nature of direct taxation is confirmed by 
the 0.914 Pearson correlation, together with an R-squared reading of 0.835, which suggests 
that 83.5percent of the levels of taxation at the end of the period may be ‘explained’ by the 
levels of taxation at the beginning. There is also evidence of some relationship between the 
average levels of taxation and average levels of social benefits payments over the period, 
with a Pearson correlation of 0.585, but with only an R-squared explanatory value of 0.342, 
indicating that at best only just over 34 percent of the social benefits value can be directly 
related to levels of direct taxation. The other correlative combinations yield little of note 
overall, other than there is not enough empirical evidence to progress the argument for a clear 
relationship between the two variables, and that the only strongly evidenced outcome is the 
stability of EU levels of taxation over the 20-year period.  
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Table 20 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Correlative relationships between direct government taxation and social benefits payments  
 
Comparison Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
(r) 
R 
squared 
P 
value 
Level and type of 
relationship 
Taxation at start of period 
with taxation at end of 
period 
0.914 0.835 0.001 Clear, positive and very 
strong 
Social benefits payments at 
start with social benefits 
payments at end of period 
0.460 0.217 0.251 Clear and positive, but 
weak 
Taxation at start of period 
with social benefits 
payments at start of period 
0.496 0.247 0.211 Clear and positive, but 
very weak 
Taxation at end of period 
with  social benefits 
payments at start of period  
0.415 0.172 0.307 Clear and positive, but 
very weak 
Taxation at start of period 
with social benefits 
payments at end of period 
0.317 0.100 0.444 Hardly any relationship 
Average taxation over 
period with average social 
benefits over period 
0.585 0. 342 0.128 Clear, positive and of 
average strength 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
Intra and extra-EU trade openness 1986-2006 
The selection of the 20-year timeframe, 1986 to 2006, was largely influenced by the SEA 
coming into force in 1986. In doing so, the EU established one of the major objectives of the 
whole European project: to establish a common market where goods, people, and capital 
could move freely within and between all the member-states. The advent of the SEA not only 
signifies one of most important steps on the road to the full economic and monetary union the 
EU architects planned as the economic integration platform from which to move on to 
increasing political union, but also for the purposes of this research heralded the first concrete 
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indication of the possibilities for an EU supracapitalism. The internal logic of this is simple: 
if one of the preconditions for capitalism is a centrally co-ordinated market system, as 
discussed in the passages above regarding the evolution of capitalism, then the advent of a 
single market, for what was in 1986 to include 12 disparate national capitalisms, must 
represent one of the foundations from which to build the overall structure for a 
supranationally-managed grouping of national economies. 
The creation of such a single market promised many advantages and benefits for its members, 
not least of which was trade. Therefore, this final section of economic variable analysis 
focuses on patterns of trade, both within and between member-states, and also between 
member-states’ trade with the rest of the world. The analysis employed here is predicated on 
trade openness values, which are calculated by adding together a country’s imports and 
exports, and illustrating the total as a percentage proportion of GDP. The main areas of 
interest are the profiles of the selected national capitalism typologies over time; the 
relationship between intra-EU and extra-EU trade; the effect of the advent of the single 
currency and the establishment of a supranational central bank; comparisons between the 
different typologies relating to trade; and to consider future trajectories beyond the 20-year 
timeframe being used in this study. Figure 14 below shows the intra-EU trade openness 1986 
to 2006 and Figure 15 plots the extra-EU trade openness for the same period. These graphical 
illustrations are followed by statistical analyses relating to the above objectives, and 
following that there is a brief commentary on the overall profile of both the typological 
groups and comparisons of selected collectives.  
Due to the lack of reliable data for a sufficient time span for the Baltic, Small Island, and 
former Eastern Bloc economies, the analysis includes only five of the comparative 
typologies, but does include the necessary empirical evidence for these countries for the full 
20-year period. 
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Figure14 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Intra-EU trade openness 1986-2006 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
 
Figure 15 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Extra-EU trade openness 1986-2006  
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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    Table 21 
  __________________________________________________________________________ 
   EU Trade openness – summary of statistical analysis 
 
 
 
Group 
(see 
key 
below) 
Statistical test 
At 95 percent 
confidence level (CL) 
Sample 
size 
range 
(n) 
p-
value 
Outcome 
a,b Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
7-7 0.356 No statistically significant difference 
e,f Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
2-2 0.112 No statistically significant difference 
q,r Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
3-3 0.649 No statistically significant difference 
c,d Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
7-7 0.084 No statistically significant difference 
g,h Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
2-2 0.231 No statistically significant difference 
s,t Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
3-3 0.074 No statistically significant difference 
a,e,i,m,
q 
One-way ANOVA 3-7 0.387 No statistically significant difference 
b,f,j,n,r One-way ANOVA 3-7 0.555 No statistically significant difference 
c,g,k,o,
s 
One-way ANOVA 1-7 0.002 Statistically significant difference 
d,h,l,p,t One-way ANOVA 1-7 0.031 Statistically significant difference 
u,v Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
2-2 0.365 No statistically significant difference 
y,z Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
2-2 0.112 No statistically significant difference 
w,x Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
11-11 0.174 No statistically significant difference 
aa,bb Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
3-3 0.112 No statistically significant difference 
cc,dd Two-sample sample  
t-test 
14-14 0.958 No statistically significant difference 
ee,ff Two-sample sample 
 t-test 
14-14 0.301 No statistically significant difference 
 
              __________________________________________________________________________ 
               Source: analysis primary with raw data from European Economy Statistical Annex (2006) 
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       Key codes to groupings in Table 21 
 
      __________________________________________________________________________                 
      Source: primary 
 
The intra-EU trade openness trajectories in Figure 14, with the exception of the LMEE 
(Ireland), exhibit a general increase in the overall internal EU trade volumes, broadening 
from the 20 to 40 percent band in 1986 to a 20 to 50 percent spread at the time of the launch 
of the euro, and to the 20 to 60 percent range seen by 2006; by which time Ireland’s 
exceptional trade profile had normalised with the other typologies from about 2003, and had 
itself entered the 20-60 percent band. As would be expected, the single currency appears to 
have been a major influence in this significant increase in internal EU trade, although it is 
also clear that the single market took some time to meaningfully influence the other four 
groups of national capitalisms until the late 1990s. Nonetheless, a 50 percent increase in 
intra-EU trade in 20 years must be considered as successful, and although not wholly 
a CMEs in Eurosphere: intra-
EU openness  
1986-1998 q SEEs in Eurosphere: intra-EU openness  1986-1998 
b CMEs in Eurosphere: intra-
EU openness  
1999-2006 r SEEs in Eurosphere: intra-EU openness  1999-2006 
c CMEs in Eurosphere: extra-
EU openness  
1986-1998 s SEEs in Eurosphere: extra-EU openness  1986-1998 
d CMEs in Eurosphere: extra-
EU openness  
1999-2006 t SEEs in Eurosphere: extra-EU openness  1999-2006 
e CMEs not in Eurosphere: 
intra-EU openness  
1986-1998 u ALL in Eurosphere: intra-EU openness  1986-1998 
f CMEs not in Eurosphere: 
intra-EU openness  
1999-2006 v ALL in Eurosphere: intra-EU openness  1999-2006 
g CMEs not in Eurosphere: 
extra-EU openness  
1986-1998 w ALL in Eurosphere: extra-EU openness  1986-1998 
h CMEs not in Eurosphere: 
extra-EU openness  
1999-2006 x ALL in Eurosphere: extra-EU openness  1999-2006 
i LMEs in Eurosphere: intra-
EU openness  
1986-1998 y ALL not in Eurosphere: intra-EU 
openness  
1986-1998 
j LMEs in Eurosphere: intra-
EU openness  
1999-2006 z ALL not in Eurosphere: intra-EU 
openness  
1999-2006 
k LMEs in Eurosphere: extra-
EU openness  
1986-1998 aa ALL not in Eurosphere: extra-EU 
openness  
1986-1998 
l LMEs in Eurosphere: extra-
EU openness  
1999-2006 bb ALL not in Eurosphere: extra-EU 
openness  
1999-2006 
m LMEs not in Eurosphere: 
intra-EU openness  
1986-1998 cc ALL intra-EU openness  1986-1998 
n LMEs not in Eurosphere: 
intra-EU openness  
1999-2006 dd ALL intra-EU openness  1999-2006 
o LMEs not in Eurosphere: 
extra-EU openness  
1986-1998 ee ALL extra-EU openness  1986-1998 
p LMEs not in Eurosphere: 
extra-EU openness  
1999-2006 ff ALL extra-EU openness  1998-2006 
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conclusive from the trendlines, there is some indication upward movement towards 2007 and 
beyond. 
The extra-EU trade openness illustrations appear to offer a more complex profile, and it is 
instructive here to examine both the individual typologies’ trajectories as well as the overall 
pattern of activity.  As a departure point, Ireland again appears as a significant outlier until 
2003, where, as with the intra-Euro trade illustration, it peaks in the early 2000s before 
converging on the other four typologies in the analysis during the last few years of the 20-
year period under review. The first general observation regarding the other groupings is the 
clear stability demonstrated by all typologies between 1986 and the launch of the euro in 
1999, where although externally trading at various levels, all are situated between ten and 30 
percent of GDP. After the establishment of the euro, both the Eurosphere and non-Eurosphere 
CMEs exhibit significant extra-EU trade expansion to 35 percent and 30 percent respectively, 
while the southern European economies and the UK, as the lone LMENE, appear to settle in 
the ten to 20 percent band, but without demonstrating any indication of real external trade 
expansion. The second general observation is effectively a series of questions. First, with the 
expanding post-euro internal trade openness that was the expected outcome of the single 
currency and fixed exchange rate for 12 of the 15 national capitalisms of the EU, would this 
not come at the expense of external trade volumes, given that a concentration on internal 
trade would become not only simpler and more convenient, but also cost-saving and therefore 
profit-enhancing? Or, does EMU offer significantly enhanced benefits for external trade as 
well? And, if this is the case, why is it only the two CME groups that are taking advantage? 
The answer perhaps lies in the future. Given that the beneficial effects of the SEA on internal 
EU trade took the best part of a decade to come to fruition, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
that the pattern for euro-influenced external EU trade may also need a similar gestation 
period, especially as non-euro trading partners have to reconfigure commercial relationships 
and make adjustments in relation to the single currency, fixed exchange rate, and other 
associated transaction costs. Moreover, as newly joined economies of the former Eastern 
Bloc countries, the Baltic states, and the Small Island economies of Cyprus and Malta, join in 
the equation, and perhaps also as group protectionism may be deemed necessary to protect an 
expanded EU trading bloc, the post 2006 patterns and trends may be somewhat different from 
the period currently being analysed. 
The statistical outcomes summarised in Table 21 above offer further insights into EU trade 
openness in relation to the pre and post-euro phases of the 20-year timeframe under review. 
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Beginning at the bottom of the table, and in relation to collective analyses, the only collective 
not demonstrating a statistically significant difference between pre and post-euro is the all 
non-Eurosphere collective in terms of external EU trade, where it appears that the positive 
influence of the euro on the CMENE extra trade volumes was partly negated by the LMENE 
figures. This offers clear empirical evidence that overall the euro has exerted a generally 
positive change influence across the EU as a whole. However, the picture is less clear when 
looking at individual typology comparisons via t-testing, and the selected multiple typology 
ANOVA comparisons. Here, both Eurosphere and ex-Eurosphere CMEs show statistical pre 
and post-euro difference for internal trade, while the Eurosphere CMEs also demonstrate euro 
influence on external trade. The other typological groups show no such euro influence on 
trade. The multiple ANOVA tests are as follows. 
The first of the four ANOVA tests looks at all the typologies’ intra-EU trade pre-euro, and 
returns no statistical difference between them. The second ANOVA considers all the 
typologies’ intra-EU trade post-euro, and also finds no statistical difference between them. 
The third and fourth ANOVAs mirror these tests but for extra-EU trade openness and finds 
statistically significant difference within the typologies for both periods. Both sets of 
ANOVA multiple comparison bear out the visual observations from the longitudinal 
illustrations in Figures 14 and 15, and as discussed above. In sum, out of the 16 statistical 
tests carried out in relation to EU trade openness, ten return statistically significant outcomes, 
thereby offering further empirical evidence for the influence of the euro in general, and the 
supranational management of EMU by the ECB, in particular. However, whilst the evidence 
is clear that the single currency is having some measurable influence, any more sophisticated 
insights into causality other than at the surface level, must remain the subject of further 
research 
Summary of the analyses of selected EU economic variables 
The foregoing analyses in this chapter have largely focused on the visible longitudinal trends 
and patterns of various EU macroeconomic indicators, as illustrated in graphic form, and 
detailed within-and-between statistical analysis of each of the variables has been carried out; 
where the ‘within analyses’ tests search for differences in their individual behaviours before 
and after the introduction of the euro single currency, and the ‘between analyses’ explore 
differences and similarities of the prescribed typological groupings of EU national 
capitalisms over the 20-year period. Moreover, this 20-year period of analysis also allows the 
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empirical evidence of both longitudinal study and statistical output methods to examine the 
behaviour of the selected variables over three timeframes: the entire 20-year history; the 
immediate post-SEA years leading up until the launch of the euro in 1999; and the post-euro 
period of 1999 to 2006. 
These three sub-timeframes, the longitudinal illustrations, and the within-and-between 
statistical outputs attempt  to compile enough empirical economic evidence to promulgate the 
potential for an EU supracapitalism to exist in the future, that is, sometime after 2006. The 
establishment of Eurosphere, the ECB as the supranational institution charged with its 
management, and the single currency as symbolised by the euro, represent a powerful 
reification of the theoretical planning for EMU as the foundation for the full economic 
integration which would, perhaps, precede political union. At this stage, however EMU is 
only two thirds-complete, with the ECB having supranational control of the monetary policy 
and a fixed exchange rate mechanism for 12 member-states, but not, as yet, fiscal policy. 
With the main argument couched in the potential, the above sets of evidence can now 
synthesised, by looking first at each of the selected macroeconomic variables in turn, and 
then establishing a preliminary measurement of each variable in terms of their potential for 
supranational management through the ECB. First, Tables 19 and 20 below together represent 
a synopsis of all the statistical analysis outputs considered in this chapter. Second, an 
evaluation of the trends and patterns illustrated in each of the above longitudinal graphs is 
also presented. And last, a critical assessment of the contrasts and similarities of the 
behaviour of economic variables within-and-between each of the selected typologies of EU 
national capitalisms’ is offered. 
Both Tables 22 and 23 are presented as cross-tabulations, with each of the macroeconomic 
variables being compared horizontally across the typology-headed columns, and the 
typologies of national capitalisms, compared vertically across the economic variables. The 
first table brings together all the individual statistical summaries relating to the statistical 
testing of each of the variables, and the second table offers a similar synthesis for the 
collective statistical summaries. The statistical analysis of price stability, as measured by the 
HICP method, is excluded from the first of these owing to its relatively late adoption within 
the 20-year timeframe in 1997 and thereby disallowing an effective overall assessment of the 
pre and-post euro eras for this variable. And, the overall statistical trade openness analysis is 
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entirely situated in the collective group table due to the unavailability of complete datasets for 
the SIEs, the FEBNEs, and the BCNEs. 
Notwithstanding the noted surface level of causality analysis, both Table 19 and Table 20 
reveal significant outcomes of the aggregation of the statistical testing and analysis conducted 
in this chapter. The first observation from Table 21 is the overall level of statistically 
significant post-euro change in all the selected macroeconomic variables horizontally 
illustrated, with the exception of unemployment. And, while the measurement of influence is 
only returned in statistical difference terms, and therefore not necessarily exhibiting positive 
or negative influence in the way the visual longitudinal illustrations can, the level of 
measurement of overall influence at just over 60 percent for the variables suggests that the  
single currency regime is not only influencing the 12 economies, but that the ECB’s 
supranational management is also changing the behaviours of most of the selected variables 
for most of the typological groups of capitalisms, and therefore offers some basis from which 
to support the argument for the potential for an EU supracapitalism. However, when looking 
at the vertical comparisons of each of the typologies, further dimensions to the analysis are 
revealed. Here, there is a clear separation of the influence of the euro regime between both 
the CME groupings and the other typologies in the analysis, with the CMEEs returning only a 
43 percent measurement of influence, with only growth, productivity, and inflation being 
strongly influenced; and the CMNNEs at below 30 percent overall influence, with only 
inflation and social benefits payments subjected to meaningful change. However, clear 
influence is evidenced with all the remaining groups, with an average metric of influence of 
69 percent. This disparity between the two subsets is interesting, but perhaps explained by the 
influence of the usually stable trajectories for most economic indicators of the co-ordinated 
market capitalisms, especially the Eurosphere group, over the  ECB’s policy-setting agenda 
and one often seen as emblematic of the German Bundesbank. 
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Table 22 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Analysis of statistical outcomes by typological group and economic variable indicators taken 
from the statistical summaries tables 
(SD = statistically significant post-euro difference, and NSD = no statistically significant 
post-euro difference. The totals column is expressed as a percentage for difference) 
 
 CME 
(E) 
CME 
(NE) 
LME 
(E) 
LME 
(NE) 
SEE 
(E) 
FEB 
(NE) 
SIE 
(NE) 
BCE 
(NE) 
Total 
percent 
Growth  
 
SD NSD NSD SD SD SD SD SD 75.00 
Growth per 
head 
 
NSD NSD SD SD SD SD NSD SD 62.50 
Productivity 
 
SD NSD NSD NSD SD NSD SD SD 50.00 
Inflation – GDP 
deflator 
SD SD NSD SD SD SD NSD SD 75.00 
Unemployment 
 
NSD NSD SD SD NSD NSD SD NSD 37.50 
Social benefit 
payments 
NSD SD SD SD SD SD NSD NSD 62.50 
Direct taxation 
 
NSD NSD SD NSD SD SD SD SD 62.50 
Total 
percent 
42.86 28.57 57.14 71.42 85.71 71.42 57.14 71.42 60.71 
     
     ____________________________________________________________________________ 
     Source: primary 
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Table 23 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Analysis of statistical outcomes by collective group and economic variable indicators taken 
from the statistical summaries tables 
(SD = statistically significant post-euro difference, and NSD = no statistically significant 
post-euro difference. The totals column is expressed as a percentage for difference) 
 
 All national 
capitalisms 
within 
Eurosphere 
All national 
capitalisms 
outside 
Eurosphere 
All national 
capitalisms 
Totals 
(percent) 
Growth  
 
SD SD SD 100.00 
Growth per head 
 
SD NSD SD 66.66 
Productivity 
 
SD SD NSD 66.66 
Inflation – GDP 
deflator 
SD SD SD 100.00 
Unemployment 
 
SD NSD NSD 33.33 
Social benefit 
payments 
NSD SD SD 66.66 
Direct taxation 
 
NSD NSD NSD 0.00 
Trade openness 
intra-EU 
 
NSD NSD NSD 0.00 
Trade openness 
extra-EU 
 
NSD NSD NSD 0.00 
Totals 
 
55.55 44.44 44.44 48.14 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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Another striking feature of the overall analysis in is the noticeable levels of influence on the 
non-Eurosphere groups, where even the often-considered most remote economy from the EU, 
the UK as the LMENE, returns statistical influence on growth; growth per capita; inflation; 
unemployment; and social payment benefits payments. Moreover, the statistical differences 
which indicate change and influence are usually associated with convergence trajectories as 
the longitudinal illustrations suggest. This influence on the non-Eurosphere economies can be 
seen to have both simple and complex dimensions. The simple explanation relates to the 
general expansion of post-euro intra-EU trade for most economies, and its direct and indirect 
effects. The complex levels of this influence lie in the many and varied  interrelationships 
national capitalisms enjoy with each other on the bases of bilateral historical, cultural, 
religious, and military influences on trade and commerce with partners in the EU. 
Table 23 summarises the collective analyses in terms of the selected macroeconomic 
variables, and therefore offers a broader overview of the results as a whole. There are three 
collectives used in this analysis: an aggregate of all of the Eurosphere national capitalisms of 
all of the non-Eurosphere national capitalisms, and of all EU national capitalisms as a single 
group. There is very clear evidence here that EMU, the ECB, and the euro have made little or 
no overall difference to the EU as a whole in terms of direct government taxation, internal 
trade (intra-EU trade), or external trade (extra-EU trade). However, with the exception of 
unemployment, the EU as whole has been significantly influenced in relation to both types of 
growth, productivity, inflation, and social benefits payments. And, when looking vertically 
down the columns in Table 22 all the Eurosphere capitalisms are seen to be influenced at 
around the 56 percent level, while all the non-Eurosphere capitalisms and the EU as a whole 
are both influenced at about 44 percent. And, interestingly there are identical outcomes for 
both Eurosphere and non-Eurosphere collectives in terms of GDP growth, productivity, and 
inflation. Perhaps the collective analysis goes a little further than the individual typologies’ 
analysis, in that internal and external trade, together with taxation are clearly different in their 
behaviours compared to the other macroeconomic variables, and in this outcome it is 
reasonable to suggest these three variables may be more politically and historically sensitive, 
and therefore their trajectories are more independent, and so less sensitive overall to pure 
macroeconomic supra-management by the ECB. 
When considering the longitudinal illustrations and analyses, there appears to be a fairly 
consistent pattern across all the macroeconomic variables under consideration, regardless of 
the statistical calibrations of post-single currency difference and associated influence, and 
158 
 
with the exception of GDP per capita, where the trajectories are mostly gently and upwardly 
exponential in trend. The pattern is one where the trajectories either clearly converge 
following the advent of the euro as with internal EU trade openness, external EU trade 
openness, overall GDP growth, productivity, unemployment; and both measurements of 
inflation; or where convergence is not evidenced, they move closer together following the 
launch of the single currency but whilst maintaining similar pre-euro profiles, as is the case 
with both direct government taxation and social benefits payments. 
The similarities and differences between the selected typologies of national capitalisms in 
relation to the overall analysis are encapsulated at one level in Tables 22 and 23 above, where 
the horizontal statistical responses to the macroeconomic variable testing shows that the 
typologies as a whole have significantly and similarly responded to the single currency and 
ECB’s supranational management of monetary and exchange rate policy constructs. The 
vertical comparisons in the table, as noted above, illustrate a clear difference between the 
CMEs and the other typologies. However, if the analysis was relaxed a little, it could be 
argued the only real outlier group is the non-Eurosphere co-ordinated market economies of 
Denmark and Sweden, and that may be reconciled by considering how their much higher and 
very stable direct government taxation levels may more readily negate some of the indirect 
effects of the single currency experienced by all the other non-Eurosphere typologies. 
Moreover, the original composition of the typologies is one of contingently-qualified 
arbitration at best, and it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to find an optimum 
method of fitting individual national capitalisms into collective varieties of national 
capitalisms that would satisfactorily offer a basis for a broad range of politico-economic 
interrogations. However, as the above comparisons between the typological responses in 
Table 22 and the collective EU responses in Table 23 suggest, that although there will always 
be a residual amount of statistical ‘noise’ or ‘error’ because of the n = 1 problem discussed 
earlier, practical contingent or issue-specific compositions of national capitalisms do offer 
significant analytical advantages when attempting to view the potential progress of EU 
capitalism as a whole. 
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Chapter 5  The evolution and performance of the ECB 
Overview 
In the preceding passages the ECB and the Eurosphere have, at times, been used both 
interchangeably and synonymously. This seems reasonable given that both were created at 
the same time, and for the joint purpose of the commencement of Stage Three of EMU. 
Moreover, the Eurosphere can be seen as a clearly defined politico-economic space, where 
the participating members of the single currency are interrelated in that membership by the 
collective control of the ECB. Nonetheless, the ECB is charged with the supranational 
strategic management of the euro, and as such much of the individual and collective 
economic and monetary performance of the Eurosphere countries. And, as the ECB has also 
been positioned as the key economic agent and major political influence for the concept of an 
EU form of supracapitalism here, it becomes the overall analytical focus from which to assess 
the macroeconomic performance of the Eurosphere and the degree to which an EU 
supracapitalism is a genuine possibility. Therefore, although the development of the 
Eurosphere since 1999 also informs elements of this chapter, the main focus is on the 
evolution and effectiveness of the ECB itself.  And importantly, such a focus not only allows 
the empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter to be critically evaluated against 
both the ECB’s existing primary and ancillary policy objectives, but also crucially for the 
propositions made here to challenge the basis and narrowness of ECB monetary policy-
setting by propounding the heterodox monetary production model as a more effective means 
of managing the Eurosphere.. 
Any meaningful adjudication of the ECB’s supra-institutional performance is contingent 
upon an appreciation of its nature and characteristics, and, in turn, these can probably be best 
understood by chronicling its evolution. The unfolding story of the ideas, creation, and 
eventual realisation of the ECB directly relates to the concept of economic integration being a 
necessary prerequisite for the full political union the founding fathers of the EU envisioned. 
And economic integration was predicated on economic and monetary union, which the ECB 
would ultimately be mandated to deliver.  
Whereas any assessment of ECB’s performance can obviously only be made following its 
full operationalisation in January 1999, its evolution can be seen to have begun with the 
enactment of the Treaties of Rome in 1958. A more recent staring point may possibly be 
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1989 when the European Council decided to initiate the realisation of EMU by the end of the 
century. However, it would be historically incorrect to disregard the first steps towards 
monetary integration, which began in the mid-1960s (Scheller, 2004). These early attempts 
were characterised by varying degrees of success, but where progress was often punctuated 
with setbacks. Nevertheless, the achievements of this period, and some of the lessons learned, 
were indispensable in shaping the process of the monetary integration that began in the 
1990s. With this in mind, perhaps the most practical departure point for ECB’s history would 
be 1962 and the Marjolin Memorandum (See Table 10a below). Here, the memorandum 
initiated the first discussions on monetary integration at the Community (EEC) level, and 
prompted the first, although limited, measures in the area of monetary co-operation. So, with 
an evolution timeframe now defined between 1962 and 2006, ECB’s history can be viewed as 
having two stages, where a number of distinct phases of ECB history can be identified, and 
each with its own definable developmental moments.  There is a pre-history between 1962 
and 1998, where there is a theoretical and political discussion period resulting in Stage One 
and Stage Two of EMU; and from 1999 until 2006, an operational record which saw the 
implementation of a strategy based on Stage Three of EMU, and therefore the policies and 
decision-making characterising the first seven years of ECB’s development. Tables 24a and 
24b below summarise the main developments. Following an account of the events leading up 
to the operationalisation of the ECB and launch of the euro, the chapter evaluates the 
progression of the ECB by looking first at its political landscape and potential tensions, then 
by considering ECB’s economic challenges, before finally assessing its performance between 
1999 and 2006. In doing so, elements of constructivist analysis are used to appreciate the 
developments of the pre-history stage, whereas neoinstitutionalist perspectives help make 
sense of the early ECB years in terms of its politics, economics, and overall macroeconomic 
performativity. 
A pre-history of the ECB  
Although the EU’s founding fathers perceived economic integration as a necessary precursor 
to full political union from the early 1950s, and that monetary co-operation was seen as the 
initial condition of that economic assimilation, it was not until the end of the 1960s, that the 
European Commission drew up plans for its realisation. Up until this time the Bretton Woods  
system had maintained a relatively stable and well-functioning international monetary 
mechanism. However, the system began to show significant strain as a result of US balance 
161 
 
of payments policy, and because of several exchange rate and balance of payment crises, the 
EEC members differed on economic policy priorities. In turn, this threatened to disrupt the  
Table 24a 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The evolution of the Eurosphere 1962-1995 
 
During 1962 The European Commission makes its first proposal (Marjolin 
Memorandum) for economic and monetary union 
 
May 1964 A Committee of Governors of the central banks of member-states of the 
EEC is formed to institutionalise the co-operation among EEC central 
banks 
During 1971 The Werner Report sets out a plan to realise an economic and monetary 
union in the EEC by 1980 
April 1972 A system (the snake) for the progressive narrowing of the margins of 
fluctuation between the currencies of members states is established 
April 1973 The European Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF) is set up to ensure 
the proper operation of the snake 
March 1979 The European Monetary System (EMS) is created 
February 1986 The Single European Act (SEA) is signed 
June 1988 The European Council mandates a committee of experts under the 
chairmanship of Jacques Delors  (the ‘Delors Committee’) to make 
proposals for the realisation of EMU 
May 1989 The ‘Delors Report’ is submitted to the European Council 
June 1989 The European Council agrees on the realisation of EMU in three stages 
July 1990 Stage One of EMU begins 
December 1990 An intergovernmental Conference to prepare for Stages Two and Three of 
EMU is launched 
February 1992 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) known as the ‘Maastricht Treaty’ is 
signed 
October 1993 Frankfurt is chosen as the seat of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) 
and of the ECB  
November 1993 The TEU comes into force 
December 1993  Alexandre Lamfalussy is appointed as President of the EMI, to be 
operational from January 1994 
January 1994  Stage Two of EMU commences 
December 1995 The Madrid European Council decides on the name of the single currency 
and sets out the plans for its adoption and cash changeovers  
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: adapted from Scheller (2004) 
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Table 24b 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The evolution of the Eurosphere 1996-2006 
 
December 1996 The EMI presents specimen euro banknotes to the European Council 
June 1997 The European Council agrees on the Stability and Growth Pact 
May 1998 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain are considered to fulfil the necessary 
conditions for the adoption of the euro as their single currency. The 
members of the Executive Board of the ECB are appointed 
June 1998 The ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) are 
established 
October 1998 The ECB announces the strategy and operational framework  for the single 
monetary policy it will conduct from 1st January 1999 
January 1999 Stage Three of EMU begins; the euro becomes the single currency for the 
Eurosphere; conversion rates are irrevocably fixed for the former national 
currencies of the participating member-states ; and a single monetary 
policy is accepted and conducted for the Eurosphere 
January 2001 Greece becomes the 12th member state to join the Eurosphere  
January 2002 The euro cash changeover takes place.  New euro banknotes and coins are 
introduced and become the sole legal tender in the Eurosphere by the end 
of February 2002 
May 2004 The national central banks (NCBs) of the ten new EU member-states, the 
‘Fifth Enlargement’, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia,  join the ESCB 
2004-2006 The ECB and Eurosphere fully operational 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: adapted from Scheller (2004)  
 
hitherto effective running of the customs union and common agricultural market. Deciding to 
push forward plans to now create a new monetary identity and move towards the realisation 
of economic and monetary integration, the Council of Ministers commissioned the Werner 
Report16  which outlined a scheme to deliver economic and monetary union in a number of 
stages, and by 1980. 
                                                 
16 The Werner Report was prepared by a group of experts under the chairmanship of Pierre Warner, 
Luxembourg’s Prime Minister, and published in 1970. 
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The first of these stages was designed to ensure the ‘progressive narrowing of the fluctuations 
or members states’ currencies’ (Scheller, 2004). The system, known as the ‘snake’17, came 
into operation in 1972, and was organised alongside the newly-formed European Monetary 
Co-operation Fund (EMCF). In what could be viewed as the forerunner to the now European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB), the EMCF was effectively a first attempt at organising the 
EU central banks into a co-operative. From this platform it was envisaged that a high degree 
of currency convergence and a plan for stability, growth, and full employment could be 
achieved. However, by the mid-1970s the process of integration had lost its momentum under 
divergent policy member-states’ responses to the international economic shocks of the period. 
The EMCF evolved into an exchange rate mechanism involving the currencies of West 
Germany, Denmark, and the Benelux countries, together with two outsider currencies; the 
Swedish krona and the Norwegian krone. By 1977, this had effectively become a Deutsche 
Mark zone, and also perhaps the first indication of the dominant role the German central 
bank, the Bundesbank, was to play in the development of the ECB.  
The net result of the divergent policy decisions and uncertainty surrounding the snake led 
first to proposed interventions in the snake in order to maintain the fixed and narrow currency 
convergence, especially against the US dollar; and then varying degrees of involvement in the 
system with countries leaving and re-entering the snake mechanism at different times; 
notably France and Italy. Consequently, most of the other members kept their currencies 
outside the system for all or most of its existence, and as a result the EMCF became merely a 
book-keeping organ, with member-states and their central banks increasingly reluctant to 
adopt it in their respective policy formations. 
In March 1979 the process of monetary integration was relaunched with the creation of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). The EMS was established by a Resolution of the 
European Council, and its operating procedures were laid down in an agreement between the 
participating central banks. The EMS proved to be instrumental in furthering European 
monetary integration. Unlike the snake, the EMS managed to keep most EEC currencies in a 
single exchange rate system. Some features of the EMS were similar to the snake, for 
example the EMS was also built around a grid of fixed but adjustable central rates among the 
participating EEC currencies. A new feature, however, was the introduction of the European 
                                                 
17 The analogy of the snake, or the snake in the tunnel, refers to a set band of European currencies within plus or 
minus of 2.25 percent of their relative exchange rate against the US dollar, effectively allowing a potential 4.5 
percent appreciations or depreciations 
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Currency Unit (ECU), which was defined as a ‘basket’ of fixed quantities of the currencies of 
the member-states. The ECU was to serve as the ‘numeraire’ of the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM), as a unit of account to denominate operations in the intervention and credit 
mechanisms, and as a reserve asset and means of settlement among the participating 
central banks. 
However, the EMS was not just an exchange rate mechanism. In line with its objective to 
promote internal and external monetary stability, the EMS also covered the adjustment of 
monetary and economic policies as tools for achieving exchange rate stability. Its participants 
were able to create a zone in which monetary stability increased, and capital controls were 
gradually relaxed. The exchange rate constraint greatly helped those participating countries 
with relatively high rates of inflation to pursue disinflation policies, in particular through 
monetary policy. It therefore fostered a downward convergence of inflation rates and brought 
about a high degree of exchange rate stability. This in turn helped to moderate cost increases 
in many countries and led to an improvement in overall economic performance. Moreover, 
reduced uncertainty about exchange rate developments, together with a perception that the 
parities of the participating currencies were not allowed to depart significantly from the 
economic fundamentals protected intra-European trade from excessive exchange rate 
volatility. 
Although the EMS became the focal point of improved monetary policy co-ordination, its 
success in bringing about greater convergence of economic policies was rather limited. The 
lack of sufficient convergence in fiscal policy also remained a source of tension: some 
countries had persistently large budget deficits (leading to several exchange rate crises at the 
beginning of the 1990s), which put a disproportionate burden on monetary policy.  
A further impetus for economic and monetary union was provided by the adoption of the 
Single European Act (SEA), which came into force on the 1st of July 1987. The main purpose 
of the SEA was to introduce the Single Market as a further objective of the EEC, in order to 
make the necessary decision-making changes to complete the Single Market and to 
reaffirm the need for the EEC’s monetary capacity for achieving economic and monetary 
union. 
There was growing consensus among policy-makers that a market without internal borders 
would link the national economies much more closely together and significantly increase 
the degree of economic integration within the EEC. This, in turn, would reduce the room 
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for manoeuvre of national policies and thus oblige the member-states to step up 
convergence of their economic policies. If greater convergence did not occur, full freedom of 
capital movements and integrated financial markets was expected to put an undue burden on 
monetary policy. The integration process would therefore require more intensive and effective 
policy co-ordination for which the prevailing institutional framework was perceived to be 
insufficient. In addition, the Single Market was not expected to be able to exploit its full 
potential without a single currency. A single currency would ensure greater price transparency for 
consumers and investors, eliminate exchange rate risks within the Single Market, reduce 
transaction costs and, as a result, significantly increase economic welfare in the EEC. 
Taking all these considerations into account, the then 12 member-states of the EEC decided in 
1988 to relaunch the EMU project. Where the Werner Plan of the early 1970s had failed, the 
second attempt at EMU would prove to be a success, finally turning the single currency dream 
into reality. In June 1988 the European Council confirmed the objective of the progressive 
realisation of economic and monetary union and instructed a committee chaired by Jacques 
Delors, President of the European Commission, to propose ‘concrete stage’s leading to EMU. 
The resulting Delors Report of 17 April 1989 recommended that economic and monetary 
union be achieved in ‘three discrete but evolutionary steps’ (Scheller, 2004). 
Stage One was to focus on completing the internal market, reducing disparities between Member-
states' economic policies, removing all obstacles to financial integration and intensifying 
monetary co-operation. Stage Two would serve as a period of transition to the final stage, 
setting up the basic organs and organisational structure of EMU and strengthening economic 
convergence. And, in Stage Three, exchange rates would be locked irrevocably and the various 
Community institutions and bodies would be assigned their full monetary and economic 
responsibilities. 
Although Stage One was established within the existing institutional framework of the 
Community, changes to the institutional structure were needed for Stages Two and Three. It 
was necessary therefore to revise the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
To this end, an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on EMU was convened, which opened in 
November 1990 in parallel with the IGC on European Political Union. At the European 
Council's invitation, the EMU IGC was prepared by the Council of Ministers, the European 
Commission, the Monetary Committee, and the Committee of Governors, all within their 
respective fields of competence. 
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The outcome of the IGC negotiations was the Treaty on European Union (the EU Treaty, 
commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty), which was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 
1992. The EU Treaty established the EU and amended the founding treaties of the 
European Communities. The amendments to the EEC Treaty added, among others, a new 
chapter on economic and monetary policy. This new chapter laid down the foundations of 
EMU, and set out a method and timetable for its realisation. Reflecting the Community's 
increasing powers and scope, the EEC was renamed the European Community. The Statutes 
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the European Monetary Institute (EMI), 
and the ECB, were attached as Protocols to the EC Treaty. Denmark and the United Kingdom 
were given a special status that did not oblige them to participate in Stage Three of EMU.  
On the basis of the Delors Report, the European Council decided in June 1989 that the first 
stage of the realisation of economic and monetary union should begin on the 1st of July 
1990. This was the date on which, in principle, all restrictions on the movement of capital 
between member-states were to be removed. At this time, the Committee of Governors of 
the central banks of the member-states of the EEC was given additional responsibilities, 
which were set out in a Council Decision of 12 March 1990. They included holding consultations 
on, and promoting the co-ordination of, the monetary policies of the Member-states, with the 
aim of achieving price stability. In view of the relatively short time available and the 
complexity of the tasks involved, the Committee of Governors initiated the preparatory work for 
Stage Three of EMU as soon as the Maastricht Treaty had been signed. The first step was to 
identify all the issues that should be examined at an early stage and establish a work 
programme by the end of 1993. Then it was necessary to define appropriate mandates for the 
existing sub-committees and the new working groups which had been set up to look into 
specific issues. 
The establishment of the EMI on 1 January 1994 marked the start of Stage Two of EMU. It 
was created as a transitory body to undertake the preparatory work for Stage Three of EMU, 
while the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy in the EU remained the preserve of 
national authorities. The Committee of Governors ceased to exist but was effectively 
reconstituted as the Council (governing body) of the EMI. The two main tasks of the EMI 
were to strengthen central bank co-operation and monetary policy co-ordination; and to 
make the necessary preparations for establishing the ESCB, for the conduct of the single 
monetary policy, and for creating a single currency in the third stage of EMU. 
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In December 1995 the Madrid European Council confirmed that Stage Three of EMU would 
start on the 1st of January 1999. It also named the single currency to be introduced at the start 
of Stage Three as the euro, and announced the sequence of events leading up to its introduction. 
This scenario was mainly based on detailed proposals developed by the EMI, which had also 
used the term ‘changeover to’ the euro instead of ‘introduction of’ the euro in order to 
reflect the nature of the transition to the single currency. The EMI's changeover scenario 
recommended a transitional period of three years starting from the 1st of January 1999 to 
accommodate differences in the pace with which the various groups of economic agents, for 
example, the financial sector, the non-financial corporate sector, the public sector, and the 
general public would be able to adapt to the single currency. Also in December 1995, the 
EMI was given the task of carrying out preparatory work on the future monetary and exchange 
rate relationships between the euro and the currencies of the non-euro area EU countries. One 
year later, in December 1996, the EMI presented a report to the European Council, which 
subsequently formed the basis of a European Council Resolution on the principles and 
fundamental elements of the new exchange rate mechanism (ERM 11), which was adopted in 
June 1997. 
In December 1996 the EMI presented to the European Council, and to the public, the blueprint 
that had won the euro banknote design competition, and that would therefore feature on the 
banknotes to be put into circulation by the ESCB on the 1st of January 2002. The design of 
the euro coins which were to be issued by the Eurosphere member-states was endorsed by the 
European Council in 1997. In June 1997 the European Council adopted the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), which complemented the Treaty provisions and aimed to ensure budgetary 
discipline within EMU. The Pact consists of three instruments: a European Council 
Resolutions and two Council Regulations. It was supplemented and the respective 
commitments enhanced by a Declaration of the Council in May 1998. 
The member-states implemented policies to fulfil the economic convergence criteria (Article 
121 of the EC Treaty) and revised extensively their national legislation to bring it into line with 
the requirements of legal convergence (Article 109 of the EC Treaty). The adaptations 
concerned in particular the legal and statutory provisions for their central banks with a view 
to their integration into the Eurosphere. The final decisions on EMU were taken starting in 
May 1998. On the 2nd of May 1998 the EU Council, meeting in the composition of the 
Heads of State or Government, decided unanimously that 11 member-states had fulfilled 
the conditions necessary to adopt the single currency on 1 January 1999. These countries 
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(Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal and Finland) would therefore participate in Stage Three of EMU. Given their special 
status, Denmark and the United Kingdom ‘opted out’ of Stage Three of EMU, and Greece and 
Sweden were not deemed to have met the conditions for adopting the single currency.  
The Heads of State or Government also reached a political understanding on who to appoint 
as members of the future ECB's Executive Board. At the same time, the ministers of finance 
of the member-states adopting the single currency and the governors of the national central 
banks of these Member-states agreed, together with the European Commission and the 
EMI, that the current ERM bilateral central rates of the currencies of the participating 
member-states would be used to determine the irrevocable conversion rates for the euro. 
The six members of the Executive Board were appointed with effect from the 1st of June 1998 
when the ECB was established. The EMI had completed its tasks and went into liquidation in line 
with Article 123(2) of the EC Treaty. The ECB, as liquidator of the EMI, inherited not only an 
extensive body of preparatory work but also the whole EMI infrastructure, including a body of 
staff which had been prepared to undertake its duties at the ECB. This greatly helped the ECB 
to make the Eurosphere operational within only seven months, i.e. in time for the start of Stage 
Three, and to complete the preparations for the euro cash changeover by the 1st of January 2002.          
The pre-history of the ECB therefore can be seen as the result of on-going ideas and resulting 
discourse, in a constructivist sense; and the subsequent establishment of the ECB based on 
rules, continual change by process, and an interdependent embeddedness, within 
neoinstitutionalist logic. With the ECB in place, the focus can now critically turn to the impact 
of the early politics and economics of its decision-making and policy implementations. 
The politics of ECB decision-making 
The politics of ECB decision-making can first be understood by considering an overview of 
the political economy of the EU at the time the ECB operationalised. Sometimes referred to 
as EU ‘spaces of contestation’, Hooghe and Marks (1999:77) see these spaces as representing 
the political climate in which the ECB first found itself,  and Figure 16 below illustrates this. 
Here, the horizontal axis represents the member-states’ domestic political positions on the 
left-right political spectrum in relation a vertical plane which calibrates levels of member-
states’ adherence, or willingness to adhere to (or resist), supranational governance by the 
ECB. By the quadrantile positioning of each member state within the two planes, a visual 
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overview of the political economy is offered. In addition, Hooghe and Marks identify a third 
continuum, or linear cleavage, within the space. This represents the relationship between 
those member-states that advocate an EU-regulated capitalism with those who privilege less 
regulation of capitalism in favour of a neoliberal propensity for the market mechanism. This 
immediately raises a number of key points. First, although there are only two identifiable 
member-states which fall into the second category, Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK), 
although this does not mean that the remaining 13 national economies are in concert as 
regards levels of regulation, nor for that matter, can their positions be considered static. Here, 
if we now move from this projected 13-2 split, to the 12-3 division that exists between the 
Eurosphere countries and those outside the single currency, a different cleavage is created 
where member-states are seen to change positions: Ireland moving into the ‘ECB regulated’ 
zone, and Denmark and Sweden joining the UK in the less-regulated domain characterised by 
independent national central banks and national control of monetary and exchange rate 
policy. Third, the cleavage would again have to be repositioned if fiscal policy stances were 
to be represented. Here, with all the 15 members having national control over government 
spending and borrowing, the sloping line would appear entirely below the horizontal axis, 
with its gradient relating to members’ adherence to the SGP’s constraints. Clearly, France 
and Germany would now occupy positions at the non-regulated end of the line, and indeed, 
further away from the supranational pole of the vertical axis. Fourth, the left-right continuum, 
along which represents the social-democratic member-states to the left, with the neoliberals 
to the right, shows the Christian democrats occupying the centre ground. In relation to the 
vertical national-supranational axis, the cleavage in Figure 16 suggests that left-leaning 
national capitalisms tend to be more in favour of a regulated or supranational capitalism, and 
their neoliberal counterparts tending towards more national control of their economies. 
However, with left-leaning nationalists in the Danish Social Democratic party and right-
leaning supranationalists immanent in the German Christian Democrat movement (Hooghe 
and Marks 1999), it becomes clear that employing the original Hooghe and Marks cleavage 
does not encompass all actors, and suggests there are a number of further issue-specific 
spatial contestations to consider. Moreover, the agents operating within these spaces are 
likely to be more fluid in terms of the tenure of their positions, thereby rendering the spaces 
of contestation, as illustrated, a continuing dynamic, as both individual member-states change 
governments and political hue, and as the members of the recently acceding collective of ten 
new EU national economies inevitably join the single currency and the Eurosphere 
significantly expands 
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Figure 16 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Spaces of EU politico-economic contestation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: adapted from Hooghe and Marks (1999:77) 
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decision-making mechanism pre and post-euro enlargement. At stake is not only the 
credibility of ECB, itself a holy grail amongst central banks, but also the relative power of the 
new members as a collective voting force in ECB policy-making strategy. 
Under the current rules, the central bank governor of each new EU member gets a vote on the 
Governing Council. For example, as at 2002, the ECB President of a board of six executives 
sits with the twelve existing central bank governors, each with a vote. This means that a 
simple majority for any proposed interest rate change requires a majority of nine plus the 
President's vote will win the day. Effectively, the President and his board need only to 
persuade three other central bank governors to pass a particular rate. The weighting of each 
individual member's economic contribution is not taken into account. The implication of this 
is that when say, all ten new members join the euro, the board will need to sway the votes of 
at least seven members to pass the recommended rate. Of course, there will be not only a 
broader mix of national bias, but also the potential for increased cohorts of interest groups’ 
tactical voting. Under the present system, the relatively small economies of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania will be able to outvote Germany and France, who between them account for 
about 50 percent of the total GDP of the EU. Baldwin et al (2001) offer a simple example. 
Consider a very simple EU made up of two countries, one rich, one poor, with the 
rich country's GDP being four times that of the poor one. Furthermore, assume 
inflation is zero in the rich nation, but because of the Balassa- Samuelson effect18 
it is ten percent in the poor country. Using GDP 'weights', the average inflation in 
this simplified EU would be 2 percent (0 percent x 0.8 + ten percent x 0.2). Now 
consider the situation facing the ECB. To keep inflation below 2 percent the ECB 
must do one of two things: force deflation in the rich country via a recession, or 
force the poor country's growth below its long-term potential. Most likely, the 
application of the tools available to the ECB vis a vis monetary tightening would 
lead to some of both; a highly undesirable outcome (2001:28)  
On top of this there is the matter of national central bank governors demonstrating a voting 
bias relative to their home country conditions. Although not always at surface level, elements 
of national bias will always be present, and there is also potential for further sub-groupings of 
                                                 
18 The Balassa-Samuelson effect stems from the fact that poorer nations have lower price levels than rich 
nations, Although the prices of traded goods do not differ much from those in rich nations, the prices of non-
traded goods, especially construction and labour-intensive services, are typically lower because wages are 
lower. As productivity, income and wages catch up, so do the non-traded goods prices. This means poorer 
countries will have higher and different inflation rates as increased growth is achieved. 
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collective bias(es) to exist, and these will also be therefore interchangeable. This suggests, in 
essence, a ‘preference fluidity’ of members’ allegiances contingent on specific economic and 
political issues. Baldwin et al (2001) consider this by looking at hypothetical alliances within 
two stages of an enlarged Governing Council. 
The first assumption drawn in the hypothesis is that in a post-enlargement ECB, the six board 
members only care about Eurosphere inflation; that is they have no national bias. Here, 
Eurosphere inflation would be the average of national inflation rates, where the averaging 
uses weights (GDP weights) that are related to the economic size of member nations (See 
Table 25). Baldwin et al (2001:33), then assume that all the national central bank governors 
adopt ‘an extreme Machiavellian’ view, in that they only care about their national inflation 
rates. The second assumption is that there are a few ‘core’ economies that dominate the EU 
collective GDP, (France, and Germany together account for more than half of EU GDP). At 
the present time, with twelve members in total, seven countries represent this core: Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. With Denmark, Sweden 
and the UK still outside the Eurosphere, and the remaining five economies of Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are considered as ‘less synchronised’ in terms of their 
collective voting behaviour. This means that the Executive Board will find natural voting 
allies among the core economies - even if all governors take purely national perspectives 
(Baldwin et al, 2001:33). Under these conditions governing council decision-making is 
relatively smooth because the Eurosphere average is dominated by six nations whose 
macroeconomies are relatively synchronised.  
The first stage of enlargement is likely to see five of the ten new acceding member-states join 
the euro; Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The second wave, which 
would probably be more gradual, could see Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia 
sign up. In addition to these accepted at the Nice summit, Bulgaria, Bulgaria, and perhaps 
Turkey, are also expected to accede in the medium-term. The first additions would give the 
ECB a 23-vote polity (6 board plus 17 governors) thereby shifting the balance of the 
Executive Board plus the core economies over the less synchronised members from 72 
percent (6+7/18) to 56 percent (6+7/23). At this point, it becomes clear that not only would 
the balance of voting power shift under the existing structure, but also the asynchronicity of 
the ten countries may evaporate, and new sub-groupings of alliances emerge. For example, by 
voting together as a single cohort of ten they would only have to persuade two of the core 
voters to move with them in order to outvote the board. Or, a grouping of eight out of the ten, 
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say, of the faster-growing economies could collaborate against any potential increases in 
interest rates which may be favoured by the board to maintain the EU average inflation rate 
below the 2 percent target. The second stage of enlargement could swell euro membership to 
22 economies. This would then comprise 30 votes and, more significantly, move the balance 
of voting power away from the board core alliance to (6+7/30) to 43 percent. This advantages 
the ‘less synchronised’ economies to 57 percent of the votes, and enough therefore, in theory, 
to dictate interest rates. 
This image of a straightforward and transparent voting mechanism is, however, deceptive and 
does not, as Baldwin et al (2001) argue, allow for the complexities of ECB decision-making. 
Central to these complexities is ‘status quo bias’ and a brief consideration of this is relevant 
to the foregoing. In the light of the preference fluidity of members identified above, Baldwin 
et al (2001:35) suggests that the President, backed by the Executive Board, sets the agenda 
for decision-making meetings. Now, on the one hand, it is assumed that each member state 
knows its own ideal interest rate at any given moment, and it also knows that its ideal interest 
rate will change in the future. The Executive Board is interested in the Eurosphere average, 
so if the individual Eurosphere members have correctly calculated their ideal rates, the 
Board's ideal interest rate is a weighted average of member-states' ideal interest rates at any 
given time. On the other hand however, if the President and the Board chooses to propose a 
rate that they feel is more likely to win the vote, than a rate that is the ideal rate for 
Eurosphere, and that rate is only as close as the board feels it can get to the ideal, then it is 
feasible that it will not be the ideal rate for the major part of the Eurosphere economy in GDP 
terms, but may be the rate acceptable to the majority of voters.  
Although this illustration is used by Baldwin et al in support of an argument for ECB reform 
sooner rather than later, that is before enlargement, it is employed here to demonstrate how 
the constructivist approach allows a positioning of the ECB's policy strategy formulation 
between the 'thick end' of constructivism, where certain strategies are favoured by the 
institutional actors over others regardless of the actors themselves, and the 'thin end' where 
elements of neorealism may be identified through national bias in such strategy formulation. 
Of course, it can be argued that as  EU supranationalism increasingly overarches national 
preferences, policy and strategy formulations should commensurately become more socially 
constructive in nature, that is at the 'thick end' of constructivism and national bias will be 
gradually eroded, although not eliminated altogether.  
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The economics of ECB decision-making 
Among the criticisms aimed at ECB policy regarding interest rate setting, one of the most 
important, and one crucial in terms of enlargement, is the target band of 0 percent to 2 
percent that the ECB, since its inception, has focused nearly all its attention upon. De Grauwe 
(2002:697) argues that there are several reasons why the maximum (original emphasis) 
inflation target of 2 percent is too low. First, some economists believe that a little (modest) 
inflation is good for the economy because it provides an element of lubrication. This means 
that workers not only have the feel-good effect of seeing their wages rise, if only in line with 
retail prices, but that it allows for increased flexible adjustments in real wages, De Grauwe 
(2002:697). This lubrication, in turn, reduces the equilibrium level of unemployment, 
(Akerlof et al 2000). Some economic analysts have therefore called for a rate of inflation of 
2-3 percent a year. By keeping the inflation rate rigidly, at, or below, 2 percent, the ECB is 
increasing unnecessary rigidities in the economy by performing at below optimal level. It 
must, however be stressed that other economists argue that this money illusion effect of 
lubrication may well disappear in a new regime of low inflation where low rates of inflation 
will not need it. 
Another reason why the 0-2 percent band is too low is that the inflation rate is, or could be, 
pushed too close to zero. The current deflationary situation in Japan where prices are 
continuing to fall in a downward spiral is considered a much worse 'evil' than an upward 
movement in inflation. This is because there is so little room for central bank manoeuvre; 
Japan now has a 0 percent overnight rate and with deflation persisting can, obviously go no 
further with this policy instrument. De Grauwe (2002) also reasons that if the ECB is 
successful in pushing the inflation rate within the 0-2 percent band, it will be inevitable with 
an enlarged Eurosphere membership of 22 that this rate will be an average rate and as such 
inflation would drop below 0 percent in some countries. Moreover, if this were to happen it 
would be the existing low growth-low inflation countries that would be at greatest risk. This 
also brings sharply into focus the fact that the within the ten accession economies there are 
differing levels of relationships between inflation and growth, consider the analysis of, say, 
Poland and Cyprus in Figure 17 below. Both countries have grown at an average of 4.2 
percent a year over the 5 year period, however Poland's average inflation for the same period 
is 9.2 percent compared to 2.7 for Cyprus; over three times the rate. The obvious question is 
what can the ECB do to manage both of these divergent economies with so little room to 
manoeuvre? 
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The different growth-inflation profiles illustrated in Table 25 also introduce another concern: 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This is where less developed countries may experience, as are 
the EU enlargement countries, high productivity growth in their tradeable goods sector which 
generates a non-inflationary increase in wages which spreads to the less productive non-
traded goods sectors. This means that inflation, measured as it is by the ECB using the 
Harmonised Consumer Index of Prices (HCIP), will be higher again in the growth economies 
than in the more mature national economies, thereby compounding the existing differentials. 
A clear example can be found by comparing Hungary with the UK. As at the end of January 
2003 both economies were growing at 3.4 percent (The Economist, 18/1/03 pp.98-ten0) but 
Hungary’s consumer prices were rising at 4.8 percent, 2.53 times the 1.9 percent rate in the 
UK. Therefore, the ECB’s problem with such a narrow inflation target band is in danger of 
becoming exponentially compounded.  
The ECB’s perception of the relationship between monetary growth and inflation is also a 
concern to academics. The problem here is that the linear relationship between the two adopts 
varying properties between a grouping of 30 low inflation countries and a more universal 30-
country sample analysis. Again, De Grauwe (2002:705) argues the point by drawing attention 
to the contrast in the empirical evidence between the two samples using M1 monetary 
growth.  In the universal sample there is a clear correlation between M1 stock and inflation 
up to about 40 percent money growth and 30 percent inflation, and this is the basis upon 
which the ECB appears to focus in pillar one of its policy strategies. However, when a sample 
of 30 low-inflation countries is compared, it is very difficult to see any definable best fit 
correlation, although above 3 percent inflation and including a wide 0 percent to14 percent 
M1 growth band, there is a very approximate upward ‘scatter’. What is significant, and 
challenges the ECB policy line, is that below inflation of 3 percent at all M1 growths there is 
no correlation (See Figure 17 below). 
Finally, the ECB's record on inflation itself would suggest that the narrow band is both 
unrealistic and problematic. From January 1st 1999 until April 2002, the Eurosphere inflation 
pattern has fluctuated between 1.5 percent above and approximately 1.5 percent below the 
target of 2 percent, and has been outside the target band more than 60 percent of the time. 
These observations indicate that a more flexible target band of 2 percent as the mid-point, 
thereby allowing the 1.5 percent fluctuations already observable is a more realistic and 
credible strategy 
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Table 25 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Inflation and GDP growth in accession countries 1997-2002 
 
 Inflation Growth 
 97 98 99 00 01 Av
. 
02
* 
97 98 99 00 01 Av 02
* 
FEBEs               
Czech 
Rep 
8.0 9.7 1.8 3.9 4.5 5.6 3.2 -0.8 1.0 0.5 3.3 3.3 1.1 2.5 
Hungary 18.5 14.2 10.0 10.0 9.1 12.4 6.8 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 4.5 2.9 
Poland 15.0 11.8 7.2 10.1 5.3 9.9 3.1 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.1 4.2 0.5 
Slovakia 6.0 6.7 10.8 12.3 N/a N/a N/a 5.6 4.0 1.3 2.2 3.3 3.3 3.9 
Slovenia 8.3 7.9 6.1 8.9 8.6 8.0 7.8 4.6 3.8 5.2 4.6 3.0 4.2 2.2 
Average 11.6 10.1 7.2 9.0 6.9 9.0 5.3 4.2 3.3 3.1 3.9 2.9 3.5 2.4 
BCEEs               
Estonia 9.3 8.8 3.1 3.9 5.6 6.1 4.5 9.8 4.6 -0.6 7.1 5.0 5.2 3.2 
Latvia 8.1 4.3 2.1 2.6 2.5 3.9 2.8 8.4 4.8 2.8 6.8 7.7 6.6 3.8 
Lithuania 8.8 5.0 0.7 0.9 1.3 3.3 1.8 7.3 5.1 -3.9 3.8 5.9 3.6 4.5 
Average 8.7 6.0 2.0 2.5 3.1 4.4 3.0 8.5 4.8 0.6 5.9 6.2 5.0 3.8 
SIEs**               
Cyprus 3.3 2.3 1.1 4.9 2.0 2.7 2.3 2.4 5.0 4.6 5.1 4.0 4.2 2.9 
Malta 6.4 3.7 2.3 3.0 2.5 3.6 N/a 4.9 3.4 4.1 5.5 -0.8 3.4 1.4 
Average 4.8 3.5 1.7 4.0 2.3 3.1 2.3 3.7 .2 4.3 5.3 -1.6 3.8 2.2 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
    Source: constructed from data at www.europa.com 
 
Key: (FEBEs = Former Eastern Bloc Economies; BCEs = Baltic Country Economies; SIEs = 
Small Island  
Economies) ** = projected 
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Figure 17 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
               Inflation and money growth (1979-1999) average yearly changes (low inflation counties) 
 
 
        
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: adapted from De Grauwe (2002:704) 
 
The interface of the politics and economics of EU supranationality 
Both the political and economic positions outlined above suggest that effective supranational 
co-ordination of political and economic convergence could remain elusive. What appears to 
be emerging within the Eurosphere is that economic supranationality can have opposite, if not 
equal, political effects. In the case of the ECB, this is because individual national monetary 
policy preferences have been relinquished and subsumed by the central decision-making 
processes as described above. An illustration of this point can be found by examining the 
relationship between the monetary policy strategy of the ECB and the SGP (sometimes 
referred to as the ‘Pact’). Both were designed to bring about EU economic convergence, and 
given that 12 of the existing15 members share one currency and the same interest rate, it 
would be reasonable to suggest that the ECB is achieving its aims. Conversely, the SGP is 
emerging as an example of economic and political divergence. Economically, this is partly 
because of its developing inverse relationship with the constraints of the ECB's conservative 
monetary policy, and partly to do with member-states' relative fiscal autonomy. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
%
 in
fla
tio
n 
% growth 
178 
 
Paradoxically, ECB monetary policy is centred on stability, but it is the very restrictions of its 
policy strategy formations which force some members outside the boundaries of the Pact's 
narrow fiscal parameters, themselves imposed in the name of stability. Portugal, France, and 
Germany are the main current offenders. 
This is because the only room members feel they have for policy manoeuvre is to be found in 
any remaining, unfettered components of their autonomous fiscal policies. France and 
Germany, again offer a central illustration. Germany, the chief architect of the Pact, and 
originally a staunch disciplinarian of its imposition, is (again) on the verge of transgressing. 
Even more starkly, The Economist (August 25th 2001) argues that had the Pact been in 
operation for the last 15 years, both Germany and France would have been liable to pay fines 
to the EU on at least three occasions apiece. Moreover, Portugal has been outside the 3 
percent parameter for most of the time the ECB has been in control of monetary policy. 
France and Germany who join Portugal in 2001 and 2002 respectively in the sub-3 percent 
zone have also politically collaborated to protect each other from punitive action. And, the 
position of the Eurosphere average whilst remaining above the 3 percent demarcation line 
appears to be being sucked downwards towards the 'deficit zone' since late 2000. It may 
argued that this is unsurprising as France and Germany account for about half of the GDP of 
the Eurosphere. What may be surprising, pleasantly surprising to euro sceptics, is that the 
average balances for the three ex-Eurosphere economies. Denmark, Sweden and the UK have 
been below the target since 1996, and actually in surplus since 1997. In addition, the three 
Scandinavian countries, traditionally considered as 'social democracies', collectively have 
averaged a budget surplus of 2.58 percent since 1998. All of this could, of course, be 
challenged; most of the trends have been converging to within a projected band of between 
+2.0 percent and -3.0 percent in 2003 and 2004. However, although there is movement 
towards this band, the trajectories of all the 12 euro economies do not suggest a pattern of 
convergence, rather merely a narrowing of divergences. 
It is of major significance that these divergences can be aligned to an asymmetric interface 
between the politics and economics of an EU supranationality that has been, in part, created 
by disparate attempts to stabilise the political economy of the Eurosphere. This suggests that 
a more complex approach to this interface is required, and national preferences need to be 
considered in the light of experience since 1999.  
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Constructivist-neoinstitutionalism view of the Eurosphere as a political process   
Here, the political focus is on the way in which the institutional organisation of the 
Eurosphere conditions its operation and shapes political outcomes (Bulmer 1994; Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Armstrong and Bulmer 1998). From a macro-political perspective the 
Eurosphere's institutional organisation structures access to policy, privileging some 
interests over others; for example, empowering technocrats in Greece and Italy to 
pursue domestic reforms. It also provides internal incentives for policy change that 
influence a specific bias to that change, notably to embrace fiscal discipline and structural 
economic reforms. Moreover, it constitutes the self-images and identities of the key 
actors, who internalise Eurosphere-wide perspectives on issues. Finally, it helps 
solve their collective-action problems by internalising and melding collective interests 
and identities. 
In terms of the micro-political perspective, up until now, historical, social and cultural 
factors have illustrated the structured operation of the Eurosphere and influenced the 
motives of its leading decision-makers so that they seek to ground their behaviour in 
widely-shared and institutionalized principles. This communal approach to 
understanding the role of institutions has, however, found little favour with those, like 
rational-choice theorists, whose approach is more strongly rooted in realism. Realists, 
whether collective-minded or strongly individualist in perspective, do not see behaviour 
as conditioned by the moral motive of defensibility in terms of general principles 
enshrined in institutions. They reject the notion that actors are driven by a notion of 
impartiality in favour of the motivating power of individual self-interest and the search 
for mutual advantage (Barry, 1989; 1995). In their view, these motives play the central 
role in how choices are made within institutional structures and how these structures 
are reproduced and transformed takes on board the constitutive effects of institutional 
structures. However, notwithstanding any extreme realist influence on the internal 
politics of the Eurosphere, it is important to reflect on the Eurosphere as a collective-
action problem, as well as a monitoring and compliance mechanism. 
The question remains as to what extent the Eurosphere will display a capacity for self-
reflection and learning about what it needs to do, and for institutional and policy 
reforms to ensure its viability. This capacity is more likely to thrive in a culture of 
multilateral action and collective interest and identity. Such a culture has a much 
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better than average chance of thriving in an EU context of deepening economic 
interdependence, growing convergence, abiding historical memories of a collective 
security problem, and mutual self-restraint. The Eurosphere is itself a force in helping 
to secure such a culture. Therefore, there are strong grounds for stressing the 
explanatory power of sociological neoinstitutionalism and historic neoinstitutionalism. 
The ECB and the member-states are in the process of advancing a culture of co-
operation, not simply of a blind following of rules. What is of central importance is the 
nature of the social and political theory that underpins the operation of the 
Eurosphere, and the wider EU of which it is a part (Wendt 1999) 
Constructivist-neoinstitutionalist perspective of the Eurosphere as a path-dependent 
process 
The operational mechanics of the Eurosphere can be seen as being enmeshed in a 
particular path of historical development, and therefore subject to historical 
neoinstitutionalism. In turn, this path dependency is anchored in institutional 
organisation which embodies and reinforces certain social preferences and structures 
how actors respond to challenges (see, for example, Collins, 1980; Fioretes, 2001; 
Jenkins, 2004; Galbraith, 1991). Consequently, change takes on a path-dependent 
quality, with decision-makers and other actors locked into a particular trajectory of 
development that disallows some possibilities while creating a bias in favour of others. 
Administrations in such areas as taxation, labour-market, and welfare-state provision 
illustrate this tendency, and the consequent structural problems of compatibility 
within the Eurosphere (Boyer 2000; Ishikawa 1999). This constraining effect can be 
traced back to a past critical juncture when crisis threw into bold relief the failure of pre-
existing ideas and institutional mechanisms to tackle urgent problems. At such 
moments an opportunity is opened for new ideas to enter into policy discourse and to 
eventually become institutionalized (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Seeing the Eurosphere in path-dependent terms draws attention to the continuity between 
the EMS (1979-98) and the Eurosphere (1999-2006). The Eurosphere represents an 
institutional restructuring of an existing policy network whose main business was managing 
the EMS. The EMS was born out of the perceived urgency of the problems of economic 
instability in Europe caused by volatility of the US dollar, which since the demise of the 
Bretton Woods system in 1973 had failed to provide a financial anchor for Europe, and by 
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high and wildly varying inflation rates in Europe. Its evolution as a mechanism to promote 
sound money policies19 was further reinforced by the outcome of the ERM crisis of March 
1983 which focused on the French franc (Dyson 1994). The EMS acted as a socialisation 
mechanism through which sound money ideas were diffused; whilst Germany via its 
Bundesbank provided the template that other states used (Marcussen 1998). The 
Eurosphere was negotiated, in most of its key essentials, within the EMS policy network. 
Hence there was more a gradual transfer rather than just a new beginning in 1999. The US 
dollar crisis of 1977-1978, the second oil crisis in 1979-1980, and the ERM crisis of 1983 
were all part of the justification of the Eurosphere. They underpinned the definition of the 
central problems of inflation and economic instability, and therefore, underwrote the power 
of EU central bankers within the operation of the Eurosphere. As a consequence, there was 
a bias in policy development towards sound money ideas which were broadly based on 
monetary theory. An ECB-centric Eurosphere confirmed that bias. There was a formal 
commitment to policies consistent with its definition of price stability, and 
commensurately designed to enhance the credibility of associated decision-making. 
From this generally-political perspective it might take another critical issue to move the 
Eurosphere on to a different trajectory of historical development. The catalyst might be a 
major financial crisis in the US or in an emerging economy such as China, and a 
subsequent deflationary spiral. In this context co-ordinated, demand-management 
policies would gain a new urgency and credibility. The price of such a new trajectory of 
development would be a movement of power away from both the central bankers and 
some monetary economists, and towards an institutional restructuring of the Eurosphere 
for this purpose. It would take state-led action, based on redefined national preferences, to 
make that reconstruction possible and its outcome would be a Eurosphere that was 
possibly no longer ECB-centric. For such a strategy of reform to succeed, Germany would, 
no doubt, have to be part of the leader group. 
The path-dependent nature of the Eurosphere also has implications for the kinds of 
strategies adopted by stakeholders who may be dissatisfied with its consequences. The 
underpinning power of the ECB led some governments and labour-market institutions 
away from strategies that were ultimately and directly subject to its power. So, the 
negotiation of the European Employment Pact in 1999 took on both a practical and 
                                                 
19 Arguably, always the underpinning driver of the ECB’s Bundesbank-influenced strategic management of the 
Eurosphere 
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representative importance; the Employment and Labour Market Committee was 
put in place by the Amsterdam European Council in 1997 to offer an alternative 
institutional channel through which strategy and ideas could develop; and an effort was 
made to give the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment, 
Industrial Relations and Social Affairs a new role in the operation of the Eurosphere. 
The Eurosphere as an institution of cultural process  
A central aspect of the operation of the Eurosphere is the way in which its institutional 
organisation provides the cultural-frames of meaning guiding action. The Eurosphere 
involves more than just making rules about fiscal and monetary policies and procedures 
for monitoring economic performance. More importantly, its institutional organisation 
represents culturally-constructed conceptions of these policies, which are based on shared 
attitudes and values. A particular set of associated symbols are broadcast through the 
Economic and Financial Committee, and have their point of reference set within the ECB. 
From participation in the ECB and in the Economic and Financial Committee actors 
acquire a framework of meaning in terms of which they can make sense of policy and 
help define their policy preferences. 
The notion of the morality of sound money is undoubtedly provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, whose pronouncements on monetary and other policies continue to carry an 
authority denied to others well after it lost its own monetary policy sovereignty. In 
essence, realistic comparison between the ECB and the Bundesbank are, at times, often 
quite difficult, and at others impossible because of what Radaelli (1999) describes as 
‘institutional isomorphism’. Other EU national monetary authorities began to follow 
the Bundesbank well before the Eurosphere was created. They sought to copy its real, 
or perceived, superior policy performance, and to demonstrate a stronger role and status 
for themselves. Much of this can also be traced to the Bundesbank’s emphasis on a long-
term orientation for monetary policy, and on making the euro an anchor for stability. 
Moreover, the need for central bank neutrality and independence is often stressed. Both the 
Bundesbank before, and the ECB after the euro, fiercely defended a ‘de-politicised money’ 
meaning that money must be kept as much as possible away from daily political 
influences, short-term calculations, and financial and economic fashion, as well as 
from political compromises (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999b). The choice of monetary 
policy instruments of the ECB, notably the privilege given to monetary aggregates over 
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direct inflation targeting, involves more than just calculations of effectiveness. It is also 
demonstrates an ongoing continuity with the Bundesbank.  
Actors also achieved both a new image and identity from participation in the 
institutional organisation of the Eurosphere; especially within the ECB. There has 
been heightened sense of policy-making for the Eurosphere as a whole. This altered self-
image involved taking on board the implications of the structural characteristics of the 
Eurosphere as an entity and making policy on the basis of new aggregate data about 
prices, money supply, bond yields, savings and investment, trade, and so forth. There 
are consequences for the way in which preferences are formed. No longer is EU data 
nested within interpretations of national data. National data is now nested within 
Eurosphere aggregates, altering the way in which preferences express themselves. 
Actors have to adjust to defining their preferences and expressing their identity in new 
socially appropriate ways. 
A key part of the problems of establishing employment policy to complement the Stability 
and Growth Pact is the lack of clear agreement about the appropriate template from 
which lessons can be drawn. The British government pointed to the superior job-creation 
record of the US in the 1990s as legitimization for following the US model. Others, led 
by the Jospin government in France, sought to construct a new EU policy based on the 
European model of society, a catalytic role for the state in the formation of ideas and 
organisation of co-operation, and controlled globalization. For Jospin (1999) the 
priorities were a European social dialogue, a European charter of civic, economic and 
social rights, collective bargaining on the European level, and fleshing out the services 
of general economic interest recognized in the Treaty of Amsterdam as an area for job 
creation. 
But it was unclear who could provide an appropriate model that demonstrated how the 
European model of society could work. Sweden’s active labour-market policy seemed a 
possibility, not least as the European Commission Director-General of Social Affairs, 
Allan Larson, was Swedish. Its job-creation record was not, however a convincing basis for 
its claim to act as the template for EU employment policy. The neocorporatist practices 
of the Polder model, developed in the Netherlands under the government of Wim Kok, 
offered a more convincing template However, there were formidable institutional, 
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historical and cultural problems in transferring that model elsewhere, notably to France 
and the UK. 
The Eurosphere as an evolving social process  
How the Eurosphere operates, and the kinds of policies that it pursues, are also 
conditioned by the logic of social appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989; Hall and 
Taylor 1996). There is an inbuilt sense of what affords legitimacy that affects discourse 
and the kinds of proposals that are likely to be adopted. The institutional organisation of 
the Eurosphere is not simply to be understood in terms of a functional response to the 
challenge presented by global financial markets and the scale of capital mobility. It 
embodies a discourse about economic and monetary policies amongst a professional 
group schooled in monetary policy that has come to possess a cultural authority, and to 
shape the form that globalization has taken. This discourse is about policy credibility 
and reputation, about modernization of labour markets and the welfare state, and about 
economic restructuring. Its central reference point is provided by the grafting of the 
concept of globalization on to a neoliberal conception of the euro. Defending policies 
consistent with this agenda becomes associated with validation for the actors concerned 
and achieving perceived legitimacy. 
The operation of the Eurosphere became characterised by a particular type of cultural 
authority that accepted the concepts of globalisation, modernization, restructuring, 
credibility, and reputation. This development was bound up in a wider process. 
Externally, the ECB-centric nature of the Eurosphere was offered intellectual, social 
and political support by the IMF, G7, the OECD, the Bank for International 
Settlements, the US government, and transnational corporations. They shared the same 
discourse about appropriate institutional practices, favouring fiscal discipline and 
radical neoliberal reforms to labour markets and welfare states as the basis for a relaxed 
monetary policy. The ECB-centric operation of the Eurosphere can be seen as validated 
by as the hegemonic bloc in the international political economy, in the face of which 
the state has been under unrelenting pressure to redefine its role. That role was in 
facilitating the adjustment of domestic interests to the new global economic order 
rather than in defending those interests from external disturbances and in regulating 
world capitalism in the manner sought by Jospin (Cox 1987; Held 1995). From this 
perspective, the Eurosphere represented an institutionalized form of permanent 
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economic policy revolution that was led by policy professionals, especially Americans, 
British, and central bankers Dyson, (2000). They defined the terms of discourse and 
judgements about social appropriateness and were concerned to reform domestic 
policy agendas on a neoliberal basis.  
The performance of the ECB 
Finally in this section, the performativity of the ECB’s management of the Eurosphere is 
evaluated by empirical comparisons with selected national economies. Japan and the US are 
used as the world’s two largest economies against which the EU effectively will compete 
with on a number of fronts. Denmark, Sweden, and the UK comprise the three national 
capitalisms identified as non-Eurosphere EU members in the previous chapter, and against 
which the Eurosphere’s performance may be measured from an internal EU perspective.  
The longitudinal time series analyses and the statistical testing of selected datasets in Chapter 
4, appear to suggest that the advent of the euro under the control of the ECB has made some 
noticeable differences to some of the typologies of national capitalisms, and against some of 
the criteria chosen. Conversely, it must be also be acknowledged that certain levels of 
convergences would be expected, especially when pre-euro convergence criteria and the SGP 
constraints are taken into account; and that reservations about whether we can proclaim 
convergences on all the criteria, when it is arguable that it is alternatively only a narrowing of 
divergences that may be the case, must remain.  Moreover, because these analyses are 
effectively intra-EU measurements, and as such designed to consider the effect of the euro 
and ECB’s supranational management of the Eurosphere on EU national capitalisms alone, in 
order to meaningfully assess the ECB’s wider performance external comparisons are also 
needed. Here, four criteria are employed with the purpose of establishing not only the extent 
to which the ECB can be seen as a success set against its own objectives, but also whether 
there can be seen an increase in the overall well-offness of Eurosphere members’ citizens, 
and therefore any meaningful attempt to address the central problem of asymmetric 
distributions of real wealth.  
 The ECB, and therefore the Eurosphere, has been organised around a single policy focus; 
that of monetary stability. All other economic objectives are of secondary, ancilliary, or 
limited importance. This policy stance is justified by the neoclassical understanding of how a 
national economy functions. The ECB publication of 2004, The monetary policy of the ECB, 
outlines the benefits of price stability. 
186 
 
Maintaining price stability makes it easier for people to recognise changes in relative prices 
because these changes are not clouded by movements in overall price levels. This allows 
firms and consumers to make better informed decisions about consumption and investment. 
Moreover, it assists markets to allocate resources more efficiently, because they can guide  
resources to where they can be used most productively, and therefore raising the potential for 
increased productivity and growth. For investors, they can be assured that prices will remain 
stable in future and will not expect an inflation risk premium in order to compensate them for 
risks associated with holding assets over the longer term. Therefore the risk premia that are in 
the real interest rate are reduced and monetary policy can contribute to the allocative 
efficiency of capital markets, and thereby increase the incentives to invest. And, in turn, this 
fosters economic welfare. Price stability also makes it less likely that firms and consumers 
will move resources from productive use in order to hedge against inflation. Where there is 
rising inflation there is the incentive to stock real goods as they are seen to retain better value 
than money or financial assets (virtual money). This hinders economic growth. Taxation and 
associated welfare systems can also foster unhelpful incentives that distort economic 
behaviour in inflationary (or deflationary) periods. Price stability is believed to eliminate 
these distortions. And, maintaining price stability prevents the considerable and arbitrary 
redistribution of income and wealth. An economic environment that offers stable prices 
therefore helps to maintain social cohesion and stability. Recent 20thcentury history has 
shown many times where high rates of inflation or deflation tend to create social and political 
unrest (2004:42). 
With this single policy focus and the accompanying pronounced set of economic benefits 
posited as its justification, there are ready-made criteria against which to measure ECB’s 
performance. For this purpose, four macroeconomic variables are selected; three of which, 
inflation, unemployment, and industrial production, were used in the empirical analysis of the 
previous chapter, with the addition of long-term interest rates, as related by ten-year 
government bonds. Inflation offers the direct and immediate opportunity to assess ECB’s 
performance in keeping to its published (and often criticised) price stability, low positive 
inflation target of below 2 percent20. Unemployment and industrial production rates afford 
both an opportunity to assess the medium-term progress towards increased wealth and 
welfare, and to adjudge this against the above-stated benefit of ‘assisting markets to allocate 
                                                 
20 In May 2003, The Governing Council of the ECB defined price stability, as measured by the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), to maintain inflation rates below but close to 2% over the medium-term. 
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resources more efficiently…therefore raising the potential for increased productivity and 
growth’ (ECB, 2004:42). Long-term interest rates are included here to evaluate whether 
ECB’s assertion that ‘enables firms and consumers to make better informed decisions on 
consumption and investment’ (Scheller, 2004:46). Taken together, these measurements may 
also be used in order to present a wider assessment of the overarching benefit offered by ECB 
in defence of maintaining price stability above all other economic objectives. Now, bringing 
together the economic and political rationalisation for the single focus on price stability, the 
ECB’s monetary policy publication states… 
Maintaining price stability prevents the considerable and arbitrary redistribution of 
wealth and income that arises in both inflationary and deflationary environments. 
An environment of stable prices therefore helps to maintain social cohesion and 
stability. Several cases in the twentieth century have shown that high rates of 
inflation or deflation tend to create social and political instability (2004:42) 
The above indicators are examined here quarterly over the period 2001 to 2006, and set 
against similar metrics for Denmark, Japan, Sweden, the UK, and the US, and illustrated 
graphically in Figures 18, 19, 20, and 21below. 
 Starting with inflation in Figure 18, the first thing to note here is that the Eurosphere has 
largely failed in its prime objective of maintaining prices positively below the published 2 
percent threshold. Of the 24 quarters measured 18 (75 percent) were above, with two more on 
the threshold. The overall mean for the six year period is 2.2 percent, which is higher than all 
the other economies excepting that of the US (2.7 percent). Moreover, all those countries 
below the threshold have themselves maintained price stability at the prescribed ECB level, 
although with variously differing policy priorities and objectives. Nonetheless, it should also 
be acknowledged that if the ECB’s stability threshold had been more realistic, perhaps in line 
with De Grauwe (2002) above and associated observations, even to say 3 percent, would have 
demonstrated the desired price stability. Furthermore, it is also clearly visible that the 
positivity aspect of the equation has comfortably held; with the lowest quarterly reading at 
1.6 percent. And, of the five comparator countries Japan, Sweden, and the US, all show much 
more volatility, even though Japan and Sweden maintain a lower average over the period. 
This leaves Denmark and the UK, two EU ex-Eurosphere economies, closer to the stability 
prescribed by the ECB  
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Figure 18 
________________________________________________________________ 
Consumer prices in selected countries compared to Eurosphere 2001-2006 
 
 
________________________________________________________________Source: 
primary (Raw data collected from weekly editions of The Economist 2000-2006) 
 
In terms of unemployment (See Figure 19 below), there appears to be a stark contrast 
between the Eurosphere’s performance and the other five economies (See Appendix 2). 
Ranging between 7.7 percent and 9.0 percent, the mean figure is 8.5 percent compared to 5.2 
percent for the comparison countries – a relative difference of 63 percent. A first impression 
here would be one of major concern; but there is much more to consider. Firstly, it should be 
remembered that this measurement is an average of 12 economies with significantly differing 
economic profiles and structures, and although the ECB has been set up to improve job 
prospects and overall well-being, synthesising so many national capitalisms in this regard is 
far more complex and complicated than price stability – even though the ECB believes they 
are closely related. So what is the underlying picture? Firstly, looking at the contributing 
factors to the overall average, there is a considerable range of measurements. With Austria 
and the Netherlands averaging 4.5 percent and 4.7 percent respectively, and Belgium and 
Spain at 12.4 percent and 10.4 percent respectively, this ‘spread’ may be considered as a 
mitigating factor in the analysis. That is until the three largest Eurosphere economies are also 
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considered. Germany, ten.5 percent, France, 9.4 percent, and Italy at 8.3 percent averages for 
the period, all towards the higher end of the range seems to confirm that unemployment 
remains a major problem for, and asks questions of, both the ECB’s overall management and 
the single focus on price stability. These issues are brought sharply into focus when it is 
considered that the five comparator economies, also widely and variously differing in profile 
and structure, appear to have controlled unemployment to within a narrow band of between 
4.8 percent (Japan) and 5.7 percent (US), again without necessarily privileging price stability 
over all other economic objectives. 
 
 
 
Figure 19 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Unemployment – Eurosphere compared to selected economies 2001-2006 
 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary (Raw data collected from weekly editions of The Economist 2000-2006) 
 
If there is anything positive regarding the overall analysis here, it is that from the second 
quarter of 2006, the Eurosphere unemployment rate drops below 8 percent for the first time, 
and perhaps portends a new downward trajectory. However, after seven years of ECB 
control, it is difficult to see the overall Eurosphere employment situation improving for some 
time; and that again, the single focus on price stability appears to be problematic. 
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The ECB strongly emphasises a direct relationship between its policy focus on price stability 
and productivity as below. 
Price stability makes it easier for people to recognise changes in relative prices 
since such changes are not obscured by fluctuations in the overall price level. This 
enables firms and consumers to make better-informed decisions on consumption 
and investment. This in turn allows the market to allocate resources more 
efficiently. By helping the market to guide resources to where they can be used 
most productively, price stability raises the productive potential of the economy 
(ECB, 2004:42) 
However, economists may differ as to the direct influence on production as a result of price 
stability. Firstly, there must always be a time lag between when a level of price stability is 
achieved and any returning confidence for consumers to begin demanding more goods and 
services. When that happens there will need to be an adjustment period where firms make 
decisions not only about how much to produce, but also to decide between increased volumes 
of previous production lines, reduced volumes of new products, or retrenchment to cautious 
levels pending an extended stable period. Secondly, required levels of production often 
depend on relationships outside the Eurosphere, even though there are increasing amounts of 
intra-EU trade. As the above quote says price stability only can raise the productive potential 
of the economy, and not necessarily its actual production. 
Additionally, the ECB introduces the logic of hedging in relation to production. 
The credible maintenance of price stability also makes it less likely that 
individuals and firms will divert resources from productive uses to hedge against 
inflation. For example, in a high inflation environment there is an incentive to 
stockpile real goods since they retain their value better than money or other 
financial assets in such circumstances. However, stockpiling goods is not an 
efficient investment decision, and therefore hinders economic growth (Scheller, 
2004:46) 
Figure 20 below shows the industrial production trends for the Eurosphere and five 
comparator countries. By comparison to consumer prices and unemployment, the pattern here 
is somewhat different; characterised by two temporal stages, and a narrowing and gently 
rising spread of outcomes, although most striking is that all the economies have spent 
considerable time in negative production output situations. 
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Figure 20 
________________________________________________________________ 
Industrial production – Eurosphere compared to selected economies 2001-2006 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary (Raw data collected from weekly editions of The Economist 2000-2006) 
 
The first temporal stage from 2001 until around the middle of 2004 depicts a more volatile 
phase for all the economies, especially Japan. From 2004 there is a narrowing of the spread of 
production levels, but with just the Eurosphere and the US maintaining positive outcomes. 
This, for the Eurosphere shows some promise, especially as major economies France and 
Germany with six-year averages of (0.4 percent) (0.5 percent) respectively, are not the main 
contributors to the overall performance. The overall average for all six economies is 0.7 
percent, and the range is -1.4 percent to 2.2 percent with the Eurosphere at 0.7 percent, and so 
mirroring the average for all the countries. And, there is the further encouraging trend of the 
Eurosphere maintaining positive output for most of the period of analysis. However, it should 
also be noted that the Eurosphere average output representing a middle trendline for the 
group may indicate a level of production dependence on the other countries, perhaps 
especially the US. 
Long-term interest rates represented here by ten-year government bond returns illustrates 
overall confidence in individual economies, where lowering returns reflect increasing 
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
annual  
% 
Denmark
Eurosphere
Japan
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
192 
 
confidence from outside investors. Figure 21 shows the longitudinal pattern for the six 
economies. 
Figure 21 
_______________________________________________________________ 
10-year government bond returns – Eurosphere compared to selected economies 2001-2006 
 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary (Raw data collected from weekly editions of The Economist 2000-2006) 
 
With Japan an obviously outlier, confidence levels for the remaining economies follow very 
similar downward trajectories from 2001 until 2005, when three upward and levelling trends 
emerge: the UK and US together within the 4 percent to 5 percent band; and similarly the 
Eurosphere with Denmark and Sweden shadowing each other in the 3 percent to 4 percent 
zone; and Japan vacillating around 1 percent. From an ECB and Eurosphere outlook this is 
both positive and encouraging, and points to a level of stability in this area, at least in terms 
of external confidence in potential investment. And, in sharp contrast to the unemployment 
analysis, the Eurosphere is outperforming the US. The extent to which this level of 
confidence, that also suggests international support for the euro, can be maintained, will be of 
central importance to the overall level of success the ECB can accredited with in future. 
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Has the ECB been a success?  
The answer to this question of course depends on two things: what is meant by success, and 
how it can be measured? The preceding discussions can be seen to relate to four aspects of 
the ECB’s history to date: its planning and evolution; the political and economic challenges it 
faces; the unfolding evolutionary processes that have emerged; and its economic performance 
relative to price stability. 
 In terms of planning and evolution, that a level of EMU was achieved in order that the ECB 
could be established must be seen as a constructivist-institutionalism success, if for no other 
reason that it was established in the first place. Over 30 years of planning characterised by the 
realisation of ideas through discourse, policy deliberation and delivery, and significant 
temporal setbacks, bear witness to this. The bringing together of 12 largely disparate national 
capitalisms to form the Eurosphere is an extraordinary achievement, and one which makes 
the ECB unique. Only the Federal Reserve in the US could be considered as anywhere near 
comparable in size or importance. Moreover, the smooth transition of national currencies, 
exchange rates, and interests rates was accomplished without major difficulty. Even allowing 
that complete EU economic integration remains elusive, and any further political integration 
appears more a forlorn hope than a realistic target, the ECB has firmly established itself as 
the head of the Eurosphere, and the euro has become one of the world’s leading currencies. 
It is also fair to say that a seven-year timeframe is a relatively short period of time from 
which to make any lasting assessment of the ECB overall. Nevertheless, it seems highly 
likely that it will prevail, at least in the foreseeable future. And, even though it is not hard to 
imagine a situation where one or more member-states may leave the Eurosphere, or the EU 
for that matter, it is very difficult to envisage the complete breakdown of the Eurosphere, and 
even if this could be foreseen, how could it feasibly be managed; and, what would be the 
aftermath. 
In the medium-term there is also the prospect of the newly-enlarged EU to encompass a 
significantly expanded Eurosphere, with all ten new acceding countries on signing up only on 
condition of adapting the single currency. While the scale and scope of this expansion brings 
its own problems for the ECB as discussed above, the very willingness to join and take 
advantage of the perceived benefits of membership of the Eurosphere for those countries also 
can be viewed as a major achievement. 
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However, all the positive aspects of the ECB’s creation and establishment, there are clear 
problems with both its management and performance of the Eurosphere. The first of these 
concerns the rationale for, and rigidity of, price stability as a single policy focus, and as such 
against which the ECB should be primarily assessed. The ECB’s narrow target of maintaining 
a price level positively below or near to 2 percent has clearly failed, with the Eurosphere 
being outside of these parameters for 75 percent of the six years under review. This is the 
result of following the strict monetary stance which was the legacy of the Bundesbank upon 
which the ECB has been modelled (See pages 183-186).   
The Eurosphere’s record on unemployment is also a major concern, and will no doubt 
generate political spillover and social unrest in a number of member countries unless more 
jobs are created in the future. Indeed, the mass publics of the EU have been sold on the idea 
of economic and monetary union as being essential to growth and prosperity, which are not 
yet being realised overall. And although growth and productivity trends… from an internal 
EU perspective are…ECB’s overall comparative performance must be questioned, and as it 
has been often emphasised in the discussions so far, the major problem for the ECB and the 
Eurosphere is that the neoclassical understanding of the function of national capitalisms is 
privileged, and worryingly so given that this monocular view of capitalism will almost 
certainly lead to major crises in the future, as has been episodically witnessed in the past.  
In Chapter 2, the ideas and proposals for understanding national capitalisms in a different 
way were introduced. And, in the earlier passages of this chapter, economic questions have 
been raised about ECB policy setting, and political issues have highlighted regarding 
enlargement. In the next chapter, these arguments are further advanced, together with 
suggestions as to how the ECB needs to reconsider its understanding of how national 
economies actually work, and in the light of this to undergo the necessary reforms for the 
Eurosphere to succeed in the medium-term.  
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Chapter 6  A monetary production model for the Eurosphere 
Overview 
Following on from Chapter 2 where a constructivist-neoinstitutionalism approach was 
introduced as analytical framework for considering the concept of the ECB and Eurosphere 
as a potential supracapitalism, the following passages in this section focus on the further 
development of heterodox considerations of EU national capitalisms as a foundation for such 
a trajectory. In Chapter 3 three variants of neoinstitutionalism were advanced, together with 
the Wendt’s ‘Eclectic’, thin constructivism together with Ben Rosamond’s’ European 
Economy as a Space’ constructivism in order to capture political science and international 
relations perspectives. Here, the purpose is to further develop the challenge to the 
neoclassical view of the function of EU national capitalisms and argue that ECB and the 
Eurosphere can only deliver an EU supracapitalism if the heterodox view of understanding 
and managing national capitalisms is adopted via the monetary production model. In doing 
so, a third constructivist position, that of Hacking’s ‘Social Constructivism’ under the guise 
of social interaction, is introduced to embed the idea that it is non-rational behaviour between 
economic actors that shape national capitalisms, as opposed to the neoclassical view that all 
actors within an economy are rational choice utility optimisers. And, the role of money as 
being a central endogenous feature of national economies is further advanced through an 
examination of alternative theories as to its form and function in order to offer a monetary 
circuit version of how the ECB may facilitate the development of an EU supracapitalism. 
The money production model challenge  
Neoclassical theory assumes that all economic activity is bounded within a market theoretic 
context of behaviour. In this way it bounds neoclassical theory into the ‘allocation-
misallocation duality’ (Gerrard, 1989:38). In this view, all observed economic outcomes are 
seen to fall into one of two mutually-exclusive categories: perfect allocative equilibrium or 
imperfect allocative equilibrium; with imperfect allocative equilibrium being a misallocation 
of resources owing to the existence of either informational or structural imperfections, or 
both. The suggestion here seems to be that it is only the market-theoretic view that represents 
‘real’ economic behaviour, with monetary flows only playing a subordinate role in function 
determining real variables when the exchange economy falls into disequilibrium. The 
monetary sector is treated as a discrete entity within which the demand for money equals the 
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supply of money, and is therefore a purely automatic and self-balancing allocative 
mechanism. The view that money is non-essential is one of the most important limitations to 
the neoclassical understanding of national capitalisms. In a monetary production economy 
however, economic behaviour is taken to manifest itself within a monetary context. 
My argument here follows one particular path towards a more general heterodox, 
understanding of economic phenomena.  The point of departure is the notion that the 
monetary dynamics of a national capitalism significantly affect the nature of behaviour 
patterns of firms and households.  In this way a national capitalism is characterised by the 
production of commodities in a ‘monetised’ economy. The conjunction of these 
characteristics creates a monetary production economy in which the behaviour patterns of 
firms and households differ in significant ways from those to be found in a market exchange 
economy. And, it is this fundamental assumption which allows us to consider the equally 
important role of non-allocative modes of activity. 
Neoclassical theory presupposes that all economic activity takes place within the market-
theoretic context of behaviour.  The market-theoretic assumption locks neoclassical theory 
into the duality of allocation-misallocation.  All observed outcomes fall into one of two 
mutually-exclusive categories of perfect allocative equilibrium and imperfect allocative 
equilibrium; the latter being cases of misallocation caused by the existence of structural 
and/or informational imperfections.  All observed outcomes are either perfect allocative 
equilibrium or cases of misallocation, and neoclassical theory allows for no other type of 
outcome.  This places severe limitations on the potential range of reactions and remedies 
which can be provided by economists and politicians working within that frame of reference. 
The market-theoretic assumption carries with it the implication that classical theory is the 
economics of ‘real’ behaviour.  Neoclassical theory is a theory of a national economy in 
which behaviour is ‘real-focused’ (Gerard, 1989) in the sense that agents are only concerned 
with the exchange of commodities.  In a market exchange economy, monetary flows are 
purely the result of the underlying stock-adjustment processes that follow such exchanges of 
commodities; and in this way, neoclassical theory adopts a reductionist approach in relation 
to monetary flows.  Monetary flows merely represent price multiplied by quantity.  They play 
no active role in determining the position of equilibrium in real terms.  Monetary flows are 
seen to play a significant role only in determining real variables during the process of money-
price adjustments when the exchange economy is in disequilibrium.  Apart from this, money 
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is not considered to be an essential element in a market exchange economy.  It is merely a 
commodity demanded for transactions and asset valuation purposes, as in my notion of 
virtual wealth compared to real wealth. The monetary sector is treated as a separable entity, 
perhaps running parallel to the real economy, in which an allocative process ensures that any 
given demand for money equals the same automatic supply of money, in a sort of 
coterminous relationship. 
Therefore, the neoclassical acceptance that money is non-essential is one of the most 
fundamental limitations which the neoclassical frame of reference imposes on the theoretical 
conception of economic behaviour, and the restrictive nature of the market-theoretic 
assumption has to be recognised.  But in recognising the existence of this crucial constraint 
inherent in orthodox economic thought, it follows that neoclassical theory, as a whole, must 
be rejected as an adequate theoretical foundation for the study of all aspects of economic 
behaviour in general, and the national capitalisms of the EU in particular. Within a monetary 
production economy, all economic behaviour takes place within a monetary context, this 
emplaces the ECB at the centre of the proposed EU supracapitalism; and also means the 
implications of the monetary context of behaviour must therefore be investigated.  The core 
proposition here is that the monetary context of behaviour leads to non-allocative modes of 
activity as well as allocative modes of behaviour, but which are qualitatively different from 
them.   
The proposed move from the neoclassical theory of a market exchange economy to the non-
neoclassical theory of a monetary production economy demands the rejection of the choice-
theoretic assumption.  Neoclassical theory treats all economic behaviour as the result of 
optimising choices by rational agents operating within the context of a market exchange 
economy.  Rationality is the fundamental law of order within the world of neoclassical 
theory; and is the single all-embracing principle of economic behaviour.  From the 
perspective of neoclassical theory, non-rational behaviour is, by definition, non-economic 
behaviour. This is a strange position to hold when you consider that large swathes of 
consumer and business buying decisions are made emotionally and irrationally by human 
beings, and that modern marketing and advertising techniques and campaigns are predicated 
of such irrationality; the now prevalent ‘impulse buy’ being one example. 
An alternative perspective to the choice-theoretic assumption is provided by the socially-
interactive approach.  In the socially-interactive approach, firms and households are not 
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treated as rational agents able to use their available information so as to optimise 
consumption with respect to well-defined and pre-determined goals.  Rather, firms and 
households are viewed as adopting decision rules which are considered to be appropriate in 
the circumstances, but variable in the sense that such rules may be revised in the light of past 
experiences or the acquisition of new information.  The behaviours of the agents change in 
the light of the circumstances and economic conditions in which they find themselves, and in 
this way context will play a crucial role in determining the decision-making mechanisms used 
by firms and households.  The socially-interactive approach therefore allows for the 
possibility that the monetary context can have a significant effect on the behaviour.  
Therefore, the adoption of the socially-interactive approach is a necessary element, albeit an 
implicit one, in the development of the theory of a monetary production economy. 
The adoption of this alternative approach suggests a method of analysis, or analyses, in which 
all theoretical models must be constructed using socially-interactive assumptions which 
should be an acceptable and realistic approximation to the observed behaviour patterns under 
investigation.  Given realistic assumptions about observed behaviour patterns, the theoretical 
economist may pose two different types of question.  The first type of question is to ask why 
particular agents adopt particular behaviour patterns under specific circumstances.  This 
backward-looking question takes the observer into the realms of psychology and organisation 
theory; subject fields with much to say on the decision-making processes of individuals and 
organisations.  There should be no reductionist assumption that all observed behaviour can be 
ultimately explained in terms of one, all-embracing principle.  The second theoretical 
question pursued within the socially-interactive approach is the forward-looking question as 
to the implications of the observed behaviour patterns.  This involves observing the aggregate 
outcome implied by the behaviour patterns of individual agents.  The results of this type of 
theoretical analysis provide the means with which to consider macroeconomic reactions and 
policy remedies sought by politicians and economists. However, in adopting the socially-
interactive approach, it must always be remembered that theoretical models and their implied 
prescriptions are applied only if the underlying assumptions remain realistic.  As Gerard 
(1989) observes ‘all too often the axiomatic status accorded to the assumption of rationality 
has blinded economists to the empirical limitations of their models’. The socially-interactive 
approach offers an alternative method of analysis to the choice-theoretic approach of 
neoclassical theory.  
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Therefore the socially-interactive approach rejects the instrumentalist method used to justify 
the continued acceptance by neoclassical theory of the existence of overriding rationality, 
which is clearly an unrealistic assumption.  The instrumentalist method adopts the position 
that the realism of assumptions is not a relevant criterion on which to base the selection of 
theories.  According to the instrumentalist method theoretical models should be judged 
primarily on the grounds of their predictive power.  This methodological stance is 
misleading, because in denying the relevance of realistic assumptions, instrumentalism rejects 
the pursuit of explanation as an objective.  Explanation must, by definition, involve 
attempting to justify observed relationships in terms of realistic assumptions.  
Instrumentalism replaces the pursuit of explanation with the pursuit of correlation.  This 
results in statistical associations which are unexplained except in terms of the assumptions 
from which they have been generated. Indeed, correlations are of little use in political 
economy without some evidence of causality. Moreover, if these assumptions are not based 
on observed reality, the explanations are meaningless as are any implied reactions and 
remedies.  The instrumentalist method has the effect of protecting the underlying assumptions 
of any theoretical system from direct scrutiny, and thereby can be seen as self-fulfilling and 
therefore largely uncritical in effect. 
The instrumentalist justification for the use of rationality in the way the neoclassical theorists 
employ it, has not only blinded the followers of neoclassical theory to the irrelevance of their 
models for the analysis of non-allocative behaviour, but theoretical limitations of the choice-
theoretic approach within the neoclassical frame of reference have also been ignored.  The 
use of rationality in this way also means that determinate theoretical models can be 
constructed.  Rational agents with perfect information make the optimal choice in any 
particular choice situation.  However, once the more general and realistic assumption is made 
that agents may have information inputs  which both vary over time and within contexts, it is 
no longer possible to build the determinate models upon which neoclassical theory is 
founded.  There is an infinite variety of assumptions which can be made on the nature of 
informational imperfections and the learning procedures which agents adopt in such 
circumstances; and so the choice-theoretic assumption breaks down completely. 
Imperfect information also raises severe difficulties for the equilibrium-theoretic assumption 
of neoclassical theory.  Under conditions of imperfect information, agents are likely to adopt 
various learning mechanisms.  This creates a disequilibrium adjustment process, but the 
nature of the adjustment process will depend on the particular informational imperfections 
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present and the particular learning procedures adopted.  It follows, therefore, that there is no 
reason at all why any adjustment process should move towards the equilibrium outcome 
associated with conditions of perfect information.  The neoclassical Keynesian theories of 
perceived equilibrium are one example of an adjustment process, under conditions of 
imperfect information, which does not only does not result in a perfect allocative equilibrium, 
but that also may have to be accepted or tolerated  The inevitable conclusion to be drawn is 
that imperfect information represents another theoretical problem for neoclassical theory. 
The problem of imperfect information demands the adoption of the socially-interactive 
approach.  Theoretical analysis must start from realistic assumptions about information sets 
and learning mechanisms.  This may involve empirical observation and the use of the 
findings of related subject fields such as consumer behaviour, sociology, or psychology.  
Unsurprisingly, such heterodox implications for analytical methods have been resisted by the 
majority of the economics profession, and especially so in the analysis of the behaviour of 
national capitalisms.  The proponents of neoclassical theory have usually attempted to 
accommodate the implications of imperfect information within the classic set of assumed 
notions of order. Examples of this accommodation are the whole series of hypotheses which 
imply that agents adapt their expectations in a fixed, mechanistic manner, and are therefore 
predictable, regardless of time or context variabilities.  These adaptive hypotheses are too 
simple and rigid to provide a realistic approximation to the complex learning procedures used 
by individuals and organisations.  However these adaptive hypotheses do accept that agents 
must adapt their behaviour in some way through experience.  More recently, however, the 
limitations of the adaptive hypotheses have led the followers of neoclassical theory to adopt 
the rational-expectations hypothesis, in which agents are assumed to have complete 
information on the relevant core elements of economic phenomena.  In other words, the 
rational-expectations hypothesis assumes that agents know all that can be conceivably 
known, and of course raises the tangential but nevertheless important question of what is and 
is not knowable.21 Agents with rational expectations have no need to learn.  The rational-
expectations hypothesis is but the most recent example of the tendency to retain the 
neoclassical assumption of perfect information, albeit in ever more sophisticated guises.  
Another ‘escape’ from the implications of imperfect information is to argue that agents have 
complete probabilistic knowledge in the sense of being able to attach a probability to all 
                                                 
21 The question of what is knowable remains a major, and sometimes paradoxical, epistemological concern, as in 
Fitch, F. (1963) ‘A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28 (2) pp.135-142 
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possible outcomes.  This allows agents to make rational choices based on the optimisation of 
expected values. And, this means that agents are assumed to face situations of risk rather than 
uncertainty. This is the approach which sustains the search for new explanations of 
misallocation developed within the ‘new microeconomics’ faction of neoclassical theory.  It 
is yet another attempt to deal with imperfect information within the neoclassical frame of 
reference and as such is destined to be inadequate when judged from outside the neoclassical 
assumptions. Moreover, it is another example of the bounded vision which pervades modern 
economic theory.  Imperfect information requires the development of new notions of order 
and new methods of analysis - that is, a move beyond the confines of neoclassical theory. 
With the foregoing in mind, the nature and characteristics of the monetary production 
economy version of national capitalism is examined.  However, before moving on it is 
important to note the underlying influence of Keynes’s General Theory. Here, Keynes can be 
seen as having adopted the socially-interactive approach; where he began with a series of 
simple, but realistic, assumptions about the observed patterns of behaviour in a monetary 
production economy.   And, it is from these assumptions that the properties which would be 
exhibited by a monetary production economy were first aired. 
The main thrust of the argument in this chapter however, is not neo-Keynesian, or really 
Keynesian-focused at all, but rather in the search for the answer to the question, can the 
monetary production economy, the basis of which has been offered by early Keynesians as a 
theoretical constructs, provide useful insights into the operation of national capitalisms; and 
in this research whether this can be extrapolated and developed to realistically fit the notion 
of a supranationally-managed collective of EU national capitalisms. Moreover, and of core 
importance to this thesis, is whether the monetary production model and its predication upon 
the central and endogenous role of money can be adapted so as to allow the location of the 
ECB to be at the centre of a supranational version of monetary production model, thereby 
forwarding  the  potential for an EU supracapitalism. The remaining passages in this chapter 
follow Gerard (1989) and adapt his explanation of how the monetary production model 
functions, and from that how it may fit a collective of interdependent national capitalisms 
monetarily and economically conjoined by their mutually-inclusive relationship with the 
ECB.  
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The functionality of the monetary production model 
The significance of the monetary context is that firms and households adopt patterns of 
behaviour in which they seek to meet objectives with respect to monetary flows.  Behaviour 
in a monetary production economy is flow-determined, not stock-determined.  Monetary 
flows are not the result of a stock-adjustment process but a key determinant of the behaviour 
of firms and households.  The monetary production economy is largely characterised by non-
allocative modes of activity in which monetary flows are an integral part.  The nature of 
money cannot be understood in terms of some separate monetary sector.  The whole of a 
monetary production economy is a monetary sector, in our case centred upon the ECB. 
In a monetary production economy, firms undertake production in order to generate a 
monetary revenue inflow in excess of the incurred monetary cost outflow.  The difference 
between the revenue inflow and cost outflow is monetary profit, the principal raison d’être of 
capitalist firms.  Monetary flows are the central concern for firms, not the trading of physical 
goods and services.  Firms trade physical inputs and outputs in order to achieve monetary 
objectives.  Firms operate in a sequential manner, with monetary flows being of primary 
importance.  The significance of this observation is overlooked by neoclassical theory, which 
attaches only a secondary importance to monetary flows, treating them as being entirely 
consequent on the underlying stock-adjustment process.  From this perspective, money is but 
a veil behind which real economic processes operate entirely unaffected by its presence. 
An illustrative summary of the structure of the monetary production model is presented 
below in Figure 22. The non-allocative, or utilitarian, properties of a national capitalism are 
shown alongside its allocative features, and together can be seen to flow into and from the 
national monetary system and through the central bank.   
The behaviour of households is also affected by this monetary context.  Households make 
their decisions on the level of their monetary outflows on consumption and savings with 
respect to the level of their monetary inflow of income received from the production process.  
It is this observation which Keynes located in his notion of the consumption function.  It is 
entirely inappropriate to liken the sequential decision process within households to a barter 
stock-adjustment process in which households exchange their stocks of factors of production 
directly for stocks of consumer goods and services. Monetary flows are, by definition, equal 
to price multiplied by quantity, or amounts multiplied by monetary values. However, it does 
not follow from this that prices and quantities must necessarily be determined simultaneously  
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Figure 22 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Illustration of the allocative and non-allocative features of the monetary production economy 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: primary 
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in the manner suggested by the supply-and-demand theory of price determination. This 
occurs only in the particular circumstance in which agents are operating within the allocative 
mode of activity, such as in stock market trading and retail fruit and vegetable markets. In 
general, however, prices and quantities are determined independently by very different 
socially-interactive processes.  It is a fundamental property of a monetary production 
economy that prices and quantities are determined quite separately.   
Output and employment in a monetary production economy 
Capitalist firms seek a number of often conflicting objectives.  Core among these goals is the 
pursuit of monetary profits.  Firms seek to earn profits by the marketing and production of 
goods and services.  The marketing activities of a firm are those associated with generating a 
demand for its output.  The production process, on the other hand, is concerned with 
supplying the output required to meet the demand generated.  It follows, therefore, that firms 
necessarily display a sequential behaviour pattern in which marketing activities are of 
primary importance, with the production process having only a secondary, consequential, and 
therefore almost residual role. The sequential nature of the decision process within firms is 
central to the output decision.  The output decision is the fundamental behaviour pattern of 
firms in a monetary production economy. Firms set their output levels with respect to their 
expectations of the level of demand for their output.  It is this single behaviour pattern which 
ultimately gives a monetary production economy its fundamental property of being a 
demand-side economy; that is, in a monetary production economy, demand determines 
supply. Firms’ expectations, which affect such output decisions, are often described as short-
term expectations.  It is a convenient and simplifying assumption that these expectations are 
correct, since the effect of mistaken short-term expectations is only to create temporary 
variations in output and stock-building as firms seek, by a process of trial and error, to 
discover the actual level of demand. 
The demand for any product of a firm depends on three separate elements: an individual 
product’s share of the total demand for the particular product group within which any 
individual product is located; the share of the particular product group in the aggregate 
demand for all goods and services produced in the economy, and the national level of 
aggregate demand And, since the central concern here is with the short and medium-term 
behaviour of the macroeconomy, it is the level of aggregate demand which is of primary 
importance.  The distribution of aggregate demand between, and within, product groups may 
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have consequences for the aggregate level of employment if firms and or groups vary in their 
policies to employ and to lay-off workers. Thus, for present purposes, it can be assumed that 
firms set the level of output solely with respect to their, assumed correct, short-term 
expectations on the potential level of aggregate demand.   
It follows, therefore, from the nature of the output decision of individual firms that the 
national capitalism level as a whole, aggregate output depends on aggregate demand.  As the 
level of aggregate demand changes, the level of aggregate output will tend to move in the 
same direction.  However, this socially-interactive relationship involves a link between two 
very different spheres of activity.  Aggregate demand is reflected as a monetary flow, 
whereas aggregate output is a real flow of tangible and intangible goods and services.  There 
is a gap between these two spheres of activity; a gap which firms must bridge in their output 
decisions.  Firms hold short-term expectations on product demand in real terms which must 
be based on their expectations of the monetary value of aggregate demand.  This is a unique, 
but very significant, feature of a monetary production economy. The gap between aggregate 
demand and the aggregate supply of output by firms means that there is no one-to-one 
relationship between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Firms can respond to 
(expected) changes in aggregate demand in three different ways: by changing the level of 
output; by changing prices; or by rescheduling through time by inventories or customer 
queuing. 
Firms may respond in any one of these ways or by some combination of them.  It follows, 
therefore, that the output decision is a complex one, although not necessarily complicated, 
and there is no simply prescribed single rule-of-thumb at work.  There is no fixed planning to 
supply with respect to changes in the level of aggregate demand, because the propensity to 
supply varies with circumstances and context. It seems plausible, however, that the following 
behaviour patterns are likely to be exhibited by firms.  If firms hold short-term expectations 
of only a temporary rise in aggregate demand, and if firms are also currently operating under 
conditions of relatively full capacity, it follows that firms are more likely to respond by 
raising prices and building-up customer queues, rather than by increasing the level of output.  
On the other hand, firms are more likely to increase their level of output if they expect a more 
stable medium-term rise in aggregate demand under rather than raise prices, if capacity is, or 
can be made available 
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If firms expect a fall in aggregate demand, firms are more likely to react by cutting price and 
stock-building if the fall in demand is expected to be only temporary and if firms are 
operating near to their minimum-acceptable level of capacity utilisation.  Firms are more 
likely to respond by reducing output if the change in demand is expected to be more 
permanent and if there is relatively full-capacity utilisation.   
In summary, in a monetary production economy, the aggregate level of output is primarily 
determined by the level of aggregate demand. However, there is no motivation to supply with 
respect to changes in the level of aggregate demand.  The inclination to supply will vary with 
circumstances and context. In turn, any propensity to supply will tend to depend principally 
on the direction of the change in aggregate demand; the rate of the change in aggregate 
demand; the expected degree of permanence of the change in aggregate demand; and the 
current level of capacity availability and utilisation. 
Towards an alternative theory of money and the role of the ECB 
Beginning with the question of the nature, characteristics, and function of money within 
national capitalisms, we are presented with two closely interdependent challenges: to 
determine how and where money is created; and, once generated, what role does money 
perform in a national capitalism? The first problem here is of sequence. Is money, or more 
precisely are money-flows, created by the demand for it or them as a direct consequence of 
the economic activity within a national capitalism; or is money introduced (or withdrawn 
from) outside the capitalist economy in order to regulate or control the level of activity within 
it? Put simply how, when, and where, does money come from? 
One way to answer these questions in particular and also to consider the function of money 
within the workings of national capitalisms in general, is to examine a number of heterodox 
views of money and monetary theory. Additionally, these perspectives may grouped into two 
general schools of thought and presented not necessarily as a straightforward debate, but by 
exploring the similarities and differences between them, which are, in turn, highlighted by the 
sub-divisions within each, and also, in some cases, the overlapping nature of their positions. 
All of the models presented here are classified as heterodox, and contrast sharply to the 
contemporarily generally-accepted explanations of money, which are deeply rooted in the 
neoclassical economics frames of reference, and wholly based on market clearing equilibrium 
theory, sometimes referred to as exchange economy theory. And, as Rochon and Rossi (2003) 
point out, these explanations ensure that macroeconomics remain firmly ‘rooted in 
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microeconomic foundations. The causality runs from microeconomic to macroeconomic 
phenomena, while never acknowledging the possibility of reverse causality.’ In stark contrast, 
the theories considered here, and also the above non-neoclassical explanation of how national 
capitalisms function, are centred on models of production, and take into account and relate to 
money, the elements of the real economy which include institutions, cultural development, 
time, history, income distribution, class relations and technological change. (Rochon and 
Rossi, 2003) 
In so doing, these explanations attempt to discuss the real world from direct observations, and 
are fundamentally dynamic in nature, and therefore do not gravitate towards any presupposed 
equilibrium position. Opponents of these heterodox views often claim that they are based 
simply on anti-equilibrium, but as Kaldor (1985:12) observes, ‘the economy as a continually 
evolving system whose path cannot be predicted any more than the evolution of an ecological 
system in biology’.  The one issue that does bind the heterodox views of money and 
monetary theory is unemployment, where in contrast to the modern interpretations of 
neoclassical theory, the economy does not automatically move towards a level of aggregate 
demand which results in full employment at a prescribed point of equilibrium, but rather 
levels of unemployment are actually an omnipresent component of the function of national 
capitalisms, and therefore not brought about by imperfections, but through a lack of 
aggregate demand which influences the nature and timing of production and investment 
decisions, financial institutional lending decisions, and therefore levels of productivity and 
ultimately, levels employment. In this way (involuntary) unemployment is a natural 
consequence of the state of the economy at any given temporal juncture. With this in mind, it 
is useful to collectivise these heterodox explanations of national economies as ‘production 
economies’, with their neoclassical counterparts being seen as ‘exchange economies’. 
 In production economies, money is of core importance, and as such is non-neutral; whereas 
in exchange economies money is seen a neutral, whereas in the production processes money 
is merely the lubricant that make the action run more smoothly, but where in production 
economies production cannot turn at all without money. This centrality of money in 
production economies is also very important for another reason. The main purpose of 
production is to sell the goods produced for profit, and such profit is expressed in monetary 
terms, and is therefore monetary profit. So, money is to be found at the very beginning of the 
production process as necessary investment for the process to begin, and also at the end of the 
resultant commercial transactions where revenues are translated into monetary profits after 
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adjusting for fixed and variable costs. Therefore with money being anything but non-neutral 
in this view, we are necessarily drawn to consider the cost of money; and the cost of money is 
its price as expressed by interest rates, as is the case with the ECB for 12 economies. 
Although these rates are exogenous in the sense that they are set and controlled by central 
banks in the short-term, and these rates then are influenced by, and therefore follow a 
sequence of events, over time to become long-term rates, its role is often over-simplified 
because operationally it has a dual function which is of vital importance to the production 
process. Firstly, interest is an actual cost of production, and although the prevailing rate of 
interest does not have a direct influence on investment, as demonstrated by downward-
sloping investment demand curves, it is an important determinant on costs of production, 
both in terms discounted cash flow calculations, and using opportunity cost projections for 
investment decisions. Secondly, the rate of interest of interest may also have an indirect effect 
on output because of its distributional effects when interest rate rises and effective demand is 
stilted, thereby adversely affecting sales and production cycles, and sometimes also 
employment levels. In this way, production economies van be viewed as monetary and credit-
based economies (Rochon and Rossi, 2003), and as is argued above in when detailing the 
monetary production model view of national capitalisms, the real and monetary sides of the 
economy are not independent, and this means that money cannot just be an exogenous factor, 
and therefore it is not only endogenous, but is at the core of the workings and operation of 
national capitalisms. 
The Post-Keynesians and the Monetary Circuitists 
Within the heterodox camp then, we can identify two main strands of thought: those of the 
post-Keynesians and those of the Monetary Circuitists. And, while is important to note from 
the outset that there is much to distinguish the two; there is also much that binds them 
together. The post-Keynesians movement brings together four originally distinct schools of 
thought: the American post-Keynesians; the Minskian post-Keynesians or Structuralists; the 
Cambridge post-Keynesians; and the Horizontalists. And, while each of these schools 
possesses very clear underpinning features of their own, they can be further distilled down 
into two main strands of their own: Structuralists and Horizontalists. 
For the American post-Keynesians uncertainty and time play important roles in 
understanding the endogenous nature money in national capitalisms. For them, the existence 
of money is directly related to the all-pervasiveness spectre of uncertainty. National 
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capitalisms are not necessarily prone to crises, but such uncertainty obviates these economies 
from achieving optimum, or close to optimum, levels of employment. For the Minskian 
Structuralists, national capitalisms are, indeed, prone to crises, although modern institutions 
can be organised and legitimised in ways that can usually prevent major turbulences from 
being terminal. They see financial innovations such as derivatives of both the asset and 
liability type, playing important roles in explaining the endogeneity of money, and the 
attendant weakening abilities of central banks to always effectively control the money supply. 
For their part, the Cambridge post-Keynesians, privilege growth theory and business cycles in 
their explanations of money, although still with the firm conviction of the endogenous nature 
of money. Finally, the Horizontalist view of money focuses on the function of interest rates in 
monetary economies of production, or as outlined in our case above, the monetary production 
model of national capitalisms. The emphasis here is on banks lending money only to 
creditworthy firms and individuals, and thereby far from being passive actors in national 
economies are active players in the endogenous money-creation process. (Rochon and Rossi, 
2003).Within these four schools and two groups, the main commonalities in relation to the 
functioning of national capitalisms, are that output is demand-determined as laid out above in 
the description of the monetary production model of capitalism; the role and functions of 
banks; the endogeneity of money; and the important influence of uncertainty. In particular, 
there is agreement regarding the actual creation of money resulting from demand for loans 
from banks. And, as Rochon and Rossi note, there are very clear opportunities for key 
elements from each school to be brought together to forge a coherent approach representing 
all schools. 
The Monetary Circuitists movement also comprises different schools, and within this 
collective, three can be identified: the French circuit school; the Italian school; and the 
followers of the Dijon-Fribourg school. The French school collective is mainly concerned 
with policy-oriented issues relating to levels of economic activity, unemployment, and 
stabilisation strategies. The Italian school, largely following the work of Graziani 
(1987,1990,1996, and 1997), centres on the sequences of money flows in the circular process 
between production and consumption, where all firms and all households are considered 
together in terms of interventions by the banking system. While the Dijon-Fribourg approach 
focuses on the double-entry system of the banks and how money is instantaneously created 
(and destroyed) by reference to workers’ wages being simultaneously paid and deposited into 
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central banks’ reserves being used to lubricate the economy through the overall bank lending 
process. 
The next evolutionary stage of the post-Keynesian approaches came with the contributions of 
Kahn, (1958) and Kaldor (1958), where the focus was on the variable velocity of money and 
the limitations of monetary policy in controlling inflation, rather than the recognition of the 
endogeneity of money. Kaldor’s early concentration was on the causal relationship between 
money and income, whilst also noting that such causality, itself rooted in the quantity theories 
of money, was less than reliable. For Minsky, at the same early stages, the core issues 
revolved around the unreliability of monetary policy, which of course, in the absence of the 
recognition of money having only an exogenous function in capitalist economies, would have 
to be at least unreliable some of the time. 
Therefore, it can be comfortably posited that, at these early stages in the development of 
modern theories of money, that the broad post-Keynesian church had not yet recognised the 
full potential for the non-neutrality of money. However, this is with one exception. The 
seminal work of Joan Robinson, The Accumulation of Capital, (Robinson, 1956), where she 
is very clear on the endogenous nature of money, and also the importance and centrality of 
the function of bank loans to finance production and also the methods by which money can 
be extinguished or destroyed through the reflux mechanism. The reflux mechanism, 
sometimes called the compensation principle, refers to the balance sheets of central banks 
(which largely reflect the mirror image of the commercial banks under their stewardship), 
where some elements of the central banks’ balance sheets are automatically compensated for 
by other elements within the balance sheet. It has been argued that Robinson, from the 
Cambridge post-Keynesian school, ought to be credited as the founder, or perhaps discoverer, 
of ‘the post-Keynes school of endogenous money’. (Rochon, 2001).Although as Rochon and 
Rossi point out. 
It would be naїve to deny, however, that today the endogenous money view is 
encumbered by a number of differences that stand in the way to build (ing) a 
unified, and consistent, theory of money and money economies (2003) 
Differences and similarities 
The differences between the Horizontalists and Structuralists with the post-Keynesians 
collective can be seen to centre mainly on the availability of reserves and the overall liquidity 
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the banking system. Moreover, the approach seeks to explain national and international 
macroeconomic problems such as inflation and unemployment. 
However, these sub-divisions within the monetary circuit movement are not quite as 
straightforward as being three sub-sets of a singular whole. The Dijon-Fribourg group, 
largely through the influence of sharp differences of opinion between Paguez of the French 
school, and Schmitt of the Dijon-Fribourg school, have denounced the Circuitist label, 
preferring to be known as the School of Money Emissions. Effectively this means that there 
are really three general approaches to be considered, and it is instructive to contrast and 
compare each of them against each other in a ‘within and between’ type of commentary. 
First, the post-Keynesian monetary approach, and the similarities and differences between 
this and the general features of the monetary circuitist approach. 
The post-Keynesian monetary approach 
Early theories explaining the nature and characteristics of money in capitalist economies, 
came under scrutiny for the first time in a series of papers Keynes published following his 
General Theory, which focused on the finance motive. Here Keynes’s argued that banks were 
at the centre of the lending process supplying firms with the necessary finance to generate 
production. However, it was not at this point that the endogenous nature of money was 
revealed, rather, it was Keynes’s pointing out that firms (presumably because of readily 
available bank finance) do not require ex ante quantities of savings in order to make 
investment decisions. However, what was achieved here was the early intermediate linkage 
between the production process and the banking system – one of the key features of the 
monetary production model – and the importance short-term bank lending in the form of 
overdrafts, and the creation of medium and long-term credit lines. And, in this, there is the 
first indication of the potential for money being considered as being endogenous to national 
capitalisms, even though at this stage Keynes completely and mysteriously ignored, or 
somehow overlooked, the role of the central bank. Without paying attention to the central 
bank, its function and purpose is left out of the analysis, and the focus stays with the 
commercial clearing banks as a sub-sector of the macroeconomy. Perhaps this can be 
explained by Keynes previously, in the General Theory, positing money as exogenous 
because it is controlled by the central bank. Of course, the major omission here is the later, 
and generally-accepted, Keynes view of function of the money multiplier as a consequence of 
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of banks, together with the riskiness of when banks attempt to expand their balance sheets. 
The Structuralists argue that banks are not as passive as, and have more control over, bank 
lending to firms and individuals than the Horizontalists claim. In this regard, Structuralists 
maintain that banks do not necessarily become more illiquid or riskier as the quantity and 
value loans they make increases. The Structuralists generally move on three points. First, that 
money can only ever be partly endogenous; that is some of the total money supply is 
endogenous, and some is exogenous, because of the money supply only being endogenously 
adjusted in conditions of economic growth. Second, they hold that money is only endogenous 
when bank credit is required as a result of firms’ output expanding. And third, as banks do 
increase the volume of their loans to firms and individuals, they become more illiquid and 
therefore also increase the levels of interest charged in order to compensate for the riskiness 
associated, or perceived to be associated, with such illiquidity. Horizontalists, however, reject 
all three of these assumptions. First, they claim that money is wholly endogenous, and is 
‘always and everywhere an endogenous phenomenon’ (Rochon and Rossi, 2003). This is 
because even if banks do increase their reserves to cover riskiness (or decrease reserves in 
order to take advantage of profit opportunities, and become riskier), there will always be 
potential borrowers willing to enter into financial debt. It is here that money can be seen to be 
always ‘credit-led and demand-determined’ (Moore, 1988). Here, if this assumption is 
accepted, then money can never be in a situation of excess supply, where, if such a situation 
occurred, neoclassical exchange market theory would hold that interest rates would adjust 
downwards to clear the excess supply. Second, bank credit is always required, even when the 
economy is not expanding. This happens because borrowers must repay their bank loans with 
the proceeds of the sales revenues that their production generates, and in order to renew 
production, even at perhaps reduced levels, will still require some borrowed funds to do so. 
And, third banks do not necessarily or automatically become riskier as their loans expand, 
because they usually only lend to creditworthy, and so mostly profitable, borrowers. 
Moreover, provision for the bad debts of even creditworthy is normally made, and is 
normally built into the cost structuring of banks as well as being tax deductible in many 
countries, although they also have to somehow plan for the type of unforeseen 
macroeconomic, or market-systemic shocks, that affect all borrowers and lenders. 
Even though these differences between the Horizontalists and Structuralists are real and 
problematic, substantial arguments can be put forward for a common and coherent approach 
by all post-Keynesians in order to offer a meaningful alternative to neoclassical theory. 
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Following Rochon and Rossi (2003), the first two key elements are the role of effective 
demand and endogenous money, which form the cornerstone of the overall post-Keynesian 
approach. If, as promulgated, production is carried out through, and therefore directly related 
to, bank loans, and if wages as the cost of productive labour are paid, or accounted for, before 
production commences. Then the theory of effective demand and endogenous money actually 
become flip sides of the same coin. In this way, all post-Keynesians agree on at least an 
endogenous component to money, regardless of whether it is directly related to increased 
output or not. Bank loans always result in a quantity of money, which, in turn, create bank 
deposits that also increase banks’ reserves.  Given then, these two components it becomes 
easier to incorporate other elements of post-Keynesian into an acceptable whole. The 
distribution of income can be allowed to play a part in adjusting levels of aggregate demand; 
and if increased aggregate demand translates into an economic growth that is demand-
determined, this needs to be included in the approach. In this way, increased investment, 
expanded levels of public expenditure, and higher wages, will all have a positive impact on 
aggregate demand  
The rate of short-term interest, as set by the central bank, may also have a role to play, 
because interest rates whilst not necessarily having a direct influence on aggregate demand 
through investment; may well have an indirect impact on income distribution. This point 
leads to the question of the financial markets and what their actual function is. As with the 
elements above, do they have an influence on aggregate demand? And, if so, how may this 
work. Apart from Minsky and other like-minded Structuralists, the post-Keynesians have 
rather overlooked the precise role of the financial markets in relation to their analysis of 
money and aggregate demand. And finally, politico-economic uncertainty should also be 
included in the overall analysis, as propounded by the American post-Keynesians. Mixtures 
of a disproportionate fear of the future, undue attention to the unknown behaviour of key 
economic variables over time, and disregard for the potential incidences of unexpected and 
asymmetric external economic shocks, may directly affect the efficacy of investment 
decisions made or delay feasible investment projects and potential subsequent related 
consumption levels. Such uncertainty may also engender spillover effects on the financial 
markets in the guise of reduced, or reducing, confidence in the markets themselves leading to 
perceived and real market instabilities. Perhaps even more importantly, conditions of 
uncertainty may adversely affect not only the demand for loans, but also the willingness of 
banks to supply loans. This is not to say money should be considered as supply-determined, 
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as banks clearly can only extend loans to borrowers that request them; there is no known or 
legal mechanism for forcing loans on to unsuspecting borrowers. However, under conditions 
of particular levels of uncertainty, banks may be encouraged to be more pessimistic about 
borrowers’ stability in general, and also their ability to repay loans in particular. Often, these 
levels of banks’ uncertainty are associated with an economic downturn and therefore a 
diminution of aggregate demand and associated output. In this way, and because the world is 
non-ergodic, all economic agents, governments; central banks; commercial banks; firms; and 
households operate under the spectre of uncertainty, and although they will all have 
individual tolerances and attitudes to such uncertainty, this will affect these agents’ decisions 
to save, lend, consume, and invest. 
The Monetary Circuit Approach 
Based on the circular flow of production and consumption by households and firms, which is 
one of the oldest aspects of economic analysis, the Monetary Circuitists attempt to establish 
the nature of the flow of money around national capitalisms’ economies, and to analyse the 
related circular flow of income. Within the school linkages have been identified between the 
generation and utility of income on one hand, and the creation and destruction of money on 
the other.  
As its name suggests the theory of the monetary circuit is first of all a theory explaining 
money from its creation by the banking system to its destruction by the same system. This 
flow takes place within a logical sequence over time, and circuitist commentators separate it 
into a number of sequential phases, which link together from the opening to the closing of a 
loop, or defined circuit of monetary activity. From this, the Circuitists identify the central 
problem of, or set of challenges caused by, the circuit being what is called as temporarily 
‘open’. As Realfonzo (1998:16) observes ‘until the moment in which in which firms are in a 
position to repay the banks, a stock of money remains in existence, a double debit/credit 
relation between firms banks on the one hand, and between banks and workers on the other’. 
Circuitists consider that the formation of money stock poses a problem for firms, taken here 
as a collective in the economy, because such a money stock ultimately obliges them to 
renegotiate their loan commitments with banks; and this may lead to less favourable 
borrowing conditions for those firms that are not able at that point in time to settle existing 
outstanding obligations. The principal result of this situation is that these firms will then need 
to support greater costs for producing a given output in the following periods. And, at the 
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macroeconomic level, failure to pay existing bank debt may lead firms to cut back on other 
costs such as their wage bill, which adversely affecting unemployment levels, and from there, 
aggregate demand and economic output. Although quite different in context and texture, the 
framework for the monetary circuit explanations of money bears a number of similarities 
with the post-Keynesians, as well as some notable differences. 
Similarities and differences between monetary circuit theory and post-Keynesian theory 
Both sets of explanations share a number of important features and characteristics, which is 
encouraging for those from both camps who actively promote the notion of a single, 
encompassing, and coherent approach for the heterodox views of the endogenous function 
and behaviour of money, and its interdependent relationship with aggregate demand and 
output, as part of the workings of modern national capitalisms.  
The encouraging level of similarities begins with the general acceptance by all schools across 
the two strands of the central importance of bank credit in terms of setting the process in 
motion, and for its continuing expansion. And, although for the post-Keynesians the creation 
of money is ‘congenital to production’ (Rochon and Rossi, 2003), whereas, for the Circuitists 
the creation of money is contingent on output expanding and the economy growing, both 
camps agree that banks are essential for the coterminous production and consumption 
relationship. Moreover, they agree that bank money is endogenous to national capitalisms 
because it is credit-led and demand-determined. Within the post-Keynesian monetary 
economics, the Horizontalists come very close to the position generally held within the 
monetary circuit theoretical framework, where both share the view regarding the creation, 
circulation, and destruction of money within modern national capitalisms.  
In addition, both post-Keynesians and monetary circuit commentators alike, support the 
notion of partial and sequential analyses of macroeconomic outcomes and asymmetries, 
whilst wholly rejecting the very narrow neoclassical imperatives relating to market clearance, 
and general and simultaneous equilibria. And, although neo-Keynesians privilege the focus 
on time and uncertainty, in contrast to the Circuitists’ main concern for issues surrounding 
the macroeconomic problems relating to different classes of agents and their varying 
positions and influences on the macroeconomy, they are both interested in the partial, or 
whole, relationships between aggregate demand and income distribution. In particular, they 
both favour the reverse causality view regarding the interface between microeconomic forms 
of behaviour and macroeconomic phenomena, where the neoclassical view holds that 
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microeconomic behaviour directly shapes the macroeconomic landscape. Finally, both also 
agree on the exogenous role of the interest rate as a macroeconomic variable. Here, it is 
jointly held that the central banks can control interest rates much more effectively than they 
can control the total money supply. And, in particular, through this channel, the central banks 
can play an important role in manipulating interest rates to enhance recovery phases of the 
business cycle, and to boost unemployment during such downturns. 
However, there are also significant differences between the two approaches regarding the 
actual function of money in modern national capitalisms. While the advocates of the 
monetary circuit model emphasise that money functions as ‘final payment’ mechanism within 
an economic system of production and exchange, and importantly note that there may also 
exist groups of individuals who have no access to this mechanism because of their low social 
status, the post-Keynesians hold that money should be considered as a stock of liquid wealth 
which economic agents may use to overcome differences between current and future financial 
contingencies brought about by uncertainty and individual liquidity-holding preferences.  
These differences need not be terminal. As Graziani (1996) observes, this difference could 
form the basis of agreement between the camps, where the distinction between the two views 
on the fundamental function of money may be moved ahead of, and to build a general theory 
of the monetary production economy that explains money as a means of payment as well as 
money as a stick of wealth.  And here, it could be argued that if money is a stock of wealth, 
then it has the inherent capacity of being available as a means of payment. 
As well as converging on the function of money within the workings of national capitalisms, 
both sides also need to address and hopefully come to some agreement on the nature of 
money in national capitalisms. And, as pretty much all else depends on this, it is essential for 
the potential of a common approach between the two camps, and then the question of what 
money actual is cannot be subjugated by the other points of disagreement. Therefore, we 
commence with a dichotomy: if money is a store of wealth, it is then clearly, in this view, a 
static stock of money; if money is a means of payment, and its creation, circulation, and 
destruction occur in a circular flow, it is a non-static flow. The question is, can this apparent 
polarisation be overcome? Perhaps it is both, with flows of money emanating out of static 
stocks, or static stocks being somehow the residual of a particular flow that has come to a 
halt, depending on the type of analysis being conducted. But can this proposed dual nature of 
money be seen as satisfactory? 
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The main stumbling block in the debate in the heterodox literature regarding the nature of 
money appears to be that money either has to be a temporary, and therefore, static, store of 
value or wealth (accumulated income), or is a flow, and therefore a dynamic, and readily 
available (liquid) means of payment. The obvious and simplest way to overcome this problem 
is merely to state that the nature of money to the observer depends on the type of analysis 
required. To use the example of the dollar bill on the pavement story, if a passer-by observed 
dollar bill on the pavement, a neoclassical economist would argue that you would never see 
someone observing a dollar bill at because it would be picked up immediately without 
thinking, a post-Keynesian would also pick it up fairly quickly because it is recognised as a 
store of value, and the post-Keynesian would now have an increased store of wealth equal to 
the denomination of the bill. The circuitist would also pick the note up quickly, but for this 
observer, the gain would be seen as increasing his or her capacity to make increased 
payments in the short-term future. In essence, the last two fortunate observers of the dollar 
bill are viewing the acquisition of the money in different ways, because for them, at that 
particular juncture, and by their differing analyses, the money satisfied different needs or 
wants. So it could be argued that the nature of money changes only on analytical and 
temporal grounds. The circuitist will actually hold the note as a store of value until such time 
as it can be used to make a payment, and the post-Keynesian has received a means of 
payment which will be held as a store of value or wealth, albeit in the short, or very short-
term. Ultimately, it is human efforts of production and choices of consumption that determine 
the nature of money, and all transactions and expenditures of any meaningful import, always 
must relate to these human interventions. (Adapted from a passage in Keynes’s Treatise on 
Money (1930/1971)) 
However, to many commentators this duality still does not conceptually satisfy the central 
question, and it is to a particular group of writers, those proponents of the theory of money 
emissions, that I now turn. 
The Theory of Money Emissions 
This approach can be seen as a the result of a breakaway group of monetary circuit writers 
from Italy, France, and Canada in the 1970s, who now share very little of the mainstream 
circuit writers’ views, other than that their overall focus is the same, a heterodox account of 
how the monetary production economy works, and the function of money within it. Now 
recognised as the Dijon-Fribourg school, this movement centres its main argument on money 
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being a flow, but an instantaneous flow, that results from the double-entry mechanism used to 
record transactions in a banks’ system of accounting. In this view, money is integrated into 
the real economy through production, where it is the payment of wages that allows money in 
its numerical form to relate to output, its real content. In effect, this means that money and 
productive output are two sides of the same coin, and that produced goods exist as (residual) 
wage-units as soon as workers’ wages are paid into banks by firms. The banks record these 
transactions as deposits, which is where they stay until workers withdraw these monies and 
spend them in markets for produced goods. Here, the value of money is created by this 
relationship between productive activities and banking systems, or more simply, the 
integration of banks and production. In this way, productive outputs become instantly 
monetised by the banks. Therefore, the payment of wages is an emission where money 
income defines an exchange value that sits in a bank as a deposit. The theory goes further to 
explain that as these wages are paid by out by firms that have borrowed from banks in order 
to finance the very production that has resulted in the wages being paid to workers in the first 
place, and that the deposits are destroyed as soon as workers spend them in the form of 
money exchange in markets for produced goods. Moreover, other quantities of these deposits 
are also circulated around the macroeconomy as a result of banks’ other financial market 
intermediary activities. As Schmitt (1986) states, ‘effective demand is defined as a two-way 
flux, firms giving and receiving the same product’. 
Similarities and differences between the post-Keynesians and Monetary Circuitists 
There are some similarities between the approaches. First, all the heterodox schools address 
the main problems of the modern monetary production economy. In particular, the 
relationship between unemployment and lack of total demand is shared by all the approaches. 
Second, the schools collectively focus on issues surrounding capital accumulation and 
(asymmetric) income distribution. Third, there is also a cross-approach consensus on the 
reverse causality of microeconomic and macroeconomic phenomenon. That is, they all share 
the view that macroeconomics are not based on microeconomic foundations, and that 
macroeconomic phenomena and interrelationships cannot be reduced to, or analysed by,  
simple economic aggregates. 
 However, although these commonalities are important and can be seen to constitute some 
elements of a basis for the eventual unification of the heterodox approaches on a number of 
issues, there remain fundamental, and perhaps more importantly, conceptual differences, 
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brought about by a radically different view regarding production and income, and one which 
more closely resembles the neoclassical view. These departures can be summarised as 
follows. Firstly, the emissions position rejects the notion of income as a flow of expenditure 
over time, choosing to consider it as a stock, but one that is constantly renewed via a process 
of creation involving money and the production of goods and services. Secondly, Schmitt and 
his followers believe macroeconomics has little to do with the economy’s agents’ behaviour, 
and therefore there is no point in relating uncertainty and liquidity preference to the true 
endogenous nature of money. Thirdly, the school’s own ‘quantum theory of production’ 
(Rochon and Rossi, 2003) is promulgated to replace any semblance of the idea that income 
formation takes place in a temporal framework or sequence, because in the payment of 
wages, the quantum theory holds that output is emitted as an amount that is simultaneously 
real and monetary. Real, in the sense that it is the result of a physical process of 
transformation that creates a value-in-use; and monetary in as far as it is emitted within, and 
by, the payment of money wages, which, in turn, are seen as the real measure of output in 
economic terms. This means that income is automatically created when these wages are paid 
into the bank by firms, and destroyed when workers withdraw them and buy finished goods 
in markets. And finally, general rises in aggregate price levels in contrast to other schools, are 
believed to be the result of the mixed structures of domestic and cross-border payment 
systems whose operations do not yet adhere to the above double-entry explanation of modern 
money and its conceptual difference to income and capital. 
Summary 
Having put forward the case for the monetary production economy model as an alternative 
means of considering the functions of national capitalisms as individual units of analysis, the 
notion of a collective and centrally-managed EU supracapitalism demands a conduit between 
the role of money, as the prescribed endogenous and central feature of national capitalisms, 
and the promotion of how this view of the role of money in capitalist economies may be the 
basis for the promulgation of an EU supracapitalism. Firstly, Figure 23 below shows how an 
adapted version of the monetary circuit view of money serves as one attempt at the 
unification of the monetary schools as discussed above, and Figure 24 represents a revised 
version of the illustration in Figure 22 above.  
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Figure 23 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The flow of funds in an adapted monetary circuit model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  author’s adaptation from Rochon and Rossi (2003:145) 
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Figure 24 
Illustration of the Eurosphere Monetary Production Model 
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Conclusions 
Assessing the potential for an EU supracapitalism effectively rests on the evolution and 
performance to date of a Eurosphere as a self-contained macroeconomy, largely controlled by 
the ECB. For its part, the ECB effects the management of the Eurosphere by means of a 
single-policy monetary strategy designed to both consolidate the existing extent to which 
economic integration has been accomplished, and also create the conditions under which 
further economic and monetary union can be realised in the future. From the findings of the 
research undertaken here, the degree to which complete economic and monetary harmony can 
be achieved depends on the extent to which there is a political will to reform the ECB, and 
therefore liberate the economies of the Eurosphere member-states to take full advantage of 
the dual benefits of EU membership and sharing the single currency. Furthermore, any ECB 
reforms need to be not only radical and immediate, but also accompanied by a wider EU 
recognition that if further economic integration is to be achieved, and the full benefits of 
sharing a single currency are to be enjoyed, any damage that future potential politico-
economic crises must be minimised. 
The creation of Eurosphere has been predicated upon monetary and economic union, with 
this being heralded by the commencement of Stage Three of EMU. However, any 
measurement of EMU’s success to date has been limited to the extent to which the monetary 
integration part of the equation can been seen to have been achieved. The wider assessment 
of the potential for an EU supracapitalism is grounded in the projection that the bringing 
together of the 12 national capitalisms of the current Eurosphere may provide the necessary 
pre-conditions for its realisation. The previous chapters, in particular the passages chronicling 
its evolution, proliferation, and subsequent adaptations, capitalism is established as a politico-
economic system, and therefore by extension a supracapitalism must entail elements of  
supra-political endeavour. Consequently, the main thrust of the arguments presented here is 
bounded by the monetary, the economic, and the political, but with the recognition that the 
Eurosphere’s current evolutionary location lies somewhere between the first two, and where 
further progression is contingent on the latter. 
The conclusions to the research can be considered to be delimited by three interrelated 
aspects of the development of the Eurosphere, and of its supranational policy-setting and 
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management by the ECB. The first of these concerns an assessment of the ECB’s overall 
performance, where a patchwork picture of the empirical evidence and analysis emerges 
which indicates both positive and negative outcomes, and while this amounts to a largely 
inconclusive assessment of the Eurosphere, the results point directly towards a pressing need 
for the above-mentioned ECB reforms, which move away from the current single-policy 
focus and towards multiple and contingent policy formations. The second relates to these 
reforms, and calls for the EU to demonstrate the political will to more meaningfully move 
towards the fiscal harmony required for full economic integration. This will involve a 
reconsideration of the ECB’s future form and function, and ultimately whether it can be 
mandated in some way to exercise levels supranational influence and control over the fiscal 
policy in order for the Eurosphere is to achieve the full economic integration intended by 
EMU. And, in doing so, these reforms will also need to see a significant reduction in the 
influence on the Eurosphere by the German Bundesbank’s legacy. 
And finally, it is important to remind ourselves what the EU was originally envisaged to 
achieve; something which is often obfuscated by the continuing focus on economic 
integration. The ultimate drive for political union may seem a long way off, if achievable at 
all, but it was aimed at deepening the synergistic and mutually-beneficial togetherness that 
was to offer all the members protection; protection from invasion (especially by Germany); 
from the threat of the spread of communism, and from the potential trade dominance of the 
US. And while it is not surprising that the contemporary focus is mainly on the economic 
gains to be shared from the single market, macroeconomic policy co-ordination, structural 
change, and regional development; the EU in general, and the Eurosphere in particular, are as 
much about economic protection. Economic protection means when a fellow member finds 
itself in trouble, the others come to assistance alongside; and this means financial support and 
backing. The recent history of Eurosphere crises tells us that this does not always transpire, 
and often national domestic politics and preferences intervene. Among other things, this 
could be due to the EU being split into to two zones: the Eurosphere and the ex-Eurosphere 
member-states, although as the empirical evidence in Chapter 4 suggests, there can be seen to 
be some cross-transfers of benefits between the two spheres.   
The third interrelated aspect is then one of pursuing the necessary reforms to ensure there are 
the necessary safeguarding measures are in place so that the Eurosphere can be better 
equipped to obviate future financial crises. With this in mind, the subsequent concluding 
remarks are laid out with first a summary of the overall findings and individual conclusions, 
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together with an interpretation of each of the main chapters, followed by a closer examination 
of the fiscal policy issues, and finally an examination of ECB’s and EU’s handling of another 
recent financial crisis.  
Summary of findings and conclusions 
The task of establishing the potential for an EU supracapitalism, considered though a 
constructivist-neoinstitutionalism mix of political science and international relations 
explanations, demands a great deal of both the available literature and data. The treatment of 
the literature here was mainly distributed across three chapters: one developing the 
constructivist-neoinstitutionalism framework, another focusing on EU integration, and the 
third based on a challenge to the accepted wisdoms that explain both the function of national 
capitalisms and the role of money in those economies. The available datasets from which the 
empirical evidence was distilled are voluminous, although largely unrefined, and whilst 
following Colin Hay’s advice to be necessarily ‘empirical, though not empiricist’ (Hay, 
2002a), maintaining an adequate theoretical-empirical balance has been a major challenge 
throughout. With this in mind, an initial summary of findings and accompanying individual 
conclusions can be outlined below. 
Beginning with the literature, the first discovery was the initial separation of the 
understanding of wealth into the real and the virtual, which correspond to productive assets 
and financial assets respectively. In turn, productive assets can be seen as largely non-
allocative in nature, while most financial assets are allocative. And from this, the opportunity 
arises to subsequently mount a critical challenge to not only the generally-accepted, but also 
ECB-acknowledged, view of how national capitalisms function. This affords a framework 
which both offers a heterodox view of countries’ economies, and also a methodological basis 
from which to critical assess the effectiveness of the ECB and the political economy of the 
Eurosphere. 
Understanding the nature and characteristics of national capitalisms as politico-economic 
systems presents a number of challenges. The first of these relates to capitalism’s continuing 
success over the last 300 years or so, regardless of its episodic failures and resultant domestic 
and world crises. The second concerns widely varying national interpretations of its basic 
accepted tenets. Capitalism’s on-going success appears to lie in governments’ and policy-
makers’ acceptance of both capitalism as being the only available (current) viable politico-
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economic system in general, and the neoclassical version of how capitalism is translated by 
national economies, in particular. 
Although numerous and varied, the commentaries on EU integration point to some clear 
reckonings. That the ‘governance turn’ coincided with the emerging international relations 
prominence of constructivism and the new availability of a range of neoinstitutional 
methodologies, affords a more clearly-defined analytical framework than that of the 
foregoing neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debate, is particularly important. This is not 
to say that that the constructivist-neoinstitutionalism approach favoured here comes without 
its problems. Constructivism is revealed either as more of a collection of theories bounded by 
the privileging of the fluidity of ideas, interpretations, and discourse, than the more closely-
described and dichotomous pre-governance-turn theoretical positions. The choice of  
constructivism as a means of understanding the Eurosphere as unfolded in Chapter 5, whilst 
generally challenging the rational family of realisms, also entailed having to pragmatically 
employ three of the identified ‘constructivisms’ in order to consider the international relations 
aspects of the EU. The neoinstitutionalist political science side of the approach also 
demanded consideration of a mix of variants, and where the opportunity presented itself to 
take advantage of its sociological, historical, and empirical variants in the design and 
justification of the EU typologies as an analytical framework for the longitudinal and 
statistical evaluation of the 20-year pre and post-euro timeframe.  
The literature focusing on EU integration and Europeanisation reveals both the helpful, 
clearly-defined pre and post-governance turn, but also widely contrasting, and at times 
confusing, perspectives of events and potential trajectories. Nevertheless, the main 
conclusions that can be gleaned here are that a dual-speed EU of a Eurosphere and ex-
Eurosphere economy will persist for the medium-term at least, although the extent to which 
there will be developing cross-benefits and eventual convergence remains unclear. What is 
clear is that the ten new acceding economies constituting the fifth enlargement will 
significantly reshape this dynamic. With all of these countries contracted to adopt the euro in 
the short-term, the previous 12-3 structure of the EU will become a 22-3 and then 24-3 when 
Bulgaria and Rumania join in 2007. As the Eurosphere expands in this way, the non-Euro 
economies will become increasingly influenced by the euro economies, not least because of 
the evidence regarding intra-EU and extra-EU trade openness (See pages 146-152); and that 
within the newly-expanded Eurosphere, there is possibly the potential for multiple-speed 
configurations either based on the kinds of typologies discussed earlier, or those that may be 
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shaped by future contingent political alliances, the potential for which is discussed by 
Hooghe and Marks and De Gruawe and others on pages 168-173. Whatever unfolds in this 
regard, one thing is inevitable; that crises, notably financial crises, will always be a feature of 
a partially-integrated EU, and that the full political union that would largely obviate these is 
either so far off it is difficult to envisage at this stage, or is ultimately unachievable. 
The varieties of capitalism literature is at once helpful and seriously limited, although 
elements of this have been ‘borrowed’ here from the seminal Hall and Sosckice book of 
2001, there are a number of problems with it as a genre. The first, as advanced by Colin Hay 
and others, is that each variety must be considered contextually-contingent, and therefore 
fluid in nature, and consequently always in a state of flux (France, Ireland, Spain, and Poland 
all being contemporary examples). This is because national governments are subject to 
episodic changes in political form and function, and because capitalism is a form of politico-
economic organisation, the nature and characteristics of national capitalisms must continually 
change. Furthermore, Lippit’s Social Structures of Accumulation shows us not only how 
national capitalism’s change as result of shifting government ideologies, but also because of 
the regional and international shifts brought about by transnational social, technological, and 
financial developments. Nonetheless, by default, what this body of literature does point to is 
the need to recognise that understandings of national capitalisms should always be 
contingent, and as such any resultant typologies cannot remain static in the long run. 
Therefore accepting that capitalisms do vary in these ways highlights what needs to be 
achieved in order to successfully integrate; and also what may prove to be very difficult to 
accomplish. 
The theme of understanding national capitalisms leads to another important outcome from the 
literature, and is rooted in a challenge to the very nature of how a national economy 
functions. In many ways, considering the heterodox explanation of the form and function of 
national capitalisms, as propounded by Gerard (1989), is akin to either inversing the image of 
what a national capitalism looks by standing on one’s head to view it, or more realistically to 
contest the direction of the internal cause and effect relationships which determine the 
outcomes of a national economy’s operation. This alternative, ‘ideas and discourse’ approach 
to grasping the rudiments of national capitalisms can be seen as philosophical, 
neoinstitutionalist, and constructivist. It is philosophical in the sense of the simple definition 
offered by Honderich  
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The shortest definition, and it is quite a good one, is that philosophy is thinking 
about thinking. That brings out the generally second-order character of the 
subject, as reflective thought about particular kinds of thinking – formation of 
beliefs, claims to knowledge – about the world or large parts of it 
(1995:666).(emphasis added) 
 In short, Gerard offers a different, second order, view of national capitalisms. This view is 
taken here to be of central importance, especially in the light of both the narrowness of the 
ECB’s failing single-policy strategy being a direct consequence of EU policy-makers 
following a singular and  unchallenging view of how European capitalisms function, and the 
accompanying monocular view of the role of money in those economies. Gerard’s take on 
how national capitalisms works can also be seen to be neoinstitutionalist in nature. This is 
evidenced first by reference to Table 6, where we can specifically identify the ‘overtly critical 
stance’ and the ‘Interdependent’ and ‘embeddedness’ features of the monetary production 
view. Additionally, with reference to the spectrum of neoinstitutionalist variants in Figure 4, 
Gerard’s account can be aligned with the empirical, historic, and normative aspects of the 
continuum. And, the positing of the monetary production alternative shares elements of 
Wendt’s eclectic ‘thin end’ of constructivism, especially with the idea of states being 
individual units of analysis, although not in the conventional neorealist sense, but as regards 
not being subject to the exogenous ECB interventions of  money, and by creating money 
demand from within the economy. And, the social constructivism position of Hacking is 
visible within the monetary production version via the view that the capitalist economy 
follows a broader explanation of economic phenomena in general, and the workings of 
national capitalisms in particular. Central to these ideas is the view that the behaviour 
patterns of household, firms, and individuals differ from those found in neoclassical theory, 
and that the non-allocative modes of economic activity, those that describe socio-economic 
activity and which are apparently ignored by contemporary EU economic planners, are not 
pre-determined or predictable as the proponents of rational analysis assert. Finally, on the 
constructivist aspect of the monetary production perspective is the less obvious but 
importantly radical view of an imagined (alternative) European ‘economic space’ introduced 
by Ben Rosamond. Here, the constructivist idea that the European economic space can be 
imagined differently falls in line with Gerard’s upside down view of individual national 
economies that can be extended to the collective of Eurosphere capitalisms through 
envisioning that the creation of money flows is a product of both allocative and non-
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allocative modes of economic activity. And, that because of this, the ECB strategy of 
privileging price stability via the exogenous monetary control of the Eurosphere interest rate 
above all other macroeconomic measures, especially those that may stimulate demand and 
create jobs, is both seriously limiting and potentially injurious to the wider EU economy. 
A major strand of Gerard’s critique of the general understanding of capitalisms is the role of 
money in a modern national economy, and the attendant issues of neutrality and non-
neutrality. This leads to the closer examination of modern alternative theories of money in the 
same chapter, and the identification of two sets of thinking about money in a national 
economy: the Post-Keynesians and the Monetarist Circuitists. The four individual schools of 
the Post-Keynesians (See pages 209-210), can be analytically paired into the Structuralists 
and the Horizontalists; and the Monetary Circuitists similarly fall into three sets comprising 
the Italian School, the French Circuit School, and the Dijon-Fribourg School (See pages 210-
211), that can be seen to offer either a Circuitist or Monetary Emissions view of money in a 
national economy.  Although with many differences and similarities to note, both within and 
between them, all the four collectives demonstrate a number of significant commonalities, 
and all of which can be applied to the Eurosphere as a platform for an EU supracapitalism. 
And, it is the similarities that together allow a choice to be made that could be either a 
bespoke hybrid or straight selection of the models on offer. Bearing in mind the uniqueness 
of the EU and the Eurosphere, it is not then unreasonable to opt for a blend of understandings 
of money that would fit a reformed ECB.  
The ECB should then be guided by a policy framework that accepts the above awareness of 
the role of money. That money is neither exogenous nor neutral in relation to the function of 
national economies, rather it is both endogenous and central to the operation of national 
capitalisms; it is demand that creates the commensurate levels of supply in an economy, and 
it is this demand creates the necessary volume of money flows, and therefore the amount of 
money required. Also, that macroeconomic activity is not based on microeconomic 
foundations, and that macroeconomic behaviour cannot be understood or analysed merely as 
a set of economic aggregates. 
The analysis of selected macroeconomic variables over the 20-year pre and post-euro period, 
as advanced in Chapter 3 is predicated on a contextually-contingent group of typologies of 
EU national capitalisms. The first question here is to what extent can these prescribed 
formations be justified, in the sense that any sample size ‘n’ could be taken as n=1, where all 
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EU national capitalisms are seen to be the same; n=8 as in the typologies selected here,   
n=12, where the all the Eurosphere countries are separated as a group, but analysed as 
individual units, or n= 25 to include all EU member-states economies as individual units of 
analysis, and so on. The second question is can such typologies offer any real analytical 
utility anyway, and if this cannot be answered, why bother at all with typologies?  
The broader varieties of capitalism literature discussed above seems to answer these 
questions by pointing to a number different ways to the concept of contextually-contingent 
analysis. In other words, typologies offer significant analytical utility if, and only if, the 
collectives have a basis, and that there is a rationale and an internal logic for their groupings. 
In the ‘varieties’ literature many such collectives are identified, and are typified by a wide 
range of contextually-contingent rationales that include geographical, geo-political, political, 
historical, military, politico-economic, socio-economic, and temporal strategic alliances.  
The typological logic employed here is based on the relationship, and potential relationships, 
that the ECB may enjoy with similar groups of EU capitalisms. Obviously, the Eurosphere 
and non-Eurosphere member states are an automatic sub-grouping, as are the Former Eastern 
Bloc economies, the Baltics, the Benelux countries, the Southern European economies, the 
Nordic economies, and the Rhinish-influenced economies. However, as well as recognising 
this, two more levels of collectivisation can be added: those relating to the direct and indirect 
influence of other national economies, in the way that the UK influences Ireland, and 
Germany sways Austria; and the extent to which national governments choose the level of 
their involvement with the economic activity of their firms and individual citizens, as is the 
case with France and Germany. All of these factors have shaped the selection outlined in 
Chapter 3. The main conclusion here then is that privileging the method of similarity within 
comparative political economy over the method of difference (where n might equal 25), as 
advocated by Strange (1997); Neal and Barbezat; Dicken, (1998); Esping-Andersen (1990); 
Smelser (1971); and Pontusson (1995), for EU analysis can be justified, but with the caution 
that it is difficult to envisage a method, whether typological or non-typological, that would be 
able to capture a universal analytical framework for all purposes, at all times; and therefore 
that must then point to the need for purpose-specific, contextually-contingent analytical 
frameworks.  
Finally, the empirical analysis of Chapter 4, and the assessment of ECB’s post-1999 
performance on pages 186-195, can best be described as inconclusive overall, but at the same 
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time clearly pointing to the limitations and inadequacies of the ECB’s single-policy focus, 
and therefore the effectiveness of this level and type of EU institutional supranationalism. 
And, this is largely due to the extent to which the monetary integration aspect of EMU has 
been achieved by the ECB, as the institution charged with its accomplishment, and how much 
of this has translated into the economic integration planned for, but for which under its 
present remit, the ECB is severely restricted.   
Moreover, because of these shortcomings, it is difficult to meaningfully project the possibility 
of the Eurosphere as an EU supracapitalism in the medium-term, or even maybe long-term, 
unless there are radical reforms of the ECB in terms of both the scale and scope of its policy-
formations, and a more comprehensive and empathetic understanding of how EU national 
capitalisms function, alongside the establishment of a coordinated fiscal mechanism, of 
which the ECB must have some influence on, but not necessarily complete control over. 
The problem here is an existing gap, or a level of incompleteness, between monetary 
integration and adequate pre-requisite economic integration, that can only be achieved with 
the leverage of a coordinated supranational fiscal policy framework. This then raises two 
more problems: on this basis EMU can only go so far without fiscal coordination; and that 
fiscal co-ordination is a major political issue, but where the original plan was to achieve full 
economic and monetary union before effective political union can be envisioned. This means 
we are effectively presented with an interface between the economics of monetary and fiscal 
policy and the politics of Eurosphere tax harmonisation. The relationship between monetary 
integration and national fiscal policy remains problematic for the Eurosphere. This is because 
at the present time national governments are comforted that they have a fall-back position by 
retaining domestic control over their public finances, borrowings, and the formulation of their 
own tax regimes – regimes that are still perceived as both politically sensitive as well as 
being aligned to individual national socio-cultural trajectories. 
The inevitability of Eurosphere crises without fiscal coordination 
Whatever the exchange rate regime, a country’s budgetary policies will have international 
external effects. In a regime where exchange rates are either flexible, or where governments 
occasionally resort to artificial currency realignments, an increase in domestic demand caused 
by a fiscal expansion is reflected in movements in the currency of the initiating country. If 
exchange rates are fixed, these external effects change nature as the exchange rate adjustment 
buffer disappears. Potential spillover effects of a different nature arise when large deficits in 
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one Eurosphere country affect the savings and investment balance of the entire euro area, or 
when a Eurosphere national government that cannot service its debt either leans on the ECB 
to obtain lower interest rates for all the single currency members, or applies for an individual 
cash bail-out. This is the basic academic argument in support of Eurosphere-wide fiscal co-
ordination, but it inevitably must come down to the publication, and subsequent  
supranational  enforcement, of upper limits on deficits and debts, as originally laid down at 
Maastricht where the failed Stability and Growth Pact was spawned. If there is neither fiscal 
coordination, or at least some level of tax harmonisation as an interim measure, Eurosphere 
crises are inevitable. As a footnote to the conclusions of this thesis, the unfolding events of 
May 2010 offer both support to the above arguments, and also a cautionary tale.   
Greece had six months earlier been bailed out as Ireland found itself in similar difficulties. 
Investors nervous about a small European country with ballooning debts and uncertain 
prospects started selling its bonds. ‘A surge in bond yields infects other countries in a similar 
(if less urgent) manner it feeds doubts’ (The Economist, 2010).  
Ireland’s economy, at the time referred to by commentators as the ‘Celtic Tiger’, had been 
growing at a fast rate, but it paid too little attention to its overly-speculative banks and asset 
markets. A property bubble blew up, and Ireland became dangerously dependent on the 
revenues that flowed from it. The country's financial regulators were incompetent at best. 
And, at the first sign of trouble, the government made the mistake of issuing a blanket 
guarantee for all its banks' debts, which meant that taxpayers had to bear the catastrophic 
losses on property bets made by Anglo Irish Bank and others. Ultimately, this pushed the 
budget deficit to 32% of GDP. Moreover, Ireland had long been flirting with a debt crisis of 
its own, but it has not been helped by the other Eurosphere members. To begin with, the 
rescue of Greece mentioned above was a botch: it had fudged the obvious issue that Greece 
would never fully be able to repay its debts on time, if at all; and, the temporary support 
scheme cobbled together for the rest of the Eurosphere was equally flawed - in particular, it 
was too easy on private creditors.  
At an EU summit at the end of October the German chancellor won agreement that any future 
Eurosphere rescue scheme should include a mechanism for a structured sovereign-debt 
default mechanism. The principle was absolutely right; unless default is a possibility, bond 
investors have no reason to distinguish between good and bad credits. However, the ideas of 
making bond-holders lose money when sovereign credits turn sour was aired without any 
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guidance about how and when it might apply. To make matters worse, the Germans failed to 
put together a detailed proposal outlining the above structure for the summit.  
There was a knock-on effect with Ireland, Greece, and now Portugal all trying to deliver 
austere budgets for 2011. Bond-holders were invited to fear the worst, and subsequently the 
Irish were under increasing pressure, with the Greeks and others on tenterhooks. An Irish 
problem had quickly become a Eurosphere problem - and a UK worry, too, given its close 
links with Ireland, the only other LME in the Eurosphere. Additionally, the proposed 
solution, when it came, demonstrates how different Ireland in fact is from Greece, which at 
the time was pleading for money from a reluctant Mrs Merkel. This time the argument is 
between the Irish, who have insisted they do not need a bail-out, and some of the large 
Eurosphere countries which insist they must take one. 
The Irish were right in that that they had enough money to last until the middle of the 
following year, but they could face runs on their banks long before then. Moreover, the Irish 
were also suspicious of intentions in Brussels and Berlin. Too much of the EU's motivation 
seemed to be to punish Ireland for its liberal market, ‘Anglo-Saxon’, ways especially its 
highly competitive 12.5% tax rate on corporate profits, which helped it attract foreign firms 
in the first place. Raising this would have been be illogical, especially as Ireland was 
planning budget cuts for the next year of 3.8% of GDP; ‘any economy would struggle against 
that headwind’ (The Economist, 2010) 
Academics and other influential commentators argued that European rescue funds should be 
used to stabilise Ireland's banks, insisting only on certain budget targets in return. Such a deal 
would have satisfied Ireland's Eurosphere partners, which preferred an end to the uncertainty, 
and also the ECB, on which Ireland's own banks had become overly reliant for funding. It 
would also have been wise to offer a similar deal to Portugal, with its banks then also 
dependent on ECB support, and also facing significant falls in confidence from the bond 
market  
Could the euro survive? For all the talk then of the euro failing to survive this sovereign-debt 
crisis, it would be able struggle through. Despite the troubles on its periphery, the public debt 
of the Eurosphere as a whole is not particularly high by rich-country standards. The real 
problems are the absence of a credible plan to deal with errant countries (as the Germans had 
recognised), the structural imbalances between Germany and the less competitive SEE 
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members and, most of all, the poor growth prospects for those poorer, weaker Eurosphere 
economies, would be made worse by any fiscal retrenchment. And ‘by being denied the 
possibility of devaluation, slow-growing countries like Portugal and now Spain would be 
looking for meaningful structural reform’ (The Economist, 2010).  
This crisis highlights both the problems a partially straight-jacketed ECB faces when fiscal 
problems arise, and also, as is the case here with Ireland and the Eurosphere southern 
European economies (SEEEs), that groups of member-states within the Eurosphere are 
different, and have to be managed in different ways. This leads back to the title of the thesis, 
and that although some potential for a supracapitalism can evidenced in part, any such 
development will require both a complete rethink about the ECB as a supranational 
institution, and the now necessary need to move closer towards the political integration that 
any attempt at a coordinated Eurosphere fiscal policy demands. 
Closing remarks 
The constructivist-institutionalist commentaries on pages 179-185 describe the unfolding 
nature of the Eurosphere as a political process, a path dependent process, a cultural process, 
and an evolving social process. These progressions are also interrelational, and together 
illustrate the potential for a Eurosphere type of EU supracapitalism in terms of ideas, 
discourses, and the unfolding of a clear Eurosphere identity. Whilst hopefully justifying the 
selection of such an international relations-political science method of viewing the EU, the 
ECB, and the Eurosphere, I would argue the euro area can clearly be seen to have evolved, in 
the seven years or so of its making, towards a partially complete capitalism in its own right. 
However, the fairly extensive empirical scrutiny of the ECB’s overall performance, together 
with the existing and potential sub-structures (or sub-spheres) that characterise the 
Eurosphere at present, point to a much longer gestation period for the type of EU 
supracapitalism advanced in the opening passages. The title ‘The Potential for an EU 
Supracapitalism’ really implies the question to what extent can the Eurosphere become a 
complete and integrated capitalist economy - perhaps in a similar way to the United States? 
The answer appears to be an EU supracapitalism in the Eurosphere remains a possibility, but 
not a probability, without further and deeper political integration. However, it remains 
unclear as whether even this progression would address the wealth inequality that originally 
inspired this work. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for EU economic growth 1986-2006 (tests 1-13) 
 
 
1. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro.  [CME (E-BE) compared to CME (E-AE) (groups a & b in 
key code)] 
 
                          N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (E-BE)   104  5.59   3.05     0.30 
CME (E-AE)   64  4.49   2.51       0.31 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME (E-BE)) - mu (CME (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.ten0 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.244, 1.956) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.54  P-Value = 0.012  DF = 152 
 
 
2. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [CME (NE-BE) compared to CME (NE-AE) (groups c & d 
in key code)] 
 
 
                          N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (NE-BE)  26  5.47   2.86     0.56 
CME (NE-AE)  16  4.46   1.38     0.34 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME(NE-BE)) - mu (CME (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.007 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.325, 2.339) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.53  P-Value = 0.134  DF = 38 
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3. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies within  the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [LME (E-BE) compared to LME (E-AE) (groups e & f in key 
code)]  
 
                      N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (E-BE)  13   9.25   3.74      1.0 
LME (E-AE)   8  10.55   3.47      1.2 
 
Difference = mu (LME(E-BE)) - mu (LME(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.30 
95percent CI for difference:  (-4.72, 2.13) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.81  P-Value = 0.433  DF = 15 
 
 
4. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies outside  the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro.  [LME (NE-BE) compared to LME (NE-AE) (groups g & h in 
key code)] 
 
                          N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (NE-BE)  13   7.08   2.28      0.63 
LME (NE-AE)   8  5.225  0.590     0.21 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(NE-BE)) - mu (LME(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.860 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.433, 3.286) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.80  P-Value = 0.014  DF = 14 
 
 
5. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies within the 
Eurosphere pre-euro [(LME (E-BE) compared to Liberal Market Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre-euro. (LME (NE-BE) (groups e & g in key code)] 
 
 
                          N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (E-BE)     13  9.25   3.74      1.0 
LME (NE-BE)  13  7.08   2.28     0.63 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(E-BE)) - mu (LME(NE-BE)) 
Estimate for difference:  2.17 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.37, 4.71) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.79  P-Value = 0.090  DF = 19 
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6. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies within the 
Eurosphere post-euro. [(LME (E-BE) compared to Liberal Market Economies outside the 
Eurosphere post-euro (LME (NE-BE)  (groups f & h in key code)] 
 
                         N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (E-AE)    8 10.55   3.47      1.2 
LME (NE-AE) 8  5.225  0.590    0.21 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(E-AE)) - mu (LME(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  5.33 
95percent CI for difference:  (2.38, 8.27) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 4.28  P-Value = 0.004DF = 7 
 
 
7. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Southern European Economies within the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [SEE (E-BE) compared to SEE (E-AE) (groups I & j in key 
code)] 
 
                     N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SEE (E-BE)  39  12.43   5.48     0.88 
SEE (E-AE)  24   7.16   2.28      0.47 
 
 
Difference = mu (SEE(E-BE)) - mu (SEE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  5.275 
95percent CI for difference:  (3.284, 7.266) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.31  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 55 
 
 
8. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Former Eastern Bloc Economies outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [FEB (NE-BE) compared to FEB (NE-AE) (groups k & l 
in key code)] 
 
                         N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FEB (NE-BE)  34  43.3   80.7       14 
FEB (NE-AE)  24  8.17   3.32     0.68 
 
 
Difference = mu (FEB(NE-BE)) - mu (FEB(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  35.1 
95percent CI for difference:  (6.9, 63.3) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.53  P-Value = 0.016  DF = 33 
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9. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Small Island Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [(SIE (NE-BE) compared to SIE (NE-AE) (groups m & n in 
key code)] 
 
                    N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SIE (E-BE)  26  8.83   3.09     0.61 
SIE (E-AE)  16  5.82   2.39     0.60 
 
 
Difference = mu (SIE (E-BE)) - mu (SIE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  3.006 
95percent CI for difference:  (1.281, 4.730) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.53  P-Value = 0.001  DF = 37 
 
 
10. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Baltic Country Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [BCE (NE-BE) compared to BCE (NE-AE) (groups o & p in 
key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for BCE(E-BE) vs BCE(E-AE) 
 
                      N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
BCE (E-BE)  21    111    194       42 
BCE (E-AE)  24  11.59   5.70      1.2 
 
 
Difference = mu (BCE(E-BE)) - mu (BCE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  99.5 
95percent CI for difference:  (11.0, 188.0) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.35  P-Value = 0.029  DF = 20 
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11. One-way ANOVA for All Country Economies within the Eurosphere pre and post –euro. 
[ALL (E-BE) compared to ALL (E-AE) (groups q & r in key code)] 
 
Source   DF      SS     MS      F      P 
Factor     1     224.7  224.7  12.30  0.001 
Error   250   4568.0   18.3 
Total   251   4792.7 
 
S = 4.275   R-Sq = 4.69percent   R-Sq(adj) = 4.31percent 
 
 
                           Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                           Pooled StDev 
Level              N   Mean  StDev  --+---------+---------+---------+------- 
ALL (EBE)  156  7.606  4.843                       (------*------) 
ALL (EAE)   96  5.661  3.134  (--------*-------) 
                           --+---------+---------+---------+------- 
                           5.0       6.0       7.0       8.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 4.275 
 
 
 
12. One-way ANOVA for All Country Economies within the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. 
[ALL (NE-BE) compared to ALL (NE-AE) post-euro (groups s & t in key code)] 
 
Source   DF       SS     MS     F      P 
Factor    1    39358  39358  7.07  0.008 
Error   206  1147208   5569 
Total   207  1186566 
 
S = 74.63   R-Sq = 3.32percent   R-Sq(adj) = 2.85percent 
 
 
                            Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                            Pooled StDev 
Level                 N   Mean  StDev  -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
ALL (NEBE)  120  35.58  98.11                      (--------*--------) 
ALL (NEAE)   88   7.74   4.50  (---------*----------) 
                            -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                                 0        15        30        45 
 
Pooled StDev = 74.63 
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13. One-way ANOVA for All Country Economies pre and post-euro. [ALL (E-AE) compared 
to ALL (NE-AE) (groups u & v in key code)] 
 
 
Source   DF       SS     MS     F      P 
Factor    1    18988  18988  7.22  0.007 
Error   458  1205045   2631 
Total   459  1224033 
 
S = 51.29   R-Sq = 1.55percent   R-Sq(adj) = 1.34percent 
 
 
                          Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level        N   Mean  StDev   -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
ALLBE  276  19.77  66.12                        (-------*--------) 
ALLAE  184   6.65   3.97   (----------*---------) 
                           -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
                          0.0       7.0      14.0      21.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 51.29 
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Appendix 2 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for EU economic growth per head of population 1986-2006 
(tests 1-13) 
 
1. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [CME (E-BE) compared to CME (E-AE) (groups a & b in 
key code)] 
 
                        N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (E-BE)   104  119.7   29.7      2.9 
CME (E-AE)     64  122.0   41.3        5.2 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME(E-BE)) - mu (CME (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -2.30 
95percent CI for difference:  (-14.04, 9.44) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.39  P-Value = 0.699  DF = 103 
 
 
2. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [(CME (NE-BE))compared to (CME (NE-AE) (groups  
c & d in key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for CME(NE-BE) vs CME(NE-AE) 
 
                          N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (NE-BE)  26  137.54   9.81      1.9 
CME (NE-AE)  16   131.3   11.0       2.7 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME (NE-BE)) - mu (CME(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  6.20 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.65, 13.04) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.85  P-Value = 0.074  DF = 29 
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3. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere (CME (E-BE)) and Co-ordinated Market Economies outside the Eurosphere 
[(CME (NE-BE), both pre-euro (groups b & d in key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for CME (E-BE) vs CME (NE-BE) 
 
                         N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (E-BE)    104   119.7   29.7      2.9 
CME (NE-BE)   26  137.54   9.81      1.9 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME (E-BE)) - mu (CME (NE-BE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -17.82 
95percent CI for difference:  (-24.73, -ten.92) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.11  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 118 
 
 
4. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies within the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [LME (E-BE) compared to LME (E-AE) (groups e & f in key 
code)] 
 
Two-sample T for LME(E-BE) vs LME(E-AE) 
 
                       N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (E-BE)  13   76.4   12.1      3.3 
LME (E-AE)   8  133.5   13.2      4.7 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(E-BE)) - mu (LME(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -57.12 
95percent CI for difference:  (-69.50, -44.74) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -9.97  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 13 
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5. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [LME (NE-BE) compared to LME (NE-AE) (groups g & h in 
key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for LME(NE-BE) vs LME(NE-AE) 
 
                          N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (NE-BE)  13   90.48   6.68      1.9 
LME (NE-AE)   8  112.68   2.58     0.91 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME (NE-BE)) - mu (LME (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -22.20 
95percent CI for difference:  (-26.58, -17.82) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -ten.75  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 16 
 
 
6. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies outside the 
Eurosphere post-euro. [(LME (NE-AE)) compared to Liberal Market Economies within the 
Eurosphere post-euro (LME (E-AE (groups f & h in key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for LME (NE-AE) vs LME (E-AE) 
 
                          N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (NE-AE)   8  112.68   2.58     0.91 
LME (E-AE)      8   133.5   13.2      4.7 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(NE-AE)) - mu (LME(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -20.82 
95percent CI for difference:  (-32.04, -9.61) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.39  P-Value = 0.003  DF = 7 
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7. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Southern European Economies within the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [SEE (E-BE) compared to SEE (E-AE) (groups I & j in key 
code)] 
 
Two-sample T for SEE(E-BE) vs SEE(E-AE) 
 
                      N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SEE (E-BE)  41   52.2   10.4      1.6 
SEE (E-AE)  22  62.99   9.74      2.1 
 
 
Difference = mu (SEE(E-BE)) - mu (SEE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -ten.74 
95percent CI for difference:  (-16.05, -5.43) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.08  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 45 
 
 
8. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Former Eastern Bloc Economies outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. FEB (NE-BE) compared to FEB (NE-AE) (groups k & l in 
key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for FEB(NE-BE) vs FEB(NE-AE) 
 
                        N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FEB (NE-BE)  35  15.83   5.41     0.91 
FEB (NE-AE)  24  27.13   5.73      1.2 
 
Difference = mu (FEB(NE-BE)) - mu (FEB(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -11.30 
95percent CI for difference:  (-14.29, -8.32) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -7.62  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 47 
 
 
9. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Small Island Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [SIE (NE-BE) compared to SIE (NE-AE) (groups m & n in 
key code)] 
Two-sample T for SIE(E-AE) vs SIE(E-BE) 
 
                      N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SIE (E-AE)   6  55.6   12.8      5.2 
SIE (E-BE)  36  48.3   10.1      1.7 
 
Difference = mu (SIE(E-AE)) - mu (SIE(E-BE)) 
Estimate for difference:  7.21 
95percent CI for difference:  (-6.21, 20.62) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.31  P-Value = 0.237  DF = 6 
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10. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Baltic Country Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [BCE (NE-BE) compared to BCE (NE-AE) (groups o & p in 
key code)] 
 
 
Two-sample T for BCE (E-BE) vs BCE (E-AE) 
 
                       N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
BCE (E-BE)  20   9.27   4.29     0.96 
BCE (E-AE)  24  20.67   5.52      1.1 
 
 
Difference = mu (BCE(E-BE)) - mu (BCE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -11.40 
95percent CI for difference:  (-14.39, -8.41) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -7.70  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 41 
 
 
11. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all economies within the Eurosphere pre 
and post-euro. [ALL (E-BE) compared to ALL (E-AE) (groups q & r in key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for ALL (E-BE) vs ALL (E-AE) 
 
                         N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (E-BE)  215   86.2   40.9      2.8 
ALL (E-AE)  100 10.6   43.8      4.4 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL (E-BE)) - mu (ALL (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -19.78 
95percent CI for difference:  (-30.02, -9.54) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.81  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 181 
 
 
12. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all economies outside the Eurosphere 
pre and post-euro [ ALL (NE-BE) compared to ALL (NE-AE) ( groups s & t in key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for ALL(NE-AE) vs ALL(NE-BE) 
 
                           N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (NE-AE)     72  57.6   48.9      5.8 
ALL (NE-BE)   129  47.6   51.4      4.5 
 
Difference = mu (ALL (NE-AE)) - mu (ALL (NE-BE)) 
Estimate for difference:  ten.04 
95percent CI for difference:  (-4.43, 24.51) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.37  P-Value = 0.172  DF = 15 
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13. One-way ANOVA for All Country Economies pre and post-euro. [ALL (E-AE) compared 
to ALL (NE-AE) (groups u & v in key code)] 
 
 
 
Source   DF       SS     MS      F      P 
Factor    1    67688  67688  29.20  0.000 
Error   498  1154322   2318 
Total   499  1222009 
 
S = 48.14   R-Sq = 5.54percent   R-Sq(adj) = 5.35percent 
 
 
                            Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                            Pooled StDev 
Level          N   Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
ALL (BE)  344  71.71  48.75  (----*----) 
ALL (AE)  156  96.83  46.78                        (-------*------) 
                            ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                              70        80        90       ten0 
 
Pooled StDev = 48.14 
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Appendix 3 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for EU productivity 1986-2006 (tests 1-13) 
 
 
1. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [CME (E-BE) compared to CME (E-AE) (groups a & b in 
key code)] 
 
                         N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (E-BE)   104  2.06   1.43     0.14 
CME (E-AE)     64  1.34   1.10     0.14 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME (E-BE)) - mu (CME (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  0.723 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.334, 1.111) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.68  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 157 
 
 
2. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [CME (NE-BE) compared to CME (NE-AE) (groups c & d 
in key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for CME(NE-BE) vs CME(NE-AE) 
 
                           N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (NE-BE)  26  2.01   1.22     0.24 
CME (NE-AE)  16  1.86   1.26     0.32 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME (NE-BE)) - mu (CME (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  0.155 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.653, 0.964) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.39  P-Value = 0. 
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3. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies within the 
Eurosphere  pre and post-euro. [ LME (E-BE) compared to LME (E-AE) (groups e & f in key 
code)] 
 
                        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (E-BE)  13  3.28   2.23     0.62 
LME (E-AE)   8  2.71   1.44      0.51 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(E-BE)) - mu (LME(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  0.572 
95percent CI for difference:  (-1.112, 2.256) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.71  P-Value = 0.485  DF = 18 
 
 
 
4. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro.  [LME (NE-BE) compared to LME (NE-AE) (groups g & h in 
key code)] 
 
                           N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (NE-BE)  13   1.87   1.16     0.32 
LME (NE-AE)   8  1.750  0.532     0.19 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(NE-BE)) - mu (LME(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  0.119 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.663, 0.901) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.32  P-Value = 0.752  DF = 18 
 
 
 
5. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Southern European Economies within the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [SEEE (E-BE) compared to SEE (EE-AE) (groups I & j in key 
code)] 
 
                      N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SEE (E-BE)  42  1.99   2.21     0.34 
SEE (E-AE)  21  1.08   1.09     0.24 
 
 
Difference = mu (SEE(E-BE)) - mu (SEE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  0.907 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.077, 1.737) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.19  P-Value = 0.033  DF = 6 
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6. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Former Eastern Bloc  Economies outside 
the Eurosphere  pre and post-euro. [FEB (NE-BE) compared to FEB (NE-AE) (groups k & l 
in key code)] 
 
 
                         N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FEB (NE-BE)  19  2.82   4.32     0.99 
FEB (NE-AE)  24  3.97   1.79     0.37 
 
 
Difference = mu (FEB(NE-BE)) - mu (FEB(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.15 
95percent CI for difference:  (-3.35, 1.04) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.09  P-Value = 0.287  DF = 22 
 
7. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Small Island Economies (SIEs) outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [SIE (NE-BE) compared to SIE (NE-AE) (groups m & n in 
key code)] 
 
                       N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SIE (NE-BE)  10 3.20   1.25     0.39 
SIE (NE-AE)  16  1.13   2.12     0.53 
 
 
Difference = mu (SIE(NE-BE)) - mu (SIE(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  2.075 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.710, 3.440) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.14  P-Value = 0.005  DF = 23 
 
 
8. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Baltic Country Economies (BCEs) 
outside the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [BCE (NE-BE) compared to BCE (NE-AE) 
(groups o & p in key code)] 
 
                         N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
BCE (NE-BE)  20   1.5   11.0      2.4 
BCE (NE-AE)  24  6.84   2.34     0.48 
 
 
Difference = mu (BCE(NE-BE)) - mu (BCE(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -5.33 
95percent CI for difference:  (-10.54, -0.13) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.14  P-Value = 0.045  DF = 20 
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9. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all economies within the Eurosphere pre 
and post-euro. [ALL (E-BE) compared to ALL (E-AE) (groups q & r in key code)] 
 
                       N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (E-BE)  158  2.41   2.06     0.16 
ALL (E-AE)   94  1.45   1.30     0.13 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL (E-BE)) - mu (ALL(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  0.955 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.538, 1.372) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 4.51  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 248 
 
10. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all economies outside the Eurosphere 
pre and post-euro. [ALL (NE-BE) compared to ALL (NE-AE) (groups s & t in key code)] 
 
                         N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (NE-BE)   95  2.43   5.45      0.56 
ALL (NE-AE)  104  3.65   2.69     0.26 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL(NE-BE)) - mu (ALL(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.220 
95percent CI for difference:  (-2.442, 0.003) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.97  P-Value = 0.051  DF = 134 
 
 
11. One-way ANOVA for all economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [ALL 
(NE-BE) compared to ALL (NE-AE) (groups s & t in key code)] 
 
Source   DF      SS    MS     F      P 
Factor    1    73.9  73.9  4.11  0.044 
Error   197  3536.5  18.0 
Total   198  3610.4 
 
S = 4.237   R-Sq = 2.05percent   R-Sq(adj) = 1.55percent 
 
Level                  N   Mean  StDev 
ALL (NE-BE)   95  2.427  5.449 
ALL (NE-AE)  104  3.647  2.690 
 
            Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on Pooled StDev 
Level         +---------+---------+---------+--------- 
ALL(NE-BE)    (---------*----------) 
ALL(NE-AE)                   (----------*---------)    .60      2.40      3.20      4.00 
Pooled StDev = 4.23 
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12. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all economies pre and post-euro. [ALL 
(BE) compared to ALL (AE) (groups u & v in key code)] 
 
 
 
                    N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (BE)  253  2.42   3.70     0.23 
ALL (AE)  198  2.61   2.41     0.17 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL(BE)) - mu (ALL(AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.190 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.758, 0.378) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.66  P-Value = 0.511  DF = 435 
 
 
 
13. One-way ANOVA for all economies pre and post-euro. [ALL (BE) compared to ALL 
(AE) (groups u & v in key code)] 
 
Source   DF      SS    MS     F      P 
Factor    1     4.0   4.0  0.39  0.532 
Error   449  4596.1 10.2 
Total   450  4600.1 
 
S = 3.199   R-Sq = 0.09percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                            Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                            Pooled StDev 
Level            N   Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
ALL (BE)  253  2.415  3.703  (-------------*------------) 
ALL (AE)  198  2.605  2.407       (--------------*--------------) 
                            ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                             2.10      2.40      2.70      3.00 
 
Pooled StDev = 3.199 
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Appendix 4 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for EU price stability through inflation (GDP deflator 
method) 1986-2006 (tests 1-11) 
 
 
1. One-way ANOVA for Co-ordinated Market Economies within the Eurosphere pre and 
post-euro. [CME (E-BE) compared to CME (E-AE) (groups a & b in key code)] 
 
Source   DF      SS     MS      F      P 
Factor    1   200.5  200.5  18.59  0.000 
Error   250  2695.7   10.8 
Total   251  2896.2 
 
S = 3.284   R-Sq = 6.92percent   R-Sq(adj) = 6.55percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level               N   Mean  StDev  --------+---------+---------+---------+- 
ALL (E-BE)  156  4.288  4.021                           (------*-----) 
ALL (E-AE)   96  2.451  1.414  (--------*-------) 
                              --------+---------+---------+---------+- 
                                    2.40      3.20      4.00      4.80 
 
Pooled StDev = 3.284 
 
2. One-way ANOVA for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and 
post-euro. [CME (NE-BE) compared to CME (NE-AE) (groups c & d in key code)] 
 
Source  DF      SS     MS     F      P 
Factor   1   31.41  31.41  7.60  0.009 
Error   40  165.40   4.14 
Total   41  196.81 
 
S = 2.033   R-Sq = 15.96percent   R-Sq(adj) = 13.86percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level                  N   Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
CME (NE-BE)  26  3.481  2.514                      (-------*-------) 
CME (NE-AE)  16  1.700  0.703  (---------*---------) 
                              ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                               1.0       2.0       3.0       4.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 2.033 
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3. One-way ANOVA for Liberal Market Economies within the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. 
[LME (E-BE) compared to LME (E-AE) (groups e & f in key code)] 
 
 
Source  DF     SS    MS     F      P 
Factor   1   1.09  1.09  0.31  0.581 
Error   19  65.53  3.45 
Total   20  66.61 
 
S = 1.857   R-Sq = 1.63percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                             Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                             Pooled StDev 
Level               N   Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
LME (E-BE)  13  3.269  2.043  (-------------*------------) 
LME (E-AE)   8  3.738   1.486     (----------------*----------------) 
                             ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                              2.40      3.20      4.00      4.80 
 
Pooled StDev = 1.857 
 
 
4. One-way ANOVA for Liberal Market Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-
euro. [LME (NE-BE) compared to LME (NE-AE) (groups g & h in key code]) 
 
 
Source  DF     SS     MS     F      P 
Factor   1  21.36  21.36  7.56  0.013 
Error   19  53.70   2.83 
Total   20  75.07 
 
S = 1.681   R-Sq = 28.46percent   R-Sq(adj) = 24.69percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level                  N   Mean  StDev   -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
LME (NE-BE)  13  4.377  2.046                      (-------*--------) 
LME (NE-AE)   8  2.300  0.705   (---------*----------) 
                               -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
                              1.2       2.4       3.6       4.8 
 
Pooled StDev = 1.681 
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5. One-way ANOVA for Southern European Economies within the Eurosphere pre and post-
euro. [SEE (E-BE) compared to SEE (E-AE) (groups I & j in key code)] 
 
 
Source  DF      SS     MS      F      P 
Factor   1   437.2  437.2  26.39  0.000 
Error   61  1010.5   16.6 
Total   62  1447.7 
 
S = 4.070   R-Sq = 30.20percent   R-Sq(adj) = 29.05percent 
 
 
                             Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                             Pooled StDev 
Level             N   Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
SEE (E-BE)  39  8.841  5.120                         (----*-----) 
SEE (E-AE)  24  3.417  0.792  (------*-----) 
                             ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                              2.5       5.0       7.5      ten.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 4.070 
 
 
6. One-way ANOVA for Former Eastern Bloc Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and 
post-euro. [FEB (NE-BE) compared to FEB (NE-AE) (groups k & l in key code)] 
 
Source  DF      SS      MS      F      P 
Factor   1  3456.9  3456.9  49.14  0.000 
Error   45  3165.4    70.3 
Total   46  6622.4 
 
S = 8.387   R-Sq = 52.20percent   R-Sq(adj) = 51.14percent 
 
 
                                Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                                Pooled StDev 
Level                N    Mean   StDev  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
FEB (NE-BE)  23  21.552  11.685                           (----*----) 
FEB (NE-AE)  24   4.396   2.652  (----*----) 
                                ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                                       7.0      14.0      21.0      28.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 8.387 
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7. One-way ANOVA for Small Island Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. 
[SIE (NE-BE) compared to SIE (NE-AE) (groups m & n in key code)] 
 
Source  DF     SS    MS     F      P 
Factor   1   0.69  0.69  0.35  0.558 
Error   29  56.82  1.96 
Total   30  57.51 
 
S = 1.400   R-Sq = 1.20percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level               N   Mean  StDev  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
SIE (NE-BE)  15  3.073  1.738        (-------------*--------------) 
SIE (NE-AE)  16  2.775  0.984  (--------------*-------------) 
                              ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                                     2.50      3.00      3.50      4.00 
 
Pooled StDev = 1.400 
 
 
8. One-way ANOVA for Baltic Country Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-
euro. [BCE (NE-BE) compared to BCE (NE-AE) (groups o & p in key code)] 
 
Source  DF       SS      MS     F      P 
Factor   1   212049  212049  5.98  0.019 
Error   43  1525475   35476 
Total   44  1737524 
 
S = 188.4   R-Sq = 12.20percent   R-Sq(adj) = ten.16percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level                N   Mean  StDev  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
BCE (NE-BE)  21  141.6  276.1                  (----------*---------) 
BCE (NE-AE)  24    4.0    3.7  (---------*--------) 
                              ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                                       0        80       160       240 
 
Pooled StDev = 188.4 
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9. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all economies within the Eurosphere pre 
and post-euro. [ALL (E-BE) compared to ALL (E-AE) (groups q & r in key code)] 
 
 
                        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (E-BE)  156  4.29   4.02     0.32 
ALL (E-AE)   96  2.45   1.41      0.14 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL(E-BE)) - mu (ALL(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.837 
95percent CI for difference:  (1.141, 2.532) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.21  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 209 
 
 
10. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all economies outside the Eurosphere 
pre and post-euro. [ALL (NE-BE) compared to ALL (NE-AE) (groups s & t in key code)] 
 
 
 
                          N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (NE-BE)  121    34    124       11 
ALL (NE-AE)  117  3.72   2.67     0.25 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL (NE-BE)) - mu (ALL (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  30.6 
95percent CI for difference:  (8.4, 52.9) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.73  P-Value = 0.007  DF = 120 
 
 
 
 
11. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all economies pre and post-euro. [ALL 
(BE) compared to ALL (AE) (groups u & v in key code]) 
 
 
                   N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (BE)  277  17.4   82.9      5.0 
ALL (AE)  213  3.15   2.28     0.16 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL(BE)) - mu (ALL(AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  14.28 
95percent CI for difference:  (4.47, 24.09) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.87  P-Value = 0.004  DF = 27 
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Appendix 5 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for EU price stability through inflation (HICP method)  
1997-2006 (tests 1-7) 
 
1. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere for the period and Co-ordinated Market Economies outside the Eurosphere 
period  [CME (E) compared to CME (NE) (groups a & b in key code)] 
 
                     N   Mean StDev SE Mean 
CME (E)     80  1.872  0.829    0.093 
CME (NE)  20  1.705  0.644     0.14 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME(E)) - mu (CME(NE)) 
Estimate for difference:  0.167 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.180, 0.515) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.98  P-Value = 0.334  DF = 36 
 
 
2. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies within the 
Eurosphere for the period and Liberal Market Economies outside the Eurosphere period 
[LME (E) compared to LME (NE) (groups c & d in key code)] 
 
                   N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (E)    10   3.11   1.30     0.41 
LME (NE) 10  1.510  0.448     0.14 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME (E)) - mu (LME (NE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.600 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.642, 2.558) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.68  P-Value = 0.004  DF = 11 
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3. One-way ANOVA for all groups over the period [CME (E), CME (NE), LME (E), LME 
(NE), SEE( E), SIE (NE), FEB (NE), and BCE (NE) (group i in key code)] 
 
Source   DF       SS     MS      F      P 
Factor    7   462.14  66.02  14.84  0.000 
Error   222   987.67   4.45 
Total   229  1449.80 
 
S = 2.109   R-Sq = 31.88percent   R-Sq(adj) = 29.73percent 
 
 
                           Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                           Pooled StDev 
Level            N   Mean  StDev  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
CME (E)     80  1.872  0.829        (-*--) 
CME (NE)  20  1.705  0.644     (----*---) 
LME (E)     10  3.110  1.301          (------*-----) 
LME (NE)  10  1.510  0.448  (------*-----) 
SIE (E)       20  2.710  0.886          (----*---) 
SEE (E)      30  3.317  0.917              (---*--) 
FEB (NE)   30  6.020  4.717                           (---*---) 
BCE (NE)   30  3.940  2.778                 (---*--) 
                           ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                                  2.0       4.0       6.0       8.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 2.109 
 
 
Grouping Information Using Tukey Method 
 
                      N   Mean  Grouping 
FEB (NE)    30  6.020  A 
BCE (NE)   30  3.940    B 
SEE (E)       30  3.317    B C 
LME (E)     10  3.110   B C D 
SIE (E)        20  2.710    B C D 
CME (E)     80  1.872        D 
CME (NE)  20  1.705      C D 
LME (NE)  10  1.510      C D 
 
Means that do not share a letter are significantly different. 
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4. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Small Island Economies outside the 
Eurosphere for the period and Southern European Economies inside the Eurosphere for the 
period [SIE (NE) compared to SEE (E) (groups e & f in key code)] 
 
 
                 N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SIE (E)   20  2.710  0.886     0.20 
SEE (E)  30  3.317  0.917     0.17 
 
 
Difference = mu (SIE (E)) - mu (SEE (E)) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.607 
95percent CI for difference:  (-1.131, -0.083) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.34  P-Value = 0.024  DF = 41 
 
 
5. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Former Eastern Bloc Economies outside 
the Eurosphere for the period and Baltic Country Economies outside the Eurosphere for the 
period [FEB (NE) compared to BCE (NE) (groups g & h in key code)] 
 
 
                   N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FEB (NE)  30  6.02   4.72     0.86 
BCE (NE)  30  3.94   2.78     0.51 
 
 
Difference = mu (FEB(NE)) - mu (BCE(NE)) 
Estimate for difference:  2.08 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.07, 4.09) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.08  P-Value = 0.043  DF = 46 
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6. One-way ANOVA for Co-ordinated Market Economies within the Eurosphere, Co-
ordinated Market Economies outside the Eurosphere, and Liberal Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere [CME(E), CME(NE), and LME(E) over the period (groups a, b,& c in key 
code)] 
 
 
 
Source   DF      SS     MS      F      P 
Factor    2  15.135  7.567 10.46  0.000 
Error   107  77.418  0.724 
Total   109  92.553 
 
S = 0.8506   R-Sq = 16.35percent   R-Sq(adj) = 14.79percent 
 
 
                             Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                             Pooled StDev 
Level           N    Mean   StDev  --------+---------+---------+---------+- 
CME (E)     80  1.8725  0.8292        (--*--) 
CME (NE)  20  1.7050  0.6436  (-----*------) 
LME (E)    103 1.100  1.3008                       (--------*--------) 
                             --------+---------+---------+---------+- 
                                   1.80      2.40      3.00      3.60 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.8506 
 
 
Grouping Information Using Tukey Method 
 
                  N    Mean  Grouping 
LME (E)   10  3.1100  A 
CME (E)   80  1.8725    B 
CME (NE)  20  1.7050    B 
 
Means that do not share a letter are significantly different. 
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7. One-way ANOVA for Co-ordinated Market Economies within the Eurosphere, Co-
ordinated Market Economies outside the Eurosphere, and Liberal Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere [CME(E), CME(NE), and LME(E), over the period (groups a, b, & d in key 
code)] 
 
Source   DF      SS     MS     F      P 
Factor    2   1.433  0.716  1.20  0.306 
Error   107  63.998  0.598 
Total   109  65.431 
 
S = 0.7734   R-Sq = 2.19percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.36percent 
 
 
                             Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                             Pooled StDev 
Level             N    Mean   StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
CME (E)       80  1.8725  0.8292                         (----*-----) 
CME (NE)    20  1.7050  0.6436             (-----------*----------) 
LME (NE)    10  1.5ten0  0.4483  (---------------*---------------) 
                             ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                                 1.20      1.50      1.80      2.10 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.7734 
 
 
 
Grouping Information Using Tukey Method 
 
                     N    Mean  Grouping 
CME (E)     80  1.8725  A 
CME (NE)  20  1.7050  A 
LME (NE)  10  1.5ten0  A 
 
Means that do not share a letter are significantly different. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for EU unemployment 1986-2006 (tests 1-11) 
 
 
1. One-way ANOVA for Co-ordinated Market Economies within the Eurosphere pre and 
post-euro. [CME (E-BE) compared to CME (E-AE) (groups a & b in key code)] 
 
Source   DF      SS    MS     F      P 
Factor    1     4.4   4.4  0.43  0.512 
Error   166  1685.0  ten.2 
Total   167  1689.4 
 
S = 3.186   R-Sq = 0.26percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                               Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                               Pooled StDev 
Level                  N   Mean  StDev  --------+---------+---------+---------+- 
CME (E-BE)   104  7.220  3.474            (-----------*------------) 
CME (E-AE)     64  6.887  2.648  (---------------*--------------) 
                               --------+---------+---------+---------+- 
                                     6.50      7.00      7.50      8.00 
 
Pooled StDev = 3.186 
 
 
2. One-way ANOVA for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and 
post-euro. [CME (NE-BE) compared to CME (NE-AE) (groups c & d in key code)] 
 
Source  DF      SS    MS     F      P 
Factor   1    5.52  5.52  1.11  0.298 
Error   40  198.80  4.97 
Total   41  204.32 
 
S = 2.229   R-Sq = 2.70percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.27percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level                 N   Mean  StDev  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
CME (NE-BE)  26  6.165  2.709                (------------*------------) 
CME (NE-AE)  16  5.419  1.009  (---------------*----------------) 
                              ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                                     4.90      5.60      6.30      7.00 
 
Pooled StDev = 2.22 
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3. One-way ANOVA for Liberal Market Economies within the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. 
[LME (E-BE) compared to LME (E-AE) (groups e & f in key code)] 
 
 
Source  DF      SS      MS      F      P 
Factor   1  422.77  422.77  85.60  0.000 
Error   19   93.84    4.94 
Total   20  516.61 
 
S = 2.222   R-Sq = 81.84percent   R-Sq(adj) = 80.88percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level               N    Mean  StDev  --+---------+---------+---------+------- 
LME (E-BE)  13  13.777  2.769                              (--*---) 
LME (E-AE)   8   4.537  0.515  (----*----) 
                              --+---------+---------+---------+------- 
                              3.5       7.0     10.5      14.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 2.222 
 
 
 
4. One-way ANOVA for Liberal Market Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-
euro. [LME (NE-BE) compared to LME (NE-AE) (groups g & h in key code)] 
 
Source  DF     SS     MS      F      P 
Factor   1  58.23  58.23  36.55  0.000 
Error   19  30.27   1.59 
Total   20  88.49 
 
S = 1.262   R-Sq = 65.80percent   R-Sq(adj) = 64.00percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level                  N   Mean  StDev  --+---------+---------+---------+------- 
LME (NE-BE)  13  8.554  1.561                          (----*----) 
LME (NE-AE)   8  5.125  0.381  (-----*-----) 
                              --+---------+---------+---------+------- 
                              4.5       6.0       7.5       9.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 1.262 
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5. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Southern European Economies within  
the Eurosphere  pre and post-euro. [SEE (E-BE) compared to SEE (EE-AE) (groups I & j in 
key code)] 
 
Two-sample T for SEE (E-BE) vs SEE (E-AE) 
 
                     N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SEE (E-BE)  41  ten.08   4.52     0.71 
SEE (E-AE)  22   8.64   2.56     0.55 
 
 
Difference = mu (SEE(E-BE)) - mu (SEE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.437 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.348, 3.222) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.61  P-Value = 0.113  DF = 6 
 
6. One-way ANOVA for Former Eastern Bloc Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and 
post-euro. [FEB (NE-BE) compared to FEB (NE-AE) (groups k & l in key code)] 
 
Source  DF     SS    MS     F      P 
Factor   1    2.0   2.0  0.11  0.743        Pooled StDev = 4.252 
 
Error   40  723.1  18.1 
Total   41  725.0 
 
S = 4.252   R-Sq = 0.27percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
                               Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                               Pooled StDev 
Level                N    Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
FEB (NE-BE)  18 10.100  2.753  (----------------*----------------) 
FEB (NE-AE)  24 10.538  5.083        (--------------*-------------) 
                               ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                                8.4       9.6 10.8      12.0 
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7. One-way ANOVA for Small Island Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. 
[SIE (NE-BE) compared to SIE (NE-AE) (groups m & n in key code)] 
 
Source  DF     SS    MS     F      P 
Factor   1   9.60  9.60  4.51  0.043 
Error   26  55.38  2.13 
Total   27  64.98 
 
S = 1.459   R-Sq = 14.78percent   R-Sq(adj) = 11.50percent 
 
 
                              Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level                N   Mean  StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
SIE (NE-BE)  12  4.642  1.246  (-----------*------------) 
SIE (NE-AE)  16  5.825  1.598                     (---------*----------) 
                              ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                                  4.20      4.90      5.60      6.30 
 
Pooled StDev = 1.459 
 
 
8. One-way ANOVA for Baltic Country Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-
euro. [BCE (NE-BE) compared to BCE (NE-AE) (groups o & p in key code)] 
 
Source  DF     SS    MS     F      P 
Factor   1   56.0  56.0  2.84  0.099 
Error   44  867.8  19.7 
Total   45  923.8 
 
S = 4.441   R-Sq = 6.07percent   R-Sq(adj) = 3.93percent 
 
 
                               Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                               Pooled StDev 
Level                 N    Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
BCE (NE-BE)  22   8.936  5.643  (------------*-----------) 
BCE (NE-AE)  24  11.146  2.942                 (-----------*-----------) 
                               ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                                7.5       9.0     10.5      12.0 
Pooled StDev = 4.44 
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9. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for All Economies within the Eurosphere  
pre and post-euro. [ALL (E-BE) compared to ALL (EE-AE) (groups q & r in key code)] 
 
                        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (E-BE)  158  8.50   4.21     0.34 
ALL (E-AE)   94  7.10   2.72     0.28 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL (E-BE)) - mu (ALL (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.403 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.542, 2.265) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.21  P-Value = 0.002  DF = 248 
 
 
10. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for All Economies outside the Eurosphere 
pre and post-euro. [ALL (NE-BE) compared to ALL (NE-AE) (groups s & t in key code)] 
 
                          N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (NE-BE)  91  7.75   3.87     0.41 
ALL (NE-AE)  88  8.42   4.11     0.44 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL(NE-BE)) - mu (ALL(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.670 
95percent CI for difference:  (-1.849, 0.509) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.12  P-Value = 0.264  DF = 175 
 
 
11. One-way ANOVA for all economies pre and post-euro. 
[ALL (BE) compared to ALL (AE) (groups u & v in key code)] 
 
Source   DF      SS    MS     F      P 
Factor    1    25.2  25.2  1.68  0.195 
Error   429  6408.6  14.9 
Total   430  6433.7 
 
S = 3.865   R-Sq = 0.39percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.16percent 
 
 
                            Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                            Pooled StDev 
Level           N   Mean  StDev   -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
ALL (BE)  249  8.228  4.099                  (-----------*-----------) 
ALL (AE)  182  7.739  3.519   (-------------*--------------) 
                             -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
                            7.20      7.60      8.00      8.40 
 
Pooled StDev = 3.8 
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Appendix 7 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for EU social benefits payments 1986-2006 (tests 1-11) 
 
 
1. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [CME (E-BE) compared to CME (E-AE) (groups a & b in 
key code)] 
 
                          N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (E-BE)   143  15.36   2.97     0.25 
CME (E-AE)   94  14.90   3.11     0.32 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME(E-BE)) - mu (CME (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  0.456 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.345, 1.256) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.12  P-Value = 0.263  DF = 192 
 
 
 
2. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [CME(NE-BE) compared to CME (NE-AE) (groups c & d 
in key code)] 
 
                           N    Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
CME (NE-BE)  19   18.47   1.93      0.44 
CME (NE-AE)  16   16.950  0.758     0.19 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME(NE-BE)) - mu (CME(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.518 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.523, 2.514) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.15  P-Value = 0.004  DF = 24 
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3. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies within the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [LME (E-BE) compared to LME (E-AE) (groups e & f in key 
code)] 
 
                       N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (E-BE)  13  12.29   1.45     0.40 
LME (E-AE)   8  8.738  0.447     0.16 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME (E-BE)) - mu (LME (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  3.555 
95percent CI for difference:  (2.633, 4.476) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 8.22  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 15 
 
 
4. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. LME (NE-BE) compared to LME (NE-AE) [(groups g & h in 
key code)] 
 
                           N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (NE-BE)  13   13.86   1.40     0.39 
LME (NE-AE)   8  12.762  0.106    0.038 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME (NE-BE)) - mu (LME (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.099 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.251, 1.947) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.82  P-Value = 0.015  DF = 12 
 
 
5.Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Southern European Economies within the 
Eurosphere  pre and post-euro, SEE(E-BE) compared to SEE(E-AE) (groups i&j in key code) 
 
                      N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SEE (E-BE)  28  11.86   1.98     0.37 
SEE (E-AE)  24  13.50   1.83     0.37 
 
 
Difference = mu (SEE(E-BE)) - mu (SEE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.639 
95percent CI for difference:  (-2.699, -0.579) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.11  P-Value = 0.003  DF = 49 
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6. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Small Island Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [SIE (NE-BE) compared to SIE (NE-AE) (groups m & n in 
key code)] 
 
                        N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SIE (NE-BE)   5  11.50   1.65     0.74 
SIE (NE-AE)  16  11.64   1.46     0.36 
 
 
Difference = mu (SIE(NE-BE)) - mu (SIE(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.137 
95percent CI for difference:  (-2.152, 1.877) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.17  P-Value = 0.873  DF = 6 
 
7. One-way ANOVA for Former Eastern Bloc Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and 
post-euro. [FEB (NE-BE) compared to FEB (NE-AE) (groups k & l in key code)] 
 
Source  DF      SS     MS     F      P 
Factor   1   22.99  22.99  4.08  0.050 
Error   42  236.40   5.63 
Total   43  259.39 
 
S = 2.372   R-Sq = 8.86percent   R-Sq(adj) = 6.69percent 
 
 
                               Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                               Pooled StDev 
Level                N    Mean  StDev  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
FEB (NE-BE)  20  15.510  2.892               (----------*----------) 
FEB (NE-AE)  24  14.058  1.835  (---------*--------) 
                               ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                                     14.0      15.0      16.0      17.0 
 
Pooled StDev = 2.372 
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8. One-way ANOVA for Baltic Country Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-
euro. [BCE (NE-BE) compared to BCE (NE-AE) (groups o & p in key code)] 
 
Source  DF      SS    MS     F      P 
Factor   1    3.08  3.08  1.00  0.323 
Error   41  126.06  3.07 
Total   42  129.14 
 
S = 1.753   R-Sq = 2.38percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                               Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                               Pooled StDev 
Level                 N    Mean  StDev  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
BCE (NE-BE)  19  10.326  2.022          (------------*-------------) 
BCE (NE-AE)  24   9.787  1.5ten  (-----------*-----------) 
                               ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                                      9.60    10.20    10.80     11.40 
 
Pooled StDev = 1.753 
 
 
9 .One-way ANOVA for All Economies within the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [ALL (E-
BE) compared to ALL (E-AE) (groups q & r in key code)] 
 
Source   DF       SS    MS     F      P 
Factor    1     8.97  8.97  0.99  0.322 
Error   239  2174.04  9.10 
Total   240  2183.01 
 
S = 3.016   R-Sq = 0.41percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                               Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                               Pooled StDev 
Level              N    Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
ALL (E-BE)  147  15.297  2.951               (-----------*------------) 
ALL (E-AE)   94  14.901  3.115  (---------------*--------------) 
                               ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                               14.40     14.80     15.20     15.60 
 
Pooled StDev = 3.016 
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10. One-way ANOVA for All Economies outside the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [ALL 
(NE-BE) compared to ALL (NE-AE)] (groups s & t in key code)] 
 
Source   DF       SS     MS     F      P 
Factor    1    81.62  81.62  8.26  0.005 
Error   188  1857.54   9.88 
Total   189  1939.16 
 
S = 3.143   R-Sq = 4.21percent   R-Sq(adj) = 3.70percent 
 
 
Level                  N    Mean  StDev 
ALL (NE-BE)   86  14.430  3.518 
ALL (NE-AE)  104  13.113  2.797 
 
            Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on Pooled StDev 
Level         -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
ALL (NE-BE)                      (--------*---------) 
ALL (NE-AE)    (-------*--------) 
              -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
            12.60     13.30     14.00     14.70 
 
Pooled StDev = 3.143 
 
11. One-way ANOVA for All Economies pre and post-euro. [ALL (BE) compared to ALL 
(AE) (groups u & v in key code)] 
 
Source   DF       SS    MS     F      P 
Factor    1     8.97  8.97  0.99  0.322 
Error   239  2174.04  9.ten 
Total   240  2183.01 
 
S = 3.016   R-Sq = 0.41percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                               Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                               Pooled StDev 
Level               N    Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
ALL (E-BE)  147  15.297  2.951               (-----------*------------) 
ALL (E-AE)   94  14.901  3.115  (---------------*--------------) 
                               ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                               14.40     14.80     15.20     15.60 
 
Pooled StDev = 3.016 
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Appendix 8 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for direct government taxation 1986-2006 (tests 1-11) 
 
 
1. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [CME (E-BE) compared to CME (E-AE) (groups a & b in 
key code)] 
 
                           N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (E-BE)   100  13.39    2.87     0.29 
CME (E-AE)   64    13.87    2.64     0.33 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME(E-BE)) - mu (CME (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.477 
95percent CI for difference:  (-1.343, 0.388) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.09  P-Value = 0.278  DF = 142 
 
 
2. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [CME (NE-BE) compared to CME (NE-AE) (groups c & d 
in key code)] 
 
                           N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CME (NE-BE)  19  26.70   4.44      1.0 
CME (NE-AE)  16  24.98   5.23      1.3 
 
 
Difference = mu (CME(NE-BE)) - mu (CME(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.72 
95percent CI for difference:  (-1.66, 5.11) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.04  P-Value = 0.306  DF = 29 
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3. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies within the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [LME (E-BE) compared to LME (E-AE) (groups e & f in key 
code)] 
 
                        N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (E-BE)  13  13.931  0.725     0.20 
LME (E-AE)   8   12.575  0.746     0.26 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(E-BE)) - mu (LME(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.356 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.644, 2.067) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 4.09  P-Value = 0.001  DF = 14 
 
 
4. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Liberal Market Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. LME (NE-BE) compared to LME (NE-AE) (groups g & h in 
key code)] 
 
                           N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
LME (NE-BE)  13  15.369  0.783     0.22 
LME (NE-AE)   8  15.950  0.717     0.25 
 
 
Difference = mu (LME(NE-BE)) - mu (LME(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.581 
95percent CI for difference:  (-1.288, 0.127) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.74  P-Value = 0.ten1  DF = 16 
 
 
5. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Southern European Economies within the 
Eurosphere  pre and post-euro [SEE(E-BE) compared to SEE  (EE-AE) (groups I & j in key 
code)] 
 
                       N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SEE (E-BE)  28   7.32   1.87     0.35 
SEE (E-AE)  24  9.967  0.864     0.18 
 
 
Difference = mu (SEE(E-BE)) - mu (SEE(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -2.645 
95percent CI for difference:  (-3.443, -1.848) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -6.71  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 39 
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6. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Former Eastern Bloc Economies outside 
the Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [FEB (NE-BE) compared to FEB (NE-AE) (groups k & l 
in key code)] 
 
                          N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FEB (NE-BE)   30  9.76   1.89     0.35 
FEB (NE-AE)   40  8.10   1.19     0.19 
 
 
Difference = mu (FEB (NE-BE)) - mu (FEB (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.665 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.873, 2.457) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 4.23  P-Value = 0.000  DF = 45 
 
 
7. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Small Island Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [SIE (NE-BE) compared to SIE  (NE-AE) (groups m & n in 
key code)] 
 
                        N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SIE (NE-BE)   5   8.240  0.913     0.41 
SIE (NE-AE)  16  10.46   1.19     0.30 
 
 
Difference = mu (SIE(NE-BE)) - mu (SIE(NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -2.223 
95percent CI for difference:  (-3.386, -1.059) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.40  P-Value = 0.002  DF = 8 
 
 
 
8. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Baltic Island Economies outside the 
Eurosphere pre and post-euro. [BCE (NE-BE) compared to BCE (NE-AE) (groups o & p in 
key code)] 
 
                         N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
BCE (NE-BE)   21   9.35   1.73       0.38 
BCE (NE-AE)   24  8.050  0.767     0.16 
 
 
Difference = mu (BCE (NE-BE)) - mu (BCE (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.302 
95percent CI for difference:  (0.463, 2.142) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 3.19  P-Value = 0.004  DF = 26 
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9.Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for All Economies within the Eurosphere  pre 
and post-euro, ALL(E-BE) compared to ALL (E-AE) (groups q & r in key code) 
 
                       N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (E-BE)  141  12.24   3.55     0.30 
ALL (E-AE)   96  12.79   2.77      0.28 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL(E-BE)) - mu (ALL(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.550 
95percent CI for difference:  (-1.360, 0.261) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.34  P-Value = 0.183  DF = 230 
 
10. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for All Economies outside the Eurosphere 
pre and post-euro. [ALL (NE-BE) compared to ALL (NE-AE) (groups s & t in key code)] 
 
                         N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALL (NE-BE)  88  14.06   7.41     0.79 
ALL (NE-AE)  82  12.08   7.22     0.80 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALL (NE-BE)) - mu (ALL (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  1.99 
95percent CI for difference:  (-0.23, 4.20) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.77  P-Value = 0.079  DF = 167 
 
11. One-way ANOVA of all economies pre and post-euro [ALL (BE) compared to ALL (AE) 
(groups u & v in key code)] 
 
Source   DF       SS    MS     F      P 
Factor    1     23.0  23.0  0.79  0.373 
Error   405  11700.5  28.9 
Total   406  11723.5 
 
S = 5.375   R-Sq = 0.20percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                             Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                             Pooled StDev 
Level          N    Mean  StDev  -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
ALL (BE)  229  12.938  5.430              (-------------*-------------) 
ALL (AE)  178  12.460  5.304  (---------------*---------------) 
                             -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
                                 12.00     12.50     13.00     13.50 
 
Pooled StDev = 5.375 
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Appendix 9 
 
Minitab statistical outputs for EU trade openness 1986-2006 (tests 1-16) 
 
 
 
1. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere intra-EU trade openness pre and post-euro. [CMEIEO (E-BE) compared to 
CMEIEO (E-AE) (groups a & b in key code)] 
 
 
                              N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CMEIEO (E-BE)  7  40.3   24.0      9.1 
CMEIEO (E-AE)  7  55.1   32.7       12 
 
 
Difference = mu (CMEIEO(E-BE)) - mu (CMEIEO(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -14.8 
95percent CI for difference:  (-48.6, 19.0) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.96  P-Value = 0.356  DF = 11 
 
 
 
2. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside 
the Eurosphere intra-EU trade openness pre and post-euro [CMEIEO (NE-BE) compared to 
CMEIEO (NE-AE) (groups e & f in key code)] 
 
 
                                 N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CMEIEO (NE-BE)  2  32.87   2.08      1.5 
CMEIEO (NE-AE)  2  42.24   1.10     0.78 
 
 
Difference = mu (CMEIEO (NE-BE)) - mu (CMEIEO (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -9.38 
95percent CI for difference:  (-30.57, 11.81) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.62  P-Value = 0.112  DF = 1 
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3. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Southern European Economies within the 
Eurosphere intra-EU trade openness pre and post-euro. [SEEIEO (EE-BE) compared to 
SEEIEO (E-AE) (groups q & r in key code)] 
 
 
                            N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SEEIEO (E-BE)  3  25.7   10.4      6.0 
SEEIEO (E-AE)  3  30.3   11.6      6.7 
 
 
Difference = mu (SEEIEO (E-BE)) - mu (SEEIEO (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -4.54 
95percent CI for difference:  (-33.17, 24.09) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.50  P-Value = 0.649  DF = 3 
 
 
4. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies within 
the Eurosphere extra-EU trade openness pre and post-. [CMEEEO (E-BE) compared to 
CMEEEO (E-AE) (groups c & d in key code)] 
 
                               N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CMEEEO (E-BE)  7  18.50   5.54      2.1 
CMEEEO (E-AE)  7   27.9   11.4      4.3 
 
 
Difference = mu (CMEEEO(E-BE)) - mu (CMEEEO(E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -9.44 
95percent CI for difference:  (-20.45, 1.58) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.98  P-Value = 0.084  DF = 8 
 
5. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Co-ordinated Market Economies outside 
the Eurosphere extra-EU trade openness pre and post-euro. [CMEEEO (NE-BE) compared to 
CMEEEO (NE-AE) (groups g & h in key code)] 
 
                                  N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
CMEEEO (NE-BE)  2  25.30   2.11      1.5 
CMEEEO (NE-AE)  2  35.67   5.16      3.7 
 
 
Difference = mu (CMEEEO (NE-BE)) - mu (CMEEEO (NE-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -ten.37 
95percent CI for difference:  (-60.48, 39.73) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.63  P-Value = 0.231  DF = 1 
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6. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for Southern European Economies within the 
Eurosphere extra-EU trade openness pre and post-euro [SEEEEO (E-BE) compared to 
SEEEEO (E-AE) (groups s & t in key code)] 
 
 
                             N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
SEEEEO (E-BE)  3   11.17   1.23     0.71 
SEEEEO (E-AE)  3  13.550  0.917     0.53 
 
 
Difference = mu (SEEEEO (E-BE)) - mu (SEEEEO (E-AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -2.383 
95percent CI for difference:  (-5.200, 0.434) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.69  P-Value = 0.074  DF = 3 
 
 
7. One-way ANOVA for all qualifying economies intra-EU trade openness pre-euro 
comparing CMEIEO (E-BE); CMEIEO (NE-BE; LMEIEO (E-BE); LMEIEO (NE-BE); and 
SEEIEO (E-BE) (groups a, e, i, m, & q in key code) 
 
Source  DF    SS   MS     F      P 
Factor   4  1915  479  1.17  0.387 
Error    9  3691  410                              Pooled StDev = 20.25 
Total   13  5606 
 
S = 20.25   R-Sq = 34.17percent   R-Sq(adj) = 4.91percent 
 
 
 
                                Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                                Pooled StDev 
Level                        N   Mean  StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
CMEIEO (E-BE)     7  40.34  24.04              (---*---) 
CMEIEO (NE-BE)  2  32.87   2.08        (-------*-------) 
LMEIEO (E-BE)     1  72.06      *               (----------*----------) 
LMEIEO (NE-BE)  1  23.08      *  (-----------*----------) 
SEEIEO (E-BE)       3  25.74 10.44        (-----*------) 
                                ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                                      0        40        80       120 
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8. One-way ANOVA for all qualifying economies intra-EU trade openness post-euro 
comparing CMEIEO (E-AE); CMEIEO ( NE-AE; LMEIEO (E-AE); LMEIEO (NE-AE); and 
SEEIEO (E-AE) ( groups b, f, j, n, & r in key code) 
 
Source  DF    SS   MS     F      P 
Factor   4  2381  595  0.80  0.555 
Error    9  6698  744 
Total   13  9079 
 
S = 27.28   R-Sq = 26.23percent   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00percent 
 
 
                                Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                                Pooled StDev 
Level                         N   Mean  StDev  --------+---------+---------+---------+- 
CMEIEO (E-AE)      7  55.13  32.73                (----*----) 
CMEIEO (NE-AE)   2  42.24   1.10          (-------*--------) 
LMEIEO (E-AE)      1  69.03      *           (------------*-----------) 
LMEIEO (NE-AE)   1  23.52      *  (------------*-----------) 
SEEIEO (E-AE)       3  30.28  11.57         (------*------) 
 
Pooled StDev = 27.28 
 
9. One-way ANOVA for all qualifying economies extra-EU trade openness pre-euro 
comparing CMEEEO (E-BE); CMEEEO (NE-BE; LMEEEO (E-BE); LMEEEO (NE-BE); 
and SEEEEO (E-BE) (groups c, g, k, o, & s in key code) 
 
Source  DF      SS     MS      F      P 
Factor   4   928.3  232.1  10.91  0.002 
Error    9   191.4   21.3 
Total   13  1119.6 
 
S = 4.611   R-Sq = 82.91percent   R-Sq(adj) = 75.31percent 
 
 
                                Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                                 Pooled StDev 
Level                          N    Mean  StDev  -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
CMEEEO (E-BE)       7  18.502  5.536         (-*--) 
CMEEEO (NE-BE)    2  25.300  2.1ten           (----*----) 
LMEEEO (E-BE)       1  44.892      *                      (------*------) 
LMEEEO (NE-BE)    1  18.138      *    (------*------) 
SEEEEO (E-BE)        3  11.167  1.229  (---*---) 
                                 -------+---------+---------+---------+--    Pooled StDev = 4.611 
 
                                       15        30        45         
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10. One-way ANOVA for all qualifying economies extra-EU trade openness post-euro 
comparing CMEEEO (E-AE); CMEEEO (NE-AE; LMEEEO (E-AE); LMEEEO (NE-AE); 
and SEEEEO (E-AE) (groups d, h, l, p, & t in key code) 
 
 
Source  DF      SS     MS     F      P 
Factor   4  1561.4  390.3  4.38  0.031 
Error    9   802.3   89.1 
Total   13  2363.7 
 
S = 9.442   R-Sq = 66.06percent   R-Sq(adj) = 50.97percent 
 
 
                                  Individual 95percent CIs For Mean Based on 
                                  Pooled StDev 
Level                          N    Mean   StDev  -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
CMEEEO (E-AE)      7  27.938  11.358             (---*---) 
CMEEEO (NE-AE)   2  35.675   5.162             (-------*------) 
LMEEEO (E-AE)      1  55.425       *                    (----------*---------) 
LMEEEO (NE-AE)   1  19.550       *  (----------*---------) 
SEEEEO (E-AE)       3  13.550   0.917    (-----*-----) 
                                  -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
                                   0        20        40        60 
 
Pooled StDev = 9.442 
 
 
11. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all qualifying economies within the 
Eurosphere intra-EU trade pre and post-euro comparing ALLEIEO (BE) with ALLEIEO 
(AE) (groups u & v in key code) 
 
 
                            N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALLEIEO (BE)  11  39.2   23.1      7.0 
ALLEIEO (AE)  11  49.6   29.0      8.7 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALLEIEO(BE)) - mu (ALLEIEO(AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -10.4 
95percent CI for difference:  (-33.7, 13.0) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.93  P-Value = 0.365  DF = 19 
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 12.Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all qualifying economies outside the 
Eurosphere intra-EU trade openness  pre and post-euro, comparing ALLNEIEO(BE) with 
ALLNEIEO (AE) (groups y &z in key code) 
 
                              N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALLNEIEO (BE)  2  32.87   2.08      1.5 
ALLNEIEO (AE)  2  42.24   1.10     0.78 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALLNEIEO(BE)) - mu (ALLNEIEO(AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -9.38 
95percent CI for difference:  (-30.57, 11.81) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.62  P-Value = 0.112  DF = 1 
 
 
13. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all qualifying economies within the 
Eurosphere extra-EU trade openness pre and post-euro comparing ALLEEEO (BE) with 
ALLEEEO (AE) (groups w & x in key code) 
 
 
                             N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALLEEEO (BE)  11  18.9   10.2      3.1 
ALLEEEO (AE)  11  26.5   14.6      4.4 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALLEEEO(BE)) - mu (ALLEEEO(AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -7.61 
95percent CI for difference:  (-18.94, 3.72) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.42  P-Value = 0.174  DF = 17 
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14. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all qualifying economies outside the 
Eurosphere extra-EU trade openness pre and post-euro comparing ALLNEEEO (BE) with 
ALLNEEEO (AE) (groups aa & bb in key code) 
 
                              N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALLNEIEO (BE)  2  32.87   2.08      1.5 
ALLNEIEO (AE)  2  42.24   1.10     0.78 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALLNEIEO (BE)) - mu (ALLNEIEO (AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -9.38 
95percent CI for difference:  (-30.57, 11.81) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.62  P-Value = 0.112  DF = 1 
 
15. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all qualifying economies intra-EU trade 
openness pre and post-euro, comparing ALLIEO(BE) with ALLIEO(AE) (groups cc & dd in 
key code) 
 
 
                                N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALLNEEEO (BE)  3   29.8   10.8      6.2 
ALLNEEEO (AE)  3  30.32   9.97      5.8 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALLNEEEO (BE)) - mu (ALLNEEEO (AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.49 
95percent CI for difference:  (-27.45, 26.47) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.06  P-Value = 0.958  DF = 3 
 
 
16. Two-sample T-Test and Confidence Intervals for all qualifying economies extra-EU trade 
openness pre and post-euro, comparing ALLEEO (BE) with ALLEEO (AE) (groups ee & ff 
in key code) 
 
Two-sample T for ALLIEO (BE) vs ALLIEO (AE) 
 
                           N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
ALLIEO (BE)   14  37.2   20.7      5.5 
ALLIEO (AE)   14  46.7   26.4      7.1 
 
 
Difference = mu (ALLIEO (BE)) - mu (ALLIEO (AE)) 
Estimate for difference:  -9.49 
95percent CI for difference:  (-28.02, 9.05) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.06  P-Value = 0.301  DF = 24 
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Appendix 10 
Eurosphere consumer prices compared to Denmark, Japan, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States 2001-2006 
Selected individual Eurosphere countries 
 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Austria 2.0 1.7 1.3 2.6 2.0 1.8 1.9 
Belgium 2.1 1.1 1.9 2.5 2.6 1.6 2.0 
France 1.2 2.2 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.9 1.9 
Germany 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.7 
Italy 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.4 
Netherlands 4.2 3.2 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.4 2.3 
Spain 2.7 3.9 2.8 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.4 
Mean 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.2 
 
 
